The shifts in Hizbullah's ideology. Religious ideology, political ideology, and political program by Alagha, J.E.
T H E  S H I F T S  I N   
H I Z B U L L A H ’ S  I D E O L O G Y
R E L I G I O U S  I D E O LO G Y,   
P O L I T I C A L  I D E O LO G Y,  A N D  
P O L I T I C A L  P R O G R A M
J o s e p h  E l i e  Al a g h a
i s im  d issertat ions
is im  /  le iden
ams terdam univers it y  press
Cover illustration: The painted picture, across the side of a huge building in Tehran, depicts 
Iman Khumayni’s 20-million-soldier army for the liberation of Jerusalem. The same picture, with 
the same Qur’anic substantiation, is employed by Hizbullah in Lebanon. Picture taken by Serge 
Veldhuisen in 2002.
Cover design and lay-out: De Kreeft, Amsterdam
ISBN-13 978 90 5356 910 8
ISBN-10 90 5356 910 3
NUR 741 / 717
© Joseph Elie Alagha / ISIM / Amsterdam University Press, 2006
Alle rechten voorbehouden. Niets uit deze uitgave mag worden verveelvoudigd, opgeslagen in 
een geautomatiseerd gegevensbestand, of openbaar gemaakt, in enige vorm of op enige wijze, 
hetzij elektronisch, mechanisch, door fotokopieën, opnamen of enige andere manier, zonder 
voorafgaande schriftelijke toestemming van de uitgever.
Voor zover het maken van kopieën uit deze uitgave is toegestaan op grond van artikel 16B 
Auteurswet 1912 jº het Besluit van 20 juni 1974, Stb. 351, zoals gewijzigd bij het Besluit van 
23 augustus 1985, Stb. 471 en artikel 17 Auteurswet 1912, dient men de daarvoor wettelijk 
verschuldigde vergoedingen te voldoen aan de Stichting Reprorecht (Postbus 3051, 2130 kb 
Hoofddorp). Voor het overnemen van gedeelte(n) uit deze uitgave in bloemlezingen, readers 
en andere compilatiewerken (artikel 16 Auteurswet 1912) dient men zich tot de uitgever te 
wenden.
All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this 
book may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any 
form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without 
the written permission of both the copyright owner and the author of the book.
V R I J E  U N I V E R S I T E I T
The Shifts in 
Hizbullah’s Ideology:
Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, 
and Political Program
A C A D E M I S C H  P R O E F S C H R I F T
ter verkrijging van de graad Doctor aan
de Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam,
op gezag van de rector magnificus
prof. dr. T. Sminia,
in het openbaar te verdedigen
ten overstaan van de promotiecommissie
van de faculteit der Godgeleerdheid
op vrijdag 10 februari 2006 om 10.45 uur







Promotor: prof. dr. A. Wessels
To my wife and child

 Contents
 A Note on Transliteration 8
 Acknowledgements 9
 Prologue 11 
Preface 13
1. A Survey of Hizbullah’s History 19 
(1978 -2005)
2. The Saliency of Hizbullah’s Religious Ideology 69 
(1978 -1984/5)
3. The Prominence of Hizbullah’s Political Ideology 115 
(1984/5 -1990)
4. Primacy to Political Program 149 
(1991 to 2005)
5. A Specific Perspective on the General Shifts 191
6. Epilogue: Conclusion and Implications 207
7. Appendices 221
A Map of Lebanon  221 
B Hizbullah’s Statements 223 
C Parliamentary Elections Programs 247
D 2004 Municipal Elections Program 271
E Chronology of Events (1975 -2005) 279
F Glossary 297
G Selected Bibliography 301
 Notes 317
 English Summary 373
 Dutch Summary (Nederlandse samenvatting) 377
7
 A Note on Transliteration
The transliteration of Arabic words into English in the dissertation is 
in conformity with the transliteration system of the International Journal of 
Middle East Studies, with a few modifications.
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 Personal account: My interest in the subject 
Lebanon is a myriad of 18 recognized minorities that coexisted in rela-
tive peace1 till April 13, 1975, the date of the outbreak of the 16-year old civil 
war. From being the “Switzerland of the Middle East”, Lebanon plunged into 
the law of the jungle where various militias undermined the Lebanese state’s 
sovereignty and curved out their own cantons, most of the times based on 
sectarian affiliation. I am writing from personal experience as a member of 
what came to be called the “war generation”, meaning someone who has 
witnessed and survived the entire civil war – in all its atrocities and futilities 
– from 1975 till 1990. Through out the course of the war I lived as a “neutral” 
civilian, who neither belonged to any political party nor had any knowledge 
of using any kind of weapon, as such I never participated in the civil war 
in any capacity whatsoever. As a child, these events left in me a sense of 
helplessness, helplessness at the internal situation (the civil war), and the 
external factor (the Israeli invasion). Later on as I matured I endeavoured to 
understand why so many people gave their lives in the 16-year appalling 
civil war? Was it in vein? Was it for a cause? Was it for the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Lebanon? The Israeli army was portrayed as the “invin-
cible army”. Was it then a matter of beating a dead horse to fight it back? 
I was only 14 when Israel occupied Beirut on September 14, 1982 after 
83 days of besieging it. The 1982 Israeli invasion left a great mark on my 
personality because of the physical injury that I have incurred and the psy-
chological scars that I have suffered from. While filling water from the well 
of the Near East School of Theology (NEST), I was injured in my shoulder 
and knee, injuries that never healed completely until this present day. On 
September 24 of that year, my friends and I went to Hamra Cinema Theatre 
to watch a movie by Bud Spencer and Terence Hill. In the midst of the movie, 
the Israeli army stormed the theatre, kicked us out, and beat us up order-
ing us to go home. I was wondering what have we done to be treated this 
way? The answer was simple: a Lebanese member of the resistance targeted 
Israeli soldiers at the nearby Wimpy Restaurant, killed three of them with 
his pistol, and escaped unharmed. This incident among others heralded the 
withdrawal of the Israeli army 13 days after occupying Beirut. The Lebanese 
Resistance gained momentum and in 1985, the Israelis withdrew to their 
1978 (first Israeli invasion) declared “security zone”. After 1985, Hizbullah 
spearheaded the Lebanese resistance, and the Islamic Resistance, its mil-
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itary wing, inflicted heavy casualties through a war of attrition on Israeli 
soldiers occupying Lebanese soil. Hizbullah employed hit and run tactics 
as well as guerrilla attacks that eventually drove Israel to withdraw out of 
Lebanon in May 2000.
The civil war taught me to live day by day; thus, my only achieve-
ment during that time was survival. After the civil war ended and the bar-
riers between different Lebanese regions were removed, especially the 
notoriously renowned demarcation line between West Beirut (The Muslim 
sector where I live) and East Beirut (The Christian sector), I toured Lebanon 
in order to get to know “the other”. At the beginning I was frightened from 
and critical of Hizbullah’s notion of the Islamic state, especially since it was 
clearly stated on their flag, back then, “The Islamic Revolution in Lebanon”. 
The watershed occurred in 1996 as a direct result of the Israeli “Grapes of 
Wrath” military campaign, which resulted in an unprecedented national soli-
darity with Hizbullah, most notably from the Christians who adhered to a 
diametrically opposed ideology. Fear of the other as well as the bulwark or 
veil of misconceptions were replaced by sociability and compassion. This 
encouraged me in 1997 to start attending Hizbullah’s activities that were 
open to the public. This close encounter aroused my interested in the party; 
my interest was in its “resistance identity” and its achievements on the bat-
tlefield. What added to my interest is that, unlike other militias and political 
parties, Hizbullah did not take part in the civil war2, concentrating all its 
energy on driving the Israeli army out of Lebanon. This led me to seek con-
tact with Hizbullah’s “Central Information Office”, which opened the door for 
me to a closer look on Hizbullah’s social and political activities. Eventually, 
this prompted me to write my dissertation on Hizbullah in order to construe 
how can Hizbullah be faithful to its Islamic identity, on the one hand, and at 
the same time function as a mainstream political party working in a confes-
sional-sectarian system, on the other? This interest led me to start serious 
research about the party. This dissertation is a result of this research.
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 Preface
1. Hizbullah’s identity and brief history 
The basic aim of this dissertation is to study the Lebanese Shi‘ite 
resistance movement Hizbullah as an identity-based movement from its 
rudimentary foundations in 1978, passing through its official inauguration 
in 1985, and ending in 2005, thus surveying a period that covers more than 
a quarter of a century. I question how the movement has tried since its tran-
sition to a political party in the 1990s to maintain and integrate its identity 
through the interplay between religion and politics. My research analyses 
how Hizbullah’s identity construction is taking place by focusing on three 
key components: religious ideology, political ideology, and political pro-
gram. Thus, this dissertation studies how Hizbullah’s identity as an “Islamic 
jihadi (struggle) movement” changed in the following three stages: (1) from 
propagating an exclusivist religious ideology; (2) to a more encompassing 
political ideology; and (3) to what can be considered a pragmatic political 
program. 
Hizbullah defines its identity as an Islamic jihadi movement, “whose 
emergence is based on an ideological, social, political and economical mix-
ture in a special Lebanese, Arab and Islamic context”.3 I study the constitu-
ents or contents of this identity throughout Hizbullah’s historical develop-
ment. The body of the dissertation consists of the three parts below, which 
are explained in the following sequence.
1.1 The development of Hizbullah’s ideology:  
saliency of religious ideology: (1978-1984/5)
Since Hizbullah absolves itself from abiding by a specific date for its 
birth, I argue that Hizbullah was founded in 1978 as an Islamic movement of 
social and political protest by various sectors of Lebanese Shi‘ite clergy and 
cadres, with Iranian ideological backing. The constituents of Hizbullah’s reli-
gious ideology are the following: (1) belief in Shi‘a Islam; (2) wilayat al-faqih 
(guardianship of the jurisprudent or jurisconsult); (3) and jihad (struggle) 
in the way of God.4 Ever since its emergence, Hizbullah has been a party in 
which the ‘ulama (Muslim religious scholars) played, and still play, an impor-
tant role. In this chapter, I try to find out what is so specific and different 
about Hizbullah’s interpretation of the Shi‘ite religious ideology? In particu-
lar, I gauge the role of the ‘ulama in the formation and development of Hiz-
bullah’s Islamist ideology under the presumed Iranian influence.
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1.2 The development of Hizbullah’s ideology: prominence to 
political ideology (1984/5-1990)
In 1985 Hizbullah forged its “Open Letter” in which it declared its 
political manifesto to the public, thus engaging directly in Lebanese politi-
cal life after operating clandestinely for some years. Over the period 1985 
to 1990 Hizbullah became a full-pledged social movement “in the sense of 
having a broad overall organization, structure, and ideology aiming at social 
change”5 and social justice. The components of Hizbullah’s political ideology 
are the following: oppressors and oppressed; Islamic order; relations with 
the Lebanese Christians; perspective on Israel; unity of the Muslims; stance 
vis-à-vis the West; and jihad and martyrdom. The questions I raise intend to 
shed light on the reasons and methods through which Hizbullah shifted its 
emphasis from a religious ideology to a political ideology.
How did Hizbullah employ the transnational link of Iranian political 
ideology in its dealings with domestic Lebanese politics as well as region-
al and international relations? Does this explain why Hizbullah followed 
domestically a radical-violent approach towards the Christian militias and 
an uncompromising attitude anathematising the Lebanese political system 
in its entirety, regarding the Lebanese government as an infidel? Does this 
also account for Hizbullah’s regional and international militancy towards 
Israel, France, and the US?
1.3 The development of Hizbullah’s ideology:  
paramount to political program (1991 to 2005)
Since the early 1990s Hizbullah evolved, more and more, into a 
mainstream political party, with an extensive network of social services 
that benefits both Muslims and Christians. Hizbullah participated in elec-
tions, assuming not only parliamentary and municipal responsibility, but 
also governmental responsibility by joining the cabinet in 2005. Hizbullah’s 
political program is based upon the following constituents: oppressors and 
oppressed; perspectives on the Islamic state; dialogue with the Lebanese 
Christians; jurisprudential stipulations of parliamentary, municipal, and 
governmental work; socio-economic program: Non-Governmental Organi-
zations (NGOs) and civil institutions; Lebanonisation and infitah (“opening 
up”); relations with Syria and Iran; perspective on Israel; and jihad and mar-
tyrdom. I bring up the following questions in order to underscore the ration-
ale and way in which Hizbullah altered its accent from a political ideology 
to a political program.
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Lebanonisation or infitah refers to Hizbullah’s integration policy in 
the Lebanese public sphere or Hizbullah’s enrolment in Lebanese domes-
tic political life starting the early 1990s.6 What is the place of Islam in Hiz-
bullah’s idea of integration, infitah, or Lebanonisation? Can Hizbullah, as a 
social movement and a full pledged political party, vitally affect society and 
become a powerful force for social change while functioning within the con-
fessional-sectarian system it anathematised for more than a decade? How 
could Hizbullah modify its identity from an Islamic jihadi movement towards 
a political party having a “prominent” political role in the Lebanese milieu 
by propagating a detailed political program? Did the liberalisation process 
in Iran influence the Lebanese national standard that Hizbullah is trying to 
portray, or was it Lebanese authenticity all along? How could Hizbullah sell 
to its followers its commitment to Islamic identity while it abides by a prag-
matic political program? Did Hizbullah manage to maintain an Islamic repu-
tation through its parliamentary, municipal, and governmental work, or did 
it sacrifice its Islamic identity and ideological principles in its bargaining and 
compromise with other political parties and groups? 
In what way did Hizbullah want to appeal to strata and sectors of the 
population, mainly Christians and Sunnis, it did not reach out to before? 
What are the implications of including them in Hizbullah’s election lists? 
Are there conditions for representing Hizbullah and speaking in its name? 
Is it simply Realpolitik or pragmatism? Are there usual stable alliances and 
cooperation with other political parties? How does this resonate inside the 
party? What has transformed Hizbullah to a mainstream political party that 
managed to receive the highest number of votes in the 2000 and 2005 par-
liamentary elections? Is Hizbullah mobilizing all its resources and capabili-
ties to integrate in the Lebanese public sphere? 
These questions point out to a process that is reshaping Hizbullah’s 
identity and suggest that the party is going through a remarkable trans-
formation. Each of the three components of Hizbullah’s identity – religious 
ideology, political ideology, and political program – is essential in one of the 
three stages, prompting a better explanation of the shifts from one stage to 
the other. 
P R E F A C E
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2. Analytical framework 
I offer the working definition of ideology that this dissertation 
employs and I endeavour to explain how resource mobilization is important 
to the survival of a social movement. 
2.1 Working definition of ideology 
Ideology is any kind of a coherent and systematic whole of ideas on 
politics and society. This systematised whole functions as a rationale for 
political and social action. As such, it connotes a worldview held by any social 
group to justify their actions. Such a worldview can be subject to re-descrip-
tion and reformulation, and it does not have to be accepted in its entirety; 
it could be amended and reinterpreted. However, an ideological view does 
not undergo the stringent criterion of empirical tests in the way scientific 
theories and hypotheses are subjected to. Intellectual ideology is defined as 
a formal system of belief and a coherent system of thought, which includes 
political programmes/manifestos, philosophical orientations and religious 
codification.7 I employ the latter usage in this dissertation. 
2.2 The survival of a social movement and the role of resource 
mobilization
A social movement is defined as “purposive collective actions whose 
outcome, in victory as in defeat, transforms the values and institutions 
of society”.8 In studying the shifts in the ideology of a social movement, I 
mainly employ the concept of resource mobilization. Resource mobilization 
refers to the way a social movement mobilizes its capabilities or resources 
– such as money, political influence, access to the media, and personnel – in 
order to confront and survive strategic difficulties and challenges facing it. A 
principal advantage of the theory of resource mobilization is that it attaches 
a high degree of importance to the survival of a social movement i.e. how it 
copes with strategic difficulties and challenges while standing its grounds. 
Thus, a social movement might shift its ideology to facilitate adjustment to 
a world that is in incessant flux, or else it would risk demise or might not 
remain a viable-throbbing social movement.9 
Gramsci argued that all the fundamental sociological questions boil 
down to political science questions.10 Thus, paraphrasing Gramsci, social 
movements are nothing but political movements.11. Not all Islamists aim 
at only mobilizing civil society through a bottom-up process, rather their 
objective is to take power and govern through a top-down process. As such, 
Islamism could be conceived as the most salient unitary mobilizational 
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power behind political change and transformation in the Arab and Mus-
lim world.12 Islamists seem to be effective in pointing at grievances and in 
expressing them, but this is not enough. In order to eradicate these griev-
ances Islamists must actualise their potential role by constructively address-
ing societal needs through effective allocation of their resources. Islamism is 
holistic in its approach since it is “a religious-cultural-political framework for 
engagement on issues that most concern politically engaged Muslims”.13 
And so, social movements thrive on propagating their social, economic, 
and political legitimacy through efficient resource mobilization. This seems to 
make up their main modus operandi of mobilization in order to acquire a sub-
stantial following and backing in society. Indeed, the way and extent to which 
social movements acquire resources from their constituencies shape their 
activities. Thus, resource mobilization dwells on the notion of social move-
ment in a very broad sense. It covers all activities, or even beliefs (ideologies) 
and preferences (identities), to change society by collective mobilization.
3. Sources
The part and parcel of my research is based upon Hizbullah’s primary 
sources. I have analysed Hizbullah’s religious ideology, political ideology, 
and political program, mainly relying on primary sources in Arabic; some 
secondary sources in Arabic, English, and French; and conducted interviews 
of representative samples of Hizbullah’s rank and file. Primary sources are 
available in abundance in Lebanon at Hizbullah’s Central Information Office 
(CIO); Hizbullah’s think tank, Consultative Centre for Studies and Documen-
tation (CCSD); the Khumayni’s Cultural Centre in Beirut; the Cultural Centre 
of the Islamic Revolution of Iran in Lebanon14, and other Iranian and Hizbul-
lah affiliated institutions and publishing houses. In addition to many Arabic 
books, articles, archive material, communiqués, documents, speeches, polit-
ical declarations, and other Hizbullah publications, the primary sources that 
I have studied and which provided me with information on Hizbullah’s ide-
ology and program are the following: (1) the Open Letter or political mani-
festo; (2) the parliamentary and municipal election programs of 1992, 1996, 
1998, 2000, 2004, and 2005; (3) “Views and Concepts”; (4) “Statement of Pur-
pose”; (5) and “Identity and Goals”, Hizbullah’s latest self-description.15 Also, 
I made use of Hizbullah’s Internet sites pertaining to the topics researched. 
Nevertheless, my reliance on publicly available primary sources has its own 
inevitable limitations in exposing Hizbullah’s clandestine nature, given the 
largely secretive nature of the party and its operations. 
P R E F A C E
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4. Organisation of the Chapters
The chapters shed light on the different levels in which Hizbullah’s ide-
ology is shifting. The first chapter surveys Hizbullah’s historical development 
from 1978 until 2005. Chapters two, three, and four study the development 
of Hizbullah’s ideology from a phase of religious intensity (1978-1984/5), to 
a phase of political orientation (1984/5-1990), and to the phase of infitah or 
integration in the Lebanese public sphere (1991 to 2005). Chapter five sheds 
light on the general shifts in the constituents of Hizbullah’s ideology in the 
three stages. Chapter six offers a conclusion on the main findings of the dis-
sertation in relation to the shifts in Hizbullah’s ideology.
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1 A Survey of 
Hizbullah’s History
 Its Development from 
Its Rudimentary Foundations 
in 1978 until 2005
Introduction
This chapter is divided into four parts. The first endeavours to give a 
brief historical background on the political development of the Lebanese 
Shi‘ites. The second part intends to survey Hizbullah’s history between 1978-
1984/5. The third part deals with Hizbullah’s history over the years 1984/5 to 
1990. The fourth and last part adumbrates Hizbullah’s History from 1991 till 
2005. Thus, I am interested in highlighting some basic facts of the develop-
ment of the Shi‘ite community in general, and Hizbullah, in particular, by 
examining the important phases, figures, and dates in the lifespan of that 
social movement.1 
I A brief historical background on the political 
development of the Lebanese Shi‘ites 
1. The Shi‘ites of Lebanon
The Lebanese Shi‘as are partly authentically from Lebanon proper, 
and some originated from Iran. The Shi‘ite existence in Lebanon is traced 
back to their presence in the ninth century in the area between the Awwali 
River to the north and the Galilee to the South, a region known as Jabal 
‘Amil2. Others resided in the northern part of the Biqa‘ Valley. The history of 
relations between the Lebanese Shi‘ites and their Iranian counterparts dates 
back to the twelfth century.3 In the fourteenth century, the Shi‘ites were an 
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oppressed minority who were expelled by the Mamluks and were contained 
in the peripheral areas away from central Mamluk rule (1282-1516).4 In the 
sixteenth century, the Safavids assumed power in Iran and adopted Shi‘ism 
as an official state religion for the fist time in Iran’s history. Since then, the 
Iranians had a unique tie with the Lebanese Shi‘as. Thus, strong historic ties 
between the Shi‘ite community in Lebanon and the Iranians were consoli-
dated during the Safavid period, when the ‘ulama (religious scholars) from 
Jabal ‘Amil – which is the den of Shi‘ism in Lebanon, and an important Shi‘ite 
centre of higher learning – were instrumental in converting the majority of 
the Iranians from Sunnism to Shi‘ism.5 Lebanese Shi‘ite ‘ulama from Jabal 
‘Amil were rewarded by holding high-ranking positions in the Safavid state. 
Among these was Baha’eddine al-‘Amili, who occupied the post of Shaykh 
al-Islam in Esfahan, and other personalities from ‘Amil such as Al-Muhaqqiq 
Al-Karaki6, who in 1510 emigrated from Lebanon to Iran with a considerable 
number of ‘ulama, among whom was Al-Hurr Al-‘Amili, the author of the 
Shi‘ite concordance of hadith7. 
After the fall of the Mamluks in 1516 to the Ottoman Turks and the for-
mation of the Ottoman Empire, like other Shi‘ites in the Empire, the Lebanese 
Shi‘ites were again reduced to the status of defending themselves against 
the Sunnis. This period fed the preponderance of the zu‘ama (feudal leaders) 
and maintained their grip over the serfs (peasants) who trusted their leaders 
to maintain good relations with the Ottoman Empire. Among the Shi‘ites, 
the Hamadé family in the Hirmel near the Biqa‘ and the As‘ad family in Jabal 
‘Amil rose to prominence as zu‘ama, and they were able to maintain their 
leadership for a long time.8 Such Shi‘ite families ruled from within a con-
sociational arrangement that formalized their za‘ama (leadership). Again, it 
was a time when an oppressed Shi‘ite dissidence had to overcome Ottoman 
repressive measures under any legitimate means, even under the protection 
of the zu‘ama. 9
With the increase of animosities between the Safavids and the Otto-
mans and the spread of acrimonies to Jabal ‘Amil, Biqa‘, and Hirmel, the 
‘ulama in Jabal ‘Amil found in Iran a safe haven from conscription and Otto-
man persecution and bullying. Like in Lebanon, Iraq, and other Shi‘ite reli-
gious centres, also in Iran, the ‘Amili ‘ulama concentrated on writing and 
publishing an enormous number of books, which are still taught in the Haw-
zas (religious seminaries or schools)10 and religious universities. That is how 
the relationships between the Lebanese and Iranian people started taking 
an ideological twist enforcing cultural-religious brotherly exchanges. This 
resulted in intermarriage and a mutual wave of migrations.11
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After the defeat and disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, 
the provisional Arab governments, headed by the zu‘ama, replaced Otto-
man rule. This development was short-lived and the Arab nationalist dream 
of the Shi‘ite zu‘ama came to a premature end as a result of the May 1916 
Sykes-Picot Agreement, which had already divided the Middle East among 
the British and French. Thus, France created “Le Grand Liban” or the Greater 
Lebanon on September 1, 1920. From the stance of being their protégé dur-
ing Ottoman rule, France had vested interest in the Maronites of Lebanon. 
That is why it extended the borders of Lebanon, at the expense of Syria, to 
include Jabal ‘Amil, the Biqa‘, and the Sunni costal cities and declared its 
independence from Syria at the great disappointment of the Shi‘ites’ wish of 
unification with Syria.12 Nevertheless, the Greater Lebanon of 1920 opened 
up a new opportunity for the Shi‘ites since the Lebanese state was to be 
based on the guaranteed proportional representation of the different reli-
gious minorities. It is from that day on that the numerical distribution of 
the religious groups among the Lebanese became a serious volatile issue 
and a source of inequality and injustice.13 Still, for that time, under no other 
circumstance would the Shi‘ite zu‘ama aspire to play a prominent political 
role. Only in a separate Lebanon could the Shi‘ite elite expect to have a sub-
stantial role in government.14 As a result, the Shi‘ite zu‘ama proved their 
allegiance to the Lebanese state when they refused the Arabic call for the 
unity between Syria and Lebanon. Their regions (constituencies) were calm 
and indicated a consensus on the Shi‘ite support for the idea of the Greater 
Lebanon.15 
The Greater Lebanon had the effect of doubling the territory but also 
the side effect of complicating its future. It was assured that no community 
would be pre-eminent, which resulted in the dual imperatives of creating 
internal alliances and bringing about external support. However alliances 
like these were destined to fail since no community was homogenous, and 
even intra alliances were hard to strike or maintain. The Shi‘ites’ experiences 
of that period with alliances were, more or less, imposed. For instance, the 
gap that existed between the two main Shi‘ite areas of Lebanon would have 
hardly made any successful intra community alliance. Indeed, the path that 
was followed in Jabal ‘Amil was different from the one in the Biqa‘ Valley and 
Hirmel. The former was an agricultural feudal community where the zu‘ama 
reigned along with some ‘ulama. The northern Biqa‘ was characterized by 
clans’ code and honour, which regulated the lives of the semi-nomadic 
Shi‘ites of that region. Joined together, these two regions would constitute 
17% of the 1920 Greater Lebanon’s population in a country where the size 
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of a community is a prerequisite for its representation. However, the alliance 
between these two Shi‘ite communities was a bit artificial. While it enhanced 
the power of the zu‘ama, it alienated the people.16 
On May 23, 1926 the Lebanese Republic, having a written constitu-
tion and internationally recognized boundaries, saw the light.17 The Leba-
nese constitution was drafted by Lebanese parliamentarians and dignitar-
ies18 along French lines, and Charles Debbas, a Greek Orthodox, was elected 
as the first president of the Lebanese Republic. The 1926 constitution recog-
nized the Shi‘ites “as an official community separate from the Sunnis”.19
2. The deprivation of the Shi‘a in the Lebanese socio-
economic and political system, and the effects of 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict on the mobilization 
and radicalisation of the Shi‘ites
The outcome of this united Shi‘ite community was increased back-
wardness and a low standard of living that lacked any good social organiza-
tion or viable economy. This resulted in the Shi‘ite populace being deprived 
and marginalized through out the Lebanese system. One of the outcomes 
behind this is the 1932 census, which was done by the French government 
and was biased towards the Christians. Shi‘ites who lived in predominantly 
Christian areas were counted as Christians. For example, this was the case 
in the South, Mount Lebanon (Jubayl and Kisirwan), and the North (Akkar 
and al-Kura district). In other areas, many Shi‘ites were either counted as 
either Sunni or Christians. The practice of taqiyya (expedient dissimulation) 
contributed in decreasing the percentage of Shi‘ites. The results of the cen-
sus were that the Christians (the Maronites) were the majority or the largest 
community; Sunni Muslims the second largest; and Shi‘ites as the third larg-
est, comprising 19.6% of the population in 1932. Because the Shi‘ites were 
the third largest confessional group, they possessed some power, but still 
disproportionate to their number.20 
Taking the results of the 1932 census into consideration, with the 
independence of Lebanon from the French, the National Pact of 1943, which 
is an oral agreement not written in the 1926 constitution, made the presi-
dent of the republic a Maronite, the prime minister a Sunni, and the speaker 
of the parliament, a Shi‘ite.21 The National Pact between the strong Sunni 
and Maronite minorities, on the one hand, and the French government, on 
the other was to become the basis for Lebanon’s independence. Although 
the Shi‘ites had the symbolic post of the Speaker, the National Pact became 
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one of the many sources of resentment for the Shi‘ites who felt excluded 
from political power or any tangible chance of accretion to it. Thus, they felt 
as third-class citizens. Moreover, the ratio of appointments in political posts 
as well as representation in the parliament of six Christians to five Muslims, 
which was based on the 1932 census, made the Muslims, as a whole, feel 
second-class citizens.22 However, article 9523 of Section 6 of the Lebanese 
Constitution gave some hope for the Shi‘ites of a fairer representation in 
the future: “Temporarily and from the stance of justice and national recon-
ciliation, the sects are represented in a just manner in public employment 
and in the formation of the cabinet, without [this representation] harming 
the [Lebanese] state’s interest”.24 Lebanon declared its independence on 
November 22, 1943. Since then, November 22 has been celebrated as Leba-
non’s Independence Day. However, real independence did not take place till 
December 1945, and the French army left Lebanon a year later on December 
31, 1946.25 
During that time, it is estimated that about 80% of the Shi‘ites origi-
nated from the South. Although a small portion still dwelled in the South, 
many moved to Beirut and its impoverished suburbs such as Nab‘a, Burj al-
Barajné, and ‘Ain al-Rimmané. The remaining 20% lived in the northern part 
of the Biqa‘, Hirmel, and B‘albak.26 Through the process of modernization, the 
Shi‘ite community started loosening its ties with the zu‘ama. Real power was 
slipping out of the zu‘ama’s hands as early as the beginning of the 1960s, 
largely as a result of the growth of the state bureaucracy that provided as 
many services of political goods as the zu‘ama did. Consequently, a relatively 
free-floating population of politically disoriented individuals were liable to 
the influence of any discontented member of the elite. Thus, between 1946 
and 1962, the Shi‘ites were increasingly feeling under-represented and for-
bidden appropriate access to power,27 as such they despised being part of 
the Lebanese state. Most notably those of the South were the most sus-
ceptible “to the ideologies of change” demanding a complete overhaul of 
the political system.28 Over the years, the Shi‘ites became Lebanon’s fast-
est growing community, with the highest birth rate and lowest emigration 
rate compared to other communities. One can question if their religious 
identity, which emanates from their doctrines and traditions, heralded that 
increase.29 Thus, the Lebanese Shi‘ites, the largest demographic group who 
were at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder, started demanding a 
place in the distribution of power and spoils.30 During that time the unjust 
economic distribution was clearly evident: famine, illiteracy, and deprivation 
characterized the rural peripheral regions inhabited mostly by the Shi‘ites, 
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while Beirut was shining with an impressive apparent prosperity. Thus, Bei-
rut blossomed and become a showplace of wealth and consumption, while 
the Shi‘ite slums became more crowded and expanded.31
In 1959 General Fouad Shehab, the Lebanese president at that time, 
asked the French government to help him lay down a socio-economic and 
administrative reform program. So the French government dispatched the 
“Institut International de Recherche et de Formation Education Développe-
ment” (IRFED)32 delegation that conducted intensive research on Lebanese 
soil and revealed its findings in a report published after three years. Accord-
ing to this study, Louis Joseph Lebret, IRFED’s head and founder, revealed 
that two percent of the Lebanese population owned eighty percent of the 
means of production and distribution, while the South, the Biqa‘ Valley, and 
the North were very primitive. These peripheral areas had no running water 
or electricity, no infrastructure, and no hospitalisation, etc. In fact, almost all 
infrastructure, superstructure, modernization, and developmental projects 
were concentrated in Beirut and Mount Lebanon. Thus, Lebret urged for bal-
anced development.33 According to Lebret, at that time, the Shi‘ites were 
completely disenfranchised; not only they were underrepresented politi-
cally, but also economically deprived. Most of the Lebanese grassroots, 
who lived from hand to mouth in slum areas, were Shi‘ites par excellence. 
Lebret warned that the discrepancy between the backward peripheral areas 
and the flourishing centre makes the Lebanese socio-economic structure 
incapable of sustaining any crisis, thus rendering it not viable, unless this 
discrepancy is urgently and constructively addressed. Thus, he predicted a 
bloody civil war in Lebanon in the domain of near-range or middle-range 
theories (10-15 years).34 
In conjunction with the socio-economic factor the effects of the Pal-
estinian factor on the Lebanese Shi‘ite’s population were also at play, espe-
cially in southern Lebanon. Starting from 1948, the year of the Nakba (great 
misfortune), when Israel was created as a state on the remnants of Palestine, 
hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were uprooted by Israeli forces and 
sent across the border to many Arab countries, the majority of whom resid-
ed in Lebanon. According to Sayyid Ibrahim al-Musawi between 1948 till 
the creation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964 there 
was not a single attack carried out against Israel from the Lebanese borders, 
yet Israel killed more than 100 civilians and wounded many others.35 The 
conflict was yet to worsen after the Naksa (small misfortune) of the June 4, 
1967 war where Israel annexed by military force Gaza, the West bank, Sinai, 
and the Syrian Golan Heights.36 Since then, Lebanon has been the target of 
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arbitrary Israeli aggressions, in the sense that they were not necessarily pro-
voked by or retaliatory measures against PLO or Lebanese resistance attacks. 
With the loss of their launching ground in Gaza and the West Bank, the Pal-
estinian fighters used south Lebanon as a replacement. Al-Musawi adds, in 
1968, Israeli commandos blew up 13 Middle East Airlines (MEA) planes at 
the Beirut International Airport as a reprisal for an attack in Athens, to “Leba-
nese-trained Palestinian” freedom fighters.37
As a result, “The migration of Shi‘i families to the suburbs of Beirut 
became a flood from the late 1950s onwards”38, especially after the growing 
PLO military presence in the South and the violent confrontations with the 
Israelis. The Lebanese state paid a heavy price for siding with the Palestin-
ians since Shi‘ite grassroots, especially those living in the South, lost their 
homes and loved ones and encountered great economic losses on behalf of 
Palestinian freedom fighting.39 The originated sense of bitterness towards 
the PLO accumulated and reached a confrontational dimension. “Since the 
late 1960s, hundreds of thousands of Lebanese have been repeatedly dis-
placed from their homes in the South, more often than not as a result of 
Israeli military action”.40 “[B]y 1971, nearly half of the Lebanese Shi‘a popula-
tion was found concentrated in the Greater Beirut area”.41 As such, the Pal-
estinian-Israeli conflict in southern Lebanon had its toll on the mobilization 
and radicalisation of the Shi‘ites.
Although most political and social scientists dismissed Lebret’s pre-
diction as a far-fetched possibility, his omen materialized on April 13, 1975, 
the date of the eruption of the 16-year old civil war.42 The civil war resulted 
in drastic demographic changes. Between 1975-76 the Christian Militias 
embarked on a fierce campaign of “ethnic cleansing”43 that was success-
ful in uprooting the Shi‘ites from East Beirut, thus concentrating them in 
the Dahiya (Beirut’s southern suburb). “By the early 1980s fully one-third 
of Lebanon’s whole Shi‘i population was found there. The large-scale Shi‘i 
migration to Beirut accelerated the process of social change within the sect”, 
especially since the Shi‘ites from Jabal ‘Amil and the Biqa‘ had the chance 
to fuse together, which gradually helped forge “a single national Shi‘i con-
stituency”.44 Thus, “events in south Lebanon have resulted in large numbers 
of refugees moving into the Beirut area with the result that Shi‘is are now 
probably the largest religious community in Beirut”.45 
After the end of the Lebanese civil war in 1990, statistics revealed 
that four percent of the population owned eighty percent of the means of 
production and distribution.46 This made Rashid al-Solh, an ex-prime minis-
ter, remark in the wake of May 6, 1992 social unrest, that Lebanon is a coun-
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try ruled by one thousand families who control everything in the Lebanese 
milieu.47 
Contrary to what Norton and Shatz claim, “Even at the most generous 
estimates, only 40 percent of all the Lebanese are Shiis”48 and “Shiites, who 
account for 40 percent of Lebanon’s population” 49, currently, as recent esti-
mates from the Ministry of Interior indicate, the Shi‘ites in Lebanon comprise 
about 55 percent of the population – Beirut’s Dahiya alone houses around 
850,000 Shi‘ites.50
II The Mobilization of the Shi‘a, the role 
of Imam Musa Al-Sadr, and Hizbullah’s 
Emergence
1. Imam Musa al-Sadr
Imam Musa Al-Sadr was born on March 15, 1928, in Qum (Iran), and 
was educated in Najaf (Iraq), which are considered the most important reli-
gious educational centres of Shi‘ite Islam. His father, Sayyid Sadreddine al-
Sadr, was an Iranian citizen, and his mother, Sayyida Safiyya, was originally 
Lebanese51. After Musa Al-Sadr obtained a degree in law from Tehran Uni-
versity, he began teaching fiqh ( jurisprudence) and logic in Qum. In 1954, 
he left to Najaf and studied fiqh and usul (principal elements of religion) 
under the guidance of leading Ayatullahs such as Sayyid Muhsin al-Hakim 
and Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i.52 
Musa al-Sadr arrived from Iran in 1958 and gradually acquired follow-
ing and became the leader of the Lebanese Shi‘ite community.53 The Iranian 
born Imam Musa al-Sadr later on married a Lebanese woman.54 In 1963 al-
Sadr’s Iranian citizenship was revoked due to his criticisms levelled against 
the Shah’s repression of the Iranian people’s uprising. Thus, in 1963 al-Sadr 
became a Lebanese citizen.55 
In the 1960s and 70s, the advent of Imam Musa al-Sadr opened a new 
leaf of relationships between the Lebanese and Iranian people, especially 
after many Iranians fled from the Shah’s regime and sought refuge for many 
years in Lebanon. The basis for that is that Lebanon was regarded as a safe 
haven for liberal and Muslim movements who were mobilizing against the 
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Shah. And so, the Iranians used Lebanon as a launching pad to organize their 
groups against the Shah regime. They were also interested in supporting the 
Palestinian freedom fighters who used southern Lebanon to launch attacks 
against Israeli’s northern settlements. It is worth mentioning that during 
Imam Khumayni’s stay in Najaf, he issued a fatwa (religious edict) sanction-
ing the use of khums56 (one-fifth religious tax) to support the Palestinian 
freedom fighters in their struggle against Israel.57 
Imam al-Sadr mobilized the Lebanese Shi‘ites effectively in their 
endeavours to attain a more just political, social, and economic system. He 
championed the rights of the Shi‘ites in an uncontested way, as he was fight-
ing on two fronts at the same time: (1) He started to lobby and exerted pres-
sure on the Lebanese state to adopt a more just approach to the demands of 
the Shi‘ites calling for more representation for them in the Lebanese political 
structure; (2) At the same time he challenged the large land-holding Shi‘ite 
zu‘ama, in a bid to contest and undermine the power of his Shi‘ite politi-
cal opponents, most notably Kamel al-As‘ad, the speaker of the parliament, 
back then. This resulted in an internal Shi‘ite clash.58 
His first demand, in founding strong and effective civil society organ-
izations independent of the state, materialized with the formation of the 
Islamic Shi‘ite Higher Council, which aimed at representing Shi‘ite demands 
before the state on an equal footing with other Lebanese sects. This coun-
cil was officially established in 1969, and al-Sadr became its leader on May 
22, 1969. In his inauguration ceremony on May 23, 1969 he presented his 
political program, which was outlined along the following seven points: (1) 
To organize the affairs of the Shi‘ite community and to improve its socio-
economic conditions. (2) To implement a holistic vision of Islam with regard 
to thought, practice, and jihad. (3) To strive for total unity among Muslims 
without any discrimination. (4) Infitah (“opening up”): To cooperate with all 
Lebanese sects and communities59, and safeguard national unity. (5) To fulfil 
patriotic and national duties, and to protect Lebanon’s independence, sov-
ereignty, and territorial integrity. (6) To combat ignorance, poverty, back-
wardness, social injustice, and moral degeneration. (7) To support the Pales-
tinian resistance and to effectively take part in the liberation of Palestinian 
“raped” land along with brotherly Arab countries.60 It is worth mentioning 
that Shi‘ite zu‘ama such as Sabri Hamadé and political leaders such as MPs 
Sayyid Ja‘far Sarafeddine, Fadlallah Danas, and ex-minister Sulayman al-Din 
worked hand in hand with Imam al-Sadr, not only in establishing the Coun-
cil, but also in giving it a leading political and social role.61 
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In the summer of 1969, Imam Musa al-Sadr – along with Shaykh Subhi 
al-Tufayli, Shaykh Husayn Kawtharani, and Shaykh Hasan Malik62 – met with 
his cousin Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr63, in the latter’s house in Najaf, 
in order to put him in the picture of the Islamic mobilization in Lebanon and 
consult with him on organizing the Islamic movement. The five agreed on 
boosting da‘wa (Islamic propagation or call) in Lebanon through organizing 
political, intellectual, and religious circles composed of the Shi‘ite youth who 
regularly attend Imam Musa al-Sadr’s lectures and speeches. The aim was to 
mobilize, organize, discipline, and disseminate the knowledge inculcated in 
Baqir al-Sadr’s two recently published books entitled Our Philosophy and Our 
Economy 64. However, discord ravaged the ranks of the nascent Islamic move-
ment, and its longing for unity through revolutionary mobilization, as Baqir 
al-Sadr intended, did not materialize. Imam Musa al-Sadr, while working on 
serving the political, social, and economic interests of the Shi‘a community, 
insisted on safeguarding the Lebanese Republic and working hand in hand 
with the Christian community based on the Qur’anic verse (2:135): “Say: ‘We 
believe in Allah, in what has been revealed to us, what was revealed to Abra-
ham, Isma‘il, Ishaq, Jacob and the Tribes, and in what was revealed to Moses, 
Jesus and other prophets from their Lord, making no distinction between 
any of them, and to Him we submit’ ”.65
In the late sixties and early seventies, Iranian cadres and clergy came 
to Lebanon and served in the mobilization and organization of the Shi‘ite 
community. Among the Iranians who were trained in Lebanon66 were Ayat-
ullah Khumayni’s two sons, Ahmad and Mustafa, as well as Janti, Hamid Sadi-
qi, al-Gharawi, Muhammad Husayn Muntazari, Mustafa Shamran, the late 
Minister of Defence67 in the Islamic Republic, whose wife, Ghada Jaber, is 
Lebanese.68 This manifested to a great deal the interlinkage that was preva-
lent then among the three causes: The Iranian Revolution, the Palestinian 
struggle, and the process of Shi‘ite mobilization in Lebanon. 
The Cairo Agreement of November 3, 1969, which was signed between 
the PLO and the Lebanese Army, gave the fida’iyyin (Palestinian freedom 
fighters) a freer hand in launching their attacks against Israel across the 
Lebanese border. It sanctioned Palestinian armed struggle from certain 
parts of south Lebanon, which came to be known as “The Fateh Land”.69 The 
situation turned from bad to worse, when, in 1970, Lebanon witnessed the 
influx of thousands of fida’iyyin following the bloody conflict in Jordan,70 
or what came to be known as “The Black September Massacre”. The mount-
ing tension resulting from increased Palestinian military activity in Lebanon 
resulted in 1973 in a bloody confrontation between the fida’iyyin and the 
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Lebanese Army – that was protecting the interests of the Lebanese state 
– which considered that the Palestinians manipulated the Cairo Agreement 
in order to build a state within a state.71 In turn, Israel did not stand idle 
while its northern settlements were being continuously targeted. Thus, Isra-
el retaliated aiming at stopping the Palestinians who were using the Leba-
nese land in order to carry out a war of liberation through their raids against 
Israeli forces and civilians. As mentioned earlier, the Lebanese Shi‘ites living 
in southern Lebanon paid the heaviest price since Israeli’s retaliation prima-
rily targeted them.
Imam al-Sadr was not idle; he mobilized his followers and organ-
ized mass rallies that drew tens of thousands. In 1974, Imam Musa al-Sadr, 
together with Grégoire Haddad, a Greek Catholic archbishop, formed Har-
akat Al-Mahrumin (the Movement of the Deprived) in a bid to alleviate the 
suffering of the deprived people regardless of their sectarian or ethnic affili-
ation, as such it was open for all downtrodden people from all sects and 
not restricted to the Shi‘ites.72 However, this inter-community openness did 
not last long enough, as the ruling elites (zu‘ama) were afraid this would 
undermine the community’s patronage system.73 As time passed, Harakat 
Al-Mahrumin soon developed into a Shi‘ite based movement under the lead-
ership of al-Sadr. 
Al-Sadr used religious symbolism on political mobilization, thus estab-
lishing a sectarian alternative specifically with Shi‘ite needs. His movement 
became a viable alternative to the leftist forces and the Shi‘ite zu‘ama.74 His 
leadership could not easily be challenged because his civilian leadership of 
the community rested on the moral claim he held as the supreme religious 
leader. As such his religious authority was not contested.75 In the beginning 
of his activities, demonstrations and protests were verbal and symbolic in 
nature, but after a while, demands and forms of actions became more radi-
cal and violent. Thus, al-Sadr not only succeeded in reducing the zu‘ama’s 
influence, he also brought the Shi‘ite masses into politics. 
Al-Sadr’s hopes of changing the political conditions with peaceful 
means faded away, and in 1975 he founded a militia group. The group was 
called Afwaj Al-Muqawama Al-Lubnaniyya (“The Brigades of the Lebanese 
Resistance”), known by its acronym AMAL. AMAL was an activist movement 
that aimed at social and political reform, but its primary agenda was to liber-
ate southern Lebanon from the Israeli troops. Unlike, Harakat Al-Mahrumin, 
AMAL had a military wing.76 Al-Sadr acknowledged that he established AMAL 
in order to struggle against oppression, and state corruption aiming at a 
more just representation for the Shi‘ites as well as establishing safety and 
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security in the South. Al-Sadr said in a speech in front of a massive rally of 
his supporters: “Military training is a duty like prayer, and bearing arms is a 
duty as having a Qur’an”.77 On July 6, 1975, it was the first time that al-Sadr 
announced the death (“martyrdom”) of some of AMAL fighters during military 
training exercises.78 In other words, the advent of al-Sadr’s charismatic lead-
ership over the Shi‘ite community transformed it into one of rebellion and 
social protest.79 Some scholars pointed that the motive behind establishing 
AMAL was to give the Shi‘ites an instrument for advancing their claims with-
in a political arena dominated by sectarian militancy. They even contended 
that by establishing AMAL, al-Sadr made it clear that armed struggle was a 
necessary means to reach political goals. Aside from the aforementioned, 
it seems the main reason behind al-Sadr’s establishment of AMAL was his 
perception of threat caused by Israel80, which made Lebanon, and especially 
the South, a daily target for its aggressions.81 
Al-Sadr wanted to defend the southerners, as he believed that the 
Lebanese state is not capable of doing so because of the great gap in capa-
bilities between Lebanon and Israel; he also wanted to help the Palestin-
ians against the Israeli hostilities. Thus, al-Sadr established a Shi‘ite militia 
in an attempt to integrate “all the militias into a government institution, … 
an auxiliary to the regular Lebanese army that would be capable of repuls-
ing Israeli attacks”.82 In one of Sadr’s famous speeches he declared, “If Israel 
invaded the South, I will take off my turban and attire and become a fidda’i 
(freedom fighter)”. 
Musa al-Sadr worked within the multi-confessional system, under the 
legitimacy of the Lebanese state. However, al-Sadr did not hide his intention 
of reforming the Lebanese system in order to achieve equality and social 
justice.83 Al-Sadr’s attitude brought him a wide popularity that extended far 
beyond the direct boundaries of his sect. He stressed in most of his speeches 
the indispensability of peaceful, fruitful, and interactive coexistence of the 
different ethnic and communal groups in Lebanon. He was so keen to defend 
his fellow Lebanese Christians as much as he was for the Shi‘ites. After the 
eruption of the Lebanese civil war in 1975, AMAL took an active part in it as 
well as continued fighting Israel. During the Lebanese civil war, especially in 
1975-76, al-Sadr successfully exerted pressures to defend the Christians in the 
Biqa‘ region when some militias tried to attack them as retaliatory actions to 
the aggressions carried against some Muslim neighbourhoods in East Beirut. 
On March 14, 1978, Israel launched its first massive ground invasion, 
“Operation Litani”, in order to prevent PLO rockets from reaching its north-
ern settlements, and established a security zone in south Lebanon. AMAL 
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was supporting the PLO, and during the 1978 invasion an influx of hundreds 
of thousands of Shi‘ite civilians sought refuge in the impoverished south-
ern suburbs of Beirut. Those affected were even more radicalised than they 
already were. As a result, a gap has been developing between the Shi‘ites 
and the PLO. 
Al-Sadr was active domestically and regionally in his endeavours aim-
ing at putting an end to the Lebanese Civil war. Regionally, he embarked on 
touring some Arab states, which were either considered key players in the 
fighting in Lebanon or wielded power on the fighting factions. From this per-
spective, al-Sadr visited Libya, but disappeared in mysterious circumstances 
on August 31, 1978. His whereabouts are still unknown till now. Although 
al-Sadr never declared himself as a marja‘ (religious authority) and he was 
never emulated; yet he held a firm grip on the Lebanese Shi‘ite community. 
1.1 AMAL after al-Sadr 
In 1978 the Shi‘ites witnessed a great gap in their leadership, and 
Husayn al-Husayni and Nabih Berri84 could not match al-Sadr’s charisma, 
charm, and leadership. Thus, the Shi‘ites needed a new leader to turn to, 
and the relief was to come now from another exceptional source, Imam 
Khumayni. Indeed, the only Arab country that welcomed the victory of the 
Islamic Revolution in 1979 through massive supporting demonstrations was 
Lebanon. Many Lebanese Shi‘ites were inspired by Imam Khumayni’s revolu-
tionary ideology, which eventually led them to actively mobilize and strug-
gle for a more active role in the Lebanese political system. 
The Iranian Revolution did not hide its aim to establish contacts with 
the Shi‘a communities in the Arab world. It had already developed close 
links with many cadres in the AMAL movement, and was supporting the 
Iraqi members of the Da‘wa (“The Islamic Call”) Party present in Shi‘a regions 
in Lebanon.85 In 1978 the relations between AMAL and Iranian opposition 
groups continued to develop. At the same time, many individual Lebanese 
and Iranian Shi‘ite ‘ulama, who were students at the Najaf religious semi-
nary, were closely associated and connected with Iraqi colleagues who were 
members of the Iraqi revolutionary movement, Hizb Al-Da‘wa Al-Islamiyya.86 
When the Iraqi regime decided to crack down on them, most of al-Da‘wa 
members sought refuge in Beirut, where they found in their co-religionist 
AMAL movement a natural ally.87 
Iran had encouraged former al-Da‘wa members to join and infiltrate 
AMAL in order to disseminate a more radical and revolutionary message to 
a wider audience and to challenge the secular and moderate orientations of 
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AMAL. A notable individual within al-Da‘wa, adopting this route was Sayyid 
Hasan Nasrallah88, who became an AMAL official after serving as a group 
official in al-Da‘wa party.89
By early 1982, relations between AMAL and the PLO had passed the 
breaking point. After serious clashes, it was a foregone conclusion that Shi‘ite 
interests could no longer be reconciled with the fida’iyyin’s presence90: “Ironi-
cally, the Lebanese sector that suffered most from Palestinian military activ-
ity in South Lebanon against Israel until 1982 was the Shi‘ite population; the 
misery generated by the Palestinian presence in South Lebanon was so great 
that when the IDF [Israeli Defence Force]91 invaded in June 1982 the troops 
were showered with handfuls of rice”.92 Thus, Palestinian growing military 
presence and Israeli retaliations constituted another major factor behind the 
mobilization and radicalisation of the Lebanese Shi‘ites. Indeed, the Israel 
invasion of 1982 was successful in uprooting the PLO from Lebanon, thus 
heavy military Palestinian presence ceased to be. However, the remaining 
civilian Palestinian population continued living as refugees in various camps 
in Lebanon, but they were allowed to only keep their light weapons.93 
1.2 The schism in AMAL and the defection of its cadres to Hizbullah 
The major event which led to a division within AMAL’s hierarchy 
between moderates and those adopting a radical Islamic approach, occurred 
when Nabih Berri, AMAL’s leader, decided to co-opt with the Lebanese gov-
ernment, thus joining the National Salvation Committee, which was formed 
by the Lebanese president Elias Sarkis in mid-June 1982 to deal with the 
Israeli occupation of Lebanon and its besiegement of Beirut. For many radi-
cal AMAL members, who were inspired by Ayatullah Khumayni’s revolution-
ary doctrines, Berri’s participation was contrary to the line he should have 
adopted. Thus, his attitude was also judged as un-Islamic.94 
In protest, some of AMAL’s main cadres moved to their opponent, the 
radical religious party of Hizbullah (The Party of God).95 For instance, Nasral-
lah, the current Secretary General of Hizbullah, was AMAL’s district leader of 
the Biqa‘ before he shifted his allegiance.96 Thus, the divided Shi‘ite elite97 led 
to a schism in AMAL, which eventually resulted in the creation of Hizbullah. 
Nabih Berri, the current leader of AMAL and the Speaker of the Lebanese par-
liament, has repeatedly stated that AMAL was the womb of Hizbullah.98 He 
also added, “the brothers in Hizbullah are organically tied to AMAL”.99 Thus, 
most of the cadres who established Hizbullah, including Nasrallah, originat-
ed from AMAL, but they were against AMAL’s compromising attitude; they 
opted for mobilization and revolution.
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Therefore, these radicals abandoned AMAL and joined ranks with 
already existing Islamic Shi‘ite groups – including members of the Da‘wa 
party, Itihad al-Lubnani lil Talaba al-Muslimin (“The Lebanese Union of Mus-
lim Students”)100, as well as independent active Islamic figures and clerics 
– and established Hizbullah as an Islamic jihadi movement against the Israeli 
occupation, with the material support of Iran and backing from Syria.101
2. Iranian ideological and material backing to Hizbullah: 
ascendancy and emergence of Hizbullah
Since Hizbullah absolves itself from abiding by a specific date for its 
birth, it seems that Hizbullah’s religious ideology could be traced back to 
1978, the date of the arrival from Najaf of one its primary founders and the 
teacher of Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, the late Sayyid ‘Abbas al-Musawi who 
established Hawzat al-Imam al-Mutazar and started his da‘wa in B‘albak, in 
the Biqa‘. This also coincided with the arrival of dissident Iranian clergy and 
military personnel who established religious and military training centres 
with substantial material and spiritual backing from Imam Khumayni who 
was himself banished to Najaf for a period of 13 years.102 At that time, Ali 
Akbar Muhtashami, the assumed mastermind of Hizbullah, was the Iranian 
ambassador to Damascus.103 Muhtashami, who spend a considerable time 
in Lebanon, exploited the power vacuum left by the Lebanese state and 
held regular meetings with leading Islamist cadres such as Imad Maghni-
yyé, Husayn al-Musawi, Abbas al-Musawi, and Subhi al-Tufayli, who later on 
formed Hizbullah’s nucleus.104 At a later stage Muhtashami became the Ira-
nian Interior Minister. He praised Hizbullah’s leading Lebanese experience 
and called on other Islamist movements to follow its lead.105 
In turn Mustafa Shamran was among the first Iran immigrants who 
came to Lebanon. He resided in Tyre and was very close to Imam Musa al-
Sadr, becoming in charge of his social institutions. Later on Shamran estab-
lished his own military organization and trained al-Da‘wa and AMAL cadres, 
mainly in Palestinian camps until he established independent AMAL training 
camps.106 Shamran became the first central organisational cadre of AMAL 
(awwal mas‘ul tanzimi markazi).107 In addition to helping Musa al-Sadr with 
the founding of AMAL, Shamran also had an active hand in the founding 
of Hizbullah.108 Thus, the Islamic ideology unified various sectors of the 
Shi‘a community or the al-hala al-Islamiyya (“Islamic Milieu”). This led to an 
increase in Lebanese youth who went to the religious seminaries in Qum 
and Najaf, among these, prominent would-be, Hizbullah cadres. All of these 
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factors were conducive to the emergence of Hizbullah’s rudimentary foun-
dations that crystallized in the birth of its religious ideology.
Members of the al-hala al-Islamiyya converged and established, “the 
Committee Supportive of the Islamic Revolution, a cultural organization 
founded in 1979 in the run-up to the revolution in Iran. Since the commit-
tee is considered by Hizbu’llah as its ‘prospective nucleus’, party members 
emphasize the fact that its birth preceded the [victory of the] Islamic Revo-
lution”.109 In order to coalesce the newly emerging social movement, after 
the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Sayyid Abbas Al-Musawi along with 
his students and other leading ‘ulama officially founded “The Hizbullah 
of Lebanon”.110 Thus, Sayyid Abbas personally coined the name Hizbullah 
based on the Qur’anic verse (5:56): “Whoever takes Allah, His Apostle and 
those who believe as friends [must know] that Allah’s party [Hizbullah] is 
indeed the triumphant”. However, Hizbullah’s “leadership nucleus had been 
formed before the Islamic Revolution unfolded. Hizbu’allah was therefore 
the organizational manifestation of a religious current [religious ideology] 
that can be traced back to the 1960s”.111 
According to Sayyid Husayn Al-Musawi, even when Imam Khumayni 
was banished in Iraq, he was deeply concerned with Jerusalem and the occu-
pation of Palestine. From this perspective, when Israel invaded Lebanon in 
1978, he was in direct contact with al-hala al-Islamiyya, but was not able to 
sent military support, rather material support from his stance as a leading 
marja‘ responsible for khums and muqadasat (holy sites).112 Al-Musawi adds, 
with the success of the Islamic Revolution and the second Israeli invasion in 
June 1982, Imam Khumayni could send his Pasdaran (Republican Guards) 
in order to train al-hala al-Islamiyya.113 At that time, the Islamic Revolution 
was four years old, and already engaged in a fierce war with Iraq. In spite of 
that, when the Israeli army invaded Lebanon, the Iranians did not hesitate to 
declare their intention to defend Lebanon against the Israelis. The speaker 
of the Iranian parliament at that time, Hashemi Rafsanjani, said that the road 
to Jerusalem passes through Karbala’ and Lebanon.114 Syria allowed the dis-
patching of around 1500 Pasdaran to the Lebanese Biqa‘  Valley in June 1982. 
The Pasdaran were at the right place and time to provide Hizbullah with the 
necessary military and financial support. 
And so, Iran played an important part in the emergence of Hizbul-
lah, and it supported Hizbullah’s development and profile. Internal Iranian 
affairs continued to influence Hizbullah during the 1980s, but the influence 
changed in character and strength. It seems Hizbullah did not make it on 
its own; part and parcel of its military and social institutions are financed 
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directly by Iran. In fact, to spread the Islamic revolution and help Shi‘ite com-
munities outside Iran, Iran provided the Hizbullah of Lebanon with religious 
(marja‘iyya), financial, organizational, and military aid.115 Thus, without Ira-
nian ideological and material backing there could not have been an efficient 
Lebanese Hizbullah.116
2.1 Hizbullah as an Islamic jihadi movement
In 1982, Hizbullah’s founding members, as represented by the “Com-
mittee of the Nine”, wrote an internal treatise entitled, “The Treatise of the 
Nine”, which indicated the dimensions of Hizbullah’s work and operation 
stressing its resistance identity as an Islamic jihadi movement whose “emer-
gence is based on an ideological, social, political and economical mixture 
in a special Lebanese, Arab and Islamic context”.117 Nasrallah seconds that, 
attributing the direct causes of this emergence to the “Zionist invasion” of 
Lebanon that led to Israel’s military occupation of the country from the 
southern border till Beirut, the collapse of all resistance in the face of the 
Israeli forces, the expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon, and the formation of a 
pro-Israeli puppet government led by Amin Jumayyel, etc.118 
On November 11, 1982, Ahmad Qasir, Hizbullah’s first suicide bomber 
(“martyr”), detonated himself in the Israeli headquarters in Tyre, in south-
ern Lebanon, killing around 76 military officers and wounding 20 others.119 
Begin, the Israeli Prime Minister at the time, declared a three-day mourning 
in Israel purporting that this is Israeli’s worst calamity since its creation in 
1948.120 In Qasir’s honour, Hizbullah annually celebrates “Martyrdom Day” 
on the eleventh of November. On April 13, 1983, Hizbullah conducted its 
second “martyrdom operation” when ‘Ali Safiyyeddine detonated his car into 
an Israeli convey in Dayr Qanun al-Nahr killing six soldiers and wounding 
four others. On October 14, 1983, Hizbullah conducted its third “martyrdom 
operation” when Ja‘far Al-Tayyar blew himself in an UNRWA building in Tyre 
housing Israeli soldiers, killing 29 soldiers by the concessions of the Israelis 
themselves. It is worth mentioning that in the same year (1983), Hizbullah 
put a lid on an aborted double suicidal operation when the car of the two 
suicide bombers got blown prematurely on its way to Tyre.
And so, since its founding Hizbullah remained operating underground 
and anonymously till 1984. Hizbullah’s Shura (Consultative) Council, or main 
decision body, passed through different stages from nine members to five 
and was finalized to seven as of 1984. Hizbullah released several political 
declarations bearing its name and established its politburo. On June 18, 1984 
Hizbullah’s mouthpiece and weekly newspaper al-‘Ahd came to light.121 And 
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so under Iranian material backing (financial-military-logistical support) and 
ideological support (adherence to wilayat al-faqih), Hizbullah’s institutions 
started to emerge. 
Ayatullah Fadlallah’s role
Although many social scientists122 consider the Lebanese Ayatul-
lah Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, the godfather of al-hala al-Islamiyya in 
Lebanon, as Hizbullah’s murshid ruhi (spiritual leader), Fadlallah has repeat-
edly stated that he did not have and does not have “any organizational role, 
link, or ties with Hizbullah”.123 He added, “I do not concede to this alleged 
organizational role… I’m the one who reared this generation [of Islamists]… 
they exercise their own ‘ijtihad’ [independent reasoning] or ‘hypocrisy’ and 
attribute to me this characterisation of murshid ruhi, an accusation that 
is totally unfounded. I never was and would never be the murshid ruhi of 
any Islamic movement… I’m totally independent and would never confine 
my role to that”.124 However, this does not rule out informal ties. Fadlallah 
unequivocally stated that in Islam there is no murshid ruhi.125 Even though 
Fadlallah is not listed as one of Hizbullah’s leaders or ideologues on its offi-
cial website126, he is the leading Lebanese Ayatullah who is respected by 
Hizbullah.127
III Hizbullah anathematising the Lebanese 
political system (1984/5-1990)
1. Hizbullah’s Open Letter (al-risal al-maftuha)
In the 1980s, Hizbullah followed a radical-violent approach and a 
rigid political discourse that conveyed an uncompromising attitude anath-
ematising the Lebanese political system in its entirety, regarding the Leba-
nese government as an infidel. Al-Tufayli, Hizbullah’s first Secretary General, 
said: “We [Hizbullah] consider the regime of Amin Jumayyel [the Lebanese 
president at the time] as one created by the Western imperialism to destroy 
the personality of Muslims in this country and to Westernise it. And we will 
not allow that”.128 Al-Tufayli added: “We should first defend the Islamic Revo-
lution and Iran before considering the formation of a second Islamic state 
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in Lebanon”.129 In that milieu, on February 16, 1985, Hizbullah declared its 
first detailed official document that outlined its political ideology. The Open 
Letter, considered to be Hizbullah’s political constitution or political mani-
festo, was published on February 22, 1985, as Al-Nass Al-Harfi Al-Kamil li-Ris-
alat Hizbullah (Al-Maftuha) ila Al-Mustad‘afinin [The Original Text in Full of 
Hizbullah’s Open Letter Addressed to the Oppressed] in Hizbullah’s weekly 
mouthpiece al-‘Ahd.130 It officially revealed what already had been in exist-
ence, namely, the establishment of Hizbullah, its military wing, the Islamic 
Resistance, as well as Hizbullah’s identity and objectives. The timing of the 
propagation of the Open Letter is telling: exactly one year after the assas-
sination of Saykh Raghib Harb, one of its leading cadres in the Islamic Resist-
ance who was mobilizing the masses to fight against the Israeli forces occu-
pying southern Lebanon. It also coincided with the Israeli retreat from Sidon 
and its preparations to retreat to its self-declared “security zone”, which was 
accomplished by June of the same year.
2. Hizbullah’s reaction to the aftermath of the Israeli invasion
In March 1985 Israel blew the Husayniyya (centre for male Shi‘ites in 
which religious ceremonies are held and study groups are conducted) of 
Ma‘raké and assassinated two leading Hizbullah cadres. In April Israel with-
drew from Nabatiyyé and Tyre. The Jalil Operation on May 20 between the 
General Command of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 
and the Israeli government resulted in the release of 1,150 Lebanese and 
Palestinian detainees from the Atlit detention camp in Israel, in exchange 
for three Israeli soldiers. In June the Israeli Army announced that it has final-
ised its withdrawal and established an 1100-squared kilometre “Security 
Zone”, which included 168 cities and villages. The “Security Zone” compro-
mised around 15% of Lebanese territory along Lebanon’s southern border 
with Israel, which is reminiscent of the 1978 invasion that aimed at creat-
ing a similar security arrangement in order to protect the northern Israeli 
settlements from missile attacks across the Lebanese border. The Israeli 
withdrawal resulted in a confrontation between the Christian militias (The 
Lebanese Forces, the military wing of the Phalangists) and the Muslim and 
secular militias. The Christian militias were defeated and withdrew leaving 
behind the Christian population that suffered from atrocities committed by 
the victors.
On February 16, 1986 the Islamic Resistance captured two Israeli sol-
diers in an operation in the Kunin area of Bint Jubayl. Israel launched a lim-
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ited incursion in 17 villages for six consecutive days in order to retrieve the 
two soldiers, but with no avail. The Islamic Resistance waged a relentless 
war against the local collaborators with the Israeli Army, the South Lebanon 
Army (SLA) posts aiming at occupying them and destroying them, killing and 
detaining all members, then blowing the entire post. In October an Israeli 
jet fighter was downed, and Ron Arad, the assistant pilot, was captured. Hiz-
bullah standardised the practice of videotaping military operations against 
Israeli forces in order to convey the exact number of the Israeli dead and 
wounded to the Israeli public, thus belying Israeli claims of low casualties. 
In 1987, Nasrallah assumed the newly established “chief executive 
officer” post, in addition to being a member of the Consultative Council, 
which is Hizbullah’s highest leading panel.131 On the Islamic Resistance’s 
front, the year of 1987 witnessed the reinvigoration of the war of attrition 
against SLA posts in an unprecedented manner. December marked the 
beginning of the first Palestinian Intifada (popular uprising). 
In 1988 the first major military encounter and direct confrontation 
took place between the Islamic Resistance and the Israeli Army, in an Israeli 
attack on Maydun, in the Western Biqa‘. On March 11 Hizbullah conducted its 
fifth “martyrdom operation” when ‘Amer Kalakish blew himself in an Israeli 
convoy near the Mtulé settlement at the Lebanese border killing 12 Israeli 
soldiers and wounding 14 others. The AMAL-Hizbullah control war started 
on April 5 in the South and spread to the Dahiya on May 6, which led to the 
ousting of AMAL fighters from the Dahiya. This control war ended more than 
two years later in November 1990. In that war secular Shi‘ites (AMAL) fought 
against Islamist Shi‘ites (Hizbullah). 
On another note, also in 1988 the Consultative Centre for Studies and 
Documentation (CCSD), Hizbullah’s think tank, was created. In May 1988 Hiz-
bullah’s al-Nour radio station started broadcasting. 
On August 19, 1988 Hizbullah conducted its sixth “martyrdom opera-
tion” when Haytham Dbuq blew himself in an Israeli convoy on the Marji‘yun 
road killing one Israeli soldier and wounding three others according to 
Israeli military sources. The seventh operation occurred on October 19 when 
Abdallah ‘Atwi blew himself near the Fatima Gate, on the border between 
Lebanon and Israel, killing eight soldiers and wounding another eight by the 
concession of the Israelis. 
In 1988 Hizbullah still voiced its opposition to the Lebanese politi-
cal system as Sayyid Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyid declared on the ninth anniver-
sary of the victory of the Islamic Revolution that the Muslim populace in 
Lebanon does not accept to become part of the (political) project of others 
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(Lebanese state) heeding to the “president of the Maronite regime”; rather 
others should find a place for themselves in the project of Islam.132 Thus, 
Amin al-Sayyid was inviting others to become part of the Islamic project in 
Lebanon, refusing to be under the governance of or to co-opt with a non-
Muslim regime (Lebanese state), which was an offshoot of Hizbullah’s grand 
program of Islamisation of society in the 1980s.
In these bleak circumstances the tenure of the then Lebanese Pres-
ident Amin Jumayyel133 ended without electing a successor by the Leba-
nese parliament. So, on September 23, 1988, Jumayyel appointed General 
Michel ‘Aun, the Lebanese Army Commander, to head a military government 
composed of three Christians and two Muslims. Deeming the appointment 
unconstitutional, Muslim clergy met and issued a fatwa banning any Mus-
lim from participating in the military government. So General ‘Aun virtually 
ruled the Christian areas in East Beirut and Mount Lebanon, while the rest 
of the country was under the mandate of prime minister Salim Al-Hoss, who 
formed a second government in West Beirut. Thus, at that time, Lebanon had 
two governments, a situation that lasted for almost two years.
On June 3, 1989 Imam Khumayni died and Khamina’i was named as 
his successor. Hizbullah pledged allegiance to Khamina’i’s religious author-
ity.134 Also in 1989 Hizbullah held its first conclave and revealed the identity 
of its leaders and cadres. The conclave resulted in the creation of the post 
of the secretary general and the election of Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli as Hiz-
bullah’s first secretary general. On July 28 the Israeli army abducted Shaykh 
AdbulKarim ‘Ubayd, a leading Hizbullah cadre, from his hometown, Jibshit. 
On August 9 Hizbullah conducted its eighth “martyrdom operation” when 
Shaykh As‘ad Birru blew himself in an Israeli convoy across the Marji‘un road 
killing five soldiers and wounding five others according to Israeli military 
sources.
In an attempt to drive the Syrian Army out of Lebanon, on March 14, 
1989, General Michel ‘Aun, waged a “Liberation War” against the Syrian forces 
present in Lebanon since 1976. The “Document of National Accord,” known 
as the Ta’if Agreement, was negotiated by 58 members of the Lebanese par-
liament in Ta’if, Saudi Arabia, between the 30th of September and the 22nd of 
October 1989. On Saturday, October 22, 1989 at 10:45 pm, it was officially 
announced, from the Palace of Conventions at Ta’if, that the civil war ended. 
However, the nominal declaration of ending the war was not abided by on 
the ground and the civil war dragged on. ‘Aun issued a decree dissolving the 
parliament, but it fell on deaf ears. 
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The Ta’if Agreement served as a “bill of rights” or a blueprint for 
national reconciliation and reform aimed towards a more equitable politi-
cal system for all sectarian-confessional groups in Lebanon. The bulk and 
parcel of the agreement dealt with textual changes to the constitution; the 
rest handled procedural matters such as ending the state of war, dissolving 
the militias and integrating their members in the Lebanese Army, Lebanese-
Syrian relation, etc. The proposed changes in the Ta’if Agreement were offi-
cially adopted and written into the Lebanon’s new constitution in August 
and September 1990. The final document is known as “The Constitution of 
Lebanon after the Amendments of August 21, 1990”. The new constitution 
stipulated the need to share political office on a fifty-fifty basis between 
Christians and Muslims, as opposed to the earlier 6/5 ratio. Also, the number 
of seats in the parliament was increased from 99 to 108.135 The new constitu-
tion officially marked the end of the civil war since it stipulated the disband-
ing of all militias and surrendering their weapons to the Lebanese state. It 
also called for the integration of the militia members in Lebanese civil soci-
ety and Lebanese state institutions, most prominently, the Lebanese Army. 
Nevertheless, the Ta’if Agreement allowed the militias to transform them-
selves into political parties. 
On August 1, 1990 Saddam Husayn invaded and annexed Kuwait. The 
regional situation dictated on the US to give a green line to the Syrian army 
to oust General Michel ‘Aun, who was considered an ally of Saddam. October 
13, 1990 witnessed the actual ending of the 16-year civil war by the ousting 
of General Michel ‘Aun and banishing him to France.136 Also, the regional 
situation had its toll on the two and a half-year AMAL-Hizbullah war that 
ended by a final accord on November 9, 1990 brokered between the warring 
factions through intensive Syrian and Iranian pressure.
3. Hizbullah’s views on the Ta’if
Did Hizbullah accept the Ta’if? It seems that Hizbullah’s initial reaction 
was to reject its political component and to accept its security component. 
On August 13, 1989 Hizbullah issued a political declaration that regarded 
the Ta’if Agreement “as timid reform that does not touch upon the essence 
of sectarian privileges, rather it refashions a political system similar to a 
Maronite Israel in the region” [i.e. a racial state].137 Hizbullah added, “The 
Ta’if Agreement constitutes a deadly repetition to the historical sin that was 
committed in 1943 [National Accord], and which was the main factor behind 
the disintegration and destruction of the Lebanese state” [a reference to the 
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civil war].138 That was not all; Hizbullah practiced its own discourse analysis 
when it issued an official document, which conveyed its stance on Ta’if.139 
Hizbullah criticised the superficial level of the proposed political reforms, 
but agreed on  implementing its security stipulation, pending a clear distinc-
tion between militia and resistance. As such, Hizbullah’s military wing, the 
Islamic Resistance was deemed as a legitimate-national resistance by the 
Lebanese state140, thus it was allowed to keep its weapons and to conduct 
its resistance against Israeli forces occupying south Lebanon and the Biqa‘. 
However, Hizbullah abided by the security clause of the Ta’if Agreement that 
prohibits bearing arms and walking in military clothes in the non occupied 
areas of Lebanon.141 This arrangement outraged the leaders of the Christian 
militias since; after all, Hizbullah was allowed to keep its arms and military 
structure. Also, this move angered secular and leftist militias since it virtu-
ally granted Hizbullah a total monopoly in resisting the Israeli forces. Thus, 
one could say that Hizbullah accepted the Ta’if Agreement out of necessity, 
rather than conviction.
IV Hizbullah’s infitah (“opening-up”) policy 
(1991 to 2005) 
Unlike its uncompromising pre-1990 stance that anathematised the 
Lebanese state and called it an infidel, Hizbullah conveyed a lenient stance 
towards the Lebanese state. On January 3, 1991, Hizbullah issued a political 
declaration, which called on the Lebanese government to safeguard politi-
cal, intellectual, ideological, and media freedoms. Also, Hizbullah urged 
the government to differentiate between the role of the different militias 
in Lebanon and the role of Hizbullah’s Islamic Resistance.142 In March 1991 
the Lebanese government officially declared the dissolution of the mili-
tias. The end of April was set as a deadline for the militias to hand in their 
heavy weapons and to close their military and training centres. Hizbullah 
was exempted as the notable exception to such a decision since the Islamic 
Resistance, its military wing, was classified as a resistance movement, and 
not as a militia; as such it was allowed to keep up its arms and continue its 
resistance against Israel. 
Starting May 22, 1991 Hizbullah held its second conclave and elected 
Sayyid ‘Abbas Al-Musawi as its second Secretary General, and Shaykh Na‘im 
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Qasim, as his deputy. Unlike the first conclave in which the seven-member 
Shura Council were nominated, in the second conclave they were elected. 
The conclave set written moral precepts upon which dialogue would be 
conducted with the Christians.143 Thus, the most salient decision of the con-
clave was Hizbullah’s infitah. This development was reflected in Hizbullah’s 
1991 political program, authored by Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi. 
In line with its infitah policy, Hizbullah changed its discourse and made 
it pluralistic and inclusive in orientation. Thus, on June 3 Hizbullah’s Al-Manar 
TV station was launched. A few months after making its voice heard through 
its written and audio-visual media, the first swap operation between Hiz-
bullah and Israel, which was brokered by UN144, took place, on three instal-
ments, between September 11 and December 1. Israel released 91 Lebanese 
detainees (one from Israeli prisons and 90, including ten women from the 
Khyam detention camp), and the remains of nine fighters in exchange for 
information about the two Israeli soldiers who were detained by Hizbullah 
on February 16, 1986.
February 16, 1992 witnessed the assassination of Sayyid Abbas al-
Musawi, his wife, and his son, by an Israeli helicopter. Two days later, Sayyid 
Hasan Nasrallah, Hizbullah’s third Secretary General, was elected as well as 
Shaykh Na‘im Qasim as Deputy Secretary General. Both Nasrallah and Qasim 
retain their posts till the present day. Israel attacked the two villages of Kafra 
and Yatir, an act that was met with forceful resistance from Hizbullah fight-
ers. This inaugurated Hizbullah’s employment of the Katyusha weapon as a 
deterrent strategy to protect Lebanese civilians from Israeli aggressions. 
The Lebanese electoral system: 
The parliamentary elections of 1992
In order to ensure a fairer representation of the sectarian-confession-
al balance, in 1992 the Lebanese state increased the number of seats in the 
Lebanese parliament from 108, as stipulated by the Ta‘if, to 128. Thus, the 
Lebanese government embarked on organizing the first parliamentary elec-
tions that were not held for the past twenty years145 due to the civil war. The 
post-Ta’if Lebanese electoral system has been based on a system of absolute 
majority of votes received by a candidate who belongs to a certain sect and 
represents a certain electoral district. The list system reigns where each voter 
has to choose candidates across the confessional divide according to a rigid 
sectarian quota system that allocates a certain number of seats to each sect 
depending on the size of the population in the election district and its con-
fessional make up. The Ta’if Agreement stipulated the division of Lebanon 
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into five muhafazat (large administrative districts): Beirut, Mount Lebanon, 
North Lebanon, Biqa‘, and South Lebanon. This was precisely done in order 
to ensure the multi-confessional composition of all lists in an endeavour to 
safeguard Muslim-Christian co-existence and national unity, and fend off 
tribalism and sectarianism. 
Hizbullah found difficulty in deciding whether to participate in the 
1992 elections or not; this resulted in an internal row or discord146. Since 
al-waliyy al-faqih ( jurisconsult) is the one who determines “legitimacy”147 
(even in practical political matters), Khamina’i had to intercede and grant 
legitimacy for participation. This caused a considerable schism in Hizbul-
lah because Tufayli contested the decision and pursued a confrontational 
stance with both the party and the Lebanese state. 
After the issue was settled, on July 3, 1992 Hizbullah publicly 
announced its decision to participate in the elections and launched its polit-
ical program, which was based on the elaboration of the following pillars: 
(1) The liberation of Lebanon from the “Zionist” occupation; (2) the abolish-
ment of political sectarianism148; (3) amending the electoral law so that it 
will be more representative of the populace; (4) ensuring political and media 
freedoms; (5) enacting a modern naturalization law based on meritocracy; 
(6) the complete return of all the displaced; (7) administrative, developmen-
tal, educational and cultural, and social reforms.149 Based on its 1992 elec-
tion program, Hizbullah’s won all of the twelve seats on its election list: eight 
were reserved for party members, and four for affiliated sympathizers: two 
for Sunnis and two for Christians (a Greek Catholic and a Maronite). In com-
menting on the 1992 election program and Hizbullah’s performance, Hajj 
Muhammad Ra‘d, the current head of Hizbullah’s 12-member parliamentary 
Bloc, explained that Hizbullah’s MPs tried to show the other side of the party, 
i.e. Hizbullah as a political party. Hizbullah’s deputies defended the Islamic 
Resistance, addressing and engaging the domestic, regional, and interna-
tional public opinion as much as the parliamentary public space allowed.150
On September 21, 1992, Ibrahim Dahir conducted Hizbullah’s ninth 
“martyrdom operation” when he targeted an Israeli convoy on the Jarmaq 
road, killing and wounding 25, according to Hizbullah. 
Hizbullah’s dialogue with the Lebanese Christians
On December 1, 1992, Hizbullah set a precedent in its relations 
with the Christians when its late MP Shaykh Khudr Tlays and Sayyid Naw-
waf Al-Musawi, Hizbullah’s Politburo member, paid a watershed visit to the 
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Maronite Patriarch. After the meeting, Tlays stressed the need for Christian-
Muslim dialogue and infitah adding that Hizbullah regards cultural, political, 
and religious freedoms in Lebanon as sanctified and, as such, should not 
be encroached upon, come what may.151 From this perspective, Hizbullah’s 
leadership embarked on developing a political program of dialogue as a 
statement of intention aimed at opening up the channels of dialogue with 
all parties, except those who had blatant connections with Israel such as the 
Phalangists and Lebanese Forces. The aim behind this political program of 
dialogue has been to survey common grounds that would set the pace for 
a fruitful cooperation on common issues as well as solve existing discords 
without any recourse to confrontation. Hizbullah stressed that this is pos-
sible if each party’s beliefs, particularities, specificities, and overall visions 
are respected, while at the same time, leaving room for altering, out of con-
viction, certain standpoints. According to Hizbullah, dialogue and political 
relations ought to be based upon a complete respect for citizens’ rights, 
social justice, and peaceful coexistence, all stemming from the conviction 
that Lebanon is for all its citizens.152 
In response to Hizbullah’s 1992 visit, on January 22, 1993, the Maronite 
Patriarch sent a delegation headed by his deputy to meet with Hizbullah’s Sec-
retary General. In the wake of this meeting a common committee was set to fol-
low up on Christian-Muslim dialogue on a regular basis. Although the Maronite 
Patriarch indicated divergence with Hizbullah on certain issues, he conveyed his 
respect for Hizbullah because of its integrity in honouring its words with deeds. 
In turn, Hizbullah stressed that dialogue should concentrate on and be confined 
to issues of mutual benefit and things that do not encroach upon sensitivities 
or lead to repulsion. Rather, dialogue should deal with primary issues that have 
a high potential of leading to convergence or modification of ideas and opin-
ions among the parties. The various parties adjust themselves to and reconcile 
themselves with consenting to dialogue regardless if it leads to an acceptable 
result or roots discord instead, without allowing that negatively to affect the 
persistence and continuity of dialogue and cooperation.153
In the early summer of 1993 Hizbullah held its third conclave, in which 
it re-elected Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah as its Secretary General, and Shaykh 
Na‘im Qasim as Deputy Secretary General. It is important to note that the 
Islamic Resistance was rewarded by electing Hizbullah’s “Central Military 
Commander”, Hajj Muhsin Al-Shakar, as one of the seven-member Shura 
Council. 
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From the 23rd till the 31st of July 1993 “The seven days war” or the Israeli 
“Operation Accountability” erupted as a direct result of the Islamic Resistance’s 
killing of seven Israeli soldiers. “The seven days war” led to the death of 130 
people, mostly Lebanese civilians, and it displaced around 300,000. “Operation 
Accountability” resulted in an unwritten (oral) agreement between Hizbullah 
and Israel to sideline the civilians on both sides of the border. In spite of PM 
Rafiq Hariri’s government ban on demonstrations, in the wake of the signing 
of the Oslo Agreement, Hizbullah protested in the Dahiya by a peaceful dem-
onstration, which turned out bloody when the Internal Security Forces (ISF) 
or the Police and Lebanese Army fired at the demonstrations killing thirteen, 
including two women, and wounding around forty.
In October 1994 the Islamic Resistance stormed the Israeli post of 
Dabshé. Hizbullah exploited the camera as a primary weapon in its psycho-
logical warfare against Israel by airing, through its al-Manar TV, details of the 
operation and the Israeli casualties. On May 31, an Israeli commandos unit 
abducted Hajj Mustafa al-Dirani, an Islamic AMAL leading cadre, from his 
hometown, Qsarnaba, in the Biqa‘. 
Acknowledging the difficulty of implementing the stipulations of the 
Open Letter in the Lebanese public sphere and its clash with the political sys-
tem, in October 1994 Nasrallah hinted to a possible rewording of the Open 
Letter: “The Open Letter conveyed general precepts and general guidelines 
of our identity… for some time ago, we have reviewed the Open Letter and 
I do not consider that there are major alterations that have occurred to 
our overall doctrines and orientations although we should account for the 
changes and eventualities that took place in the previous years”.154 
On May 17, 1995, Khamina’i appointed Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, Hiz-
bullah’s Secretary general, and Shaykh Muhammad Yazbik, Hizbullah’s Shura 
Council member, as wakilayn shar‘iyyan (his religious deputies)155 in Leba-
non “in the hisbi (things that God does not allow that we forsake) domain 
and shar‘i (religious) precepts, taking over from him the religious duties 
and disposing them to the benefit of the Muslims; warding off oppression 
and injustice; conducting shar‘i conciliations for the khums adherents; and 
appointing their own deputies”.156
On April 25, 1995 Salah Ghandur conducted Hizbullah’s tenth “martyr-
dom operation” when he blew himself in an SLA post in Bint Jubayl wound-
ing eleven according to Israeli military sources. Hizbullah’s fourth conclave 
was held in July 1995. The Secretary General and his deputy were re-elected. 
Some of the basic organizational changes that Hizbullah made were the fol-
lowing: (1) The Politburo was renamed the “Political Council” and its jurisdic-
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tion was enlarged; (2) The creation of the “Jihadi Council”, headed by Sayyid 
Hashim Safiyyeddine, the only new member of the Shura Council; (3) The 
“Executive Council” replaced the “Executive Shura” with, more or less, the 
same jurisdictions; (4) In order to evaluate Hizbullah’s experience in the par-
liament, the party formed a new body called the “Parliamentary Bloc Coun-
cil”. 
On March 20, 1996 ‘Ali Ashmar conducted Hizbullah’s eleventh “mar-
tyrdom operation” in the Town of Rub Thalathin in al-‘Daysé killing two 
according to Israel military sources. In an attempt to curtail Hizbullah, from 
April 11 till April 18, 1996, Israel launched a massive attack against southern 
Lebanon killing more than 150 civilians – including 102 civilians seeking 
shelter in the UN headquarters in the Lebanese village of Qana – and dis-
placing around half a million others. Also, Israel bombed heavily the Leba-
nese infrastructure.157 The “Grapes of Wrath” resulted in an unprecedented 
national solidarity with Hizbullah. Along with other denominations, Chris-
tians, most notably, donated gold and money so that Hizbullah can buy 
Katyusha rockets to be fired at Israel as a deterrent strategy in an endeavour 
to halt the attack. Thus, after the Grapes of Wrath there seems to be a con-
sensus among most Lebanese parties on Hizbullah’s resistance legitimacy. 
The Israeli aggression produced what became known as the “April 1996 
Understanding/Agreement” that protected both Israeli and Lebanese civil-
ians from military operations. The UN, France, Syria, and the US brokered 
the April 26 written Agreement between Israel and Hizbullah, which estab-
lished the “Monitoring Group for the Understandings of Operation Grapes 
of Wrath”. Thus, the international community along with Israel seem to have 
recognised Hizbullah’s right to resist the occupation.
The parliamentary elections of 1996
In the shadow of the foregoing pressuring military confrontations, in 
the summer of 1996 Hizbullah launched its parliamentary election program, 
which could be outlined as follows: (1) Resisting the Israeli occupation; (2) 
achieving equality and establishing the just state; (3) pressuring the state 
to adopt favourable economic policies towards the oppressed, aiming at 
balanced development; (4) educational and syndicate reforms; (5) social 
and health reforms; (6) safeguarding public freedoms; (7) and enhancing 
the foreign policy of the Lebanese state.158 Muhammad Ra‘d stated that in 
1996 Hizbullah evaluated its participation in these parliamentary elections, 
especially after the Lebanese public opinion rallied around Hizbullah159. Hiz-
bullah managed to keep nine seats: seven were occupied by party members, 
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and two others by a Sunni and a Maronite Christian, non-party members. 
This resulted in changing some deputies with incumbents who are charac-
terised by practical dimensions, rather than theoretical ones (more speciali-
zation and division of tasks). This led to more representation of the different 
geographical areas that form Hizbullah’s constituencies: Beirut, the South, 
and the Biqa‘. Further, a member of Hizbullah’s Bloc was elected as the head 
of the parliamentary committee of economy.160 It is worth mentioning that 
only the head of Hizbullah’s parliamentary Bloc was a clergyman, Sayyid 
Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyid. 
Under German sponsorship, on July 21, 1996 Hizbullah exchanged 
the bodies of 2 Israeli soldiers (kidnapped on February 16, 1986) and 17 SLA 
collaborators, for 45 Lebanese detainees and 123 remains. In the 1996 par-
liamentary elections, Hizbullah managed to keep 11 seats. On April 7, 1997 
a swap operation between Hizbullah and Israel resulted in the exchange of 
three Lebanese detainees for the body of a dead SLA sergeant. 
On May 4, 1997 conflict erupted between Hizbullah and the Lebanese 
state when Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli declared the “Revolution of the Hungry”, 
and on July 4 he called for civil disobedience against the Lebanese govern-
ment. This culminated in blocking roads on October 26. On September 5 
the Israeli operation of al-Ansariyyé resulted in the death of 12 high-rank-
ing officials of an elite Israeli military commandos while not a single mem-
ber of the Resistance was injured. On September 12, Sayyid Hadi Nasrallah, 
Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah’s son, died in a confrontation with the Israel soldiers 
in southern Lebanon. 
The formation of the Multi-confessional Lebanese Brigades 
On November 3, 1997 Hizbullah formed Al-Saraya161 Al-Lubnaniyya Li-
Muqawamat Al-Ihtilal Al-Israeli or the Multi-confessional Lebanese Brigades 
to Fighting the Israeli Occupation (LMCB), which marks the “Lebanonisa-
tion”162 of the resistance. Although the LMCB was formed by Hizbullah, not 
a single member of the Islamic Resistance participated in its operations. The 
former was an attempt to revive something like the secular al-Muqawama 
al-Wataniyya al-Lubnaniyya (“Lebanese National Resistance”) that became 
defunct as of early 1991 as a result of the disbanding of militias in accord-
ance with the Ta’if Agreement. LMCB was based on the nationalist and secu-
lar dimension of the resistance to occupation, while the Islamic Resistance 
is based on the Islamist ideology.163
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Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli was officially expelled from Hizbullah by a 
political declaration issued on January 24, 1998. On January 30 a violent 
military confrontation erupted between the Lebanese army and al-Tufayli’s 
supporters, who occupied by military force Hizbullah’s religious seminary in 
‘Ayn Burday, near B‘albak. The bloody face off – which resulted in some casu-
alties, the most important were the death of a Christian army lieutenant and 
ex-Hizbullah MP Khudr Tluys, Tufayli’s son in law, and wounded many others 
– ended with the destruction of Tufayli’s headquarters and the Lebanese 
state’s issuing of an arrest warrant against Tufayli. However, till this day, he is 
still at large. After solving the problem of internal discord, Hizbullah held its 
fifth conclave between June 20 and the end of July. Nasrallah was elected for 
a third term. For this move to be made, Hizbullah had to amend its internal 
bylaws by deleting the stipulation that the secretary general cannot serve 
for more than two consecutive terms. 
The municipal elections of 1998
From May 24 till June 14, 1998 Lebanese municipal elections – that 
reflect true populace representation164 and which had not been carried out 
since 1963 – were carried out only after pressure and lobbying from Hiz-
bullah. The Lebanese government used the pretext of lack of financial and 
technical resources and manpower, but Hizbullah insisted on the reactiva-
tion of the elections. In its bid to control the municipal councils in its main 
constituencies, Hizbullah fielded its party members along with Christian 
candidates. Hizbullah contested the municipal elections according to the 
following municipal election program: (1): “Encourage the citizen to play 
a more active role in the selection process of development projects; (2): 
increase the functions and powers of municipalities in the provision of edu-
cation, health care and socio-economic affairs; (3): involve qualified peo-
ple in developmental projects; (4): finance development projects from both 
municipal revenues and donations; (5): exercise control over public woks 
and prevent embezzlement; (6): renovate the physical and administrative 
structures of municipalities and provide them with computer facilities”.165 
Around seventy municipalities could not take part in the elections, either 
because of the Israeli occupation in the South or due to the displacement of 
various Lebanese citizens during the course of the civil war. AMAL and Hiz-
bullah failed to agree on a common electoral list, which resulted in fielding 
competing candidates. In Mount Lebanon, AMAL and the Lebanese govern-
ment’s candidates lost a lot of ground to Hizbullah and the Christian opposi-
tion. Eventually, Hizbullah won a landslide victory in Beirut and a consider-
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able number of municipal councils in its main constituencies in the South 
and the Biqa‘ (with the exception of the B‘albak district where it won 4 out of 
21 seats), including electoral districts that were supported by the Lebanese 
government and its candidates. However, the dissident Tufayli was able to 
take control of his village, Brital, and the adjacent village, Tarayya. On the 
whole, Hizbullah won a landslide victory in most Shi‘ite electoral districts, 
monopolizing most of the local municipal councils. The results of the elec-
tions revealed Hizbullah as “a major political force” that has to be reckoned 
with.166 
On June 26, 1998, by the mediation of the Lebanese government, the 
remains of an Israeli soldier, who died during the Ansariyyé battle of Sep-
tember 1997, were exchanged for 60 detainees (10 of whom were detained 
in Israel) and the remains of 40 Lebanese resistance fighters, including Hadi 
Nasrallah. On September 13 Israel released Suha Bshara (who 10 years ago 
attempted to take the life of the SLA leader, Antoine Lahd) after 10 years of 
imprisonment and torture at the notorious Khyam prison.
In September 1998 Hizbullah overtly acknowledged that it does not 
consider the Open Letter anymore as a primary authoritative frame of refer-
ence (la ya‘tamiduha masdaran asasiyyan min adabiyatihi)167, which conveys 
more and more Hizbullah’s Lebanonisation and infitah policy.
On February 28, 1999 the Islamic Resistance blew the convoy of the 
Israeli Brigadier-General in Lebanon, Erez Gerstein, which resulted in his 
immediate death. Gerstein was the highest-ranking Israeli soldier to be 
killed in 17 years. In early June Israeli forces and SLA withdrew from Jez-
zin (a predominantly Christian enclave) that comprised around 6% of the 
“Security Zone”, thus reducing the total size of the “Security Zone” to 9% 
of the Lebanese territory. Through German mediation, Israel released, on 
two instalments, 13 Lebanese freedom fighters, five of whom were released 
on December 26 from the Israeli Ayalut detention camp, in exchange for 
a promise from Hizbullah to help track the missing Israeli pilot, Ron Arad, 
whose plane was downed over south Lebanon in 1986. On December 30, 
1999 ‘Ammar Husayn Hammud conducted Hizbullah’s twelfths “martyrdom 
operation” on the road to al-Qlay‘a killing 7 Israeli soldiers and wounding 
seven others according to Hizbullah, while according to Israeli military 
sources the operation resulted in no Israeli casualties since the suicide 
bomber detonated himself prematurely.168
The confrontation between Hizbullah and Israel continued. From 
1992 till 2000, “14 Israeli civilians have died as a direct or indirect result of 
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Hizbullah’s attacks, while over 500 Lebanese and Palestinian civilians have 
died”.169 Furthermore, “In April 1996 alone, hundreds of thousands of civil-
ians were driven north by IDF bombing… Israeli strikes on Lebanese power 
plants darkened much of Lebanon in 1996, 1999, and twice in 2000, caus-
ing damages estimated at $300 million”.170 In February 2000 the Islamic 
Resistance blew the farm of the SLA’s second man in rank, ‘Aqil Hashim, who 
died in the blast. On April 19 Israel released 13 Lebanese detainees from 
the Israeli Ayalut detention camp. On May 24 Israel withdrew from southern 
Lebanon after 22 years of occupation; however, Israel failed to relinquish 
the Lebanese Shib‘a Farms171, which are a bone of contention between Israel 
and Lebanon.
Unlike the atrocities that were committed against the Christians after 
the Israeli withdrawal in June 1985, nothing happened after the Israeli with-
drawal of May 2000. Rather, only civil peace prevailed and stability reigned 
since Hizbullah acted under the Lebanese state laws and left to it to deal 
with ex-collaborators and ex-SLA members.172 Hizbullah won 12 seats in the 
parliamentary elections held in the summer. On October 7 Hizbullah cap-
tured 3 Israeli soldiers from the Lebanese Shib‘a Farms. On 15 October Hiz-
bullah lured and apprehended, at Beirut, a retired Israeli Mossad colonel.
The Lebanese Shib‘a Farms
The Lebanese Shib‘a Farms border Lebanon and Syria from the side 
of the Golan Heights from the east and Israel from the southeast; they have 
an area of around 22 square kilometres, which comprises around 2% of the 
total area of Lebanon that is 10, 425 square kilometres. They were captured 
by Israel in the 1967 war.173 After Israel invaded Lebanon on March 14, 1978, 
the UN issued Resolution 425 demanding the complete and unconditional 
withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon.174 By May 25, 2000175 and after 22 
years, Israel complied and withdrew from southern Lebanon and the west-
ern Biqa‘, but not from the Shib‘a Farms because it was considered to be part 
of the Syrian Golan Heights that were occupied in 1967. After the Israeli 
withdrawal in May 2000, Syria filed a letter to the UN conceding unequivo-
cally, in writing, that the Shib‘a Farms are Lebanese. From May 25, 2000 till 
June 6, 2000, the UN and Lebanon were engaged in a painstaking operation 
of verifying the Israeli withdrawal. As a result, Lebanon regained 17,756,600 
square meters of its southern land along the Israeli border, and what has 
been labelled as the “Blue Line” was drawn between the two countries. 
On May 20, 2001, Nasrallah, Hizbullah’s Secretary General, affirmed that 
it is not his concern if Shib‘a falls under UN Resolution 242 or 425; rather, this 
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is the concern of governments. What he is concerned about is that it is Leba-
nese land, which is under occupation and Hizbullah will liberate it come what 
may. He added that it was the Islamic Resistance that forced Israel to accept the 
implementation of 425, and not the international community.176 Lebanon still 
maintains its reservations against the “Blue Line”, as President Emile Lahud reit-
erated in his official visit to France on May 29, 2001, arguing that the “Blue Line” 
is a demarcation line that does not conform to the official truce border between 
Lebanon and Israel. He added that, without Hizbullah, the Lebanese resistance, 
and the Lebanese Army, Israel would not have withdrawn. He also refused to 
send the Lebanese Army to the south “in order to protect Israel”.177 On June 27, 
2001, during his official visit to France, Bashshar al-Asad, the Syrian president, 
reiterated that Shib‘a is Lebanese. John Kelly, the ex-US ambassador to Lebanon, 
corroborates this by stressing, “Both Syria and Lebanon has affirmed that Shib‘a 
Farms are Lebanese and send a written memo in this regard to the UN. That is 
why Shib‘a Farms are Lebanese”.178 In turn, Asher Kaufman, an Israeli academic, 
demonstrated that the Shib‘a Farms are Lebanese.179 
The 2000 electoral system
The Christian right, who accused Syria of controlling the electoral 
process, characterized the 2000 election law as neither free nor fair, plagued 
with gerrymandering, manipulation of electoral lists, and exploitation in the 
eligibility of voters.180 It contended that, this resulted in a culture of intimida-
tion, extortion, and bribery of voters as well as vote rigging. Contrary to the 
Ta’if, the 2000 election law divided the five muhafazat into 14 electoral dis-
tricts: Beirut was divided into three districts; Mount Lebanon into four; North 
Lebanon into two; the Biqa‘ into three; and the South into two. According to 
the Christian right, the election law had the inevitable result of electing pro-
Syrian candidates, while at the same time barring those who were against 
Syrian influence from making it to parliament. It is alleged that the late Syr-
ian Colonel Ghazi Kan‘an181 was the orchestrator and godfather of the 2000 
parliamentary election law, on which he was handsomely rewarded by a $10 
million check from the late PM Rafiq Hariri.182 
Hizbullah’s 2000 parliamentary elections program
Hizbullah’s August 2000 electoral program was divided along seven 
categories which are the following: (1) Resistance and liberation (E.g. the 
Shib‘a Farms); (2) Enhancement of Lebanese foreign policy; (3) Reforms 
on the economic level in order to solve the serious socio-economic crisis; 
(4) Building of institutions and the state of law as well as the promotion 
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of political participation; (5) Educational and cultural issues; (6) Social and 
health issues; (7) Environmental issues.183 Based on this political program, 
Hizbullah won twelve seats in the 2000 parliamentary elections. Hizbul-
lah’s nine candidates, along with two Sunnis, and one Maronite Christian, 
received the highest number of votes in the country.184 In the 2000 parliamen-
tary elections all Hizbullah’s representatives in the parliament were civilian 
(no ‘ulama). In conformity with Hizbullah’s rotation policy, Ra‘d and Amin 
al-Sayyid swapped positions, thus the former became the head of Hizbul-
lah’s Parliamentary Bloc, while the latter was appointed as the head of Hiz-
bullah’s Political Council. A member of Hizbullah’s Bloc was elected as the 
head of the parliamentary committee of agriculture, and the rest of the Bloc 
members participated in other parliamentary committees such as finance, 
defence, security, public administration, and foreign affairs.185
In Hizbullah’s sixth conclave that ended on July 30, 2001, Nasrallah 
was re-elected for life, and Sayyid Ibrahim Amin Al-Sayyid and Hajj Jawad 
Nureddine replaced Hajj Muhammad Ra‘d and Hajj Muhsin Shakar in the 
Shura Council. Hizbullah placed its media institutions under the direct com-
mand of Nasrallah, aided by the head of the Political Council and that of the 
Executive Council. This was done in order to upgrade the role of Hizbullah’s 
media, and pursue its ideological hegemony. Also, Hizbullah abolished its 
“Central Planning Council”, and strengthened internal audit and accounta-
bility mechanisms. From this perspective, the roles and duties of the munici-
pal councils were expended (horizontally) and upgraded (vertically). 
On March 27-28, 2002 the Arab Summit was held in Beirut and the 
“Saudi Initiative”, which aimed at ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
was adopted. In late March, early April, the Israeli army conducted a deadly 
incursion into the West Bank. Hizbullah responded by 12-day military opera-
tions in the Shib‘a Farms in order to buttress the Intifada. On June 10, in light 
of the revival of the prisoner-swap negotiations and as a good will gesture 
towards Hizbullah, Israel released Muhammad al-Birzawi, a Hizbullah fight-
er, who has been detained since 1987.
Hizbullah’s evaluation of the Open Letter
On June 10, 2002, Na‘im Qasim confirmed that the party was intend-
ing to release a modified version of its 1985 Open Letter. According to him, 
the new version will specify the goals and record Hizbullah’s vision on new 
developments during the previous years. Nevertheless, Qasim stressed that 
Hizbullah’s position towards doctrinal issues would remain the same: “We 
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[Hizbullah] consider that our stance concerning our attitudes is overt and 
transparent. That is why, the new Open Letter would not shatter these doc-
trinal positions; rather it will consolidate them. It will be considered as coa-
lescing with earlier stances taken by the party in different contexts”.186
In October 2002 rumour surfaced that Hizbullah was in the final 
phases of launching a new updated version of its Open Letter in conformity 
with an earlier decision taken in Hizbullah’s sixth conclave that was held in 
July 2001. The rumour was substantiated by Qasim’s October 28, 2002 pub-
lished interview in the Daily Star. Qasim argued, “Much has happened and 
much has changed between 1985 and now… Our basic principles remain 
the same because they are the heart of our movement, but many other posi-
tions have changed due to evolving circumstances developing around us”. 
Locally, Qasim stressed that Hizbullah’s position towards the Phalagists has 
obviously changed, stressing that they are partners in dialogue. Region-
ally, concerning Hizbullah’s stance towards Israel, Qasim affirmed Hizbullah 
outright animosity towards the “Zionist entity” and the “Small Satan” from 
an immutable, doctrinal perspective: “Since many positions have changed, 
we need to be flexible and change ours too… But the resistance against 
Israel has been the core of our belief and that has never changed” since “the 
struggle against Israel remains the central rationale of Hizbullah’s existence”. 
Internationally, Qasim argued that Hizbullah’s relationship with the West has 
witnessed many changes in line with its infitah policy and the West’s chang-
ing perception towards the party, especially France: “The French were con-
sidered our enemy because they attacked our bases in the Bekaa… France’s 
position has changed towards us, so we have to change ours”. However, he 
added that Hizbullah’s perception towards the US187 is still the same, since 
the party still regards it as the “Great Satan”.188 
On August 21, 2003 Israel returned the remains of two Hizbullah fight-
ers in return for a meeting between the detained Mossad colonel and the 
German mediator. In response to a suicide operation in Israel a day earlier, in 
which 19 Israeli civilians died, on December 5 Israeli jets violated Lebanese 
airspace and bombed an alleged Palestinian training camp near Damascus. 
This was the first Israeli air strike on Syria in 30 years, since the end of the 
October 1973 war. Syria exercised restraint after receiving assurances from 
the UN.
On January 19, 2004 Hizbullah destroyed an Israeli military bulldozer 
after it crossed the “Blue Line”. Hizbullah targeted it by firing an anti-tank 
rocket when it was 26 meters inside Lebanese territory by the concession of 
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the UNIFIL. One Israeli soldier was killed, and another was seriously wound-
ed. This confrontation came at a time when the prisoner exchange negations 
between Israel and Hizbullah were at their peak. This exemplifies Hizbullah’s 
two-track policy: military confrontation and negotiations, side by side.
The prisoners’ return
On January 29-30, 2004 Hizbullah and Israel conducted the first phase 
of a watershed prisoner exchange deal after four years of negotiations bro-
kered by Germany. Hizbullah released the Israeli colonel and the bodies of 
three Israeli soldiers captured in October 2000 in return for 400 Palestinians 
and 23 Lebanese and Arabs (including two Hizbullah senior cadres: Shaykh 
AbdulKarim ‘Ubayd and Hajj Mustafa Al-Dirani) released from Israeli prisons, 
and the remains of 59 Lebanese guerrilla fighters, 11 of whom belonged to 
Hizbullah. It was a groundbreaking operation since it was the first time that 
Israel acquiesced to Hizbullah’s demands and released Palestinians, setting 
a precedent and bestowing Hizbullah with an unprecedented role in the 
Intifada, thus regionalizing the conflict. By this move, Israel granted Hizbul-
lah a de facto recognition as a legitimate resistance movement, which has 
managed to release all it cadres from Israeli prisons, as Nasrallah has repeat-
edly promised.189
On May 7, 2004 an Israeli incursion reminiscent of Ansariyyé occurred 
after the elite Israeli Egoz commandos unit crossed the “Blue Line”. Hizbul-
lah fighters ambushed it, killed one soldier and wounded 5 others, by the 
concession of the Israelis themselves. Unlike the precedent set by Ansariyyé 
and in spite of Hizbullah’s intensive firing power, the Israelis were able to 
evacuate their dead and wounded.
Hizbullah’s 2004 political program
Almost two years before the 2004 municipal elections took place, Hiz-
bullah held a special conference and produced its election program, setting 
a precedent to other political parties, which either had sketchy election pro-
grams or hardly any election program. I outline the election programs, and 
then I highlight the results. Hizbullah’s 2004 municipal elections program190 
was based on the following two slogans: (1): Hizbullah’s principles dictate 
that the populace constitute the main pillars behind its movement. From 
this perspective, Hizbullah is under a responsibility to fend off all oppression 
and injustice in order to serve them and protect their dignity. (2): One of 
Hizbullah’s aims is to adopt the plight of the oppressed and the disenfran-
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chised populace by protecting them and actively working for putting an 
end to oppression and discrimination towards the deprived areas in order to 
raise its standards of living in all respects. The election program can be sum-
marised as follows191: (1) Administration and organization; (2) The efficiency 
of the municipal council and boosting the confidence of the citizens in it; 
(3) Expand the financial revenues of the municipalities; (4) Developmental 
projects, which are divided into guiding plans and specific projects; (5) Giv-
ing importance to environmental conditions within the municipal jurisdic-
tion; (6) Social care: (A) Consolidating a resistance society; (B): Caring for the 
youth; (C): Children, motherhood, old age, and handicap (disability) care; 
(D): Pedagogical care; (7): Specifying the domestic, regional, and interna-
tional resources that the municipalities benefit from.
From the second to the thirtieth of May the second municipal elec-
tions were held after a lapse of six years. The usual correlation between 
Hizbullah’s programs and its success192 materialised once more since it has 
consolidated its earlier gains and advanced more at the expense of other 
political parties, most notably AMAL. Hizbullah achieved a landslide victory 
in the Biqa‘ winning 28 out of the 30 municipalities that it was behind their 
formation; 3 municipalities in which Hizbullah contributed few members to 
its municipal councils; 16 municipalities were left to their own devices; and 
8 municipalities won without competition or by acclamation (bi-al-tazkiya), 
where Hizbullah was behind fielding its candidates. In Brital, Subhi al-Tufay-
li’s supporters won a landslide victory. Unlike 1998, Hizbullah secured all 
the 21 seats in B‘albak, a constituency composed of roughly 15,000 Shi‘a, 
10,000 Sunnis and 5,000 Christians. The Ministry of Interior estimated the 
participation was 70%.193 As in 1998, Hizbullah achieved a sweeping victory 
in Beirut securing all municipalities in the Dahiya. In the South, where the 
highest rate of voting was detected, the party won 61% of the municipali-
ties securing 87 out of 142 and penetrating 20 others. Hizbullah won in 5 
out of 7 main municipalities. In the South, which has always been consid-
ered as AMAL’s turf, AMAL shared only scattered victories, splitting the 39% 
with other political parties and independents.194 Thus, the coordination and 
cooperation pact or the “understanding” between AMAL and Hizbullah did 
not pay off and resulted in no consensus since each insisted on forming dif-
ferent election lists and not a common slate list. Contrary to 1998 when Har-
iri won in Beirut and Sidon, his hometown, this time he was able to secure 
only Beirut, and only one candidate on his list was able to make it in Sidon. 
Moreover, none of Hariri’s candidates made it in Tripoli. Thus, it seems that 
there emerged two main winners and two main losers in the elections, these 
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being respectively Hizbullah and President Lahud, on the one hand, and the 
PM and the Speaker, on the other hand.195
On May 21, 2004 Hizbullah held a huge demonstration to protest the 
desecration of the holy sites in Iraq. Around half a million Hizbullah sup-
porters wearing white burial shrouds chanted “death to Israel” and “death to 
America”. This show of force came two days before the municipal elections in 
the South, which was considered an AMAL den and strong constituency. By 
this, Hizbullah proved itself to be the largest political force in the country. 
Unlike the September 13, 1993 unlicensed demonstrations, on May 
27, 2004 licensed demonstrations spread over the country in protest for the 
pressing socio-economic situation triggered by a severe hike in fuel prices. 
In Hayy al-Sulum, in the Dahiya, the Lebanese Army fired at the demonstra-
tors who where throwing rocks at it, killing five and wounding several oth-
ers. As a result, riots spread in the Dahiya, and the demonstrators burned the 
first floor of the Ministry of Labour. On May 29, 2004 Nasrallah held a news 
conference in which he accused the US Embassy in Beirut of infiltrating the 
demonstrators and perpetrating the violence, thus giving weight to the hid-
den hand explanation or the conspiracy theory. He called on the cabinet and 
parliament to hold emergency sessions to discuss the issue, and he called on 
the government to launch an investigation about what has happened. On 
May 31, 2004, conceding to Nasrallah’s demands, the Lebanese cabinet held 
an urgent meeting in which it vehemently condemned the May 27 shoot-
ings and offered, as blood money, around $33,000 to the family of each vic-
tim. The cabinet asked the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Defence to 
conduct an investigation into the unrest and report directly to it.
Hizbullah’s seventh conclave
From June to August 16, 2004, Hizbullah held its seventh conclave. 
Unlike, the previous conclaves where information was leaked to the media, 
hardly any information was disseminated. It seems that Hizbullah’s extra 
clandestine tactic might have to do with the dismantling of a network of 
underground operatives allegedly linked to Israel, as well as the assassina-
tion attempts the party’s rank and file suffered from in the last two years.196 
It is worth mentioning that the followers of Subhi al-Tufayli released 
a political declaration chastising the conclave and asking for reinstating him 
and his followers to their “natural, normal position of leadership” in the party 
after being ousted due to conspiracies that occurred a few years ago. The 
political declaration added that the convening of this conclave offers a his-
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torical chance to conduct honest elections in Hizbullah’s rank and file in order 
to choose leaders who will retain Hizbullah’s earlier glory as a religious, Shi‘ite 
social movement. The declaration accused Nasrallah of planting discord in the 
Shi‘ite house (milieu) by his “total hegemony and tyrannical control” over the 
party and its capabilities and directing them in a way that is not conducive 
to the Shi‘ites, for instance, as exemplified by the criticisms directed towards 
Sayyid Fadlallah197 in favour of some (Iranian) personalities and maraja‘s.198 
Hizbullah released a political document in the form of two political 
declarations. The first political declaration conveyed that no changes took 
place within Hizbullah’s 7-member Shura Council, which includes the fol-
lowing members: Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, Hizbullah’s Secretary General and 
the head of the Jihadi Council; Shaykh Na‘im Qasim Deputy Secretary Gen-
eral; Sayyid Hashim Safiyyeddine head of Executive Council; Sayyid Ibrahim 
Amin Al-Sayyid the head of the Political Council; Hajj Hasan Khalil, Nasral-
lah’s political aide or advisor; Shaykh Muhammad Yazbik head of Religio-
Judicial Council, or the “responsible for the dossier of the shar‘i matters and 
Islamic scholars’ affairs”; and Sayyid Jawad Nureddine. In its second politi-
cal document, Hizbullah listed four priorities and eight basic modifications 
or amendments. The most salient amendment was Hizbullah’s division of 
the South into two administrative geographical areas: the first south of the 
Litani river, and the second to its north. Both function under the auspices 
of one central organisational leader in order to secure organisational struc-
tures that are capable of improving local administration and activate polari-
sation. In addition, Shaykh Karim ‘Ubayd was appointed as the head of Hiz-
bullah’s social institutions. Besides that, Shaykh Hasan Izzeddine, Hizbullah’s 
spokesman at the Central Press Office, was appointed as Hizbullah’s political 
representative in the South, and he was replaced by Nasrallah’s media aide 
or advisor, the engineer Hajj Muhammad Afif.199
The UN Resolution 1559
On September 2, 2004, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 
1559200 censuring Syrian intervention in Lebanese affairs and criticising 
both Syria and Lebanon for the intended constitutional amendment that 
will extend president Lahud’s tenure for three more years, till November 
2007. Among other things, 1559 called for the disbanding and disarmament 
of all the Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias which is a direct reference to 
Hizbullah since it is the only Lebanese political party that still bears up arms. 
It also called upon all remaining foreign troops to withdraw from Lebanon, 
which is an indirect reference to the presence of 14,000 Syrian troops in 
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Lebanon. In spite of the international pressure, on September 3, 2004, the 
Lebanese parliament amended the constitution, thus allowing president 
Lahud to remain in office for a second three-year term.
On November 30, 2004 around 250,000 Lebanese people201, one-third 
of whom were Hizbullahis, demonstrated against resolution 1559. Clergymen 
and secular notables representing various leftist and rightist political par-
ties (including the Phalagists, Armenians, Kurds, etc.) as well as civil society 
organizations participated in the demonstration. In addition to a number of 
ex-Ministers and ex-MPs, 4 Ministers, and 29 MPs took part in the demonstra-
tion. What is noteworthy to mention is that all the participants carried out 
Lebanese flags including Hizbullahis. It was the fist time that Hizbullah par-
ticipates in a demonstration without portraying flags, banners, and special 
slogans. The only two features that pointed out at Hizbullah were the follow-
ing: (1) the chanting of “death to Israel” and “death to America”; and (2) the Hiz-
bullahi veiled women, who outnumbered Hizbullahi men by a great margin. 
Contrary to the precedents of spearheading such demonstrations, Hizbullah 
only marched at the rear of the demonstration. Some of the banners raised 
by the Hizbullahis were the following: “Unity, unity in Lebanon so that we can 
defend our country”; “We do not want democracy American style”. Hizbullah’s 
presence was symbolic202, rather than a taklif shar‘i (legal-religious duty) since 
Hizbullah wanted to convey its infitah and Lebanonisation aspect. 
Due to anti-Semitism charges, on December 13, 2004 France banned 
Hizbullah’s satellite TV, al-Manar, from broadcasting to France and other EU 
countries. Hizbullah abided by the ruling and al-Manar voluntarily stopped 
transmission. However, al-Manar continued to broadcast from six other sat-
ellites covering most of the globe, including three in Europe, which do not 
fall under France’s jurisdiction. On December 17, 2004 the US followed suit 
and banned al-Manar classifying it as a “terrorist organization”.
First woman appointed to a prominent political role
In the beginning of December 2004 and in light of the decisions taken 
in Hizbullah’s seventh conclave, Hizbullah, for the first time in its history, has 
appointed the head of its Women’s Organization, Rima Fakhry, as a mem-
ber of its 18-member Political Council (Politburo). Also, Hizbullah appointed 
Wafa’ Hutayt, the person responsible for political programs in al-Nour radio, 
as deputy of Hizbullah’s Central Information Office.203 These two moves 
came as a result of internal debates among Hizbullah cadres and amending 
some of the party’s bylaws.204 
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Rafiq Hariri’s assassination and its aftermath
In 2005 dramatic and dynamic events swept Lebanon. The ex-PM 
Rafiq Hariri was assassinated on February 14, 2005 by a massive suicidal 
truck bomb attack in the predominantly Muslim West Beirut.205 Hizbullah 
offered an outright condemnation of the assassination. For the first time, 
people took to the streets in the Muslim part of the capital demanding the 
withdrawal of the Syrian troops and blaming Syria for the Hariri assassina-
tion, a charge that it vehemently denied. On March 8, Hizbullah organised a 
pro-Syrian rally in Downtown Beirut, the heart of the capital. Around half a 
million Hizbullahis along with their supporters and sympathizers filled the 
streets of the capital carrying only Lebanese flags. Like the November 30, 
2004 demonstration Hizbullah did not convey any party banners or slogans; 
it just showed banners stating, “Thanks to Syria” and “No to Syria out”. Nasral-
lah addressed the rally calling for national unity, constructive dialogue, and 
coexistence among all the Lebanese in order to confront the crisis that is 
rupturing the country.206 
Although the aim behind Harir’s assassination might have been to 
militarise Lebanon and bring it back to the brink of civil war, the assassina-
tion resulted in an unprecedented dynamic mobilisation process. The “Cedar 
Revolution” of March 14, 2005 organized by the opposition – where around 
one million Lebanese, mostly Sunnis, Christians, and Druz, took the streets in 
Martyr’s Square of Downtown Beirut demanding the withdrawal of the Syri-
an forces and unveiling the truth about Rafiq Hariri’s murder – accomplished 
most of its goals: the pro-Syrian Karami cabinet resigned; Syrian forces with-
drew; a UN investigation headed by Detlev Mehlis ensued into Hariri’s assas-
sination; the heads of the Lebanese security forces resigned; parliamentary 
elections were held; and a new government was formed. 
The Run up to the formation of a technocrat Cabinet: 
Hizbullah’s Dialogue with the US
On April 19, 2005 Omar Karami’s government resigned and Nagib 
Miqati’s 14-member Cabinet, which in accordance with the Lebanese con-
stitution was evenly divided between Christians and Muslims, was sworn 
in. The government promised to fulfil the opposition’s demands, especially 
the holding of free and fair parliamentary elections, where none of the 
members of the cabinet were entitled to run. In an unprecedented move, 
Hizbullah not only gave a parliamentary vote of confidence to the Miqati’s 
cabinet, which received 109 votes out of 128, but also fielded Trad Hamadé, 
a Hizbullah affiliated sympathizer (non-official member)207, for the first time 
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in its history. Hamadé was accorded the service Ministry of Labour and Agri-
culture, an appointment that is supposed to serve as a litmus test to Hiz-
bullah’s future ministerial work in the cabinet. Keeping in mind that the 
US Administration brands Hizbullah as a “terrorist organization”, it neither 
voiced its opposition to such an appointment nor threatened boycotting 
him. On the contrary, in June Hamadé met, with Hizbullah’s blessings, sen-
ior members of the US Administration, including Elizabeth Dibble, the Dep-
uty Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, in his capacity as 
a minister representing Hizbullah in the cabinet. In that meeting Hamadé 
advised the US Administration to consider 1559 as null and void for the 
time being and to place it on the shelf for at least two years.208 This was not 
the only contact between Hizbullah and the US Administration over the 
past few years. In an attempt to discuss the problematic that was imped-
ing Muslim-European-US dialogue, a lot of unofficial meetings took place 
between the two parties in Beirut, Amsterdam, Rabat, Geneva, and Oman. 
Graham Fuller, a former intelligence officer at the CIA, has conducted dia-
logue sessions with Hizbullah officials, most notably in March 2005 with 
Nawwaf al-Musawi.209
The May/June 2005 parliamentary elections: The first after the 
Syrian withdrawal
Hizbullah’s political program 
Hizbullah called for reforming the election law trying to lobby the 
government to replace the old law by a new one based on proportional rep-
resentation, which the party believed would give the 18-ethno-confessional 
communities a more equitable chance for a proper representation. As soon 
as the Lebanese state announced that it would conduct the elections based 
on the 2000 election law, Na‘im Qasim outlined the party’s 2005 election 
program: (1) Safeguard the Resistance. (2) Facilitate the mission of the UN 
investigating team into Hariri’s assassination. (3) Maintain a special relation-
ship between Lebanon and Syria. (4) Reject foreign interference in Leba-
nese affairs. (5) Work hard towards attracting the largest popular support. 
(6) Affirm the value of national dialogue. (7) Stress the need for a compre-
hensive socio-economic program.210 Hizbullah emphasized that its election 
alliances would not be at the expense of its political alliances. It also clarified 
that the most salient article in its election program is protecting the Resist-
ance, which comes as no surprise since this has been the first article in all its 
previous parliamentary elections programs: 1992, 1996, and 2000.
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2005 election results 
Based on this election program, Hizbullah made a strong showing in 
the parliamentary elections through a political-strategic alliance with AMAL 
and other players. In the first round of the elections, which took place on 
May 29 in Beirut, Sa‘d Hariri’s entire 19-member list was elected, including 
Hizbullah’s candidate. The voter turn out was estimated to be 28%. The sec-
ond round of the elections took place on June 5 in the South, one of Hizbul-
lah’s strong holds and a major constituency. Hizbullah’s alliance with AMAL 
won a landslide victory appropriating all the 23 seats. In spite of the calls for 
boycotting the elections, the turn out was an unprecedented 45%, 1% high-
er than five years ago. What is telling is that there were more than 100,000 
votes difference between the last winner and the first loser.211 In spite of 
the Christian boycott that dramatically lowered the overall turn out average, 
Hizbullah picked up more than 88% of 45% turn out, where all of Hizbul-
lah’s 6 candidates made a sweeping victory receiving the highest number of 
votes in the country. The biggest and most intense round of elections, where 
58 seats were out for grabs, took place on June 12 in Mount Lebanon and the 
Biqa‘, which is Hizbullah’s major constituency and strong hold, “the reservoir 
of the Resistance”, as Hizbullah’s cadres term it. In B‘albak-Hirmel voter turn 
out was more than 52%. All of Hizbullah’s 6 candidates were elected. Also, 
in Mount Lebanon Hizbullah’s candidate was elected. On June 19 the fourth 
and last round of the elections took place in the North. The Hariri coalition 
needed 21 seats in order to obtain the majority in the parliament; however, 
he and his allies captured all of the 28 seats.212 Unlike the elections in Beirut, 
the South, and the Biqa‘, Hizbullah did not have a say at all in the elections 
in the North, since, according to Qasim, the number of voters it could influ-
ence is very small.213 
Although the 2005 parliamentary elections were conducted accord-
ing to the 2000 election law, the direct opposite of 2000 happened, maybe 
because the Syrians were not physically present anymore. The opposition 
to Syrian influence led by the Sa‘d Hariri camp won 72 seats out of the 
128.214 The new parliament was composed of 61 new MPs and 67 former 
ones. However, many leading pro-Syrian cadres failed to be re-elected and 
out of the 84 pro-Syrian MPs in the previous parliament, only 4 remained.215 
Sa‘d Hariri clarified that he is not anti-Syrian and aspires for good and bal-
anced relations between Syria and Lebanon; rather he is against Syrian 
tutelage.
In accordance with its rotation policy and in order to ensure better 
representation, accountability, and transparency, Hizbullah succeeded in 
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fielding 10 new candidates, including a Maronite Christian and two Sunnis, as 
well as four previous candidates in the 2005 parliamentary elections.216 Thus, 
Hizbullah’s parliamentary bloc entitled, “Loyalty to the Resistance,” added two 
more seats to its earlier 12-seat representation in 1992 and 2000. A member 
of Hizbullah’s Bloc was elected as the head of the parliamentary committee 
of media and communication, and the reset of the Bloc members participat-
ed in the following parliamentary committees: finance; public administration 
and justice; education and culture; public health; defence and municipalities; 
public works and energy; agriculture and tourism; environment; economy, 
commerce, and industry; youth and athletics; and human rights.
The employment of al-taklif al-shar‘i in the elections 
The leader of the parliamentary opposition – Michel ‘Aun who repeat-
edly stated that the safety of the Resistance is conducive to the safety of 
Lebanon – criticized exploiting “God” in the elections blasting Hizbullah’s 
call for its supporters to vote in the elections from the stance of al-taklif al-
shar‘i. Hizbullah responded through the head of its Political Council, Sayyid 
Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyid, who argued that the party’s al-taklif al-shar‘i is in 
conformity with its strict obedience and discipline, which constitute the ful-
crum of its organizational structure.217 
Not surprisingly, Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah blasted Hiz-
bullah’s employment of taklif shar‘i in the elections, accusing the party of 
exploiting taklif as a commodity in the political bazaar in order to polish 
its reputation and boost its credentials. He cautioned that, on the long run, 
people would get used to these “perverted practices” that do not adhere to 
religious safeguards and injunctions, an eventuality that would ultimately 
lead to stripping Islamic concepts and norms of their purity, authenticity, 
and reach out to the populace.218 Sayyid Fadlallah clarified that Khamina’i 
considers that Hizbullah’s leadership shoulders the responsibility of execut-
ing his injunctions through taklif, and abides by God’s injunctions in both 
the religious and political spheres. In this way, taklif originates from per-
sonal choices that people are responsible for in front of God. Thus, Fadlallah 
added, by choosing a candidate, people are giving that incumbent a blank 
check. To the contrary, Fadlallah considers the people free to elect their rep-
resentatives on the objective criteria of merit, probity, and integrity: “I do 
not consider that al-taklif al-shar‘i amounts to electing the corrupt, the crim-
inals, the murderers, the wayward, etc.” Fadlallah concluded that Hizbullah 
employs al-taklif al-shar‘i from the stance of a political-pragmatic maslaha 
(interest) in order to legitimise itself.219
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Repercussions of the elections
Contrary to the US Administration’s stance on Hizbullah, Sa‘d Hariri 
stressed that, like his father, the Lebanese state, and most Lebanese citizens, 
he considers Hizbullah as a national liberation resistance movement and 
not a militia.220 He added that Hizbullah would not be disarmed in the near 
future, unless a comprehensive peace settlement is reached in the Middle 
East. In that case, the Lebanese would sit together and discuss Hizbullah’s 
military role.221 Sa‘d Hariri was echoing his father’s earlier position as com-
municated by Nasrallah who revealed that he held regular weekly meetings 
with Hariri in order to discuss the future of the Resistance. In these meetings, 
Nasrallah purported that Hariri promised that he would neither fight the 
Resistance nor allow Lebanon to become another Algeria, rather he would 
resign and leave the country.222 Nasrallah stated: “If anybody entertained 
the idea of disarming Hizbullah, then we will fight him as the martyrs did in 
Karbala”.223 
On the whole, Hizbullah’s interpreted its performance in the parlia-
mentary elections as national-political referendum, which constitutes a 
“slap in the face” of the international pressure to disarm it led by US and 
France, and presented a great disappointment to Israel.224 The results of the 
elections imply that Hizbullah is going to hold on to its arms, being granted 
legitimacy from the people. Nasrallah stressed that the current parliament 
is the most important and most dangerous parliament since 1992 because 
it is obliged to decide the basic political and strategic choices for Lebanon 
in the decades to come.225 
To date, Hizballah’s record in this “most important” parliament is 
mixed. The party helped to prevent the proposed pardon of the SLA who 
fled to Israel in the wake of the “Liberation” or the Israeli withdrawal in May 
2000.226 Nasrallah considered the proposal “a big insult” to the Lebanese 
people and “an unequivocal threat to national security”.227 But the legislators 
did pardon Samir Geagea – the leader of the right wing Christian Lebanese 
Forces (LF) who has served an 11-year jail sentence – and the Sunni Islamists 
who served a 5-year jail sentence. Hizbullah’s bloc opposed this measure by 
walking out of the parliament before the vote began; however, it endorsed 
the pardoning of the ex-Minister of Energy, Barsumian, and lifting the ban 
on the anti-Syrian MTV.228 Parliament is scheduled to enact a new and more 
representative electoral law, and is holding weekly hearings to check the 
performance of the cabinet, a first in Lebanese politics. It is also discuss-
ing the disarmament of Palestinians inside and outside refugee camps in 
accordance with UNSC 1559, which many consider the prelude to discus-
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sions of Hizballah’s disarmament. To Hizballah’s dismay, the parliament 
debated whether it should avail itself of FBI assistance in training Lebanese 
security forces to better investigate killings and assassination attempts tar-
geting politicians and journalists.
Four days after Shaykh ‘Afif al-Nabulsi, the head of the Shi‘ite religious 
scholars of Jabal ‘Amil, granted Hizbullah religious approval and legitimacy 
to its participation in the Lebanese cabinet229, on June 10, 2005, Nasrallah 
delivered a fiery speech in which he announced Hizbullah’s intention to 
play a leading political and developmental role by fully integrating in the 
Lebanese public sphere through a complete enrolment in Lebanese political 
and economic life as well as participation in all the Lebanese government’s 
institutions including the cabinet.230 The party deemed it necessary to seek 
a seat at the cabinet table so as to be able at least to speak strongly and 
directly to power against steps it opposes.231
The Formation of the first cabinet after the Syrian withdrawal 
and its aftermath 
After Berri’s election as Speaker for a fourth consecutive term on June 
30, 2005, al-Sanyura, the ex-Minister of Finance and a veteran of the Hariri 
bloc, was appointed by the Lebanese president, in light of the mandatory 
parliamentary consultations, which resulted in the historical precedent232 of 
126 out of 128 votes nominating al-Sanyura, to form the new cabinet. The 
newly elected LF MP Edmond N‘im – the Lebanese Maronite judicial, constitu-
tional, and international law expert, who earlier condoned Palestinian suicide 
bombers233 – argued from the stance of public international law that Hizbul-
lah should not give up its arms before Israel withdraws from the occupied 
1967 Palestinian territories, since Hizbullah or any other group or state are 
entitled to come to the rescue of the weaker party, as he purported.234 By this 
N‘im gave Hizbullah’s disarmament a regional dimension. On his part, the 
Syrian PM, Muhammad Naji al-‘Utari, stated that Hizbullah’s disarmament 
posses a threat to Syria’s national security since Lebanon would become a 
“playground for Israeli intelligence”, as he put it.235
The tensed political situation, the spate of bombings and assassina-
tions236 that rocked civil peace, the Syrian economic transit embargo effec-
tive early July, and regional tensions negatively effected the Lebanese tour-
ism season and curtailed a badly needed substantial income in foreign cur-
rency. In addition to the explicitly stated reason for Syria’s de facto economic 
punishment of Lebanon, namely fear of smuggling guns and explosives to 
Syria on board of transit trucks, the Syrian authorities asked for compensa-
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tion for its alleged killed and abused workers, a claim rejected as unfounded 
by Lebanese officials. 
After 19 days of political bickering over key ministries, and after five 
meetings between Sanyura and Lahud, and four previous draft line-ups, the 
first “national unity” 24-seat cabinet after the Syrian withdrawal saw the light 
on July 19. In addition to Trad Hamadé, who retained his post as Minister of 
Labour, for the first time, a veteran leading cadre, Muhammad Fnaysh, who 
was accorded the Energy Ministry, directly represented Hizbullah. Thus, Hiz-
bullah was granted two service ministries and its rival AMAL also obtained 
the ministries of Health and Agriculture. During the negotiations that pre-
ceded the formation of the cabinet, Hizbullah endeavoured to break the 
taboo that bars Islamic movements from obtaining the two sensitive minis-
tries of Defence and Foreign Affairs. Hizbullah lobbied hard for the Foreign 
Ministry, but International pressure, especially from the US and France, as 
well as domestic Lebanese reservations barred Hizbullah from realizing its 
dream. In order to avoid the deadlock, Hizbullah proposed a moderate Shi‘ite 
independent, Fawzi Sallukh, an ex-ambassador and a veteran diplomat who 
is also acceptable to AMAL, and it got what it wanted. However, it is worth 
mentioning that Hizbullah is represented in the parliamentary committee 
for foreign affairs by two MPs who were elected for that post.237
In response to Fnaysh’s appointment, the US Department of State 
said it would not have any dealings with “terrorists”, clarifying that it would 
only boycott the Hizbullah minister, but would have regular dealings with 
the cabinet. Fnaysh responded that the US should stop interfering in Leba-
nese domestic affairs and leave the Lebanese to their own devices. Con-
doleezza Rice’s unexpected visit to Lebanon on July 22 aimed at buttressing 
“Lebanon’s progressive path towards democracy”. She affirmed the interna-
tional community’s stance of standing by Lebanon and communicated the 
US Administration’s will of the full implementation of the 1559, stressing 
Hizbullah’s disarmament. Hizbullah’s MP Husayn Hajj Hasan stated that the 
party refuses to have any dealings with the “oppressive US Administration 
that is aggressing against freedom and democracy” by not recognizing the 
public will of the Lebanese people that accorded Hizbullah representation 
in the parliament and cabinet.238 
On July 30, the parliament granted its vote of confidence to the cabi-
net, thus approving its policy statement, by a majority of 92 votes.239 The 
policy statement upheld Hizbullah’s right to bear arms and defend the “sov-
ereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon”, while at the same time stressed 
its respect to all the UN Resolutions, without specifically mentioning 1559, 
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rather 194 that deals with the Palestinian refugees’ right of return. The next 
day, Sanyura visited Syria in an endeavour to smoothen the relations. His 
talks bore fruit and on the following day, August 1, Syria partially lifted its 
economic embargo and opened its border to Lebanese transit trucks. 
On a parallel track, between July 31 and August 6, Nasrallah along with 
members of Hizbullah’s Shura Council visited Tehran in order to attend the 
inauguration of the newly elected president Mahmud Ahmadi Nejad as well 
as conduct meetings with him, Imam ‘Ali Khamina’i, and other Iranian offi-
cials. The Iranian leadership assured Hizbullah that disarming it is a “mirage”. 
Attempting to capitalise on Hizbullah’s gains and boost his regional stance, 
the Syrian president embarked on a two-day visit to Tehran immediately 
after Hizbullah’s return. Nejad said that Syria constitutes the Islamic umma’s 
first line of defence.
On August 17, Israel relinquished the Gaza strip after 38 years of 
occupation. Nasrallah termed this eventuality as a historical victory for the 
Palestinian resistance and the Intifada as well as the second triumph for Hiz-
bullah’s model of resistance in five years: “The choice of resistance liberates 
Gaza”. He added that this constitutes further proof for the utility of holding 
on to the weapons of the Hizbullah’s Islamic Resistance. Qasim termed the 
Israeli withdrawal as defeat expropriated by the Palestinians through mili-
tary force.240
On October 21 the Lebanese government received an official copy of 
the Detlev Mehlis Report, which Mehlis presented 36 hours earlier to Koffi 
Annan, the UN Secretary General. The Report was almost immediately leaked 
to the press. Although the Report was “legally inconclusive”, but “politically 
powerful”241, it implicated high-ranking Syrian and Lebanese officials in the 
assassination. Unlike other political parties and politicians who commented 
in an impromptu way on the Report, Hizbullah declined to comment until it 
thoroughly studied it. On October 24, AMAL and Hizbullah released a three-
point joint declaration: (1) criticising the report for failing to disseminate 
the long awaited truth. (2) The statement suggested that cracking the truth 
requires a more thorough and serious judicial investigation based upon tan-
gible-conclusive evidences as opposed to attempts aiming at politicising the 
report. In spite of that, the statement endorsed the Lebanese government’s 
decision to extend the mandate of Mehlis’ team till December 15, 2005. (3) In 
order to confront the US-Israeli led campaign against Syria, both AMAL and 
Hizbullah anticipated any UN Security Council resolution that might censure 
Syria, by refusing any imposition of sanctions on the Syrian regime.242 It is 
worth mentioning that this stance mirrors, more or less, the Syrian posi-
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tion that blasted the report as being politicised, inconclusive, and dogmatic 
– aiming at serving the US-Israeli interests in the Middle East.
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This chapter presents the constituents of the Shi‘ite religious ideology 
that form the background of Hizbullah’s religious ideology. The constituents 
of Hizbullah’s religious ideology are the following: (1) belief in Shi‘a1 Islam; 
(2) wilayat al-faqih (guardianship of the jurisprudent or jurisconsult); (3) 
and jihad (struggle) fi sabili Allah (in the way of God).2 “Section I” describes 
the classical Shi‘ite doctrines or the fundamentals of the Shi‘ite faith and 
its basic historical development in order to determine which lines and out-
look Hizbullah follows; “Section II” discusses Imam Khumayni’s elaboration 
of the Shi‘ite religious ideology; “Section III” outlines Ayatullah Fadlallah’s 
possible contribution to Hizbullah’s ideology and thinking; and “Section IV” 
highlights Hizbullah’s acceptance, choice, and application of this heritage 
indicating on what does Hizbullah put emphasis on. This will be followed by 
a summary of the basic constituents of Hizbullah’s religious ideology.
I The Basic Shi‘ite Foundational 
Religious Ideology
1. Belief in Shi‘a Islam
Traditionally, Twelver Shi‘ite communities – in addition to their belief 
in the (1) Imama (doctrine of the Imamate) as a fundamental requirement of 
faith – believed also in the necessity of practicing (2) taqiyya (expedient dis-
simulation) as a quietist practice for protecting the self, and (3) ta‘bi’a (mobi-
lization), at a later stage, as an activist practice for defending the self. These 
three principles offer an insight into the basic Shi‘ite religious ideology.
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1.1 Imama
The arkan (five pillars) of Islam are the following: al-shahadatayn3 
(Muslim confession/declaration of faith), salat (the five daily ritual prayers), 
sawm (fasting), hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca), and zakat (alms giving). To these, 
Twelver Shi‘ism adds khums4 (one-fifth religious tax), jihad, and al-amr bi 
al-ma‘rub wa al-nahi ‘an al-munkar (enjoining the good and prohibiting the 
evil). Parallel to the arkan, Twelver Shi‘ism believes in usul al-din (the foun-
dations of faith), which consist of: tawhid (divine unity), nubuwwa (Prophet-
hood), Imama, ‘adl ( justice), and al-ma‘ad (resurrection).5 Imama, the most 
distinctive mark of Shi‘ite Islam, stipulates that the essential, primary, and 
sufficient attributes of the Imam boil down to three principles, which form 
the essence of the Shi‘ite theocratic dogma: (1) apostolic succession; (2) al-
‘isma (immunity from sin and error); and (3) perenniality or perpetuity of the 
Imamate. 
1.1.1 Apostolic Succession
The Shi‘ites believe that God instructed the Prophet to select ‘Ali as 
his successor and designate him and his two sons, Hasan and Husayn, as 
Imams down to the Twelfth Imam; as such, the Prophet would have named 
the eleven Imams that would succeed ‘Ali in the Imamate.6 Thus, from that 
time onwards, the Imams always designated their successors. However ‘Ali, 
the first Imam, accepted Mu‘awiya’s tahkim (arbitration) in order to salvage 
Islam from internal or civil strife. After ‘Ali was killed in January 661, Mu‘awiya 
became Caliph.7 
According to Shi‘ite doctrine, the succession of the Imamate is deter-
mined only by nass (divinely inspired designation). Nass refers to the specific 
designation of an Imam by the preceding Imam. According to Shi‘ite tradi-
tions, the nass is stipulated in the Qur’an (4:58): “God has ordered you to 
make over the trust to those who are entitled to them”.8 Thus, apostolic suc-
cession means that the Imams succeed each other exclusively in the House-
hold of the Prophet. This first principle is labelled as Imamat al-nass (divine 
designation or textual Imamat) or “the conferment of the Imamate by desig-
nation or covenant”. Imamat al-nass was first practiced when God conferred 
the title upon the Prophet. In a similar vein, the Imamate after the Prophet 
should be established solely by designation in order to determine his suc-
cessors.9 According to Imam Ja’far al-Sadiq, the sixth Imam, every Imam has 
foreknowledge of the Imam who is going to succeed him. That is why he 
designates him by nass.10 Thus, nass is blended with ‘ilm (religious knowl-
edge), a subsidiary characteristic or attribute of the Imam. ‘Ilm stipulates 
‘ T H E  S H I F T S  I N  H I Z B U L L A H ' S  I D E O L O G Y ’
71
that the Imam is the most learned in all branches of religious knowledge 
(al-‘ilm al-muhit or al-ihatah fi al-‘ilm), and he transmits his special religious 
knowledge to his successor.11
Since God, the Prophet, and the members of the House are the only 
ones knowledgeable about the Truth of Islam,12 the Imam, in his capacity as 
being designated by God through his Prophet as being the most learned in 
all branches of religious knowledge, is the only one entitled and capable of 
providing ta’wil (hermeneutics or an esoteric interpretation of the Qur’an), 
which is of fundamental importance and is the principal source of shari‘a 
(divine law, Islamic law). Like the Mu‘tazala and most mystics, the Twelver 
Shi‘ites consider the Qur’an as created in time, the created Word of God, thus 
open to allegorical interpretation.13 And so, for the Shi‘ites, religion, and 
especially the Qur’an, has besides the exoteric meaning an esoteric meaning 
that can only be known through spiritual contact with Imam al-Mahdi.14 On 
these grounds, the Shi‘ites believe that the twelve Imams are endowed with 
both esoteric and exoteric knowledge of the Qur’an and hadith (Prophetic 
Traditions). The divergence with the Sunnis is that the latter consider solely 
the Qur’an and Traditions as the primary sources of shari‘a, while the Shi‘is 
consider that religion cannot be perfected except through the pursuit of 
both the exoteric (Qur’an and Traditions) and the esoteric (the Imam). The 
departure from the Sunnis in this respect is in the belief that Islam is not 
revealed to man once and for all in the Qur’anic text; rather, it is a continuous 
process awaiting the successive rise of the Imams. Thus, the Imam being the 
legatee and guardian of the shari‘a, the source of trust in the interpretation 
and the understanding of both the esoteric and exoteric meanings of the 
Qur’an and hadith, is definitely the most erudite in religious matters. The 
Imam is the hujja (apodictic proof ) of God to mankind, thus engendering a 
mandatory obedience on each and every Shi‘ite.
Indeed, the Shi‘ites consider the Imamate a divine appointment by 
designation (al-istikhlaf bi al-nass wa al-ta‘yyin) or appointment of the suc-
cessor or vicar by a divine designation, unlike the Sunnis who consider the 
Caliphate a product of consensus, thus a political process (al-istikhlaf bi al-
shura wa al-bayy‘a) or appointment of the successor or vicar by consultation 
and mutual homage. The Shi‘a abide by the following hadiths: “The Imams 
will not confer upon an error”; “Islam is still a fortress of the Twelve Imams”, 
while the Sunnis adhere to the following hadith: “The umma will not confer 
upon an error”.15
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1.1.2 Al-‘isma (immunity from sin and error)
The second principle is al-‘isma or infallibility and impeccability of the 
prophets and the Imams, which only God has foreknowledge of. The source 
of this infallibility from errors and immunity from sins is the Divine Light, 
which in turn will lead to hikma (divine wisdom).16 The Shi‘ite Imams, the 
guardians of the shari‘a, who are deemed perfect and do not suffer from any 
defect, are infallible and pure from any defilement; they do not commit sins 
whether major or minor. According to Shi‘ite traditions this is substantiated 
by the Qur’an (33:33): “People of the House, God only desires to put away 
from you abomination and to cleanse you” [‘make you really pure’ according 
to other renderings].17 This has been interpreted to signify the sinlessness 
of the Prophet, Fatima and the twelve Imams, which has also been dem-
onstrated by tradition, the most eminent being: “I [Prophet Muhammad], 
‘Ali, Hasan, Husayn and nine of the descendants of Husayn are pure and 
sinless”.18 Moreover, ‘isma entails impeccability, sinlessness, and infallibil-
ity of the Imams. As Imam Ja‘far al-Sadiq maintains: “The one who is sinless 
(ma‘sum) is the one who is prevented by God from doing anything that God 
has forbidden. For God has said: ‘He who cleaves to God is guided to the 
Straight Path’ [al-Sirat al-Mustaqim]”.19 
1.1.3 Perenniality or perpetuity of the Imamate
The third principle is perenniality or perpetuity of the Imamate, name-
ly, the necessity for the permanent existence of an Imam. Thus, the earth is 
not left without a living Imam who is the hadi (guide) and hujja of God. The 
theory of the Imamate stipulated the necessity of the perpetual existence 
of a living Imam to guide mankind. The occultation of the Imam made him 
aloof from politics without encroaching on the principle of his perenniality. 
Ja‘far al-Sadiq placed the Imam above the ruler, who must abide by what the 
Imam’s religious edicts since he is the supreme religious authority.20
A corollary of this category is the necessity of recognizing the living 
Imam. Shaykh Saduq or Ibn Babawayh21 (306/918-381/991) asserted that 
remuneration is for belief in the Imam and recognizing him. Imam Ja‘far 
al-Sadiq stressed that God prepares the ground for the death of a prophet 
only after He has ordered him to appoint a successor from his lineage… 
The Shi‘ites should always recognize their Imam and obey him as a religious 
duty. And so, the existence of the Imam is a necessary grace. Indeed, it is 
the religious obligation of every Shi‘ite to recognize and obey the Imam of 
his time. He who perishes without recognizing the Imam of his age – even 
though he has recognized past Imams – is doomed to eternal damnation, 
73
condemnation, and jahiliyya (pre-Islamic pagan) death. Thus, a Shi‘ite can-
not ascend to heaven without acknowledging the living Imam.22 
Recognizing the Imam has been a complicated process for the Shi‘ite 
community after the disappearance of the Twelveth Imam, al-Mahdi, at 
the age of seven, thus starting the Lesser Occultation in 874 AD. With this 
eventuality, the line of the twelve Imams came to an end. For the next 67 
years Imam al-Mahdi maintained communication with the Shi‘ite commu-
nity through four directly appointed intermediaries or private deputies. In 
941 AD, a few days before the death of the fourth deputy, Imam al-Mahdi 
is believed to have declared the end of the Lesser Occultation, thus he sev-
ered communication with the Shi‘ite community and declared the begin-
ning of the Greater Occultation.23 In the Greater Occultation no deputies 
were appointed as intermediaries between Imam al-Mahdi and the Shi‘ite 
community, rather the mode of representation of Imam al-Mahdi changed 
to a na’ib ‘am (general deputy) by high-ranking mujtahids (Shi‘ite jurists) 
whose integrity is unquestionable and who possess insight into temporal 
and religious matters. And so, the Shi‘ite community has been waiting for 
the Mahdi’s return, who will found justice and peace on earth by establish-
ing an Ideal Islamic order (nizam Islami).24 
Around the end of the eighteenth century25, the leading mujtahid 
became synonymous with the faqih ( jurisprudent) or marja‘ al-taqlid, who is 
considered the supreme Islamic legal authority to be emulated, or accepted 
for emulation, by the majority of the Shi‘a in matters of religious practice 
and law since he is regarded as the most knowledgeable.26 
1.1.3.1 The Development of marja‘iyya (religious authority)
Shi‘ite history has been replete with or characterised by a plurality, 
polarity, and multiplicity of marja‘s (religious authorities) who monopolised 
religious knowledge. Marja‘iyya came about as a result of a struggle between 
the Akhbari and Usuli schools of jurisprudence, a struggle that slumbered for 
centuries and was only finally adjudicated a few centuries ago in favour of 
the Usulis, who stressed, among other things, the right of the ‘ulama to ijti-
had (independent reasoning) and the taqlid (emulation) of living mujtahids, 
practices which were totally opposed by the Akhbaris. Marja‘iyya in Shi‘ism 
got its prominence as a real power in society since the Safavid period. In 
fact, religious knowledge has been for centuries the sole prerogative of the 
institution of marja‘iyya that appropriated, constructed, and disseminated 
that religious knowledge to the faithful Shi‘ite populace, and through this 
process it accumulated and transformed this religious knowledge into reli-
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gious legitimacy. Since the marja‘s’ authority is measured by the following 
they muster, the relationship between them and the populace has been one 
of interdependence whereby the populace, through their payment of al-
huquq al-shar‘iyya (legal rights) of zakat and khums financially sustain the 
institution of marja‘iyya, and in return the populace is granted a religious 
authority to emulate. Since the hierarchy of the marja‘s is measured by the 
size of their following and wealth, and is not solely determined by their reli-
gious-academic qualifications – adhering to a certain marja‘iyya not only 
wielded religious legitimacy, but also conferred a certain religious ideology 
to the populace. In principle, the Shi‘ites follow the marja‘ whom they feel 
itmi’nan27 (peace of mind) with.28 
1.1.3.2 Stages of ijtihad leading to marja‘iyya
The person who intends to become a marja‘, also called muqallad 
(emulated or followed), should fulfil certain scholarly requirements to attain 
the degree of marja‘iyya. Basically, he has to cover the following three levels: 
al-muqaddimat (the prolegomena), sutuh (corpus of knowledge), and bahth 
al-kharij (extracurricular research). In al-muqaddimat the student spends an 
average of three to five years learning grammar, rhetoric, and logic.29 In the 
sutuh the student studies jurisprudence and positive law (man-made law).30 
The student spends three to six years in this stage, where he could freely 
choose his mentor/s who would recommend certain textbooks to be studied, 
in preparation to exercise independent reasoning. The bahth al-kharij is the 
third and final stage of religious study in which the graduate student heavily 
participates, in a seminar setting, in the ongoing debates taking place in the 
religious seminary. It is worth mentioning that this stage is referred to as the 
extracurricular research since there is no specific textbook; rather the men-
tor would lecture from his own notes, which are based on his knowledge. 
After fulfilling these criteria, the student acquires the title of mujtahid. It is 
note worthy to mention that only after the mujtahid publishes his judicial 
decisions or fatwas (religious edits), he becomes a marja‘.31
The essential function of the marja‘ is to guide the community of those 
who “imitate” his teachings and follow his precepts, in particular concerning 
the following two issues: (1) the application of the rules of the shari‘a as furu‘ 
al-din (subsidiary principles of religion) and (2) ahkam ( judicial solutions or 
legal qualifications) in regard to the problems of contemporary life. Theo-
retically, the imitation or following of the marja‘ has no connection with usul 
al-din, which are derived from iman (faith) and from yaqin (inner conviction). 
The mujtahid established as marja‘ must pronounce judicial decisions and 
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write one or more books as a risala ‘amaliyya (practical treatise) in order to 
guide his followers. Only after publishing his risala ‘amaliyya he becomes 
recognised as a Grand marja‘ or Grand Ayatullah.32
1.1.3.3 Choosing the marja‘
This is one of the hotly debated issues in Shi‘ite history that has not 
been resolved yet, simply because there is no clear cut established meth-
od for choosing the marja‘. The process of choosing a marja‘, i.e. deciding 
on who is the most knowledgeable among the mujtahids, is influenced by 
many factors such as political, social, and even geographical considerations. 
Another problematic has to do with ethnicity; for instance, being an Arab 
or a Farsi (Persian). Being a graduate of the Iraqi Najaf religious seminary or 
the Iranian Qum religious seminary is also at stake since the two religious 
seminaries have been in fierce competition over the leadership of the Shi‘ite 
community. Usually the person who intends to become a marja‘, who is a 
mujtahid, is “marketed” by a narrow clique that constitutes his entourage, 
who usually are either his disciples or his relatives. He is often promoted to 
attract more followers who emulate his religious authority, and thus pay the 
khums to him. Although the religious seminary has not provided a crystal 
clear method of choosing a marja‘, nonetheless two very important elements 
has been accounted for in this regard. First, is the number of followers and 
their proximity. Second, is the number of mujtahids attending his lectures. A 
third less salient factor to be taken into consideration is his practical treatise 
and publications. Upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned premises the 
marja‘ enjoys shaya‘ (wide reputation), which enables him to join the club of 
grand marja‘s who could have a say in establishing him as such.33
1.2 Taqiyya (expedient dissimulation) as a quietist practice
Taqiyya is rendered into English as precautionary, expedient, or reli-
gious dissimulation or concealment of one’s true convictions or belief. It was 
practiced when the Shi‘ites were facing great perils, which they could not 
shun or had no prospect of triumphant struggle and victory against.34 This 
precept of practice was employed when Shi‘ism was still an underground 
movement in embryonic form struggling to face the Sunnite majority who 
had the upper hand in political matters. As such, taqiyya became part and 
parcel of Shi‘ite tenets35, to the extent that it was regarded as their primary 
trait par excellence.36 
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1.2.1 The legitimisation and justification of taqiyya
1.2.1.1 Qur’an
The legitimisation of taqiyya is based on the Qur’an and hadith. The 
Qur’anic injunction of “enjoining the good, and forbidding the evil” (22:41) 
is regarded as one form of taqiyya.37 Taqiyya is warranted in the Qur’an in 
verses such as (3:28), (16:106), and (40:28). 
Verse (3:28): “Let not the believers take disbelievers for their friends 
in preference to believers. Whoso doeth that hath no connection with Allah 
unless (it be) that ye but guard yourselves against them [tattaqu minhum, 
from the same root as taqiyya] taking (as it were) security [tuqatan, again 
from the same root as taqiyya]. Allah biddeth you beware (only) of Himself. 
Unto Allah is the journeying”. Thus, God adamantly prohibits any kind of inti-
mate relationship with unbelievers or infidels. Therefore, the believer should 
use his discretion to scout out danger and avoid a relationship that might 
unnecessarily endanger his life.38 
Verse (16:106): “Whoever disbelieves in God after believing – except 
for those who are compelled while their hearts are firm in faith – and then finds 
ease in his disbelief, upon him will be the wrath of God’ (The section of this 
verse in italics is held to refer to taqiyya)”.39 This verse illustrates Prophet 
Muhammad’s divine forgiveness, redemption, and purification from sin of 
‘Ammar ibn Yasir, an ‘Alid companion of the Prophet, who was coerced under 
the threat of swords into denouncing his faith in Islam and accepting to wor-
ship the gods of Quraysh. ‘Ammar did that nominally, outwardly; however, 
he remained a pious Muslim wholeheartedly which explains why Prophet 
Muhammad redeemed him. 
Verse (40:28): “Then a believing man of Pharaoh’s folk, who kept hid-
den his belief, said: Will you kill a man for saying: ‘My Lord is Allah’, and he has 
brought you the clear proofs from your Lord? If he is a liar, his lying will recoil 
upon him, but if he is truthful, you will be smitten with some of what he is 
promising you. Allah will not guide one who is an extravagant impostor”. 
This verse exemplifies the story of a pious man, who, while concealing his 
faith, questioned the benefit of killing a man for the sake of his religion.40 
1.2.1.2 Hadith 
There is a whole body of hadiths attributed to Imam ‘Ali and other 
Imams such as Imam Hasan, Imam al-Baqir, and especially Imam Ja’far al-
Sadiq sanctioning taqiyya and emphasizing its vital role as an integral part 
of religion and true piety.41 Imam ‘Ali stated: “It is the mark of belief to prefer 
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justice if it injures you, and injustice if it is of use to you”; “He among you 
who is most honoured before God is the most fearful (of God)”, i.e. he who 
employs taqiyya the most; and “Taqiyya is our jihad”.42 Imam Ja‘far al-Sadiq 
asserted that taqiyya was practiced by Joseph and Abraham.43 Ja‘far al-Sadiq 
stressed taqiyya as the distinguishing trait of Shi‘ite faith: “He who has no 
taqiyya, has no religion”.44 Al-Sadiq affirmed that the person who disclos-
es the concealment and taqiyya of the Shi‘ite faith is the one who rejects 
them.45
In addition to the legitimisation and justification of the taqiyya prac-
tice by the Qur’an and hadith, throughout the course of history almost every 
volume on Shi‘ite jurisprudence contains a justification of taqiyya or out-
lines its principles. Ibn Babawayh stressed that whoever leaves the practice 
of taqiyya before the appearance of the Mahdi will be considered as aposta-
tising and disobeying God, His Prophet, and His Imam. And so, taqiyya is a 
religious obligation imposed on every Twelver Shi‘ite.46
In practicing taqiyya, the Shi‘ites are guided by the precepts of prac-
tice and way of life as exemplified by their Imams, in particular, Ja‘far al-
Sadiq. The Shi‘ites considered the occultation of the Twelfth Imam as the 
exemplary taqiyya.47 Following their Imams’ model of political quietism, the 
Shi‘ites practiced taqiyya in order to prevent their persecution and oppres-
sion, trying to adjust their roles to the various political regimes of the time. 
In practicing taqiyya the Shi‘ites, especially the ‘ulama, did not take active 
part in politics, rather they favoured the practice and observance of reli-
gion. In summary the persecution of the Shi‘a as a religious minority led 
them to resort to taqiyya, as an esoteric quietist practice, in life-threatening 
situations. Taqiyya does not only include the concealment of one’s convic-
tions, but also the concealment of one’s right to politics. Indeed, the taqi-
yya imprisoned the Shi‘ites in political quietism, and provided the doctrinal 
bases for the depolitisation of the sect.48 
1.3 Ta‘bi’a (mobilization) as an activist practice and Imam Husayn’s 
martyrdom
Ta‘bi’a is a militant practice in Shi‘ism, as in other Muslim sects, 
although its implementation varies among different sects in accordance with 
their ideological background. In the specific Shi‘ite case, ta‘bi’a is defined as 
an act of mobilization whereby the Shi‘as – emulating Imam Husayn’s revo-
lution – rebel, mobilize, and endeavour to seize power and take control of 
government in order to establish the rule of God or Islamic shari‘a, in other 
words, an Islamic order.49 The ta‘bi’a approach has a major historical prec-
T H E  S A L I E N C Y  O F  H I Z B U L L A H ’ S  R E L I G I O U S  I D E O L O G Y
78
‘ T H E  S H I F T S  I N  H I Z B U L L A H ' S  I D E O L O G Y ’
edent. Imam Husayn – Sayyid al-Shuhada (the leading martyr) according to 
Shi‘ite doctrine – mobilized his followers and revolted against the Umayy-
ads, who according to him, deviated from Islam, in order to restore the right 
of the Holy House of the Prophet to government. Imam Husyn marshalled 
his followers and faced the Umayyads at the eminent battle of Karbala’ in the 
tenth of Muharram50 61 AH (October 9, 680 AD) where he and around 70 of 
his family, close relatives, companions, and faithful followers were killed and 
overrun by the Umayyads who outnumbered them and were by far better 
equipped. It is believed by devout Shi‘ites that Imam Husayn was “martyred” 
in defence of reform in the umma, wholeheartedly knowing that his stance 
will lead to his martyrdom: “I [Husayn] fought for the reform in my grandfa-
ther’s [Prophet Muhammad’s] umma, and in order to uproot the tyrannical, 
oppressor ruler… God willed to see me killed and slaughtered aggressively 
and oppressively”51, as attributed to him.
Because this eventuality occurred on the tenth of Muharram, it was 
dubbed ‘Ashura. Since then, the Shi‘ites, all over the world, classified Kar-
bala’ as one of the greatest incidents in history and commemorated ‘Ashura, 
mourning the martyrdom of imam Husayn by walking barefooted while 
beating their chests, slashing their scalps with swords, and whipping them-
selves with chains.52 Over the period 750 to 950 AD, the Shi‘ites split into 
Zaydis, Twelvers, and Isma‘ili factions. In general, the Zaydis favoured politi-
cal action, the Twelvers were political quietists, and the Isma‘ilis adhered to 
batin (esoteric) and ‘irfan (gnostic) ideas.53 
Although some authors54 seem to refer to the martyrdom of Imam 
Husayn as being “unnecessary and useless” i.e. futile, it is most likely that 
the classical denotative meaning of jihad55 has been radically transformed 
through his martyrdom. An important significance of Imam Husayn’s mar-
tyrdom is its mobilizational effect on the Shi‘ites through a bitter feeling 
of injustice, enjoining them to alter that injustice by practicing ta‘bi’a and 
activism against unjust governments.56 
1.4 Conclusion on taqiyya and ta‘bi’a: Shi‘ism as a religious 
ideology: quietism and activisim 
Historically, Twelver Shi‘ism has been characterised by quietism and 
activisim57, which find their respective application in taqiyya and what is 
defined as ta‘bi’a in Arabic and bassidj in Persian:
As a religious ideology Shi‘ism functions within a specific sociopolitical order 
which constantly calls upon its adherents whether to defend and preserve or 
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to overthrow and transform… Shi‘ite religious ideology is both a critical assess-
ment of human society and a program of action, whether leaning toward a 
quietist authoritarianism or an activist radicalism, as the situation may require, 
to realize God’s will on earth to the fullest extent possible.58
It is worth mentioning that in both practices, namely taqiyya and 
ta‘bi’a, the Shi‘ites are guided by the precepts of practice or ways of life 
of their Imams. For instance, Imam Ja‘far al-Sadiq practiced taqiyya, while 
Imam Husayn practiced ta‘bi’a. And so, the Shi‘ites have been split into two 
factions: those calling for taqiyya and adapting themselves to the various 
regimes; those calling for ta‘bi’a with the aim of assuming power under the 
guardianship and authority of the ‘ulama. During the historical period in 
which taqiyya was practiced, ‘Ashura celebrations were carried underground 
due to fear of persecution by the successive ruling Sunni regimes. Thus, 
with the practice of ta‘bi’a, quietism was replaced by activism. However, this 
mobilization and activism remained underground – form roughly 680 AD 
until the period of the Great Occultation in 941 AD – due to the successive 
Sunni regimes repression on the Shi‘ite population. Establishing an Islamic 
order had not been realized because the Shi‘ites, up till the mid-twentieth 
century, interpreted the martyrdom of Imam Husayn in mystical, lyrical, and 
emotional terms, which were devoid of any political-activist application:
[F]ollowing numerous unsuccessful attempts by the Shi‘ite leaders at different 
times in their history to overthrow the ruling power (even when the power 
was Shi‘ite), Shi‘ites adopted the quietist attitude rather than the activist one. 
There is sufficient historical precedent to argue that the quietist attitude was at 
times adopted as a strategy for survival rather than as principle in itself. In the 
face of unfavorable circumstances it became imperative to protect Shi‘ite life 
from destruction. Moreover, such quietist passivity was justified as a religiously 
sanctioned strategy (taqiyya) to allow for time to regroup and reorganize for 
future activism. These realities render difficult the task of charting precisely the 
ebb and flow of Shi‘ite activism, for given the proper sociopolitical conditions, 
the activist mentality may be seen as merely dormant or latent within Shi‘ite 
quietism… recent Shi‘ite activism has, as in the past, emerged after a period 
of relative quietism in large part because of the central role played by Shi‘ite 
religious leaders and their radical teachings in response to specific sociopoliti-
cal conditions.59 
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Although it seems that the theory of ta‘bi’a and activism dates back 
and can be traced to Imam Husayn’s martyrdom, however, the successful 
implementation of that theory by Twelver Shi‘ites in modern times dates 
back to the third quarter of the twentieth century. Ta‘bi’a started with Imam 
Husayn, then it withered away for many centuries (at least exoteric mobili-
zation), and then it was revived again by Imam Khumayni starting the early 
1960s. By emulating Imam Husayn, ta‘bi’a materialised in the victory of the 
Islamic Revolution in 1979.60 It should be noted here, however, that follow-
ing the death of Imam Husayn, the Shi‘ite leadership went through a state 
of quietest resistance that was manifested mainly in the literary and poet-
ic enterprises by Shi‘ite scholars. This continued till the sixteenth century 
when the founder of Safavid Persia, Shah Isma‘il, launched his war to unite 
the country under his rule by employing the slogan of retaining the lost 
rights of the Prophet’s Household (through ta‘bi’a). Thus, for the first time 
after a lapse of centuries, Shi‘ite militant activism was revived and a Shi‘ite 
state was established in Iran.61 In brief, this change that took place by the 
advent of the Safavids continued to show its impact on the Shi‘ites till today. 
The Constitutional Revolution in Iran in 1905, and before that the Tobacco 
Crisis a decade earlier, and finally the Islamic Revolution in 1979, were all 
variant manifestations of what Shah Isma‘il has started and changed in the 
nature of Shi‘i ta‘bi’a.62 
2. Wilayat al-Faqih (Governance of the Jurisprudent 
or Jurisconsult)
2.1 Definition of wilaya (governance, spiritual guidance)
Wilaya can have two connotations: (1) temporal government or the 
authority to govern with the right to demand obedience; and (2) spiritual 
guidance and sanctity.
According to Imam Ja‘far al-Sadiq, 
The Imam is seen as the spiritual friend or supporter [wali] who guides and initi-
ates mankind into the mystical or inner [esoteric] truth of religion. It is through 
him that God’s grace reaches the Earth… the Imam [guides] mankind onto the 
path of spiritual enlightenment and progress [he is] master and friend in the 
journey of spirit.63
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Thus, wilaya is “the primary expression of the Islamic belief system. [It] 
is not the conventional fundamental pillars of Islamic faith, but rather the 
comprehensive relationship of the Muslim community to the legitimately 
constituted authority in Islamic public order. This is the meaning of the car-
dinal doctrine of wilayah, and it is the sole criterion for judging true faith in 
Shiism”.64 
2.1.2 Historical survey of the wilayat al-faqih doctrine
Wilayat al-faqih refers to the rule of the religious jurist. Throughout 
the course of history many Shi‘ite ‘ulama have contributed to the wilayat al-
faqih doctrine with varying degrees, from a rudimentary perspective to an 
evolutionary one.65 The precursor who paved the way and laid the founda-
tion of this doctrine is al-Karaki66 (1465-1533) who pioneered the suggestion 
that the ‘ulama were the na’ib al-‘am of Imam al-Mahdi. Al-Karaki’s disciple, 
Shahid al-Thani (1506-1558) is considered as the founding father of the doc-
trine. His contribution to the wilayat al-faqih doctrine consists in that he 
“took the concept of Na’ib al-‘Amm to its logical conclusion in the religious 
sphere and applied it to all the religious functions and prerogatives of the 
Hidden Imam. Thus, the judicial authority of the ‘ulama now became a direct 
reflection of the authority of the Imam himself…”.67 
Bihbahani (1706-1792) had the conviction in the mujtahid’s ability to 
establish hujja. Prior to that the title of hujjat al-Islam was only confined to 
Imam al-Mahdi. Moreover, in addition to his endorsement of the Usuli school 
on the right of the ‘ulama in ijtihad, Bihbahani settled the way for recogniz-
ing the legitimacy of the transfer of the Hidden Imam’s religious authority, 
but not his political authority. A mujtahid was no more considered a general 
deputy of the Hidden Imam; rather, mujtahid and faqih became one and 
the same. Thus, Bihbahani considered the mujtahids as vicegerents of the 
Prophet in religious matters only. Therefore, his contribution lies in fusing the 
religious and social dimensions, but not the political.68 
Mulla Ahmad Naraqi (1771-1829), Bihbahani’s disciple, supported the 
legitimacy of the legal speculation on the part of the faqih in the absence 
of the Hidden Imam. His emphasis on Prophet Muhammad’s succession as 
being the prerogative of religious authority is of special importance since it 
brought the political dimension into the wilayat al-faqih doctrine. As such, 
al-Naraqi was the first to recognise the faqih’s right in political authority. 
Moreover, when he compared a faqih and a king, he placed the former above 
– not even juxtaposed to – the latter, thus, making him the supreme political 
figure of the community. And so, al-Naraqi was the first to stipulate that the 
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political, religious, and social authority of the Hidden Imam can be trans-
ferred to and vested in the faqih. To recapitulate, his major contribution lies 
in adding the political dimension to the religious and social ones.69
Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Na’ini (1860-1936) became the lead-
ing marja‘ in Iran in 1920. Na’ini70 stressed that in the Greater Occultation 
period, the best way to prevent an authority from becoming wayward is 
to abide by an Islamic constitution that guarantees the rights and duties 
of the citizens as well as those of the state. He recommended establish-
ing a council comprised of leading mujtahids, intellectuals, and wise men 
who act in the interest of the people by supervising the implementation 
of the constitution and the affairs of the state. Na’ini stressed wilayat al-
umma ‘ala nafsiha (the governance of the umma by itself ) as a legitimate 
right in the period of the Greater Occultation because this issue falls under 
the hisbi domain (things that God does not allow that we forsake)71, rather 
than general takalif (delegated responsibilities, plural of taklif 72) i.e. the 
governance of the umma by itself is a political and not a shar‘i (religious-
legal) issue. Since it is a practical impossibility for a Shi‘ite to have the del-
egated responsibility to establish God’s Governance, then he has delegated 
responsibility to institute the political-hisbi domain in conformity with the 
interest of the umma. This implies that his enrolment in politics is for the 
sole purpose of transforming a tyrannical power to a democratic authority 
that represents the umma.73 
3. Jihad in the way of God from a Shi‘ite perspective74
The etymology of the word “jihad” is derived from the verb “jahada”, 
which means to exert a person’s energy or to do ones best to overcome 
trouble, difficulty, or hardship. Jihad is total devotion in performing one’s 
religious duty, be it in action or in intention.75
3.1 The general Shi‘ite understanding of jihad and its justification 
in the Qur’an and hadith
The following Qur’anic verse demonstrates the high stature of jihad 
and the mujahidin (those who carry out jihad) in Islam (9:88-89): “But the 
Apostle and those who believe with him struggle [jahadu] with their wealth 
and their lives. To those are the good things reserved, and those are the 
prosperous. Allah has prepared for them gardens beneath which rivers flow, 
abiding therein forever. That is the great triumph!” The saliency of jihad is 
also noticed in a hadith attributed to the Prophet: “Heaven has a door called 
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the ‘door of the mujahidin’. When it opens, they go toward it, wearing their 
swords while the Angels are greeting them”.76 
Imam ‘Ali enjoined jihad: “Jihad is one of the doors of Heaven, God 
opened it for his special saints. Jihad is the garment of the pious; it is God’s 
shield and his assured Heaven”. Another saying attributed to Iman ‘Ali that 
conveys the paramount role of jihad is the following: “Belief has four pillars: 
patience, strong conviction, justice, and jihad”. Imam Ja‘far al-Sadiq exhorted 
believers to conduct jihad: “Jihad is the best thing after religious duties”.77
A different hadith stresses that engaging in jihad leads to dignity, while 
not engaging in it leads to humiliation, loss, degeneration, and disintegra-
tion of the individual as well as the umma: “God clothes a person who leaves 
jihad with humiliation, poverty, and the destruction of his/her religion. God 
has dignified my [the Prophet’s] umma with the hoofs of the horses78 and the 
centres of the spears”. The person who puts jihad aside will live humiliated 
on the personal level because he is crushed and totally impotent in front of 
his enemies, surrendering to their demands. He lives in paucity because his 
enemies manipulate his life and the resources of his country. He gradually 
loses his religion because he was not committed to jihad, which strengthens 
religion and fortifies the believers.79 
Another hadith states that if the believer is incapable of performing 
jihad, or if the objective circumstances preclude him from engaging in it, 
then, at least, he should live interacting with jihad and have the desire or 
intension to conduct it (as persuasive jihad), even if he communicated this 
desire to perform jihad within himself80: “If a person died and he did not 
participate in jihad, and did not even talk within himself about it, then he 
died the death of a hypocrite”. This constitutes a different evaluation to life, 
preferring life with jihad in order to stand up for the right and dignity of the 
umma, as opposed to death in humiliation and capitulation, as Imam ‘Ali 
had said: “Death is living your life crushed with humiliation, and eternal life 
is granted to you if you die while performing jihad”.81
3.1.1 Exoteric and esoteric jihad: smaller and greater jihad
The Qur’an portrays both exoteric and esoteric jihad. The former is 
warranted in (9:36): “… fight [qatalu] the polytheists all together just as they 
fight you all together; and know that Allah is on the side of the righteous”. 
The latter is merited in (29:79): “And those who strive [jahadu] in Our cause 
We shall guide in our ways, and Allah is with the beneficent”. The Prophet 
is reported to have said when he returned from some battles (ghazawat, 
singular of ghazwa): “We returned from the smaller jihad (al-jihad al-asghar) 
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and we still have [to conduct] the greater jihad (al-jihad al-akbar)”. When the 
Prophet was asked, what is the greater jihad? He replied: “the struggle with 
the self (jihad al-nafs)”.82 God has sanctioned the smaller jihad in order to con-
solidate His religion, uphold His word, disseminate His mercy to whomever 
he wishes from his faithful servants, and to “… cause the Truth to triumph 
and nullify falsehood, even though the wicked sinners dislike it ”(Qur’an 8:8). 
God has enjoined the greater jihad in order to save and lift up the souls 
of righteous people to heaven, and rid them from living according to the 
flesh and its material desires in women and wealth: “Attractive to mankind 
is made the love of the pleasures of women, children, heaps upon heaps of 
gold and silver, thoroughbred horses, cattle and cultivable land. Such is the 
pleasure of this worldly life, but unto Allah is the fairest return”. “Say; ‘Shall I 
tell you about something better than that?’ For those who are God-fearing, 
from their Lord are gardens beneath which rivers flow, and in which they 
abide forever [along with] purified spouses and Allah’s good pleasure. Allah 
sees His servants well!” (Qur’an 3:14-15).83
3.1.2 Smaller jihad: initiative (ibtida’i) offensive jihad and defensive 
(difa‘i) jihad 
The classical distinction of smaller jihad, as offensive and defensive 
jihad, is well known in Shi‘a literature and interpretations. It is adequately 
discussed in the Shi‘ite “manual” of jihad and martyrdom.84 The jurisprudents 
divide military jihad (smaller jihad) into the following two categories: (1) initia-
tive offensive jihad, and (2) defensive jihad. Prophet Muhammad conducted 
offensive jihad in order to get rid of the infidels and build the foundations of 
the requisite social milieu for propagating Islam and disseminating its teach-
ings. The following Qur’anic verses testify (justify) to that (9: 12-13): “But if they 
break their oaths after their pledge [is made] and abuse your religion, then 
fight the leaders of unbelief; for they have no regard for oaths, and that per-
chance they may desist”; “Will you not fight a people who broke their oaths 
and intended to drive the Apostle out, seeing that they attacked first? Do you 
fear them? Surely, you ought to fear Allah more, if you are real believers”. “And 
fight them, so that sedition might end and the only religion will be that of 
Allah. Then if they desist, Allah is fully aware of what they do”. (8:39).85 
3.1.2.1 Defensive jihad: military jihad and persuasive non-military jihad
Defensive jihad branches into military jihad and persuasive non-mili-
tary jihad. Military jihad is carried by the Muslims in defence of Islam and 
the Islamic umma. According to the Shi‘ite “manual” of jihad and martyrdom, 
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defensive military jihad is a religious duty in the following nine contexts or 
circumstances86: 
1. If the enemies of Islam attack the Muslim countries in order to ter-
minate Islam, or contrived to do so, then: “And fight for the cause of 
Allah those who fight you, but do not be aggressive. Surely Allah does 
not like the aggressors” (2:190). 
2. If the enemies of Islam attacked any of the Muslim countries in order 
to control it and colonise it, then: “Permission is given to those who 
fight because they are wronged. Surely Allah is capable of giving them 
victory”. “Those who were driven out their homes unjustly, merely for 
their saying: ‘Our Lord is Allah’… ”. (22: 39-40).
3. If a Muslim country is attacked by another Muslim country, then other 
Muslim countries should take the initiative to reconcile the two war-
ring countries. If the aggressor refuses to yield to justice, then other 
Muslim countries should come to the aid of the aggressed upon 
Muslim country: “If two parties of the believers should fight one 
another, bring them peacefully together; but if one of them seeks to 
oppress the other, then fight the oppressor until it reverts to Allah’s 
command. If it reverts, then bring them together in justice and be 
equitable; for Allah loves the equitable” (49:9).
4. If there is an onslaught on the public wealth of Muslims and the 
national riches of the Muslim countries. 
5. If there is an offensive against the selves, possessions, and dignities of 
the Muslims.
6. If there is an onslaught on worshiping God, and the mosques and 
places of prayer are attacked by the enemies in order to obliterate 
Islam: “… Had Allah not repelled some people by others, surely mon-
asteries, churches, synagogues and mosques, wherein the name of 
Allah is mentioned frequently, would have been demolished. Indeed, 
Allah will support whoever supports Him. Allah is surely Strong and 
Mighty” (22:40). 
7. Conduct jihad in order to defend Islamic culture and ethical norms, 
and preclude anti-Islamic cultural and moral campaigns from target-
ing the Islamic umma.
8. Conduct jihad in order to defend the oppressed (mustad‘afin) who 
did not have the capacity to defend themselves against the aggres-
sion and injustice of the oppressors (mustakbirin): “And why don’t you 
fight for the cause of God [fi sabili Allah] and for the down-trodden 
[mustad‘afin], men, women and children, who say: ‘Lord, bring us out 
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of this city whose inhabitants are unjust and grant us, from You, a 
protector, and grant us, from You, a supporter” (4:75).
9. Conduct jihad in order to prevent the propagation of materialism and 
atheism: “So let those who sell the present life for the life to come 
fight in the way of Allah. Whoever fights in the way of Allah and is 
killed or conquers, We shall accord him a great reward” (4:74).
In these nine contexts or similar contexts and circumstances, the 
Shi‘ites have the inalienable natural right in defending their honour, pride, 
dignity, and wealth. For Islam has made this responsibility incumbent upon 
their shoulders; if they portray any negligence in conducting this delicate 
responsibility of jihad, then the enemies of Islam will exercise despotism on 
the Muslims by controlling the political, social, economic, cultural, scien-
tific, and military aspects. In addition, those Muslims who shun jihad will be 
punished and severely tortured at the day of judgement because they have 
deserted and abandoned their faith:
(9:24): “Say: ‘If your (1) fathers, your (2) sons, your (3) brothers, your (4) 
spouses, your (5) relatives, the (6) wealth you have gained, a (7) trade you 
fear might slacken, and (8) dwellings you love are dearer to you than Allah 
and His Apostle or than fighting [jihad] in his way, then wait until Allah fulfils 
His decree. Allah does not guide the sinful people’ ”.87
(9:39): “If you do not march forth, He will inflict a very painful punish-
ment on you and replace you by another people, and you will not harm Him 
in the least; for Allah has power over everything”.88
3.1.2.2 Persuasive non-military jihad
Persuasive non-military jihad is jihad by the tongue and heart, while 
military jihad is jihad by the hand. The following hadiths, attributed to Imam 
Ali, support this interpretation: “Practice jihad in the way of God with your 
hands, if you could not, then practice jihad by your tongue, if you could not 
either, then practice jihad by your hearts”; “God enjoined you to practice 
jihad with your possessions, selves, and tongues in His way”; “The first type 
of jihad you practice is jihad by the hand, then jihad by the tongue, then 
by the heart. He who neither enjoined a good by his heart nor dissuaded 
an evil, he would be turned upside down”; “If a person engages in jihad in 
way of God, with his hand, tongue, and heart, then God would shower him 
with victory and dignity”. In addition, Imam Ali specifies four categories of 
persuasive jihad: “Enjoin the good, forbid the evil, honesty in appropriate 
situations, hatred of the sinful. If a person enjoins the good, God will sup-
port him; if he forbid the evil, then he humiliates the hypocrites; if he is hon-
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est in appropriate situations, then he performed his due; if he despised the 
sinful and was angered for the way of God, then God’s anger would be on 
his side”. The “manual” of jihad stresses that Imam Ali’s hadiths resonate the 
Prophet’s hadiths: “The believer practices jihad with his sword and tongue”; 
“If a person among you sees evil, then let him change it with his hand; if he 
could not, then by his tongue; and if he could not, then by his heart, and this 
is the weakest of faith”.89
3.2 The connection/link between jihad and martyrdom
According to Shi‘ite sources, jihad is related to martyrdom. Jihad has 
two glorious fruits (husnayayyn). The word husnayayyn in (9:52) is taken to 
refer to martyrdom and victory90: “Say: ‘Do you expect for us anything other 
than one of the two fairest outcomes (martyrdom and victory); while we 
await for you that Allah will smite you with a punishment, either from Him, 
or at our hands?’ So wait and watch, we are waiting and watching you”. 91 
3.3 Summary of the general Shi‘ite understanding of jihad
The major distinction is between the smaller jihad (exoteric, external 
jihad) and greater jihad (esoteric, inner jihad). In addition, the following types 
of smaller jihad have been discussed: (1) Initiative jihad or offensive jihad, 
which cannot be practiced anymore after the death of the Prophet and the 
Eleven Imams and the occultation of Imam al-Mahdi. Therefore, only Imam 
al-Mahdi can exercise offensive jihad upon his return. (2) Defensive jihad, 
which in turn branches into military jihad (fighting the enemy in the battle-
field including martyrdom) and non-military jihad (persuasive jihad, such as 
by the tongue and heart, for instance). The distinction between greater jihad 
and smaller non-military jihad is meticulous. Greater jihad is transcendental-
metaphysical, spiritual, and inner jihad; while non-military smaller jihad has 
to do with this world, with the here and now. Although non-military smaller 
jihad is mainly concerned with material things, however, it could also have 
a spiritual dimension, but not to the extent of the transcendental-spiritual 
dimensions of greater jihad.
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II Imam Khumayni’s elaboration on the Shi‘ite 
religious ideology
2. Imam Khumayni’s stance on taqiyya and ta‘bi’a: 
quietism and activisim
Imam Khumayni blatantly rejected the taqiyya practice, which he 
considered to be one of the major sources of the quietism of the Shi‘ites. 
According to Khumayni, taqiyya sanctions a person – in order to safeguard 
his life, money, honour or those of others – to utter an injunction contrary 
to factual evidence (reality) or to commit an action against the shari‘a. He 
added that taqiyya is a non-binding practical necessity, which is an excep-
tion to the norm, rather than being a basic shar‘i principle. His alternative 
was opting for mobilization and political activism; thus, he rejected the qui-
etism of some ‘ulama who argued that sins should proliferate for the Mahdi 
to appear in order to redress injustice. By contending that if sins did not pro-
liferate then the Twelveth Imam would not appear, they retreated from their 
guidance role. And so, Khumayni considered that the practice of taqiyya is 
legitimate only if it is intended to safeguard the self and others from the 
dangers resulting from the application of religious laws and rituals; howev-
er, he stressed that under the Islamic state the necessity and maslaha (inter-
est) of resorting to taqiyya ceases to be. Khumayni affirmed that if Islam is 
in danger, then there is no room for taqiyya or quietism; he also enjoins the 
‘ulama not to practice taqiyya and not to work for an unrighteous govern-
ment. Moreover, according to Imam Khumayni another factor that contrib-
uted to the quietism of the Shi‘ites was their belief that every government 
in the absence of the Hidden Imam is perverted and unjust even if it were 
headed by a Shi‘ite.92 As a result, the Shi‘ite ‘ulama used to recommend to 
their followers not to indulge with government and to refuse governmental 
positions due to the fact that these governments were deemed unjust and 
kuffar (infidel), apostate governments anathematising the political order. 
According to Khumayni, this attitude seems to explain why the Shi‘ites until 
recent decades were not fairly represented in governmental positions; their 
negative attitude towards established government made them quietists 
and hampered their active participation in public and political life.93 
Imam Khumayni depicted Muharram as the month of the victory of 
blood over the sword, which he regarded as a characterization of the Islam-
ic Revolution as such.94 Khumayni argued that everything that the Islamic 
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Revolution has achieved is the result of ‘Ashura; he enjoined the Shi‘ites to 
generate an ‘Ashura in their struggle for establishing an Islamic order. He 
added, if Imam Husayn did not inspire95 the Islamic Revolution, then it would 
not have been victorious. Khumayni asserted that Imam Husayn’s mourning 
ceremonies (majalis al-‘aza’ ) should not be given up because they give life 
to the Shi‘ites and vitalise them.96 According to Khumayni, ‘Ashura means 
the radical change and establishing the community and the state by Islam. 
That is why any Islamic revolution regards Imam Husayn as its ideal, in the 
present and the future, by trying to emulate his revolution that rejected 
partial solutions and was adamant on Islam being the governing (or guid-
ing principle) of all men’s activities in this life.97 Khumayni added, if it were 
not for the leading martyr (sayyid al-shuhada), Imam Husayn, then Yazid, his 
father (Mu‘awiya), and his successors would have made the people forget 
Islam (by their hereditary succession)… Husayn’s revolution protected Islam 
and led the way to the people to mobilize, revolt, and confront anything 
that would endanger the Message (Islam) through deflection and forgery… 
‘Ashura is the real perpetual revolution till God inherits the earth and eve-
rything on it.98 
2.1 Imam Khumayni’s contribution to wilayat al-faqih
Imam Khumayni highlighted the crucial role of al-waliyy faqih or 
faqih99 as a leader of the state and people through his theory of wilayat al-
faqih. According to Imam Khumayni, wilayat al-faqih denotes the guardian-
ship of the jurisprudent or jurisconsult who is the most just and learned in 
all branches of religious knowledge.100 Khumayni’s contribution to wilayat 
al-faqih doctrine is his bringing the theory of na’ib al-‘am to its logical end 
in the political sphere by stipulating and sanctioning the right of the faqih, 
not only to religious and social issues, as his predecessors have argued, 
but also to political leadership.101 In line with the doctrine of the Imamate 
– which stipulates the Imam as the most learned in all theological sciences 
as well as the legitimate authority in all religious, social, and primarily politi-
cal spheres – the wilayat al-faqih sanctions the same legitimate authorities 
to the faqih. 
In other words, Khumayni’s contribution to wilayat al-faqih lies in 
his joining of Imama (Imamate) and Wilaya in one person for the first time 
after the Greater Occultation of the Twelfth Imam, which made possible, in 
the absence of the Hidden Imam, the establishment of an Islamic order. As 
such, wilayat al-faqih is bestowed upon and practiced by one person who 
is the universal authority in all religious, social, and political matters during 
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the period of the Greater Occultation on behalf of the Hidden Imam. From 
this perspective stems its perennial importance to the Shi‘ites in the whole 
Muslim world since they believed that the legal and just government could 
not be re-established until Imamate and Wilaya were united in one person. 
Moreover, since for them there was no explicit recognition of the separation 
of temporal and religious authority, the Imams were considered the supreme 
political and religious leaders of the community. And so, the faqih, in line 
with the Imam, is deemed the hujja of God to mankind, thus engendering a 
mandatory obedience (wajib) on each and every Shi‘ite.102 Imam Khumayni 
became the first supreme faqih who established the principal and tradition 
that future supreme faqihs should be selected by their predecessors, in line 
with the Imams who were designated by their predecessors.103 
Indeed, the bestowing of political authority, in addition to religious 
and social ones, upon a just faqih provided the legitimate and religious 
framework for the establishment of an Islamic order which was previous-
ly considered as a practical impossibility due to the monopoly of political 
authority by the Imams, and later on due to the Greater Occultation. Imam 
Khumayni stressed the necessity of establishing an Islamic order: “It is taken 
for granted or self-evident that the necessity of abiding by the imperatives/
injunctions that stipulated the establishment of Prophet Muhammad’s gov-
ernment are not confined or limited to his time; rather they are a continuous 
process after his death”. Basing himself on a host of Qur’anic verses104, Imam 
Khumayni added that the imperatives/injunctions of Islam are not transient 
being confined to a specific place and time; rather they are perpetual (reli-
gious) duties that should be implemented till eternity.105 On these grounds, 
Khumayni stipulated and strongly advocated that Muslims, in general, and 
Shi‘ites, in particular, have an obligation (wajib) to establish Islamic order 
that would enlighten the Muslim populace through the following process: 
making it conscious of its rights; by halting injustice and oppression: every 
non-Islamic system is polytheism (shirk) and its ruler is regarded as a tyranni-
cal and illegitimate (taghut); by stopping the corruption in the land106: elimi-
nating polytheism and illegitimate rule; by guiding people to the right path; 
and by protecting the Muslims from the tutelage of the enemies and their 
interference in the affairs of the Muslims.107 
And so, the faqih, who like the Imam is infallible108, is the only one who 
has the final say in all executive, legislative, and judicial matters. As God’s 
representative on earth, the faqih supervises the government and has the 
absolute power to declare its acts null and void. Khumayni affirmed, opposi-
tion to wilayat al-faqih “is denying the imams and Islam… I must point out, 
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the government which is a branch of the absolute governance of the Prophet of 
God is among the primary ordinances of Islam, and has precedence over all sec-
ondary ordinances such as prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage”.109 Therefore, Khu-
mayni stipulated that the maslaha of the Islamic order or its agencies gains 
priority over any other principle in the social and political affairs. As such, 
Khumayni developed the theory of al-wilaya al-mutlaqa (absolute wilaya) in 
a way that could perfectly serve his political ends through giving the waliyy 
al-faqih absolute political and religious power.
In conclusion, although the doctrine of wilayat al-faqih cannot be 
only ascribed to Imam Khumayni since it is deeply rooted in classical Shi‘ite 
thought; however, Khumayni was the first to implement the doctrine by com-
bining the social, religious, and political dimensions, thus moving Shi‘ism 
from Imama (Imamate) to wilaya (governance and spiritual guidance). The 
faqih, in the absence of the Hidden Imam is the political and a religious leader 
of the umma.110 Khumayni forcefully asserted that the faqih should depose 
or oust the ruler and rule in his place, thus establishing an Islamic order. 
And so, Imam Khumayni was the first faqih after the Great Occultation and 
in contemporary history to assume the title of the deputy of Imam al-Mahdi 
and to establish an Islamic order through political revolution. 
Khumayni practically proved, by the application of his wilayat al-faqih 
theory, that an Islamic order could be established during the period of the 
Great Occultation, before the return of Imam al-Mahdi. In other words, Khu-
mayni’s wilayat al-faqih made possible the establishment of a just govern-
ment in the absence of the Hidden Imam. Such possibility turned out to 
be the springboard of mobilization and political activism since it conferred 
upon the Shi‘ites the religious duty to establish such a government. Khumay-
ni’s theory of government delegates a minimal role to the people (populace) 
because he passionately believed in the role of the ‘ulama as leaders in both 
public affairs of the state and as spiritual advisors to the faithful. And so, the 
‘ulama were not quietist anymore; on the contrary, they resorted to political 
activism being regarded as successors of the Hidden Imam, thus, engen-
dering complete allegiance from the masses. Thus, wilayat al-faqih embeds 
and is flavoured by a revolutionary character because it calls for the active 
involvement (mobilization) of the ‘ulama in politics and government. 
Khumayni’s innovation was to unequivocally and cogently metamor-
phose Wilayat al-Faqih into a system of political administration. Khumayni in 
his capacity as al-waliyy al-faqih and marja‘ al-taqlid (authority of emulation), 
blended Imama with wilaya with marja‘iyya, which is a precedent in Shi‘ite 
T H E  S A L I E N C Y  O F  H I Z B U L L A H ’ S  R E L I G I O U S  I D E O L O G Y
92
religious ideology. This is of vital importance since in Shi‘ite jurisprudence “the 
ruler’s ordinance abrogates the mujtahid’s fatwa” (hukum al-hakim yanqud 
fatwa al-mujtahid), if the maslaha of the Islamic order requires such a course 
of action. Thus, Khumayni believed in and practiced absolute wilaya. 
2.2 Tadhiyat al-Nafs (self-sacrifice) in connection to jihad and 
martyrdom
2.2.1 Smaller military jihad and martyrdom
Imam Khumayni asserted that it is a must to obey al-waliyy al-faqih in 
general matters among it the defence of Islam and the Muslims against the 
infidels, the tyrants, and the aggressors.111 Khumayni employed sacrifice in 
the context of smaller jihad and martyrdom. He argued that there is noth-
ing to be achieved without sacrifice and martyrdom; martyrdom is eternal 
bliss and dignity. In line with the classical Shi‘ite understanding on the rela-
tionship between jihad and martyrdom (9:52), Khumayni stressed that pious 
Muslims who long for martyrdom are inevitably victorious; they have won 
eternal life, therefore, they are living martyrs. In according the martyrs a 
special status, Khumayni emphasized that they have sacrificed what God 
has granted them, so they have received God’s blessings and eternal felic-
ity; however he acknowledged that the rest of people, including himself, are 
different from them.112 Khumayni added that this conviction in martyrdom is 
a source of tranquillity and the secret of the triumph of the Islamic Revolu-
tion.113
Khumayni declared that it is a legitimate and religious duty to sacri-
fice the self and possessions in defending the land and harbours of the Mus-
lims that are besieged by a foe who threatens the Muslim community and 
territory or pale of Islam.114 According to him the raison d’être or legitimisa-
tion for the sacrifice of the self and possessions is found in a host of Qur’anic 
verses.115 Khumayni was the first faqih to sanction martyrdom operations, 
for both men and women, arguing that they constitute the highest level of 
self-sacrifice for the sake of religion:116 “[A]s Shi‘ites we welcome any oppor-
tunity for sacrificing our blood. Our nation looks forward to an opportunity 
for self-sacrifice and martyrdom”117; as such, “Red death is much better than 
black life”.118 During the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) Imam Khumayni legiti-
mised and enjoined martyrdom by ordering members of the Bassidji119 (1.5 
million 12-year-old martyrs), who were wearing the “key to heaven”, to walk 
through Iraqi landmines. He idealized kids who blew themselves in front of 
enemy tanks as leading martyrs. 
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2.2.2 Greater jihad (esoteric jihad)
According to Khumayni, greater jihad is the dynamic process that 
aims at altering reality by freeing the human being from the chains and 
bonds of material desires that weaken his soul and threatens his self with 
disintegration. He exhorts man to transcend worldly pleasures and the love 
of the world, with all its vices and corruption, and become engaged with 
spirituality (ruhaniyyat), having no aim save the love of God and His service 
in order to be able to practice greater jihad. Khumayni explains that man 
reaches this Truth when he moves to the hereafter where all the veils are 
ruptured (3:182) and (18:49). Then man realises the significance of his deeds 
in the world of the here and now and how they are weighed and reflected in 
the hereafter (99:7-8). All man’s deeds would be exposed (41:21). Khumayni 
adds that people who believe in these things should restrain their selves in 
the transitory-transient world they live in and uphold their deeds, safeguard 
their tongues, watch out where they trod, and invest in reforming, purifying, 
and rectifying their selves.120
Khumayni describes how this process of change takes place, which 
ultimately leads to self-refinement and self-purification as well as reforma-
tion of character. He stresses that God dispatched his prophets in order to 
deliver people from vices, corruption, and moral turpitude, and to incul-
cate them with virtue, good manners, and noble ethical virtues (makarim 
al-akhlaq).121 He explains that the veils of darkness cover man when God is 
not the fundamental and basic goal as well as when man seeks engagement 
in vices and corruption (7:176). According to Khumayni, the Truth is hidden 
from man by a canopy of successive veils, which correspond to man’s mortal 
sins and carnal desires. He explains that man cannot perform smaller jihad 
when his carnal desires have blinded his intellect and blurred his vision of 
the Truth. He should first transcend the here and now in order to tear down 
the veils of darkness and live according to the spirit and the love of God. This 
could only be done when man purifies his intentions, rectifies his deeds, and 
expels the love of glory, fame, and the self from his heart, directing all his 
attention to worshiping and prostrating to God, thanking him for His mercy 
and benevolence. Only then, man reaches a high stature that allows him to 
penetrate the veils of light and reach the source of Greatness and Truth by 
being completely detached from everything except God. Thus, the Muslim 
believer must engage in perpetual, non-abating jihad by striving to remove 
these veils so that God’s light may enlighten his heart and mind and purify 
his soul or self; man has to remove these veils to become closer to God. Khu-
mayni terms the struggle to remove the veils as greater jihad. He cautions 
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that the believer cannot engage in smaller jihad unless all of these veils have 
been removed, thus purifying his self.122 
According to Imam Khumayni, the practitioners of greater jihad should 
be well mannered and well versed in the tenets of Islam so that they could 
be the party of God (Hizbullah). He added that they ought to hold back 
themselves from the outer crust and the pleasures of life and be generous 
in sacrificing their selves in order to please God, uphold His word, advance 
Islamic ideas, and be of service to the umma.123 Khumayni stressed that after 
the believers build up, reform, purify, and refine their selves, then they could 
be of service to the umma: “Those who believe and do what is right, the 
Compassionate will favour with love [His love and that of their fellow crea-
tures]” (19:95). On these grounds, Imam Khumayni enjoined the believers to 
practice jihad in the way of God, to exert and sacrifice their selves, and surely 
they would be handsomely rewarded and remunerated (ajr) by God, if not 
in this life, then in the life to come, which is much better for them since the 
heavenly remuneration is boundless and infinite. According to Khumayni, 
exercising greater jihad eventually leads these wise individuals (prospective 
martyrs) to conduct smaller military jihad by spilling their immaculate blood 
in the battlefield of martyrdom on the front lines.124
In conclusion, building on the general Shi‘ite understanding that dif-
ferentiates between smaller military jihad (fighting the enemies of Islam in 
the battlefield), and greater jihad (the struggle with the self ), Imam Khu-
mayni broadened the mandate of greater jihad by arguing that any Muslim 
who does not engage in greater jihad is not a true believer and upholder 
of the faith. Instead of struggle with the self (jihad al-nafs), Khumayni pre-
ferred to use self-exertion (mujahadat al-nafs)125 in the sense of a perpetual 
struggle that aims at annihilating the egocentric self. Khumayni reversed 
the classical order of practicing smaller jihad before greater jihad; for him 
smaller jihad is only a very minute dimension in the process of destroying 
the bonds and obliterating the bulwarks and veils of darkness and light that 
stand in the way of man’s coalescence (takamul) with the greater good that 
bonds the Muslim community and allows him to reach the Truth. He stressed 
that the Muslim believer should first practice greater jihad before engaging 
in smaller jihad, greater jihad being the spearhead of change and the human 
being the fulcrum of this change. Khumayni emphasized that greater jihad 
is Islamic reform, reforming the person, the self, before reforming society. 
He radically redefined greater jihad giving it a mystical (sufi) and gnostic 
(‘irfani) dimension. 
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This warrants some explanation. In brief, according to Khumayni 
gnosticism is delving into the essence of things in order to discover them 
i.e. convey things and portray them to the realm of vision and foresight. The 
esoteric and the exoteric can respectively be expressed through the tran-
scendental-supernatural and the reality, which are complementary dimen-
sions according to Khumayni. He based his distinction between exoteric and 
esoteric on the Qur’anic verse (30:7) “They Know the outward aspect of the 
present life [exoteric], but they are heedless of the Hereafter [esoteric]”. This 
verse implies that the esoteric in this life leads to the hereafter, or, in other 
words, reaching the esoteric amounts to reaching the hereafter i.e. engag-
ing in greater jihad amounts to a meta-level of spiritualism and transcen-
dentalism that elevates man from the here and now to asymptotically reach-
ing the hereafter. Thus, confining oneself to the exoteric dimension of living 
on the outer crust of the world leads to neglecting the hereafter, which also 
amounts to disregarding the Truth and reality in this world.126
III Fadlallah’s possible contribution to 
Hizbullah’s ideology and thinking
Although Ayatullah Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah rejects and is ada-
mantly against Khumayni’s wilayat al-faqih127 and is continuously contest-
ing Iranian religious authority, and even though Fadlallah is not Hizbullah’s 
spiritual leader, this does not mean that his writings and thought did not 
influence Hizbullah’s ideology128 and thinking, especially Fadlallah’s two 
most prominent books Al-Islam wa Mantiq Al-Quwwa (1976) and Al-Haraka 
Al-Islamiyya (1984), which al-hala al-Islamiyya (the “Islamic Milieu”) in Leba-
non based its aspirations and goals upon. 
In Al-Islam wa Mantiq Al-Quwwa Fadlallah addresses the logic of power 
in intellectual, political, social, economical, and military struggles. According to 
him, the revolutionary ideology of the logic of power is very important, espe-
cially when pressures mount on the umma, thus endangering or even jeopard-
izing Muslim religious beliefs, doctrinal causes, and the destiny of the umma. 
Hizbullah might have built on Fadlallah’s logic of power in order to alter the 
notions of disinherited, downtrodden, and oppressed into empowerment.129
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In Al-Haraka Al-Islamiyya Fadlallah lays down the descriptions and 
prescriptions for Hizbullah’s umma advocating the governance of the umma 
by itself as opposed to absolute wilaya, which, according to him, is idealistic 
and not deeply rooted in the Islamic state and society at large.130 However 
the book as a whole constitutes a thorough research in the shar‘i and juris-
prudential foundations of Islamic politics and polity. Based on this theory 
and detailed vision, Fadlallah draws the milestones for any Islamic move-
ment that bases itself on the Qur’an and the Sunna, taking into consideration 
the future of the Islamic movement in the wake of the chaos of conceptions 
rupturing the Islamic world at the time. After ten years of its publication, the 
book became a frame of reference to the Islamic movement since it, most 
likely, based its ideological conceptions on it. As such, Hizbullah identified 
with this collective Islamic identity as a guiding framework and precept of 
practice.131
Thus, it appears that Hizbullah’s organizational-jihadi order concurs 
with Fadlallah’s encyclopaedic religious and cultural authority, both from 
the perspective of temporary political order and in relation to the broader 
Islamic project132: “Hizbullah’s deeds amplified Fadlallah’s words, carrying his 
voice far beyond his own pulpit to a wider world. Fadlallah’s words inter-
preted and justified Hizbullah’s deeds, transforming resentment into resist-
ance”.133 However, the differences between Hizbullah and Fadlallah visibly 
come to the fore if one delves into the particularities and specificities of 
each party. For instance, during the 1980s, Fadlallah has openly called for 
the rationalisation and routinisation of Hizbullah’s charisma arguing against 
Hizbullah’s enthusiastic-unbalanced discourse.134 And so, the Hizbullah-
Fadlallah relationship can be characterised from the following perspective: 
“Render unto Hizbullah what is to Hizbullah, and render unto Fadlallah what 
is to Fadlallah”.135 
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IV Hizbullah’s application of the Basic Shi‘ite 
Foundational Religious Ideology 
4.1 Belief in Shi‘a Islam
4.1.1 Doctrine of the Imamate
As Twelver Shi‘ites, Hizbullah’s followers recognise the twelve Imams 
and pay homage to their established religious authority. However, since 
in Shi‘ism emulating a dead marja‘ is considered an anomaly rather than 
the norm, Hizbullah stresses the absolute necessity of recognising the liv-
ing Imam136 who is infallible and has absolute knowledge about the Qur’an, 
Traditions, and shari‘a. Hizbullah specifically places heavy emphasis on this 
point since God, the Prophet, and the members of the House are the only 
ones knowledgeable about the Truth of Islam. Hizbullah acknowledges 
that in Shi‘ite history there has always been disagreement on the issue of 
marja‘iyya. As such, Hizbullah has repeatedly stated, “It is not the first time 
that disagreements surface over the religious authority. This is a normal 
issue in Shi‘ite history”.137 Hizbullah regarded highly Imam Khumayni, the 
official marja‘ al-taqlid of the Islamic Republic and paid homage to his reli-
gious authority as the first faqih after the Great Occultation and in contem-
porary history to assume the title of the deputy of Imam al-Mahdi.138 
4.1.2 Taqiyya
Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, Hizbullah’s Secretary General, argues that the 
taqiyya was a necessity imposed due to the political crackdown that was 
practiced against the Shi‘ites during particular historical epochs. As such, 
persecuted Shi‘ites resorted to taqiyya to prevent confrontation with unjust 
rulers. Nasrallah stated that this is precisely why Hizbullah’s leaders and 
cadres exercised political taqiyya as a survival strategy and operated under-
ground till 1984. According to him, the second reason of following taqiyya is 
to avoid fitna (dissention) and schism among the ranks of Muslims. From this 
perspective, Nasrallah declared that fitna should be warded off at all costs 
since its consequences would be catastrophic on the umma. As a practice 
of political taqiyya, Hizbullah has always called for unity, both in the Islamic 
and domestic fronts, in order to avoid fitna.139 
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4.1.3 Ta‘bi’a or mobilization 
Hizbullah makes use of the Karbala’ incident in order to marshal 
support and following through ta‘bi’a or mobilization. Indeed in line with 
Imam Khumayni, Hizbullah followed the exoteric activist line of mobilization 
against century’s backdrop of political quietism that was practiced by the 
majority of the Shi‘ites. In line with the classical Shi‘ite definition and Imam 
Khumayni’s view of ta’bi’a, Hizbullah regards ta‘bi’a as an act of mobiliza-
tion whereby the community of the faithful, led by the ‘ulama, try to seize 
power and take control of government in order to establish the rule of God 
or Islamic shari‘a, in other words, an Islamic order. This had been Hizbullah’s 
motto and objective since the beginning, as conveyed by its first political 
declarations that were released in 1984-1985 and were signed as: “Hizbullah 
– The Islamic Revolution in Lebanon”.140 
Hizbullah outlines the framework of its method of Islamic mobilization 
by claiming that it is the most authentic and efficient way among the Islam-
ists since it safeguards Muslim cultural authenticity from the materialism, 
consumerism, moral decadence, and cultural invasion of the East and West. 
As an Islamic jihadi movement, Hizbullah calls for mobilizing all resources 
in fighting the enemy as a doctrinal and practical necessity, while at the 
same time exercising balance in this confrontation.141 Hizbullah stresses that 
mobilization forms the backbone of its recruitment strategy, which serves 
as a baptism ritual training. Mobilization and strict discipline are Hizbullah’s 
salient features that set it apart from other movements, groups, and political 
parties.142
4.2 Wilayat al-faqih
4.2.1 Hizbullah’s adoption of wilayat al-faqih
Hizbullah adopted Khumayni’s wilayat al-faqih as a major pillar of its 
religious ideology. Since its early beginnings, Hizbullah abided by the legiti-
mate leadership of Imam Khumayni as the successor to the Prophet and 
the twelve Imams. Khumayni, who, being the most knowledgeable, had the 
epistemic competence and the leadership qualities, was the one who draws 
the general guidelines for work within the umma; that is why his orders and 
prohibitions should be enforced. Hizbullah considered Imam Khumayni as 
waliyy amr al-Muslimin ( jurisconsult of the Muslims) or al-waliyy al-faqih, 
thus commanding to him absolute allegiance and loyalty in accordance with 
al-mas’uliyya al-shar‘iyya (the legitimate and religious responsibility) to the 
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faqih, who is the official Iranian marja‘ al-taqlid. The faqih specifies the taklif 
and he is the only one who determines legitimacy.143 
4.2.2 Hizbullah’s application of wilayat al-faqih
Hizbullah’s connection to wilayat al-faqih falls within the domain of 
taklif and commitment, which are binding upon all the mukalafin (follow-
ers). The mukalafin might refer back to another marja‘ 144; however, when it 
comes to taqlid, the final ordinance, in the general Islamic procession is for 
the faqih.145 Qasim is making the distinction between “referring” to (consult-
ing with) the marja‘ and emulating him. Qasim means that in terms of the 
private domain of ibadat (ritual practices) and mu‘amalat (daily dealings) 
Hizbullahis can refer to or consult with another marja‘; however, when it 
comes to the public domain of political matters, the only court of appeal and 
the only marja‘ to emulate is Khumayni who determines the political legal 
obligation.146 Qasim adds that the limitations imposed by the faqih take into 
consideration the following two main points in the chain: (1) implementing 
the shar‘i edits, and not engaging in acts contrary to them; (2) respecting the 
specificities or particularities, which affect the circle of delegated responsi-
bility of every community or country. Qasim affirms that Hizbullah’s commit-
ment to the faqih constitutes a circle in this chain: it is work in the domain 
of the Islamic circle and the implementation of its edits; it is behaviour in 
conformity with the directives and the rules dictated by the faqih.147
I learned from my interviews that in the early 1980s Imam Khumay-
ni ordered and entrusted Khamina’i, who was at the time Deputy Minister 
of Defence, to be fully responsible of the Lebanese Hizbullah. Since then, 
Khamina’i became Hizbullah’s godfather. That is why, since the beginning, 
Hizbullah from a religious and an ideological stance fully abides by the ideas 
and opinions of Imam Khumayni as communicated by Khamina’i.148 During 
that period, the religious-ideological nexus between the Islamic Republic 
of Iran and Lebanon could be examined from the following declarations 
by Hizbullah and Iranian officials: “Iran and Lebanon are one people in one 
country… We do not say that we are part of Iran, we are Iran in Lebanon and 
Lebanon in Iran”; “We are going to support Lebanon politically and militarily 
as we buttress one of our own Iranian districts”; “We declare to the whole 
world that the Islamic Republic of Iran is our mother, religion, ka‘ba, and our 
veins”.149
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4.2.3 Views on the Islamic order (nizam Islami) in relation to wilayat 
al-faqih
Sayyid Sadiq al-Musawi is a Hizbullah religious scholar (‘alim) of Ira-
nian origin, who has complied in a 1300 pages, a two-volume work on the 
declarations and opinions that are supportive of immediately erecting an 
Islamic republic in Lebanon without any postponement. In line with wilayat 
al-faqih that enjoins the establishment of an Islamic order under the guardi-
anship of the jurisconsult, Imam al-Mahdi’s deputy, Sadiq al-Musawi argued 
that the Qur’an is the eternal divine constitution of the Muslims; they ought 
to abide by it and act according to its injunctions because it is the revealed 
word of God. He added that the Muslims should obey God and his Prophet, 
execute their wajib shar‘i, and destroy every unjust ruler in order to estab-
lish al-hukuma al-Islamiyya (Islamic government) that will instate justice 
and equality and ward off the waywardness of evil and discords among the 
Muslims. According to him, hakimiyya (governance) and sovereignty only 
belongs to God: (12:40). God’s divine law prescribes the precepts of human 
behaviour and the ordinances of government on a global scale. He stressed 
that Islam executes the injunctions through a just government in the person 
of the Prophet, the Imams, and the ‘ulama, the heirs of the prophets: (4:58). In 
line with Imam Khumayni, Sadiq al-Musawi affirmed that God commanded 
the Muslims to anathematise and to regard as infidel every authority or gov-
ernment that does not rule by what God has revealed. God has prohibited 
governance by tyrants deeming that as hypocrisy and vice, in this world and 
the world to come: (4:60-61) and (4:51). Also under the influence of Imam 
Khumayni, Sadiq al-Musawi argued that abiding by al-qawanin al-wad‘iyya 
(positive or man-made laws and legislations) instead of Islamic shari‘a, is 
totally un-Islamic.150 
Sayyid Husayn Al-Musawi151 stressed that Hizbullah’s religious ide-
ology dictated upon the party to establish an Islamic order based upon 
Khumayni’s wilayat al-faqih. He rationalised Hizbullah’s choice of the reli-
gious-ideological slogan of al-Jumhuriyya al-Islamiyya (the Islamic repub-
lic) as it is used in Iran and the feasibility of its application in Lebanon. Al-
Musawi argued that, in general terms, Islamic government is based upon 
divine principles mentioned in the Qur’an, Traditions, and the jurispruden-
tial deductions or stipulations derived from them, which deal with man’s 
social, economic, and political concerns. He contended that the contem-
porary concept of the “Islamic Republic” is an extension to the efforts of 
prophets and imams, and is a live personification of the long experience of 
the divine massages. Al-Musawi argued that the system of governance that 
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was in existence during the Prophet’s time did not bear a specific name. 
However, with the complexities of modern life, the Muslims used different 
words such as Caliphate, Emirate, or state to denote the Islamic order. He 
took this to imply that the door is open for the Muslims to choose the label 
they deem fit in expressing Islamic order and governance depending on the 
context. According to al-Musawi, this explains why the Muslims do not feel 
any discomfort in choosing the name of the system that makes it incumbent 
upon itself to implement Islamic shari‘a, even if it is different than the names 
used by the early Muslims. Since “republic” implies a political system based 
on the will of the populace, and since “Islamic” means that the opinions of 
the people lose their credibility if they are not in conformity with the Islamic 
thawabit (immutable set of values or principles), then Hizbullah uses the 
slogan of “The Islamic Republic in Lebanon” to denote a system that enforces 
Islamic laws in Lebanon based upon God’s injunctions in the Qur’an as laid 
down by wilayat al-faqih: “Whoever does not judge according to what Allah 
has revealed – those are the unbelievers [kafirun]”, evildoers (zalimun), and 
transgressors (fasiqun) (5:44-46).152
4.3 Jihad and martyrdom 
Jihad
4.3.1 Hizbullah’s stance concerning jihad and its justification
Hizbullah’s religious ideology depicts jihad as the fulcrum of belief in 
Islam.153 Hizbullah’s religious ideology abides by the classical Shi‘ite under-
standing on smaller military jihad as well as that of Imam Khumayni, as 
expressed by (22:78): “And strive [jahidu] for Allah as you ought to strive. 
He elected you, and did not impose on you any hardship in religion – the 
faith of your father Abraham. He called you Muslims before and in this [the 
Qur’an], that the Apostle may bear witness [shahidan] against you and you 
may be witness against mankind. So, perform the prayer, give the alms 
and hold fast to Allah. He is your Master; and what a blessed Master and 
a blessed supporter!” Hizbullah stresses that what is meant by jihad in the 
aforementioned verse is the general meaning i.e. jihad solely in the way of 
God. Like Khumayni, Hizbullah emphasises that by practicing jihad believers 
enter paradise, while infidels go to hell.154 
T H E  S A L I E N C Y  O F  H I Z B U L L A H ’ S  R E L I G I O U S  I D E O L O G Y
102
‘ T H E  S H I F T S  I N  H I Z B U L L A H ' S  I D E O L O G Y ’
Like the classical interpretation, Hizbullah’s religious ideology places 
jihad above the following eight mundane (worldly/material) relations men-
tioned in verse (9:24): “Say: ‘If your (1) fathers, your (2) sons, your (3) broth-
ers, your (4) spouses, your (5) relatives, the (6) wealth you have gained, a (7) 
trade you fear might slacken, and (8) dwellings you love are dearer to you 
than Allah and His Apostle or than fighting [jihad] in his way, then wait until 
Allah fulfils His decree. Allah does not guide the sinful people’ ”. Thus, the 
priority is to love God and Prophet Muhammad and practice jihad in their 
way, rather than loving the eight mundane relations and material desires 
mentioned in (9:24). Hizbullah stresses that this priority becomes noticeable 
when there is a conflict between (1) giving money for jihad and keeping it 
because of fear of losing it, and (2) when a parent prevents his offspring 
from sacrificing themselves. Both cases are regarded as a deflection from 
obedience to God. However, in the case of sacrifice in the way of God and 
jihad in His way and the Prophet’s way, there is no conflict between the eight 
mundane relations listed above and jihad. In that case, the eight mundane 
relations are considered as helping factors towards performing the taklif to 
the faqih.155 
Hizbullah’s religious ideology broadens the classical understanding of 
the verb jahada by interpreting it, as doing one’s utmost in defending one-
self against the enemy.156 Hizbullah portrays jihad as a contractual dimen-
sion (tacit consent) with God based on mubaya‘a (homage or a pledge of 
allegiance) to Him, in order to enter heaven in return for this sacrifice (9:111): 
“Allah has bought from the believers their lives and their wealth in return for 
Paradise; they fight in the way of Allah, kill and get killed [yuqtalu]. That is 
a true promise from Him in the Torah, the Gospel and the Qur’an; and who 
fulfils his promise better than Allah? Rejoice then at the bargain you have 
made with Him; for that is the great triumph”.157
4.3.2 The safeguards of jihad: abiding by the injunctions of the faqih
In line with Imam Khumayni, Hizbullah’s religious ideology empha-
sises that jihad is based upon sacrificing the self and possessions. The fruits 
of jihad can only be realised by the sacrifices and offerings of the fighters, 
their families, and the wounded because the aggressions of the enemy are 
founded on inflicting pain, suffering, and hopelessness in order to impose 
capitulation. Jihad is a means of defence to preclude the enemy from accom-
plishing its goals even though this might lead Hizbullah to pay a heavy price 
and a lot of sacrifices and pains, which are warranted by a competent and 
responsible faqih and based upon a clear shar‘i objective.158 
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Hizbullah upholds Khumayni’s assertion of obeying the faqih in gen-
eral matters including the defence of Islam and the Muslims against the infi-
dels, the tyrants, and the aggressors, which is in concert with the views of the 
jurists. The faqih estimates and judges objectively and contextually whether 
jihad has to be conducted only to attain victory or set special limitations on 
the level of sacrifice. Since the faqih’s decision is absolute and irrevocable, 
Hizbullah cannot contest it using its own logic and analyses.159
Indeed, the stated policy of Hizbullah is that the decision to wage 
jihad is incumbent upon al-faqih who diagnoses if the situation falls with-
in the narrow confines of defensive jihad. He also determines the rules of 
engagement and its safeguards. This is of vital importance because there is 
a grave responsibility for spilling blood since the fighters should not engage 
in any battle, neither without establishing the duty of jihad in it nor without 
a solid foundation in establishing its goals. Since it is the jurisdiction of the 
faqih, then the final say and decision is his, and it is binding upon all the 
Muslims who follow him.160 
One Hizbullah member, who would like to remain autonomous, told 
me that as practice of indoctrination and as a baptism/initiation ceremony, 
new Hizbullah recruits had to repeatedly state: “idha qala laka al-waliyy al-
faqih ‘an auqtul nafsak, fa ‘alayka dhalik (If Imam Khumayni told you to kill 
yourself, then you have to do it)”. This not only illustrates indoctrination, but 
also the total obedience to the faqih. 
4.3.3 Engaging in greater jihad before smaller jihad
Hizbullah’s religious ideology argues that the Islamic connotation 
of the word jihad conveys something more than militarily combating the 
enemy. The mandate of jihad could be extended to greater jihad, which is 
fighting the internal enemy of the human being. Hizbullah’s religious ide-
ology adjusts Khumayni’s interpretation of greater jihad by distinguishing 
between: (1) insinuations calling on the individual to perform all kinds of 
vices and (2) the Devil who enjoins committing delinquent, corrupt, and evil 
acts.161 Nevertheless, in line with Imam Khumayni, it stresses that a person 
needs to prepare himself before engaging in smaller military jihad by show-
ing willingness to sacrifice the most precious things a person has: his self 
and his possessions, rather than a part of them. This could only be accom-
plished after a lot of effort and jihad with the self (greater jihad). 162 
In line with Imam Khumayni, before engaging in smaller military jihad, 
a Hizbullahi has to undergo systematic and stringent indoctrination aimed at 
inculcating the spirit of greater jihad in his heart and mind. Thus, in order to 
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achieve successful and efficient mobilization, for many years, Hizbullah has 
embarked on giving extensive lessons on the importance of self-sacrifice, 
and made these the centre of its educational or indoctrination movement. 
Hizbullah’s religious ideology mobilized its followers and indoctrinated them 
on ideological and religious grounds through a gradual process based on a 
spiritual transformation, which ultimately led to fostering the inner strength 
required for self-sacrifice that would empower the weak over the strong, the 
oppressed over the oppressors.163 Thus, sophisticated and intensive military 
training (smaller military jihad) is not enough for the transformation of the 
individual who is willing to sacrifice himself. Rather, this should be accom-
panied by psychological mobilization and spiritual transformation as a basic 
indoctrination technique of greater jihad in order to instil the spirit of self-
sacrifice in their hearts and actualise their potential strength.164 
Hizbullah’s religious ideology mentioned the excessive and encumber-
ing ta’tir (process of screening) that Hizbullah’s prospective members under-
go so that they know how to go beyond enjoining the good and forbidding 
the evil, to go beyond engaging in persuasive jihad (smaller non-military 
jihad).165 He referred to the special spiritual guidance that new recruits pass 
through in order to inculcate the spirit of greater jihad in their soul and cause 
a metamorphosis of the self through a perpetual process of spiritual building. 
Only then they can engage in smaller military jihad and self-sacrifice. Accord-
ing to Hizbullah there is an urgent need to revive the culture of jihad, jihad in 
the way of God, and indoctrinate its principles and injunctions to the children 
and the populace of the umma.166 He stressed the need to go beyond both 
intellectual jihad (persuasive jihad: smaller non-military jihad) and smaller 
military jihad since the distinguishing feature of Hizbullah’s culture par excel-
lence is inculcating the culture of spiritual jihad, greater jihad, the jihad of 
polishing the self to go beyond the here and now to practice ta‘bi’a and ta‘a 
(strict discipline and obedience) to the faqih. Hizbullah stresses that mobili-
zation and obedience convey a religious-ideological commitment.167 
The salient feature of Hizbullah’s culture of greater jihad is piety, spir-
itual renaissance, sufism, and gnosticism along the lines of Imam Khumayni’s 
halal shar‘i (religiously sanctioned) practices. Hizbullah’s religious ideology 
adjusts Imam Khumayni’s interpretation of greater jihad by emphasizing 
that there is a need not only to build spiritualism but also to continuously 
reinvigorate and strengthen it by fighting in the way of God since fighting 
the enemies helps to deeply and speedily inculcate this spiritualism in the 
soul or self. That is why God ordained religious devotion by way of hurling to 
the battlefield: (9:122) “Why doesn’t a company from each people go forth 
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to instruct themselves in religion” because God is fully conversant that the 
umma’s battle with its enemies is open-ended, pending the Islamisation of 
the whole world. Hizbullah adds that God wants the battles of the umma to 
take a global dimension where both close and remote people would has-
ten to join. The justification for this behaviour is that God knows that the 
circumstances of facing the enemy and sacrificing the self make the self of 
the Muslim individual understand the truth of Islam and religious devotion 
without the veils of darkness and light.168
4.3.4 The connection between jihad and martyrdom
Hizbullah’s religious ideology affirms that the passion to martyrdom 
does not in any way compromise the desire to victory. Thus, in the line with 
the classical Shi‘ite view and Imam Khumayni’s perspective, Hizbullah’s reli-
gious ideology stresses that jihad has two glorious rewards or outcomes 
(husnayayyn): martyrdom (of the self/person) and victory (of the umma) 
(9:52).169 
Building on Khumayni’s logic and argument, Hizbullah’s religious ide-
ology defends its martyrdom operations from a religious perspective as an 
expression of obedience to God to perform smaller military jihad as well 
as fulfilling the religious duty of martyrdom, which is incumbent on the 
believers in order to defend their rights and their occupied land.170 Hizbul-
lah explains that upbringing on the notion of jihad buttresses the spirit of 
martyrdom and readiness to die in the way of God. The logic of martyrdom is 
based upon the religious understanding and belief in another life in heaven, 
where the human being lives in felicity and where all his/her dreams are real-
ized, in addition to the fruits that the umma reaps from his/her martyrdom. 
Martyrdom transcends the materialistic dimension of liberating occupied 
land; it is a religious duty and a testimony to abidance by Gods injunctions 
as that is why it is martyrdom in the way of God.171
Martyrdom
4.3.5 Hizbullah’s justification of martyrdom operations
Hizbullah’s religious ideology exhorts parents to raise their children 
on the notion of martyrdom in the way of God.172 The logic behind martyr-
dom is based on a religious understanding and belief in the hereafter where 
people live happy and realise all their dreams in addition to the fruits that 
behold the umma as a result of martyrdom. Hizbullah affirms that martyr-
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dom as the duty of defending and liberating occupied land transcends the 
material dimension. Martyrdom is an embodiment of the concept of obedi-
ence to God and it is a religious-legal obligation that leads to eternal life. 
Hizbullah stresses that the strong desire to martyrdom based on strong reli-
gious convictions. Hizbullah learned that upbringing on the concept of mar-
tyrdom leads to effectiveness and adoption of the curriculum of martyrdom, 
where remuneration is tied to the delegated responsibility of conducting 
martyrdom operations (smaller military jihad). In line with Imam Khumayni, 
Hizbullah’s religious ideology stresses that conducting martyrdom is a seri-
ous choice requiring belief and interaction with the prospective martyr. In 
order to accomplish the feat of martyrdom, a lot of indoctrination based on 
religious and spiritual upbringing is required; martyrdom is a religious duty 
incumbent upon the believer who is rewarded by going to heaven.173 In this 
regard, it is reportedly stated that Hizbullah’s Secretary General would meet 
with every martyr before he conducted his operation against the Israeli 
forces occupying southern Lebanon and the Biqa‘. “To raise their morale, he 
would stress that they are going to heaven, because religious war (jihad) 
was an obligation in Islam, and tell them: ‘Give my regards to the Prophet 
Mohammed’ ”.174 That is way there are so many Hizbullahis who are willing to 
fulfil their taklif by being “honoured” by martyrdom in order to receive God’s 
blessings and acquire his obedience. Thus, there should be no astonishment 
in the believer’s hurling towards martyrdom, for this part of the commit-
ment and religious mobilisation.175
Building on its religious ideology Hizbullah justifies martyrdom opera-
tions by arguing that they are part of a rationale and vision, an overall vision 
that is based on the necessity to use all possible force in facing the Israeli 
enemy. That is why martyrdom operations were launched against the Israeli 
army occupying south Lebanon as a policy and curriculum/program, which 
Hizbullah considers as a practical way in order to achieve consecutive hits 
against that enemy, thus depleting its morale and straining its resources. 
The motivation behind these martyrdom operations was targeting the Israe-
li occupying army with violent hits that would shake its military capabilities, 
so that it would feel impotent and eventually it would withdraw. By this, Hiz-
bullah would have achieved its goal of liberation of occupied land. Hizbullah 
stresses that martyrdom operations were part of a scrutinized plan, which 
came into being as the only possible way capable of altering the formula in 
facing the superior Israeli enemy.176 
Ayatullah Fadlallah stressed that Hizbullah’s martyrdom operations 
rendered Hizbullahis with a sense of empowerment over the seemingly 
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invincible Israeli army. He argued, “There is no alternative to a bitter and 
difficult jihad, borne from within the power of effort, patience and sacrifice –
and the spirit of martyrdom”.177 Ayatullah Fadlallah and Hizbullah’s religious 
scholars could never permit the positive outcome of martyrdom operations 
to serve as their legitimisation.178 
4.3.6 Hizbullah’s application of Imam Husayn’s model and emulation of 
Khumayni’s theory on martyrdom as a ticket to heaven
Shaykh Ali Yasin, a Hizbullah religious scholar, emphasized that Hiz-
bullah’s religious ideology considers those who conducted martyrdom oper-
ations against the enemies of Islam as living martyrs in heaven.179 Basing 
itself on Imam Husayn’s precedent180 and Imam Khumayni’s religious-ideo-
logical stance, which regards martyrdom as a religious duty and a ticket to 
heaven, Hizbullah picked up and applied Imam Khumayni’s slogan of “Eve-
ryday is ‘Ashura, and every land is Karbala’ ”.181 According to Qasim, when 
society is brought up on the model of Imam Husayn and his companions, it 
acquires madad (support and reinforcement) from their leading behaviour 
and sacrifices.182 Hizbullah learned from the martyrdom of Imam Husayn in 
Karbala’ the love of martyrdom through the love of God, and the passion for 
jihad in the way of Islam. Also Hizbullah is fully conversant with the great 
feats/accomplishments that were actualised through Imam Husayn’s mar-
tyrdom after the “renaissance” in Karbala’ since his major concern was with 
the future of Islam and the Muslims.183
Hizbullah’s religious ideology, in addition to relying on Imam Khu-
mayni’s views on martyrdom, most likely has been influenced by Ayatullah’s 
Fadlallah’s views184. Building on the Shi‘a religious scholars’ endorsement 
and sanctioning of martyrdom operations185, Hizbullah equated its martyr-
dom operations conducted against the Israeli army occupying south Leba-
non with the martyrdom of Imam Husayn in Karbala’: “Do you want to suffer 
with Husayn? Then the setting is ready: the Karbala of the South [Lebanon]. 
You can be wounded and inflict wounds, kill and be killed, and feel the spir-
itual joy that Husayn lived when he accepted the blood of his son, and the 
spiritual joy of Husayn when he accepted his own blood and wounds. The 
believing resisters in the border zone [the self-declared Israeli security zone 
in southern Lebanon] are the true self-flagellants, not the self-flagellants of 
Nabatiyya186. Those who flog themselves with swords, they are our fighting 
youth. Those who are detained in [the Israeli camp in] al-Khiyam, arrested by 
Israel in the region of Bint Jubayl, they are the ones who feel the suffering 
of Husayn and Zaynab. Those who suffer beatings on their chests and heads 
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in a way that liberates, these are the ones who mark ‘Ashura, in their prison 
cells”.187 Thus, Hizbullah explicitly identified its martyrs as being inspired by 
and following the lead of Imam Husayn.
4.3.7 Hizbullah’s religious ideology distinguishes among the four senses 
of martyrdom
Hizbullah unequivocally acknowledges that the four senses of mar-
tyrdom are thawabit that constitute an important pillar of its religious ideol-
ogy since its early beginnings.188
(Martyrdom 1): al-istishhadi al-mujahid (the martyred fighter): The 
word al-mujahid is implied, but not directly stated. The martyred fighter 
corresponds to a Muslim person who – in performing smaller jihad – inten-
tionally and willingly blows himself in the battlefield or keeps on fighting 
till he dies in order to inflict the highest amount of damage and fatalities on 
the enemy. In line with the classical Shi‘ite perspective and Ayatullah Fadlal-
lah, Hizbullah affirms that Prophet Muhammad stipulated that this person is 
neither washed nor wrapped in a burial shroud (la yughsl wa la yukaffan)189, 
although it is generally stipulated as a religious obligation to do so.190 As it 
is acknowledged in the hadith, the “angels wash him”. In line with the classi-
cal Shi‘ite understanding and Imam Khumayni, Hizbullah stresses that this 
special treatment is done in recognition of his special status, or performed 
as a token of gratitude and a sign of takrim (special commemoration) for his 
great deeds. This corresponds, for instance, to the twelve Hizbullah fighters 
who blew themselves targeting Israeli military and intelligence personnel 
during the occupation of Lebanon. According to Hizbullah the martyred 
fighter is a hard-core altruist who performed a supererogatory act i.e. he sac-
rificed himself for the maslaha (benefit and interest) of his community and 
the umma, and his sacrifice is regarded as an act beyond the call of duty. It is 
supererogatory since martyrdom is not incumbent upon every individual.
(Martyrdom 2): al-shahid al-mujahid (the martyr fighter): corresponds 
to a Muslim person who, in performing smaller jihad, falls in the battlefield 
while facing the enemy. For instance, this is the case of Hadi Nasrallah and 
other Hizbullah fighters who confronted Israel in conventional warfare with-
out blowing themselves. Like category one, the martyred fighter, the mar-
tyr fighter is neither washed nor wrapped in a burial shroud. The angels 
wash him. This corresponds, for instance, to the Hizbullah fighters who had 
died in confronting the Israeli occupation.191 Using the same reasoning as 
employed in (martyrdom 1), Hizbullah argues the martyr fighter performed 
an altruistic, supererogatory act.
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(Martyrdom 3): al-shahid (the martyr): corresponds to an innocent 
civilian Muslim person who died without taking part in the fighting. He/she 
is washed and wrapped in a burial shroud because he/she died outside the 
battlefield. However, the final evaluation is for God (al-taqyyim ‘inda Allah). 
Hizbullah abides by Ayatullah Khamina‘i who argues that martyrdom is a 
special prerogative for every person. If God responded to his/her call (du‘a’ ) 
and considered his death as martyrdom, then God has bestowed upon him/
her the highest dignity and prerogative in return for his/her essence that 
has gone to heaven.192 Sayyid Husayn al-Musawi seconds that arguing who-
soever demands martyrdom from God in uprightness obtains the place of a 
martyr, even if he should die in his bed.193 Qasim argues that the martyr is a 
victim who did not perform a supererogatory act.
(Martyrdom 4): shahid al-watan (the martyr of the nation-state) or 
shahid al-qadiyya (the martyr of a cause): corresponds to a non-Muslim who 
died in the battlefield fighting for his country or the cause he believes in. 
God is the only One who evaluates if he/she could take the ajr (remunera-
tion) of a Muslim martyr and be elevated to the level of (martyrdom 2) in the 
full Islamic jurisprudential sense of the word. This corresponds, for instance, 
to the non-Muslim Lebanese Army soldiers who died in the confrontation 
with Israel, the same day Hadi Nasrallah and his two companions died. Also, 
non-Muslim fighters of the September 1997 Hizbullah formed “Lebanese 
Multi-Confessional Brigades” (LMCB) fall in this category. These are buried 
according to the specific rites of their respective religions. According to Hiz-
bullah, this category of martyrdom in an altruistic-supererogatory act since 
it is not every citizen’s duty to fight the enemy in the battlefield.
4.3.8 Martyrdom and ithar (“preference”)194 
Hizbullah’s religious ideology explains the significance of the concept 
of “preference” in relation to martyrdom. It stresses that martyrdom is a vol-
untarily-willed act that is based on the intellectual and theoretical founda-
tions of a religious, psychological, and cultural upbringing embedded in the 
Qur’anic concept of “preference”, preference of life in the hereafter, rather 
than the here and now, and preference of the umma over the individual: 
“And they give food, despite their love of it, to the destitute, the orphan and 
the captive. [They say]: ‘We only feed you for the sake of Allah; We do not 
want from you any reward or gratitude’ ” (76:8-9). Thus, Hizbullah’s religious 
ideology broadens the mandate of preference – from fasting for three days 
and preferring to feed others, rather than the self –to include the giving of 
blood for the sake of the umma.195 
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4.3.9 The distinction between martyrdom and suicide
Shi‘ite religious scholars have unanimously vilified suicide as foolish 
behaviour leading to perdition. They extolled and sanctioned martyrdom 
operations carried out in the way of God against aggressive armies for the 
sake of liberating occupied land in wars of national resistance. Building on 
the consensus among medieval Muslim jurists who sanctioned a soldier or a 
few soldiers to attack a large hostile army, Shi‘ite religious scholars affirmed 
if the Muslims in the early centuries of Islam had been in possession of mod-
ern explosives, they would have used them in the same manner as today’s 
martyrs who blew up themselves in the enemy, intending to inflict the high-
est amount of possible casualties in its ranks.196 Hizbullah’s religious ideolo-
gy emphasizes that the carrying out of martyrdom operations is a religiously 
sanctioned act of self-sacrifice that is diametrically opposed to suicide, which 
is completely prohibited in Islam, the punishment being eternal damnation 
in hell. In other words, Hizbullah’s religious ideology regards self-sacrifice 
conducted on the basis of greater jihad as legitimate martyrdom operations, 
rather than suicide. However, Hizbullah clarifies that if a person blows up 
himself without securing a prior authorisation from the ‘ulama, then his act 
amounts to suicide.197 
Hizbullah’s religious ideology stresses that martyrdom is a volun-
tary-willed act conducted by a person who loves life, holds on to it, and 
has all the reasons to live.198 Hizbullah argues that the West has been per-
plexed by the degree and level of volitional martyrdom operations, which 
it terms suicide. The West thought that for the youth to become martyrs, 
then they definitely have been drugged, confronted with difficult living cir-
cumstances, faced with complicated psychological problems, or showered 
with enormous financial or material rewards. Hizbullah adds that the West 
has been “indoctrinated” according to its intellectual background to sanc-
tify material life and get hold of it come what may. That is why the West is 
incapable of construing the meaning of the existence of martyrs except by 
materialistically and secularly explaining the martyrs’ religious beliefs. Hiz-
bullah stresses that the West has the right not to understand the effects of 
religious indoctrination on the curriculum of Islam because understanding 
a phenomenon (martyrdom) is not only based upon or confined to rational 
explanations and justifications; rather it needs real and a close encounter 
with, and a follow up to, the different stages that the lives of the would-be 
fighters and martyrs pass through. It also requires knowledge of the Islamic 
Milieu that gives rise to such a devotion to martyrdom based upon the spirit 
of greater jihad. Hizbullah concludes that the Westerners who have wit-
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nessed the reality of martyrdom cannot deny it, even if they were perplexed 
in interpreting it because they were not able to construe the real motivation 
behind martyrdom.199 
Ayatullah Fadlallah delineated the distinction between suicide and 
martyrdom (self-sacrifice) sanctioning martyrdom by arguing that if the 
objective of a person who scarifies himself in a martyrdom operation “is to 
have a political impact on an enemy whom it is impossible to fight by con-
ventional means, then his sacrifice can be part of [smaller military] jihad”. In 
line with Hizbullah’s first sense of martyrdom, ‘the martyred fighter’, Fadlal-
lah affirmed, “Such an undertaking differs little from that of a soldier who 
fights and knows that in the end he will be killed. The two situations lead to 
death; except that one fits in with the conventional procedures of war, and 
the other does not200… the Muslims believe that you struggle by transform-
ing yourself into a living bomb like you struggle with a gun in your hand. 
There is no difference between dying with a gun in your hand or exploding 
yourself”.201 Fadlallah added, “What is the difference between setting out for 
battle knowing you will die after killing ten [of the enemy], and setting out 
to the field to kill ten and knowing you will die while killing them?”202
4.3.10 The aims and prohibitions of martyrdom operations
Since the beginning, Hizbullah placed practical safeguards on mar-
tyrdom operations; the most important was that that the number of Israe-
li soldiers killed should be at least thirty, in order for the operation to be 
religiously sanctioned.203 According to Hizbullah’s religious ideology, mar-
tyrdom is the epitome of self-sacrifice, which is conducted on the basis of 
specific religious safeguards in confronting a stronger occupying enemy. If 
inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy or achieving victory over it depends 
upon the martyrdom of a few resistance fighters, then their endeavour is 
crowned with legitimacy.204 
Likewise, Fadlallah argues martyrdom operations “should only be car-
ried out if they can bring a political or military change in proportion to the 
passions that incite a person to make of his body an explosive bomb”.205 
Fadlallah stressed that there are certain prohibitions tied to the act of mar-
tyrdom. According to him, a “martyrdom operation is not permitted unless 
it can convulse the enemy. The believer cannot blow himself up unless the 
results will equal or exceed the sacrifice of the believer’s self. Self-martyring 
operations are not fatal accidents but legal obligations [taklif shar‘] gov-
erned by rules, and the believers cannot transgress the rules of God”.206
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V Chapter Conclusion
The backbone of Hizbullah’s religious ideology centres upon the fol-
lowing constituents or specifics: belief in Shi‘a Islam {doctrine of the Ima-
mate; taqiyya; and ta‘bi’a}; (2) the adoption and application of the wilayat 
al-faqih doctrine; and (3) jihad in the way of God. 
Hizbullah views wilayat al-faqih as its true Islamic cultural authen-
ticity. Basing itself on the classical Shi‘ite interpretation of the doctrine of 
the Imamate, Hizbullah recognized Imam Khumayni as the official marja‘ 
al-taqlid of the Islamic Republic and as the first faqih after the Great Occul-
tation, and in contemporary history, to assume the title of the deputy of 
Imam al-Mahdi. Believing that Khumayni blended Imama with wilaya with 
marja‘iyya, Hizbullah followed the religious authority of Iran and paid hom-
age and allegiance to Khumayni as the political and a religious leader of 
the umma and abided by his wilayat al-faqih as a major pillar in its religious 
ideology. 
Hizbullah practiced taqiyya as a socio-political necessity (darura) as 
well as a survival strategy, but not on doctrinal grounds since it kept its 
name, identity, and goals secretive so as not to risk annihilation from its 
enemies while it was still evolving in a rudimentary form. This behaviour is 
in line with Imam Khumayni who, after the victory of the Islamic Revolution 
in 1979, banned the practice of taqiyya since there was no need to have 
recourse to it after the establishment of an Islamic order. The only exception 
being the preservation of life and religion in conformity with the purposes 
of Islamic shari‘a. Hizbullah’s religious ideology broadened the mandate of 
taqiyya and abided by it only in the specific case of avoiding dissention. This 
behaviour is warranted since Hizbullah is operating in Lebanon in a multi-
confessional sectarian state, and not within an Islamic order. 
Hizbullah’s mobilized a substantial portion of its resources to fight the 
Israeli occupying forces, making mobilization and self-discipline the distin-
guishing traits of its Islamic method as well as its recruitment strategy that 
aimed to uphold Islamic cultural authenticity. It employed ta‘bi’a as an act 
of mobilization whereby the ‘sons of Hizbullah’s umma’ endeavoured to get 
hold of political power through a top-down process in order to establish an 
Islamic order governed by shari‘a and hakimiyya in accordance with Imam 
Khumayni’s wilayat al-faqih. 
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Hizbullah endorsed and applied Imam Khumayn’s stipulation of the 
necessity of engaging in greater jihad before practicing smaller military 
jihad. However, Hizbullah slightly adjusted Khumayni’s theory by sanction-
ing prospective fighters to hasten to the battlefield in order to inculcate 
religious devotion in their souls. In line with Khumayni, Hizbullah’s religious 
ideology affirmed that greater jihad metamorphoses the individual into a 
coalescent, spiritually refined human being. Hizbullah regarded spiritual 
mobilization and strict obedience and discipline to God and the faqih as the 
religious-ideological components of greater jihad. Mobilization and self-dis-
ciple became the two most salient components of Hizbullah’s greater jihad. 
Thus, giving up the pleasures of the body through giving primacy to the 
spiritual dimension for the promise of heaven and God’s blessings, gives 
the Hizbullahi a strong volition to stay firm in his belief and to defend his 
convictions. Hizbullah members follow specific religious safeguards when 
it comes to giving blood and following the way of God, irrespective of the 
sacrifices encountered, if the order is given from the legitimate leadership 
that is represented by the faqih.
Hizbullah stressed that the base and foundation of Islamic belief is 
smaller military jihad that is practiced against the Israeli occupation army in 
southern Lebanon. Thus, in line with Imam Khumayni’s view of the sacrific-
ing of the self and possessions, which he regarded as a social liberating force 
in this world and as a ticket to heaven, Hizbullahis engaged in smaller jihad 
and sacrificed themselves in battle against the enemy. Hizbullah claimed 
that it conducted jihad in a realistic, practical, and efficient matter because 
it follows the Islamic teachings and abides by the faqih’s safeguards, guid-
ance, and supervision.
In conformity with its taklif, Hizbullah conveys Islamic upbringing 
based on the spirit of martyrdom. Hizbullah regarded martyrdom operations 
launched by freely willed individual self-sacrificial martyrs against the Israeli 
occupation forces in the early 1980s as legitimate and religiously sanctioned 
operations conducted against a superior military “aggressive” army, where 
conventional means of smaller military jihad proved futile. However, Hiz-
bullah stressed that there should always be a fatwa – religious justification 
or legitimisation – behind every martyrdom operation or else it would be 
regarded as suicide. Thus, Hizbullah’s religious ideology does not consider 
blowing oneself in enemy troops or engaging them in the battlefield till 
death as suicide, rather as “glorified” martyrdom based upon the Qur’anic 
concept of preference, preference to uphold the honour and dignity of the 
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umma over living in disgrace under the occupation; preference to live eter-
nally in heaven, rather than continuously being humiliated in this world. 
Building on Imam Khumayni’s and Ayatullah Fadlallah’s religious-
ideological justifications of martyrdom, Hizbullah explicitly identified the 
martyrs as being inspired by and emulating Imam Husayn’s martyrdom in 
Karbala’. Hizbullah’s argument that there is no distinction between dying 
while fighting in the battlefield and blowing up oneself, seems to have shat-
tered the commonly held theological view that regards giving one’s life for 
the faith to die as a martyr as not the same thing as blowing up oneself. 
However, the religious-ideological justifications of self-sacrifice and martyr-
dom do not rule out the political practicality of forcing the enemy to with-
draw from occupied land and achieve victory, since this practicality is based 
on and sanctioned on religious-ideological grounds which regard jihad as 
having two glorious fruits (husnayayyn), which are martyrdom of the self 
and victory in battle, as mentioned in the Qur’an (9:52). This is a mark of the 
collective identity of self-sacrifice and martyrdom whereby the community, 
the umma benefits and reaps the rewards of martyrdom. 
One could argue that Hizbullah’s religious ideology was to a greater 
extent successful in dominating the Lebanese state’s identity, at least in Hiz-
bullah’s major constituencies as well in al-hala al-Islamiyya where it wields 
power. Thus, Hizbullah was triumphant in increasing Islamic influence and 
identity in its Islamic Milieu at the expense of the Lebanese state.207
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This chapter presents Hizbullah’s political ideology as formulated 
over the period 1984/5 to 1990. It is compiled from and described on the 
basis of the available sources: the Open Letter of February 19851, a series 
of political declarations issued from 1984 onwards, and the speeches and 
statements issued by Hizbullah’s leaders and cadres between 1984/5 and 
1990.2 The speeches and statements that are quoted in this chapter were 
delivered, most prominently, by Hizbullah’s leaders and cadres: Shaykh 
Subhi al-Tufayli3, Sayyid Abbas Al-Musawi4, Sayyid Husayn Al-Musawi5, Sayy-
id Ibrahim Amin Al-Sayyid6, Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah7, Sayyid 
Hasan Nasrallah8, and Shaykh Na‘im Qasim.9 Also, heavy reliance has been 
placed on Muhammad Z‘aytir’s book entitled An Outlook at the Proposal of 
the Islamic Republic in Lebanon10, and brief mention of ‘Ali Al-Kurani’s book 
entitled Hizbullah’s Method of Islamic Mobilization11. 
Below I will offer a seven-point thematic exposition of the constituents 
of Hizbullah’s ideology: (2.1) Hizbullah’s standpoint towards the oppressors 
and oppressed; (2.2) its perspectives on the Islamic state (al-dawla al-Islami-
yya) or Islamic government (al-hukuma al-Islamiyya) or Islamic republic (al-
jumhuriyya al-Islamiyya)12; (2.3) its position on relations with the Lebanese 
Christians; (2.4) its perspective on Israel; (2.5) its viewpoint towards the unity 
of the Muslims; (2.6) its stance vis-à-vis the West; and finally (2.7) its views 
on jihad and martyrdom. This will be followed by a summary of the basic 
constituents of Hizbullah’s political ideology.
2. The Constituent Points of Hizbullah’s Political Ideology
2.1 Views on the Oppressors (mustakbirin) and Oppressed 
(mustad‘afin)
“Whoever takes Allah, His Apostle and those who believe as friends 
[must know] that Allah’s party [Hizbullah] is indeed the triumphant” (5:56). 
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The Open Letter presents Hizbullah as the party of the oppressed serving 
the interests of the entire world oppressed and their perpetual revolution 
for achieving social, economic, and political justice. Hizbullah considered 
Third World Countries, which included all Muslim countries, as the world 
oppressed. According to Sayyid Ibrahim Amin Al-Sayyid, mustad‘afin applies 
to all the oppressed and downtrodden of the earth. He added that Hizbul-
lah’s friends are all those Muslims and Christians who face off the oppres-
sors.13 Hizbullah clearly stated in its Open Letter that it extends its invitation 
to all the downtrodden or oppressed non-Muslims.14 Hizbullah mentioned 
that although its oppressed friends convey ideas that do not originate from 
Islam (such as Jesus is the son of God and belief in Trinity, for instance), this 
does not preclude Hizbullah from cooperating with them in order to achieve 
the goals (of getting rid of arrogance and oppression and achieving a just 
society), especially since Hizbullah feels that the motives (of fighting the 
aggressors), which exhort the oppressed to struggle, are Muslim motives in 
the first place (such as the protection of the self, family and descent, religion, 
and property15), originating from the oppression and tyranny that has been 
practiced and imposed upon the oppressed, even if these motives were 
formed by un-Islamic ideas (such as liberation theology16). Although Hizbul-
lah’s cadres argued that Liberation theology is un-Islamic since it is based 
on Biblical and Marxian notions, they conceded that the following Qur’anic 
verses could be interpreted as referring to liberation theology concepts: 
(2:220); (7:56); (7: 7:85); (7:170); (11:88); (11:117); (26:152); (38:28).17 Hizbul-
lah added that its friends are all the world’s oppressed peoples as well as all 
those who fight its enemies and ward off their evil. In addition, Hizbullah 
exhorted the entire world oppressed to bond together in order to face the 
conceit of the world oppressors by forming an international consortium of 
liberation movements. Thus, Hizbullah’s struggle is aimed at achieving these 
objectives across the Muslim umma and beyond by confronting the oppres-
sors who exploit the world’s oppressed.18 
Ayatullah Fadlallah argued that the Qur’an differentiates between two 
oppressed groups. The first group are the oppressed who have the capabili-
ties but they do not exercise their volition to alter their plight by sacrificing 
their security and status out of fear and indolence. The second group are 
those who suffer from an innate, inborn condition of oppression, but take 
action in order to rid themselves of this situation. The first group are chas-
tised because they do not abide by the Qur’anic injunction of migrating: 
“Those whom the angels cause to die while they are unjust to themselves 
will be asked [by the angles]: ‘What were you doing?’ They will say: ‘We were 
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oppressed in the land’. They [the angels] will add saying: ‘Was not Allah’s 
land spacious enough for you to emigrate to some other part?’ Those people 
–their refuge is Hell, and what a wretched destiny! Except the oppressed 
men, women and children who have no recourse and cannot find a way out. 
Those, Allah may pardon them; Allah is All-Pardoning, All-Forgiving” (4:97-
99). Thus, according to Fadlallah, the Qur’an stipulates several means19 of 
facing off oppression such as emigration, for those who are capable, to a 
new and prosperous land where they can exercise their religion freely.20
Internationally and regionally, Hizbullah depicted the imperial-capi-
talist First World Countries as the oppressors, led by the “Great Satan” (US), 
France, and the “Little Satan”, the “Zionist Entity” (Israel). Domestically, Hiz-
bullah stressed that the oppressors were the political Maronites21 and their 
right-wing militias (Phalangists, Lebanese Front, Lebanese Forces).22 Z‘aytir 
purported that the oppressor, arrogant, and hypocrite political Maronites 
spread the reigns of terror among the oppressed Muslims, being inspired 
by the oppressors, the “crusader Pope in Rome” as well as their masters: the 
French, the Americans, and the Zionists.23 He stressed that the Maronite 
oppressors should be punished according to the level of their oppression, 
injustice, tyranny, exploitation, betrayal, treason, and crimes. Justice is what 
the oppressed demand as retribution from the oppressors.24 In a similar 
vein, Ayatullah Fadlallah argued that in order to alleviate the plight of the 
oppressed, the causes of oppression should be uprooted, most prominently 
the power elite represented by the political Maronites.25 Z‘aytir contended 
that the confrontation between the oppressors and oppressed should con-
stitute an impetus for the Muslims to rebel against their tyrannical-arrogant 
governments that have enslaved them, squandered their natural resources, 
and plundered their wealth.26 
Hizbullah bases its political-ideological legitimisation of the notion 
of oppressors and oppressed on a host of Qur’anic verses27, which depict 
the mustad‘afin as the downtrodden and oppressed, or those who were 
deemed weak; and the mustakbirin as the arrogant and oppressors (34: 31-
33): “The unbelievers say: ‘We will never believe in this Qur’an, nor in what 
came before it’. If you could only see when the wrongdoers are arrayed 
before their Lord, each one reproaching the other, the downtrodden saying 
to the arrogant: ‘But for you, we would have been believers’. The arrogant 
will say to the downtrodden: ‘Did we really bar you from the guidance after 
it came to you? No, you were rather ungodly’. Then the downtrodden will 
say to the arrogant: ‘It was rather your cunning night and day, when you 
commanded us to disbelieve in Allah and assign equals to Him’. They will 
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be secretly remorseful, when they see the punishment. We will put shackles 
round the necks of the unbelievers; will they be rewarded but for what they 
used to do?” Other Qur’anic verses, stress that God would always favour the 
oppressed and grant them victory over the oppressors: “We wish to favour 
the downtrodden [oppressed] in the land and make them leaders [Imams] 
and make them the inheritors; And establish them firmly in the land…” 
(28:5-6)28; “And remember when you were few and were deemed oppressed 
in the land, fearing that the people will snatch you away; but He gave you a 
shelter, strengthened you with His support and provided you with the good 
things, that perchance you may give thanks” (8:26)29; “And those who, if they 
are oppressed, will overcome” (42:39). 
Sayyid Ibrahim Amin Al-Sayyid said that these Qur’anic verses appeared 
in many of Hizbullah’s publications in the 1980s30 and crowned the speeches 
and statements of its leaders and cadres who reiterated Imam Musa al-Sadr’s 
deprivation discourse. Most importantly, he added that Imam Khumayni has 
already given the significance of the aforementioned verses arguing that 
Hizbullah decries the Marxist dialectical historical materialism and does 
not view history from the perspective of class struggle as the socialists do, 
rather as a struggle between the Qur’anic concepts of oppressors and the 
oppressed. In line with what Khumayni sanctioned and enjoined, al-Sayyid 
stressed, as an Islamic duty (taklif) , helping and supporting all the deprived 
and oppressed – irrespective of their social class, race, or religion – from 
the grip of the oppressors. Al-Sayyid added that Khumayni emphasized 
that the Muslim religious scholars have a religious duty to fight the oppres-
sors and colonizers by precluding them from exploiting and alienating the 
oppressed. The Muslim religious scholars should not allow the oppressors 
to plunder the natural resources of the umma and disseminate hunger and 
deprivation among its populace. Imam Khumayni called on the oppressed to 
mobilize and rebel, as such being the catalysts of the Islamic Revolution that 
would eventually rapture the chains of despotic-unjust rulers and establish 
an Islamic government that protects the umma.31 
The political-ideological content of the understanding of oppres-
sors and oppressed was also articulated by Ayatullah Fadlallah. Fadlallah 
offered an Islamic theory of oppression by depicting world history as a dia-
lectical-perpetual struggle between the powerful arrogant oppressors, and 
the weak downtrodden oppressed, between injustice and justice. Fadlallah 
condemned economic and political imperialism; he regarded oppression, 
colonialism, imperialism, and Zionism as mafasid (evils and vices), and he 
legitimatised and justified the use of power by the oppressed against these 
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mafasid. He argued that oppression leads to dehumanising, humiliating, and 
robbing the oppressed of their inalienable liberty that is granted to them by 
the Qur’an.32 Fadlallah added that mustad‘afin is a Qur’anic concept where 
the oppressed suffer from social, economic, and political exploitation and 
alienation, which makes them feel an acute sense of helplessness and dep-
rivation. According to him, the Qur’an urges the oppressed to revolt against 
their oppression.33 
Although the roots of the notion of oppressors and oppressed were 
underscored by Imam Musa al-Sadr in his theory of the downtrodden Leba-
nese Shi‘ites who were deprived and dispossessed34, Hizbullah stresses in its 
Open Letter35 and political declarations that it was also influenced by Imam 
Khumayni’s revolutionary Qur’anic notion of oppressors and oppressed.36 
Hizbullah also emphasized that it supports the struggle of all the oppressed 
against the oppressors in order to achieve their rights on a global level.37
2.2 Views on the Islamic State and the Lebanese Political System 
(Political Maronism) 
Hizbullah conveyed its obligation to the rule of Islam (Islamic State) 
calling upon the populace to opt for the Islamic system (al-nizam al-Islami), 
which is the only one capable of warranting justice, liberty, and security. Hiz-
bullah portrayed its discourse in political-ideological terms by affirming that 
only the Islamic system is capable of halting any new colonialist-imperialist 
intervention in Lebanon.38 In line with Imam Khumayni, Hizbullah argued 
that abiding by al-qawanin al-wad‘iyya (positive or man-made laws and leg-
islations) instead of Islamic shari‘a, is the second out of four ways colonial-
ism seeks to distort Islam.39
In line with Ayatullah Fadlallah’s views40, according to the Open Let-
ter41 and its political declarations, one of Hizbullah’s objectives is to grant 
the Lebanese populace (both Christians and Muslims) the right of self-deter-
mination by freely choosing the form or system of government they deem 
fit based on mutual agreement:42 “There is no compulsion in religion; true 
guidance has become distinct from error. Thus he who disbelieves in the 
Devil and believes in Allah grasps the firmest handle [bond] that will never 
break. Allah is All-Hearing, All-Knowing. Allah is the Supporter of the believ-
ers. He brings them out of darkness into light. As for those who disbelieve, 
their supporters are the devils who bring them out of light into darkness. 
Those are the people of the Fire in which they shall abide forever” (2:256-7). 
However, Hizbullah anticipated the result by contending, “they would defi-
nitely choose Islam”. That is why it calls for the implementation of the Islamic 
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system. Indeed, Hizbullah emphasized in the Open Letter and its political 
declarations that it does not want Islam to reign in Lebanon by force as the 
“oppressive system” of political Maronism was governing.43 
Na‘im Qasim commented on the aforementioned by arguing that 
the Open Letter is clear in its call to establish the Islamic state (al-dawla al-
Islamiyya) in Lebanon based on the free will and free choice of the populace. 
He added that Hizbullah is totally in harmony with its convictions and with 
the practical-objective circumstances in which it operates (i.e. the Lebanese 
milieu). Thus, according to Qasim, as long as these circumstances preclude 
Hizbullah from establishing an Islamic state because the choice of the peo-
ple is otherwise, then the populace should bear the responsibility of the 
political system that they have chosen: “Had your Lord willed, everybody on 
earth would have believed. Will you then compel people to become believ-
ers?” (10:99).44 
In al-‘Ahd, Hizbullah stressed that the Muslims have no right whatso-
ever to even entertain the idea of a Muslim canton (a mini-Islamic state)45 or 
a Shi‘ite canton, or a Sunni canton… Talking about cantons annihilates the 
Muslims, destroys their potential power, and leads them from one internal 
war to another. Only the Islamic state (al-dawla al-Islamiyya) upholds their 
unity.46 
In the Open Letter Hizbullah stressed that Islam47 or the Islamic order 
is characterised by ideology, doctrine, political order, and mode of gov-
ernance48, without specifying the components or contents of these terms, 
while Z‘aytir did. He argued that based on strict religious criteria, the Islamic 
government takes its decisions, conveys its projects, wages wars, ratifies or 
rejects treaties, and deals with the international situation from the stance 
of changing it and Islamising it. He added that the Islamic government 
constitutes a practical embodiment of the Islamic laws and injunctions. It 
is stipulated that the governor should be well conversant with Islamic laws 
and injunctions, and he must be just in applying them because the ignorant 
governor would lead the people astray, and the unjust would steal money, 
downgrade the rights, and destroy the umma: “My covenant does not apply 
to the evil-doers” (2:124). Z‘aytir stressed that Hizbullah seeks the realization 
of two important objectives in establishing an Islamic Republic in Lebanon: 
(1) To prevent any governor from becoming a tyrant abusing the people in 
their security and freedom; and (2) to consolidate the Islamic content of the 
system. He stressed that the concept of Islamic state means that Hizbullah 
ought to build its Islamic republic, establish its Qur’anic government, and 
erect an Islamic community based on the foundation of an Islamic knowl-
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edge of the universe and human life, which, according to him, is the best 
system for humanity.49 
Z‘aytir concretely outlined the constituents of the Islamic order. He 
argued that authority in Islam is a means to care for people’s rights, and 
for the improvement of their daily dealings and lives. He affirmed that the 
system of Islamic governance, in addition to applying penal law (hudud), 
orders social, political, economic, and monetary relations; coordinates and 
balances between rights and duties. It is based upon the following: social 
solidarity and social justice; righteousness, fear of God, confidence in Him, 
and obedience to the Qur’an and Sunna; rendering people their rights and 
giving them security; justice, fairness, equity, compassion, liaison with the 
people, and mutual trust. In short, according to Z‘aytir, the system of Islamic 
governance prepares the adequate ground for raising free and noble human 
beings through holistic social programs, execution of the shari‘a, encourag-
ing education and progress, and treating everyone equally in front of the 
law based upon the hadith and Qur’an respectively: “There is no preference 
between an Arab and a non-Arab except on the grounds of piety; you are 
all from Adam, and Adam is from dust”; “O mankind, We have created you 
male and female and made you nations and tribes, so that you might come 
to know one another. Surely the noblest of you in Allah’s sight is the most 
pious. Allah is indeed All-Knowing, All-Informed”(49:13).50
2.2.1 The place of the Christians in the Islamic state
In conformity to the Open Letter, in one of its political declarations 
Hizbullah stated that it sees in the presence of the peace-loving Christians, 
who reside in the areas under its control, the credibility of its “opening-up” 
(infitah) and the tolerance of Islam. Hizbullah stressed that the dhimmis or 
ahl al-dhimma51 share with the Muslims the social values of overt and pur-
poseful tolerance such as love, fraternity, and solidarity. However, Hizbullah 
clarified in its political declaration that political Maronism is exempted from 
such tolerance being regarded as hypocrites: “When the hypocrites came 
to you, they say: ‘We bear witness that you are indeed Allah’s Apostle’. Allah 
knows that you are indeed his Apostle and Allah bears witness that the hyp-
ocrites are liars” (63:1).52 
Sayyid Fadlallah explained that the first constitution of Islam, the 
constitution of al-Medina (al-Sahifa) stressed the security as well as the pro-
tection of the person and property of ahl al-dhimma as long as they were 
not treacherous. Fadlallah clarified that in the Islamic state the relations 
between the Muslims, on the one hand, and the Jews and Christians, on 
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the other, were governed by the “dhimmi contract”, which regulated these 
relations and enforced them with specific contractual obligations based 
on mutual consent, by which the Jews and Christians had the same rights 
and duties as any Muslim citizen. Fadlallah added since justice53 has always 
been closely related to freedom, freedom that grants benefits and precludes 
harms54, the dhimmi contract granted ahl al-dhimma freedom, especially 
the freedom of religion and the protection of their religious practices.55 In 
turn, ‘Ali Kurani stated that the freedom accorded to ahl al-dhimma in the 
Islamic state is within the confines of the safeguards of Islamic shari‘a.56 He 
clarified that the Christian minorities who live under Muslim governance 
are accorded all their civil and religious rights, but not their political rights 
since they are governed and are not ruling anymore, as was the case with 
political Maronism.57
According to Z‘aytir, The Islamic republic that the Muslims are striving 
to instate in Lebanon does not impose upon the Christians, in general, and 
the political Maronites, in particular, to convert to Islam because Islam does 
not need them to be in its ranks, rather they need Islam. He warned that 
governance and administration of the umma should only be the prerogative 
of the Muslims, and the Muslims must not allow others to interfere in their 
affairs: “O believers, do not take as close friends other than your own people 
[co-religionists]; they will spare no effort to corrupt you and wish to see 
you suffer. Hatred has already been manifested in what they utter, but what 
their hearts conceal is greater still. We have made clear Our signs to you if 
only you understand” (3:118). Based on this verse, Z‘aytir posed the rhetori-
cal question: since it is a religious imperative not to allow the Christians to 
participate in government, then how could the Muslims accept to be ruled 
by them?58
In this respect, Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi said that compulsion in reli-
gion is not allowed or else Prophet Muhammad would not have revealed 
the constitution of al-Medina. Sayyid Abbas considered the Prophet as the 
inter-religious arbitrator among the Muslims, ahl al-dhimma, and others. 
Sayyid Abbas emphasized that the constitution of Medina pointed out that 
although the city was made up of many religious communities, Medina was 
a monolithic political community headed by Prophet Muhammad. Thus, 
non-Muslims conferred legitimacy to the Prophet as the political leader 
and final arbitrator. Sayyid Abbas stressed that since the Prophet’s religious 
authority over non-Muslims was restricted, al-Sahifa granted each religious 
community full rights to follow its own religion and to practice its own inter-
nal affairs as it deems fit. Sayyid Abbas conveyed that this is how Hizbullah 
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treats the People of the Book in accordance with the Constitution of Medina 
that distinguished between religious authority and political authority or 
leadership.59 
2.2.2 Hizbullah’s stance towards political Maronism 
According to Z‘aytir, the principal points of the Maronite political ide-
ology are the following: (1) The exclusive Maronite identity of Lebanon has 
been established for thousands of years. (2) Xenophobic nationalism: “We are 
the Christian Lebanese nation, and the others do not belong”. Since Lebanon 
is the nation-state of the Maronites, the Muslims are considered foreigners 
and should be deported.60 (3) Maronite Christian supremacy: The Lebanese 
populace is Maronite and the word “Maronite” means Lebanese. Thus, the 
Lebanese are Maronites, and Lebanon and the Maronites is one and the 
same thing. (4) The Maronite history does not mention Islam as such, rather 
it refers to the “Arab conquest” stressing the need to liberate Lebanon from 
Muslim presence and transform it into a Maronite nation-state. Since the 
Arabic language is the language of the Muslim conquerors, the Maronites 
have called for its abolishment and its replacement with Latin script. (5) The 
coalescence among the Maronites, “crusaders”, and “Zionists” as a means of 
empowerment by reliance on the West and its tutelage.61
Since the Islamic state contradicts and is the direct opposite of the 
Lebanese sectarian political system, Hizbullah’s Open Letter chastised politi-
cal Maronism and anathematised the infidel Lebanese government, which 
should be uprooted so that an Islamic system could be established in its 
place. Hizbullah stressed that the Lebanese regime is so arrogant and ineq-
uitable to the extent that no reform or amendment can overhaul it. Accord-
ing to Hizbullah, that is why it should be fundamentally altered62 since it is 
an unjust regime.63 
In its Open Letter, Hizbullah mentioned that the Phalangists are one 
of their basic enemies in the Middle East, and one of its major goals is to 
submit them “to a just power and bring them all to justice for the crimes they 
have perpetrated against Muslims and Christians”.64 Z‘aytir stressed that the 
Muslims would annihilate the crusader political Maronites who killed and 
massacred Muslims. He added that Islam prohibited, and regarded as haram 
(religiously prohibited), killing innocent people as a hadith of the Prophet 
says: “The shaking up of Heaven and earth is easier to God than killing a Mus-
lim person”. He argued that the Maronites heeded the orders of the “despica-
ble Crusaders”65 by crushing and terrorising the “Islamists” (al-Islamiyyun).66 
According to Z‘aytir, political Maronism is subservient to Zionist’s and Cru-
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sader’s legitimacy that is transient, tribal, jahili 67 (pre-Islamic period of igno-
rance), and illegitimate because it is based on killing and terrorism, and does 
not place any regard to human rights.68 In turn ‘Ali Kurani blasted the blatant 
and wayward secularism of political Maronism, which ignores or brushes 
aside Islamic political ideology and the ideological bond in favour of liberal-
izing political, humanistic, social, and economic contexts and dimensions 
that are totally governed by the materialism of the West and East.69
Z‘aytir emphasized that from a religious duty, it is always incumbent 
upon Islamist political movements to find a way to acquire political power 
through a top-down process aiming at replacing the current regime. On a 
practical level, he argued that Hizbullah thought that Lebanon was qualified 
to rupture the chains of political Maronism and establish an Islamic republic, 
as long there was an Islamic revival and Islamist movements that wielded 
power on the Lebanese scene. From this perspective, Z‘aytir stressed the 
urgent need to topple the existing regime and establish an Islamic govern-
ment in its place. Z‘aytir criticised the measured pace or cautious approach 
of al-hala al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Milieu) towards the establishment of an 
Islamic state in Lebanon.70 He clearly stated Hizbullah’s grand design of 
Islamization through a top-down process aiming at annihilating and uproot-
ing the infidel Lebanese political system.71 
Z‘aytir clarified that Hizbullah’s disagreement with political Maronism 
is not on the number of seats in the parliament or cabinet, neither on admin-
istrative positions in the state apparatus, nor on superficial amendments to 
the constitution; rather, the issue is upholding the cause as well as the sur-
vival of the umma that did not exist except to rule others: “And thus we have 
made the Muslim nation a just nation, so that you may bear witness unto the 
rest of mankind, and that the Apostle may bear witness unto you” (2:143).72 
He threatened that the road is clear to destroy the alleged Maronite supe-
riority and to crush the political Maronite Lebanese system that made it its 
duty to exterminate Muslims.73 
In place of political Maronism, Z‘aytir calls for instating an Islamic 
republic. Z‘aytir warned that Hizbullah and the Islamists would in the end 
cut the hands of the traitors and liberate Lebanon from the political Maronite 
infidels and tyrants. He stressed that Islam is unequivocal in rejecting any 
authority of the infidels (Maronites) over the believers (Muslims). That is why 
the political Maronites are afraid of Islam and are attempting to terrorise the 
Muslims and prevent them from changing the system and establishing an 
Islamic state, contending that it stands in sharp contrast to the Lebanese 
constitution and traditions.74 Z‘aytir stressed that there is no legitimacy to 
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the Maronite minority because any ‘legitimacy’, which is opposed to Islamic 
shari‘a, is rejected. Only the authority given by Islam is legitimate (12:40). 
According to him, Islam rejects the governance of infidels, and bars Mus-
lims from accepting their authority without any regard to their higher sta-
tus. That is why the Maronite system can never be legitimate. Legitimacy 
is only for Islam and anything besides that is jahiliyya governance: (5:50). 
Z‘aytir added that even if the Maronites transformed Lebanon into a piece of 
heaven, then still their rule would remain rejected and illegitimate from an 
Islamic perspective. He clarified that every government and every author-
ity, which does not govern by what God has prescribed and stipulated, is an 
infidel-illegitimate government and dealings with it are prohibited. 
He added that political Maronism, which is facing a precarious situ-
ation, is living the fear of Islam and is doing its utmost to uphold the Leba-
nese political system using the argument that the Muslims want to create 
an Islamic republic. Z‘aytir abhorred equating Islam with political Maronism, 
arguing that political Maronism is an emergency intruding system on the 
country of the Muslims. He concluded that the Maronites are afraid of the 
resurgence of Islam in the umma, a resurgence that would destroy the infi-
del Maronite system, as it has destroyed the infidel Shah of Iran, and estab-
lish an Islamic republic that would return the rights to its rightful owners.75
Z‘aytir stressed that even if the Muslims took over the state and estab-
lished a patriotic, democratic, or nationalist system of government, then still 
their rule would be illegitimate and apostate because it is rejected from God 
and his Prophet being regarded among the jahiliyya systems that are devoid 
of the bare necessities of legitimacy: (5:44-46); (5:50).76 Z‘aytir affirmed that 
every government that does not abide by the obedience of God and the 
traditions of the Prophet is rejected by Islam no matter how progressive and 
civilized it might be. Islam enjoins the rejection of infidel governments, call-
ing for fighting them till the very end. For the legitimate government is the 
Islamic government, and the shar‘i governance is the binding Muslim rule. 
He concluded as long as the president or the government or both of them 
do not abide by Islam, then all their decisions and injunctions are consid-
ered unjust and illegitimate.77 
Sayyid Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyid stated that the Muslim populace in 
Lebanon does not accept to become part of the political project of the 
Lebanese state or political Maronism; rather the Lebanese state should find 
a place in the project of Islam.78 More emphatically, Z‘aytir argued that in 
history all entities have a transient existence, and the Lebanese Republic, 
which was the volition of the colonialists and the crusaders, ceased to be. 
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He stressed that Hizbullah should earn the dignity of inculcating the rule of 
God on earth by establishing an Islamic republic: (6:106).79 
2.3 Hizbullah’s relations with the Lebanese Christians 80
By addressing the Lebanese Christians in general and the Maronites 
in particular, the Open Letter set apart the Maronites from the rest of the 
Christians.81 The Open Letter also differentiated among the Maronites them-
selves on the following grounds: (1) the leading Maronite notables and 
their retinue who constitute the symbols of the political system i.e. political 
Maronism, or those with blatant connections with Israel; and (2) the rest of 
the Maronite notables and the ordinary citizens. Hizbullah considered that 
its primary problem was with the symbols of the political system i.e. political 
Maronism and the collaborators with Israel. Hizbullah called upon the chiefs 
of political Maronism to stop using their Christian militias in order to exer-
cise oppressive policies against the Muslims because such policies would 
backfire on the Christians and would endanger their peace and security, 
especially since such exploitation was based on narrow-minded particular-
ism, sectarian privileges, and collaboration with colonialism and Israel. Also, 
the Open Letter enjoined the Christians to liberate their thoughts, minds, 
and hearts of the despicable sectarianism, fanaticism and parochialism.82 In 
addition, Hizbullah clarified in the Open Letter, that its views against politi-
cal Maronism do not imply that Hizbullah is seeking revenge against all the 
Christians, stressing that it does not wish any inconvenience or harm neither 
to the Christians who live peacefully in the areas that are under its control 
nor to those who are “patriotic” and live elsewhere.83 
However, in the Open Letter, Hizbullah practiced its Islamic propa-
gation by exhorting all the Christians to convert to Islam in order to have 
felicity in this world and the world to come: “Open your hearts to our Call 
(da‘wa)84, which we address to you. Open yourselves up to Islam where you 
will find salvation and happiness upon earth and in the hereafter”. Hizbullah 
called on the Christians to rid themselves of narrow denominational alle-
giance and of monopolising privileges to the disadvantage of other com-
munities. Hizbullah stressed that the Christians should answer the appeal 
from heaven and have recourse to reason instead of arms; to persuasion 
instead of sectarianism. Hizbullah encouraged the Christians to review their 
calculations and know that their interest lies in what they decide, by their 
own free will, not by what is imposed upon them: “Say: ‘O People of the 
Book, come to an equitable world [kalimat siwa’ ] between you and us, that 
we worship none but Allah, do not associate anything with Him and do not 
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set up each other as lords besides Allah’ ” (3:64). In an attempt to convey 
Hizbullah’s tolerance towards non-Muslims, Z‘aytir argued that Prophet 
Muhammad always placed the Qur’anic verse (3:64) as a header on all the 
letters he addressed to them. Z‘aytir stressed that this conveys the “abso-
lute freedom granted to non-Muslims, freedom that ruptures the chains of 
slavery, freedom that is based upon human coalescence, intuitive trends, 
and the spiritual dimension of human existence”85, i.e. religious and social 
freedom, but not political freedom, as was explained in the previous section. 
The Open Letter added, however, if the Christians refuse to adhere to Islam, 
Hizbullah would not force them to do otherwise, rather it just expects them 
to respect and honour their covenants with the Muslims and not to aggress 
against them.86 Most importantly, Hizbullah stressed in the Open Letter that 
there is “no compulsion in religion” (2:256).87 
Z‘aytir clarified that Islam rejects dialogue between an oppressed 
Muslim and an oppressor crusader (political Maronism), especially since 
these crusaders have been conspiring for centuries against the Muslims 
with the Zionists. He stressed that it is a well-known fact that anyone who 
allies himself with the enemies of Islam becomes an enemy of Islam even 
though he was not classified as such from the beginning. Thus, according 
to Z‘aytir, the friend of my enemy is my enemy: “O believers, do not take 
the Jews and Christians as friends; some of them are friends of each other. 
Whoever of you takes them as friends is surely one of them. Allah indeed 
does not guide the wrongdoers [al-zalimin]” (5:51). He added that in reality 
the political Maronites do not aspire for dialogue; rather they need allies. As 
such, dialogue was only a means to reach the contrived end of controlling 
the Muslims: “Neither the Jews nor the Christians will be pleased with you 
until you follow their religion. Say: ‘Allah’s guidance is the [only] guidance’. 
And were you to follow their desires after the Knowledge that came down 
to you, you will have no guardian or helper [to save you] from Allah” (2:120). 
Z‘aytir affirmed that the political Maronites do not mind to hold a meeting 
with all the militia leaders and come up with decisions that call for a politi-
cal settlement, which would stress upholding, what they call, ‘legitimacy’ 
and ‘constitutionality’. By this the political Maronites deceive the populace, 
absorb the rising discontent against them, and deceive God: “The devils 
shall insinuate to their followers to dispute with you; but if you obey them, 
then you will surely be polytheists” (6:121). He concluded by posing a rhe-
torical question, namely that since the political Maronites are responsible 
for the destruction of Lebanon, then why should anybody negotiate with 
them, and on what?88
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Hizbullah echoed the Open Letter’s views towards the Christians 
through its political declarations. In 1986 Hizbullah issued a political dec-
laration stating that it does not find itself obliged to conduct dialogue with 
political Maronism that is collaborating with is enemies; rather Hizbullah 
opens its heart and extends its hands to dialogue and understanding with 
the Christians and other religious confessions based on the unshakable con-
viction of enmity to the USA and Israel.89 
2.4 Hizbullah’s stance towards Israel 
In one of its earliest political declarations, Hizbullah affirmed its 
stance of the continuity of the struggle of the Islamic Resistance until the 
obliteration of Israel, a notion upon which Hizbullah based and erected its 
entire military, political, intellectual, and ideological resistance to the Israeli 
occupation. The declaration stressed that the Zionist entity’s presence is ille-
gal; it has no right to exist, no right in the land of Palestine, and no Arab or 
Muslim has the right to grant Israel any recognition or legitimacy.90 Hizbul-
lah declared that its enmity to Israel is a banner raised against Zionism for 
the Liberation of Jerusalem91 and all the holy sites.92 Sayyid Ibrahim Amin al-
Sayyid indicated a high degree of concordance between Musa al-Sadr’s dis-
course and rhetoric and that of Khumayni. Amin al-Sayyid argued that there 
is no difference between Khumayni’s saying that “Israel should be wiped out 
existence” and al-Sadr’s statements that “Israel is the absolute evil”; “Fight 
the Israeli’s with your teeth and nails”; and “The honour and dignity of Jeru-
salem would only be liberated by the [Muslim] believers”.93 
Hizbullah’s Open letter affirmed its ideological position of enmity 
towards Israel springs from “a political-ideological and historical aware-
ness that the Zionist entity is aggressive from its inception, and built on 
lands wrested from their owners, at the expense of the rights of the Muslim 
people”.94 Other political declarations reiterated that Israel’s very existence 
is rooted in “racist, colonialist Western expansionist ideology that aims at 
raping Muslim land”. Hizbullah emphasized that the Zionist entity is a colo-
nial settler state that was enabled and supported by Western colonial pow-
ers that artificially created it by raping Palestinian land, annihilating, and 
uprooting the Palestinian state and people in order to safeguard Western 
interests in the Middle East. Hizbullah stressed that the Western colonial 
powers were instrumental in the establishment of Israel and continuously 
supported it in order to become their Western outpost. Hizbullah added that 
the Zionist entity is an artificial expansionist entity that aims at devouring 
the whole region from the Nile to the Euphrates, not only militarily, but also 
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politically and economically. As such, Israeli hegemony through Western 
penetration poses a great threat to the Muslim presence in the Middle East. 
Hizbullah grounded its firm ideology on the destruction of Israel and the 
total liberation of historic Palestine. Finally, the three political declarations 
clarified Hizbullah’s ideology of rejecting any negotiations with Israel that 
might lead to a settlement of the ‘so-called’ Arab-Israeli conflict.95
In line with its political declarations and statements that conveyed 
Hizbullah’s ideology of resistance against Israel’s occupation and oppres-
sion, in the Open Letter, Hizbullah called for the death of Israel, referred to 
it as “occupied Palestine”, and called for the restoration/reinstatement of the 
1948 Palestine. The Open Letter added, Hizbullah enjoins the international 
community to adopt a resolution to fire Israel from the UN because it is an 
“illegitimate-rapist entity, which is opposed to humanity at large”.96 In this 
regard, Z‘aytir claimed that the demise of non-Muslim regimes is necessarily 
followed by the annihilation of Israel. According to him, that would ensue 
the downfall of all the powers and the international organizations that sup-
port Israel as well as the satellite regimes that collaborate with it (such as 
political Maronism).97
Although Hizbullah concentrated its attack on the Zionists, in the 
Open Letter Hizbullah hardly mentions the Jews, “You shall find the most 
hostile people to the believers to be the Jews and the polytheists” (5:82).98 
Hizbullah’s political declaration on the occasion of its first martyrdom opera-
tion referred to both the Jews and the Zionists: “the operation of Khaybar, 
the operation that spread terror in the heart of the Zionist enemy [Israel], 
convulsed its foundations and military balance, and signified a great histori-
cal conquest against the Jews…”99 According to Sayyid Abbas, the choice of 
the name is telling because it is based on the historical precedent of enmity 
to the Jews. Sayyid Abbas explained that the Constitution of Medina granted 
non-Muslims full partnership in the political structure based on the essential 
components of freedom, justice, and equity. As such, the Jews were part and 
parcel of the political structure and subject to it. They were even allowed to 
fight side by side with the Muslims and take part in peace making. Sayyid 
Abbas stressed that although the Jews were accorded a high status in the 
Constitution of Medina, they broke the covenant with the Prophet, so he 
had to fight them because they had to submit to what God has revealed. 
He quoted the Qur’an to substantiate his claim: “Those, who each time you 
make a covenant with them, break it, and do not fear God. So, if you should 
come up with them in the war, scatter100 them with those behind them, that 
perchance they may pay heed. And should you fear treachery from any peo-
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ple, throw back their treaty to them in like manner. Allah does not like the 
treacherous. Let not the unbelievers think that they can escape [Us]. They 
will never be able to escape. And make ready for them whatever you can of 
fighting men and horses, to terrify thereby the enemies of Allah and your 
enemy, as well as others besides them whom you do know, but Allah knows 
well” (8:56-60). 
Sayyid Abbas explained that Prophet Muhammad’s army repeated 
the following slogan when they were storming the gate of Khaybar: “Khay-
bar, Khaybar ya yahud, jaysh Muhammad qadimun [Khaybar, Khaybar you 
Jews, the army of Muhammad is coming]”. He added that Hizbullah replaced 
the anti-Judaism, which was prevalent at the time of the Prophet, with Imam 
Khumayni’s political ideology of anti-Zionism: “Khaybar, Khaybar ya sahyun, 
Hizbullah qadimun [Khaybar, Khaybar you Zionists, Hizbullah is coming]”.101 
Sayyid Abbas stressed that from this perspective Hizbullah refuses to nego-
tiate with Israel because historically the Jews were treacherous and did not 
honour their covenants, and because the Jews in occupied Palestine are rap-
ists of the land and Zionists who will never be accorded any legitimacy by 
Hizbullah whatsoever.102 
However, in al-‘Ahd Hizbullah clarified that from an Islamic legal per-
spective it considers the Jews as “people of the Book” who should be accord-
ed their religious, legal, cultural, and political rights as stipulated in Islamic 
law. Hizbullah rationalized this stance by analogy with the way the Prophet 
treated the Jews under the Constitution of Medina and the way the Islamic 
Republic treats its Jewish citizens. Hizbullah resorts to Khumayni, who clari-
fied that unlike the Jews, the Zionists are neither “people of religion” nor 
dhimmis. Khumayni added that the Islamic Republic stands firm against the 
Zionists who are driven by a political ideology that exploits Judaism and 
despises all other races. Khumayni stressed that if the Muslims and Palestini-
ans defeat the Zionist Entity, then only the Zionists (all Jewish Israelis) would 
have the same fate as the Shah, while the rest of the Jews, who live in the 
Arab and Muslim countries, would not be harmed and would be accorded 
the same rights as any other populace or race.103 As such, Hizbullah clarified 
that its enmity is not towards the Jews as a race or religion, rather towards 
the Zionists who have raped Palestinian land and established their Zionist 
Entity.104
In line with its political declarations, Hizbullah reiterated in the Open 
Letter that it rejects the “land for peace” principle, and does not acknowl-
edge any truce, ceasefire, or peace treaty with Israel, the “enemy”. Hizbullah’s 
Open Letter refused to acknowledge the ‘so called’ Arab/Palestinian-Israeli 
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conflict and totally rejected any negotiations105 or peace talks with Israel 
since it would grant legitimacy to its “Zionist occupation of Palestine”. Hiz-
bullah blasted the Lebanese government for negotiating with Israel con-
sidering the negotiators as enemies who are committing “grave treason” 
towards Hizbullah: “the negotiations with the enemy can only be regarded 
as a conspiracy aiming at acknowledging the Zionist occupation and accord-
ing it legitimacy as well as privilege on the crimes it had committed against 
the oppressed in Lebanon…” The Open Letter added that Hizbullah would 
not cease its struggle “until the Zionists evacuate the occupied lands, which 
is seen as a step in the right direction to obliterate them from the face of 
the earth”.106
As conveyed in al-‘Ahd, Hizbullah’s standard and official position con-
cerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict demands the return of all Palestine, 
namely, 1948 Palestine, from the Jordan river till the Mediterranean Sea, 
and the repatriation of all the Jews who came after the 1916 Sykes-Picot 
Agreement, which divided the Middle East among the British and French 
after the demise of the Ottoman Empire and placed Palestine under British 
Mandate.107
2.5 Views on the Unity of the Muslims
Hizbullah’s political ideology discussed the inner and outer causes 
of discord (fitna) among the Muslims. The Open Letter warned against the 
imperialist discord that is threatening to rapture the whole Muslim world. 
It blamed the “devilish conspiracy” of the imperialist-colonialist nations for 
killing and concealing righteous ‘ulama – such as Musa al-Sadr, Ayatullah 
Murtada Mutahhari108, and Ayatullah Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr109 
– who opposed its “aggressive plans” and were calling for Islamic unity in 
order to thwart Western conspiracy and ward off its venomous discord that 
is being disseminated among the Muslims.110 
Z‘aytir admonished that inner strife would lead to destroying the most 
important battlements and bulwarks that stand up against the plummeting 
of the Muslim society into discord and conspiracies. He warned that every 
individual should stay alert and ward off discord that the political Maronites 
are investing a lot in to materialize, so that its unjust system would remain 
in power.111 According to him, the “despicable” political Maronites should be 
annihilated; only then fighting would stop after getting rid of all the con-
spirers: (4:91).112 According to Kurani, the unity of the Muslims would be a 
grave disaster on the Zionist entity and the Great Satan and their allies. That 
is why, they are adamant in sowing the seeds of discord by way of provok-
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ing internal conflicts among the Muslims so that they constantly battle each 
other.113 
Fadlallah emphasized that any local collaboration with Israel and 
the US creates fitna, urging the Muslim populace to be responsible and to 
mobilize against the perpetrators of fitna in order to safeguard Muslim exist-
ence and future. He also stressed that fitna can also result from partnership 
with political Maronism, the ruling elite. Therefore, Fadlallah cautioned that 
the seeds of fitna should be uprooted so that the Muslims could forge their 
unity.114 Z‘aytir clarified that all the conspiracies, even those that seem to be 
coming from within the Muslims, are the product of the West.115 
In spite of Hizbullah’s avoidance of the issue, the era of the political 
ideology was replete with examples of Sunni-Shi‘a discord. Unlike the main-
stream Hizbullah official discourse, Kurani admits that the conspiracies did 
not only originate from the West, but they were also contrived from within 
the Muslims. Kurani refers to the “Zionist-political Maronite conspiracy”, 
aided by the Muslim feudal leaders who were part of political Maronism, 
to annihilate the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and subdue the Muslims 
by mobilizing them, in general, and the Shi‘ites, in particular, against the 
Palestinians.116 Kurani is referring to the 1985-88 War of the Camps between 
the Sunni Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, on the one hand, and AMAL and 
the Shi‘a defecting brigades of the Lebanese Army, on the other. Hizbul-
lah condemned the war as an imperialist conspiracy against the unity of 
the umma and Hizbullah’s cadres, at times, intervened on the Palestinian 
side or provided humanitarian support for the camps.117 Other examples of 
fitna coming from within was the notorious 1988-1990 AMAL-Hizbullah con-
trol war118 as well as Hizbullah’s control war with the secular leftist political 
parties119 who were fighting side by side with AMAL and Hizbullah against 
political Maronism and the Israeli occupation.
In response to discord, Hizbullah stressed the unity of the Muslims. It 
depicted itself as an “umma tied to the Muslims in every part of the world 
by a strong ideological-doctrinal, and political bond” of Islam. Hizbullah 
stressed that it is an indivisible part of the Muslim umma sharing its wails and 
woes under the guidance of the supreme jurisconsultant, the Rahbar, Imam 
Khumayni. Hizbullah stated that it was inspired by the idea of the unity of 
the Muslims from Imam Khumayni who declared the week commemorating 
the birth of the Prophet as the week of Islamic unity120 and emphasized the 
defence of the rights of all the Muslims.121 Hizbullah symbolized this unity 
to a bulwark that ruptures the conspiracies of the oppressors and arrogant 
nations.122 
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Hizbullah emphasized that the awareness and vigilance of the Mus-
lims should fend off discord and invest in unity, which is God’s injunction: 
“And hold fast to Allah’s bond [His religion], all of you, and do not fall apart. 
And remember Allah’s grace upon you; how you were enemies, then He 
united your hearts [by becoming Muslims] so that you have become, by 
His grace, brethren. You were on the brink of the pit of Fire, but He saved 
you from it” (3:102); and “Those who have made divisions in their religion 
and become sects, thou art not of them in anything” (6:159).123 Ayatullah 
Fadlallah called for the unity of the Muslims stressing that the Qur’an cau-
tions against fitna.124 According to him the Qur’anic usage of fitna connotes 
a state of chaos among the believers or populace that leads to psychologi-
cal and mental suffering, hardship, and chastisement.125 Z‘aytir exhorted 
the Muslims to avoid discord and urged them not to be the fuel that would 
burn them and burn their countries.126 He stressed that discord should be 
contained in its early stages or else it would spread like fire in hay that can 
hardly be contained.127 Prophet Muhammad has precisely warned the Mus-
lims not to engage in or help spreading discord since they would be labelled 
as infidels and would have a jahiliyya death.128 
The Open Letter called on all Muslims to be united against the oppres-
sors, the imperialists, and Zionists by following the stipulations of the right-
eous ‘ulama, and not corrupt state jurists since they would deflect from 
the teachings of Islam and follow the interests of the Great Satan and Little 
Satan. Most importantly, Hizbullah called on the Muslim ‘ulama to be united 
stressing the dangers of the Sunni-Shi‘a discord (fitna), which the imperial-
ists and oppressors are trying to fuel in order to divide and conquer the 
Muslim umma: “Be aware of the malignant colonial discord [fitna] that aims 
at rupturing your unity in order to spread sedition among you and enflame 
Sunni-Shi‘a sectarian feelings… Do not allow the policy of ‘divide and rule’ to 
be practiced among you”.129 Z‘aytir added that the crusaders were contriving 
to rapture and disintegrate the Muslims by spreading discord and enmity 
among them. He stressed that the enemies of Islam know very well that the 
Islamic unity renders the Muslims a superior power that can impose its will 
on the ruling minority governments, and by extension force the imperialists 
and colonizers to comply to the Muslim populace, which, by far, comprise a 
majority.130
Hizbullah affirmed that the jurisprudential particularities of the Sun-
nis and Shi‘ites should be respected, but this does not mean that there 
could not be a unity in the political-ideological stance towards Israel and the 
US, for instance. Therefore, Hizbullah added, that the political-ideological 
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unity of the Lebanese Sunni and Shi‘a should be directed against the West-
ern onslaught, spearheaded by the US and Israel on all Muslims.131 Kurani 
stressed that the unity of the Muslims in Lebanon means the unity of both 
the Sunni and Shi‘ite ‘ulama as well as their populace as a first step in broad-
ening this unity to encompass all the Muslims in the umma.132
Hizbullah’s leading cadres such as Hasan Nasrallah, Husayn al-Musa-
wi, and Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli highlighted the importance of the unity of 
the Muslims on a global level through an all-encompassing Islamic state.133 
In addition, they stressed the Islamic doctrine of the consciousness of uni-
fication in the Muslim umma. Thus, for Hizbullah the unity of all Muslims is 
a legitimate duty incumbent upon them in order to ward off the discord 
of infidelity (fitnat al-takfir).134 Z‘aytir argued that the erection of a global 
Islamic state would ultimately lead to the unity and dignity of the Muslims 
after being ruptured by desires, nationalities, and sects. As such the most 
important function of Islamic government is to unify the umma.135 
2.6 Hizbullah and the West, the US in particular 
Hizbullah’s political ideology towards the West was influenced by 
Imam Khumayni, the Rahbar, who repeatedly stated that the US, “the mother 
of all vice”, is behind all the calamities that have been rupturing the Muslim 
world.136 Hizbullah unequivocally conveyed its enmity towards the US and 
Israel in many of its political declarations. Hizbullah labelled the US Admin-
istration as infidel stressing the centrality of Hizbullah’s struggle with the 
US and Israel, taking pride in “breaking the American-Zionist arm” under the 
attacks of the oppressed Muslim warriors (Hizbullah’s Islamic Resistance). 
These attacks led to the US’s humiliating military defeat and its withdrawal, 
along with its NATO allies, from Lebanon. The declaration added that Hiz-
bullah reminds the Muslims with an important saying of the great leader of 
the Muslim umma, Imam Khumayni, who said that even if the US and Israel 
declared “there is no God but Allah”, this call would not be accepted, and the 
Muslims would continue their struggle against them till they crush the US 
hegemony and uproot the cancerous gland (Israel), which is implanted in 
the midst of the Muslims.137 
The Open Letter considered the US, Israel, France and NATO as its basic 
enemies in the Middle East. It stressed uprooting the US’s and Israeli vice 
from the Middle East, blaming both for the calamities, injustices, aggression 
and humiliation that have been rupturing the Muslim umma. Further, Hiz-
bullah chastised the “reactionary” Arab regimes that are corroborating with 
the aforementioned countries.138 
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Like Iranian political ideology, the enmity to the US and Israel has 
been a motto constantly repeated by Hizbullah’s leaders and cadres where 
the US has been depicted as the Great Satan and Israel as the Little Satan: 
‘death to America’ and ‘death to Israel’. Sayyid Ibrahim Amin Al-Sayyid con-
tended that the Qur’an enjoins the Muslims to fight the Great Satan (US) 
and the Little Satan (Israel): “And make ready for them whatever you can of 
fighting men and horses, to terrify thereby the enemies of Allah and your 
enemy” (8: 60).139 
Fadlallah cautioned against the dangers of colonialism and imperial-
ism, branding the West as the first and foremost enemy of the Muslim world. 
He blamed the West, especially the US and Israel, for the misfortunes that 
are rupturing the Middle East and Lebanon. He stressed that the face off 
between the West and Islam is mainly due to the Palestinian question.140 
Fadlallah warned the Muslims from heeding to or compromising with impe-
rialism since their attitude would be regarded as un-Islamic.141 Therefore, 
the only salvation to the Muslim populace is the founding of socio-political 
movements (such as Hizbullah), which exercise the ideology of resistance 
and revolution, in an attempt to rid the Muslims from imperialist domina-
tion. According to Fadlallah, this could be accomplished only when the Mus-
lims bond together raising the banner of Islam and freedom.142
Hizbullah stated in its Open Letter that it embraced many princi-
ples of Iran’s political ideology. Following Iran, Hizbullah viewed itself as 
a movement, under the guidance of Imam Khumayni, struggling against 
the injustices of imperialism and colonialism that are hostile to Islam.143 
Hizbullah stressed that it was influenced by Imam Khumayni’s revolution-
ary notion of no East, no West, only Islam i.e. an Islamic Republic (La sharqi-
yya wa la gharbiyya, innama jumhuriyya Islamiyya). Thus, no East, no West, 
rather only Islam embodies man’s renaissance because “It is kindled from a 
blessed olive tree, neither of the East nor the West. Its oil will almost shine, 
even if no fire has touched it. Light upon light, Allah guides to His light 
whomever He pleases…” (24:35).144 Hizbullah affirmed that its goals were 
“to save Lebanon from its dependence upon East and West, to put an end 
to foreign occupation, and to adopt a regime freely wanted by the people 
of Lebanon”.145 
In Al-‘Ahd, Hizbullah furnishes its understanding of the political-
ideological content of Khumayni’s slogan of: “No East no West, only Islam”. 
According to Hizbullah, the main motivation and the essence of the Islamic 
Revolution is not political and social, rather the holy matrimony between 
cultural and religious life. Hizbullah adds that this cultural-religious fibre has 
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been one of the principal pillars of the Muslim community since its early 
foundation. In order to substantiate its claim, Hizbullah quotes Ayatullah 
Murtada Mutahhari who stressed that not all revolutions erupt because of 
exploitation, deprivation, poverty, alienation, and subjugation. Mutahhari 
added that it is also not certain whether appealing to the government or 
engaging in civil disobedience are the driving shafts of every revolution-
ary movement. According to Hizbullah these are only means; the end is 
Islam.146 
Hizbullah questions the real motivation behind Western and Western-
ised (Arab) revolutionary political ideologies. Hizbullah clarifies that its criti-
cism against the West is by no means limited to capitalism, imperialism, and 
colonialism; rather it encompasses all secular ideologies including those of 
the left-wing leanings such as socialism and communism. Hizbullah criticis-
es Western political ideologies as being grounded in materialism, while the 
Islamic Revolution’s pioneering achievement is that it aimed at firmly estab-
lishing the Islamic and cultural identity of the Muslim community. According 
to Hizbullah, this is where the Islamic Revolution’s cultural authenticity lies, 
and this is what the party is endeavouring to emulate. Hizbullah purports, 
from this perspective the Islamic Revolution’s cutting edge is its original cur-
riculum, strategy, and programs, which do not owe anything to the West, 
neither from the stance of its liberal democratic ideologies nor from the per-
spective of the Marxist ideology. Again quoting Mutahhari, Hizbullah argues 
that the conflation is between the Islamic Revolution, which regards Islam 
as the end, and revolutionary Islam, which considers revolution and strife 
(nidal) as the end, while Islam is the means.147
According to Hizbullah, Khumayni’s slogan of rectifying and reform-
ing oneself before rectifying and reforming others summarises a lot of the 
political-ideological principles of the Islamic Revolution. For instance, Hiz-
bullah contends that in the West a revolution is usually delineated by a coup 
d’état, by strife against imperialism, by developing the productive sectors, 
by a quest for social equality, and maybe cultural independence. Hizbullah 
stresses that all of these dimensions are present in the Islamic Revolution, 
but they only comprise its means since struggle against the Shah’s arbitrary 
power as well as strife against tyrannical-oppressive imperialism do not 
define the Islamic Revolution. Rather, the important dimension is to recon-
solidate Islam by the founding of an Islamic government (hukuma Islamiyya), 
not only from a cultural dimension, but also from a socio-political, and most 
importantly, the spiritual dimension of Islam since Islam is holistic and all-
encompassing in its orientation.148
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2.7 The Banner of Jihad and Martyrdom
2.7.1 Smaller military jihad and greater jihad: Practicing greater jihad 
before smaller military jihad 
Sayyid Ibrahim Amin Al-Sayyid stressed the uniqueness of Hizbullah’s 
political ideology that is grounded in the Islamic prescription of smaller 
military jihad as a philosophy of resistance against the occupation and the 
oppression of the Zionist entity.149 In addition, Hizbullah preached small-
er military jihad as an obligatory duty against the oppression of political 
Maronism, the remnants of the crusaders, who made it incumbent upon 
themselves to crush Islam and the Muslims.150
In the Open Letter, Hizbullah distinguished between smaller and 
greater jihad, but not in considerable detail. Hizbullah argued that it took 
the lead of the Prophet in austerity, the passion to ascend to heaven, con-
ducted martyrdom in the way of God, and engaged in smaller military jihad 
against the enemies of Islam, most notably the “rapist Zionist entity” and the 
Great Satan. Hizbullah’s reference to Imam Khumayni’s repeated emphasis 
on the need to rectify, reform, and refine the self, before rectifying reform-
ing, and refining others and the world at large151 is a direct reference to his 
argument on greater jihad in his book that bears the same title.152 
Hizbullah amplified its distinction between smaller and greater jihad 
in an article in al-‘Ahd153, where Imam Khumayn’s statement of refining the 
self before refining others is repeated and born out through an analytical 
exposition. Hizbullah contended that Khumayni’s statement summarises 
a lot of the political-ideological concepts that the Islamic Revolution rests 
upon. Hizbullah stressed that the Qur’anic understanding of the word jihad 
does not always denote holy war (smaller military jihad), but could also con-
note the effort exerted to accomplish the duties of the believer (greater 
jihad). Hizbullah added that the freedom fighter (mujahid) who is willing 
to engage in smaller jihad has first to build up internally his self154 through 
a process of perpetual, non-abating jihad, in conformity with what Imam 
Khumyni has said, namely that the great powers (East and West) fear Islam 
because it builds up an ethically and morally complete (mutakamil) holis-
tic-coalescent-monolithic individual, who is capable of striking a balance 
between spiritual, intellectual and cognitive aspects on the one hand, and 
emotional, physical, and psychological aspects, on the other hand, thus con-
trolling his inner self. 
In the same article, Hizbullah explains that smaller jihad is struggle 
with the external enemies of Islam. Hizbullah stresses that smaller jihad is 
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either fighting in battle or generous self-sacrifice (martyrdom) originating 
internally from the self i.e. greater jihad. Hizbullah clarifies that smaller mili-
tary jihad is based upon the external struggle with the enemies of Islam, 
while greater jihad is struggle with the self in order to nourish the soul. As 
Ayatullah Mutahhari had stated after the victory of the Islamic Revolution 
in April 1979 that the danger that surrounds the Islamic Republic lies inside 
the selves of the Iranian people (greater jihad), rather than being an external 
threat. Hizbullah broadened the horizon of its argument on greater jihad 
emphasizing that the distinguishing traits of society and the development 
of good morals are things that could be put to practice, through exercis-
ing concepts such as honour, piety, virtue, trustworthiness, chastity, probity, 
diffidence, assertion, integrity in honouring oaths and commitments, recti-
tude, self-sacrifice, kindness, justice, mercy, sharing one’s fate and caring for 
others, and upholding human rights.155 According to Hizbullah, these con-
cepts, which are the product of the vigilant conscience of the individual, run 
against personal benefit and individual egoism. Thus, greater jihad could be 
practiced but it needs a perpetual process of training, building, and refining 
the self to exercise temperance.156
Ayatullah Fadlallah portrayed the importance of greater jihad arguing 
that Islam is the religion of perpetual, non-abating jihad, on all levels and at 
all fronts, whose objective is to build the individual. Islam aims to achieve 
the principles of dignity and liberty from all sorts of imperialism and slavery. 
He emphasized that the shari‘a gave prominence to both spiritual and physi-
cal jihad (smaller military jihad).157 
In turn, Nasrallah termed greater jihad as the “power of spiritual pro-
gressive ascent”. According to him, the practice of greater jihad is based 
upon the principle of obedience to the faqih and God as a vital necessity to 
the implementation of the concept of strict organizational discipline. Nas-
rallah argued that smaller military jihad should only be practiced after mas-
tering greater jihad. According to him, the testimony for that is the long list 
of martyrs who are being taught revolutionary mobilization and mentality 
(indoctrination) as well as the observance of strict discipline and obedience 
(ta‘a) in order to inculcate a certain way of thought that leads to a mutaka-
mil individual who is capable of accomplishing two roles: (1) an unforeseen 
moral-spiritual role (greater jihad), and (2) a foreseen material role (smaller 
military jihad). In other words, Nasrallah argued that the ethically and mor-
ally complete individual should be moulded in the culture of spiritual jihad 
in order to become ready to engage in smaller military jihad. Then Nasrallah 
specified four domains of smaller military jihad: (1) The jihadi role has to 
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defend the ideologues and resources of the movement of change (Hizbul-
lah); (2) It has to strike at the enemy’s fulcrum and curtail its movement so 
that it ceases its humiliation of the umma; (3) It has to rupture the bulwarks 
that political Maronism is placing between the people of change (Hizbul-
lah’s rank) and the populace of the umma (Hizbullah’s file); (4) It has to safe-
guard the accomplishments of revolutionary work that has been realized by 
the movement of change. 
Nasrallah has affirmed that the jihadi culture translates itself into a 
viable revolutionary alternative that offers conducive solutions to the umma. 
He regarded the jihadi operations against the US Marines158 as such an exam-
ple. According to Nasrallah, the Islamic jihadi culture makes the revolution-
ary alternative a real eventuality to the extent of making the US impotent in 
facing it, since the jihadi culture crushed its morale and forced it to withdraw 
from the country due to the heavy blows it suffered at the hands of the Leba-
nese mujahidin. He ends up by stressing that the culture of jihad opens new 
horizons to the populace, to the Rahbar, and to the umma at large so that “it 
sees with the eyes of God and functions under His care”.159
2.7.2 Martyrdom
Ayatullah Fadlallah regarded martyrdom operations that are conduct-
ed by Muslim believers upon the approval and sanctioning of Muslim reli-
gious scholars, as religiously sanctioned self-sacrificial defensive jihadi acts 
of resistance against the occupying Zionist enemy. As such Fadlallah defined 
martyrdom as a legitimate act of resistance viewed as a practical necessity 
that is conducive to alleviating the suffering caused by the occupying forces 
and their superior military arsenal. Fadlallah emphasized that martyrdom 
inculcates the Muslim populace with a sense of collective action, identity, 
and empowerment that project to the world the plight of the oppressed. 
Thus, according to him continuous engagement in martyrdom is the only 
solution to the Zionist violent occupation.160 
Hizbullah cadres condoned, explained, and justified martyrdom oper-
ations both on religious and political-ideological grounds. Shaykh AbdulKa-
rim ‘Ubayd, a Hizbullah leading cadre and religious scholar, stressed the 
religious foundation of martyrdom by arguing that there can be no martyr-
dom except in the way of God; this unequivocally implies that every martyr 
would be lifted to Heaven.161 Sayyid Husayn al-Musawi separated between 
the martyrdom operations against the Israelis, French, and Americans, on 
the one hand, and the kidnappings of foreign nationals on the other. He 
vehemently condemned the latter, but refused to condemn the former. 
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He buttressed, praised, and blessed martyrdom operations conducted by 
the resistance and justified them as legitimate defensive jihadi acts waged 
by the oppressed against foreign occupation led by the world oppressors. 
Husayn al-Musawi regarded those who conducted martyrdom operations 
as honest and courageous people who fulfilled their patriotic and religious 
duty. However, he added that Islam prohibits martyrdom operations in the 
presence of alternative actions that could achieve the same goals as mar-
tyrdom.162
As its leading cadres argue, Hizbullah’s inspiration on the notion of 
martyrdom originated from Imam Khumayni and Ayatullah Fadlallah163. Shay-
kh Yusuf Da‘mush, a Hizbullah religious scholar, stressed that the Hizbullahis 
consciously and willingly conducted martyrdom operations, as opposed to 
suicide, under the tutelage of Hizbullah’s leaders. The Hizbullahis martyred 
themselves in the occupying Israeli enemy in accordance with a fatwa issued 
by Imam Khumayni, the marja‘ al-taqlid and al-waliyy al-faqih.164 Sayyid Ibra-
him Amin al-Sayyid stressed more the dependence on Khumayni by arguing 
that the freedom fighters, who devastated the US marines headquarters in 
Beirut and the Israeli military intelligence headquarters in Tyre165 by vehi-
cles laden with explosives, martyred themselves in the way of God because 
Imam Khumayni sanctioned their martyrdom operations, inculcated the 
spirit of martyrdom and self-sacrifice in their heart and soul, and led them 
to the hereafter in honour and dignity for their great feat of triumph over 
Israeli and the American invaders and occupiers.166 Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi 
gave the credit to the school of the Pasdaran167 that indoctrinated Lebanese 
youth to aspire for martyrdom. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise 
that after a few weeks of the arrival of the Pasdaran, a Shi‘ite youngster wel-
comed death with a smiling face while carrying in his car 1.2 tons of TNT.168 
Thus, in line with Imam Khumayni and Ayatullah Fadlallah, Hizbullah’s cad-
res argued that martyrdom is the highest and most extolled form of Jihad 
where the martyr fulfils his political-ideological duty of defeating the enemy 
and enjoys the fruits of his sacrifices in heaven.
2.7.3 Suicide and martyrdom
In distinguishing between suicide and martyrdom, Fadlallah argued 
that martyrdom for a Muslim engaged in resisting the enemy is a constant 
necessity emanating from his own volition, which is taken on the basis of 
the doctrinal religious and political ideological convictions of the believer. 
Fadlallah unequivocally stated that Islam regards suicide as a crime169 since 
a person is not free to dispose of his own life as he deems fit. He stressed 
141
that every person’s life is God’s property and it is a great transgression to 
inflict harm on it as well as on others. According to Fadlallah, if a person 
takes his life or that of others without the endorsement of Muslim religious 
scholars, he would be punished in the hereafter by being immortalised in 
hell. He added that suicide, not martyrdom, might be conducted by mor-
ally depraved individuals who are suffering from hopelessness, social stress, 
depression, and despair; suicide is irrational, immoral, and against the very 
foundations of religion. From this perspective, Fadlallah stressed that the 
psychological approach170 to the study of martyrdom that equates martyr-
dom with suicide is untenable.171
3. Conclusion
Hizbullah’s Open Letter, political declarations, al-‘Ahd, as well as the 
discourse of its leaders and cadres specified the constituents of its political 
ideology: oppressors and oppressed; Islamic state; relations with Christians, 
anti-Zionism, pan-Islamism, anti-imperialism, and jihad and martyrdom. 
Hizbullah employed Qur’anic legitimisation of its political ideology in the 
form of Qur’anic verses to justify its stance. One can notice that only the first 
section of the Open letter explicitly refers to Hizbullah’s religious ideology: 
belief in Shi‘a Islam, wilayat al-faqih, and jihad in the way of God.
3.1 Oppressors and oppressed
The concept of oppressors and oppressed is central to a proper 
understanding of Hizbullah’s political ideology. Although, Hizbullah seems 
to employ an exclusivist discourse172 in which it labels/classifies people 
according to the Qur’anic classification/dichotomy of Hizbullah (The Party 
of God) (5:56) or Hizb al-Shaytan (The Party of the Devil) (58: 19), Hizbullah 
used the Qur’anic term or Islamic expression of oppressed and produced 
an all-inclusive concept in order to uphold political and social justice. On 
the face of it, it appears that Hizbullah is using Marxist terminology, which 
is translated or interpreted in Islamic terms along the lines of economic, 
political, and social justice, thus producing some kind of “Islamic socialism”, 
as some scholars have claimed.173 
However, Hizbullah clearly argues in the Open Letter and its political 
declarations that its friends are the entire world oppressed irrespective of 
their colour, race, or religion. Hizbullah interpreted and applied the contem-
porary concept of mustad‘af by stressing that it is a Qur’anic concept that 
came to prominence with the advent of the Islamic Revolution. Hizbullah 
emphasized that this usage conveys and is in conformity with its identity 
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as an Islamic jihadi movement struggling to address and redress the injus-
tices the oppressed suffer from. However, Hizbullah clarified that its usage 
of the term mustad‘af is different from the political concept that is used by 
the socialists to refer to the poor peasants or the proletariat, the Qur’anic 
concept being more encompassing and holistic in its orientation because 
it touches upon the existential level of oppression and offers prescriptions 
and remedies in dealing with the oppressors and warding them off. Hizbul-
lah emphasized that mustad‘afin applies to the wronged, unjustly treated, 
tyrannised, and impoverished who cannot own their daily bread, and who 
are oppressed in their freedom, dignity, and endeavours without any con-
sideration if they are Christians or Muslims. Therefore, Hizbullah’s political 
ideology stresses the universality of the Qur’anic concept – as opposed to 
the specificity of the Marxist concept – that cuts across class, cultural, and 
religious cleavages.
Even though Fadlallah is not among the main establishment of Hizbul-
lah, Hizbullah might also have been influenced by his views on oppression. 
The point of convergence is that both Fadlallah’s and Hizbullah’s Islamic the-
ory of oppression differs from liberation theology. Although liberation the-
ology places the oppressed, marginalized, discriminated minorities, women, 
workers, etc. at the centre of its discourse, siding with the oppressed in their 
struggle for their rights, it does not call for an overall Christianisation of 
society or aims at establishing a religiously based society and political sys-
tem. Rather, liberation theology builds on religious sources reinterpreting 
them for secular-Marxist aims by supporting the struggle of the oppressed 
“wretched of the earth” for social justice. In spite of that, there seems to 
be a considerable difference between the two views since Fadlallah’s politi-
cal-ideological legitimisation conveys specificity in his characterisation of 
oppression that is at variance with Hizbullah, especially his Qur’anic legitimi-
sation, which distinguishes between two groups of the oppressed. It seems 
as if Fadlallah is insinuating a distinction between negligent, idle oppressed 
who let grass grow under their feet and do not even exercise persuasive 
jihad, on the one hand, and committed oppressed who mobilize in order to 
confront their oppressors (smaller military jihad) or alter their condition of 
oppression by emigrating to the Muslim heart land, if they are capable of 
doing so, on the other. 
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3.2 Islamic state
The Open Letter, inter alia, classified Hizbullah as a social movement 
that called for the establishment of an Islamic state174 in Lebanon modelled 
along Iran’s Islamic Republic. Hizbullah’s political ideology advocated an end 
to political Maronism and rejected any participation in Lebanon’s sectarian-
confessional political system. In spite of that, Hizbullah’s political ideology 
stressed that it would not impose an Islamic state in Lebanon by coercion, 
rather Hizbullah would erect an Islamic state, if and only if, the majority of 
the Lebanese populace demand it and consent to it, since it is necessary to 
choose a political system in Lebanon by mutual agreement between the 
Muslims and the Christians. Thus, Hizbullah was inviting others to become 
part of an Islamic state in Lebanon, refusing to be under the governance of 
or to co-opt with the un-Islamic Lebanese regime. 
The Open letter did not specify the political-ideological content of 
the Islamic order; rather it only referred to the Islamic state as an ideologi-
cal doctrine, political order, and mode of governance. However, Z‘aytir did 
outline the most salient traits of the Islamic or Qur’anic government, Islam-
ic state, or Islamic republic. Hizbullah uses these terms interchangeably 
because it is concerned with instating an Islamic order (nizam Islami), and 
it does not matter which label it gives to it. According to Z‘aytir, the Islamic 
order is based upon practical application of the shari‘a and divine injunc-
tions; organisation of social, economic, and political relations in order to 
inculcate social solidarity and disseminate social justice; mutual agreement 
and trust among the subjects and rulers; and justice, fairness, equity, com-
passion as well as an equilibrium between rights and duties. 
However, Z‘aytir’s views on the Islamic state were couched in strong-
er terms than what the Open Letter and other cadres expressed since he 
stressed the forceful application of God’s governance and sovereignty. Z‘atir 
seemed to be much more radical in his political-ideological views than the 
Hizbullah establishment. This might suggest that he represented a certain 
militant trend within the party that advocated the establishment of the 
Islamic state by force to the effect of annihilating the political Maronites. He 
seemed to be against the too conciliatory, and too compromising attitude 
of the party. Z‘atir’s criticism of the Islamic Milieu might be interpreted as 
an indirect attack on Ayatullah Fadlallah who, according to Z‘atir, was not 
forceful enough in his Islamisation project. Z‘atir did not accept Fadlallah’s 
Qur’anic logic of truce/ceasefire (muhadana)175 and the step by step applica-
tion of Islamisation through a bottom-up process, rather Z‘atir called for a 
violent and radical overthrow of the regime through a top-down process 
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even if the balance of power does not favour the Islamists. As mentioned 
in the previous chapter, Hizbullah adopted the idea of Islamic order from 
Imam Khumayni, being influenced by his views on wilayat al-faqih. Hizbul-
lah’s anathematising of the Lebanese political system might also be attribut-
ed to Imam Khumayni’s views.176 However, in practice, the official Hizbullah 
establishment did not heed to Z‘aytir’s views.
In its Islamic order, Hizbullah maintained the dhimmis category, and as 
such, Hizbullah stressed that the common grounds between ahl al-dhimma 
and Muslims are the social values of mutual tolerance, respect, brotherhood, 
and solidarity. On this basis, Hizbullah accorded the Christians their human 
freedom i.e. social and religious freedom, but not political freedom. Thus, 
contrary to the Prophetic tradition that granted non-Muslims partnership in 
the political structure, Hizbullah’s tolerance or inclusiveness clearly excludes 
Christians from political life. Hizbullah seems to imply that tolerance is the 
responsibility of the “majority” and integration is the responsibility of the 
“minority”. 
Most likely Hizbullah’s treatment of the Christians as dhimmis is a spe-
cific interpretation of the Prophet’s political constitution of Medina, which 
was also inspired by the Islamic Republic’s constitution. In addition, possibly 
Hizbullah might have also been influenced by Sayyid Muhammad Husayn 
Fadlallah who, grounding his argument on the Qur’an, argued that the Mus-
lim stance towards the Christians is anchored upon the horizon of mutual 
co-existence, cooperation, and dialogue that should be based on points of 
convergence and common grounds that all parties agree upon.177 
3.3 Relations with Christians
Hizbullah’s political ideology was selective in its treatment of the 
Lebanese Christians. Although on face value it appears that Hizbullah’s call 
was addressed to all Christians, in reality Hizbullah shunned any contact 
with political Maronism, Maronites, and any collaborator with Israel. Though 
Hizbullah had some low-level contacts with the Christians living in its con-
stituencies, nonetheless no high-level or tangible dialogue materialised 
between Hizbullah and the Christians. In spite of Hizbullah’s exhortation of 
the Christians to convert to Islam, it did not impose this conversion by force; 
rather Hizbullah applied its theory of tolerance to those Christians living in 
the areas it controlled as well as to other Christians as long as they are not 
treacherous or aggressive. 
Some writers claimed that Hizbullah was abiding by a political ideolo-
gy that was not only intolerant towards the Christians, but also Hizbullah was 
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accused of imposing its will and its Islam on all the Lebanese from different 
denominations, sects, and religions.178 I do acknowledge that there appears 
to be a certain tension between Hizbullah’s two propositions: (1) Hizbullah’s 
intention not to impose Islam and its coercing the Christians to adhere to it 
its call; and (2) Hizbullah’s mission of establishing an Islamic order. Maybe 
the confusion has to do with Z‘atir’s denial of the need to convert Chris-
tians and the Hizbullah establishment’s call for conversion through peaceful 
means. Nevertheless, both Z‘atir and the Hizbullah establishment agreed 
that there should be “no compulsion in religion” (2:256) and an “equitable 
world” or common grounds (3:64) should guide the relationship between 
the Muslims and Christians. 
3.4 Anti-Zionism
Hizbullah’s anti-Zionist political ideology seems to often conflate 
Jewish identity with Zionist ideology, thus equating Jews with Zionists. Also, 
there seems to be a contradiction between Hizbullah’s views concerning the 
people of the book and how it treats the Jews in Israel. However, the Open 
Letter and the political declarations clearly stated that Hizbullah equated 
all Israelis with Zionists. Further, Hizbullah’s al-‘Ahd and the discourse of its 
leaders clarified that it does not discriminate against the Jews as a race or 
religion and it would accord them their human and civil rights as the consti-
tution of Medina had done, in spite of their discouraging Qur’anic and his-
torical precedents of treachery, hypocrisy, and breaking the covenant with 
the Prophet and fighting him at Khaybar. 
Hizbullah’s doctrinal behaviour is also warranted by Khumayni’s ide-
ology that distinguished between the Jews living in Muslim lands under 
Muslim rule and the “Zionists” in Israel. Simply stated, Hizbullah’s political 
ideology considers that there are no Jews in Israel, rather only Zionists. That 
is why the Zionists can be driven out and their country annihilated. From 
this stance, Hizbullah unleashed its venom towards the “Zionist Entity” that 
has occupied Palestine by military force. Hizbullah characterizes Israel as 
aggressive, racist, expansionist, anti-humanist, cancerous glad instated by 
Western colonial powers in the Muslim heartland. Hizbullah’s political ideol-
ogy conveyed no recognition of Israel, called for wiping it out of existence, 
and stipulated a continual commitment to the liberation of Palestine. This 
political-ideological stance mirrors that of the Islamic Revolution: “Today 
Iran, and tomorrow Palestine” i.e. the liberation of Iran from the Shah would 
be followed by the liberation of Palestine from the Zionists. From a princi-
pal and doctrinal perspective, Hizbullah’s political ideology seeks to restore 
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Arab-Muslim historical rights in Palestine and is totally against any ceasefire, 
truce, land for peace, peace negotiations, or normalisation of relations with 
Israel. 
3.5 Pan-Islamism
Hizbullah’s political ideology heeded Imam Khumayni’s call for pan-
Islamism, especially in the wake of what he termed the worldwide conspira-
cy against the unity of the Muslims. Hizbullah’s political ideology has always 
called for unity, both in the Islamic and domestic fronts, in order to avoid the 
dangers of discord. In its Open Letter, Hizbullah allotted section 22, entitled 
“God is With the Unity of the Muslims” advocating pan-Islamism in order to 
render special attention to the dangers of discord, stressing a revolutionary 
distinction between upright Muslim religious scholars and the corrupt ones, 
or state jurists who follow the injunctions of the imperialist colonizers by 
applying the precept of divide and conquer. Hizbullah based its call for the 
unity of Muslims and warding off fitna on a host of Qur’anic verses: (3:103); 
(6:159); (2:191); (2:193); (8:28); (8:73). 
On the basis of what has been presented in section 2.5, it seems that 
the conspiracy theory has governed a lot of Hizbullah’s visions. That is why 
Hizbullah considered any political or military dispute between Sunnis and 
Shi‘as as an oppressor’s-colonizer’s conspiracy aimed at spreading discord 
and dissention among the Muslims. Thus, Hizbullah blames internal discord 
on the West. Hizbullah has repeatedly warned against this and called upon 
the Muslims to uphold common grounds that ultimately lead to enforcing 
the power of the Muslims in the face of the mounting challenges facing the 
umma. 
Hizbullah’s discourse is general in the sense that it does not give 
specific examples on Sunni-Shi‘ite disagreements, since this would lead to 
discord, when Hizbullah’s aim is the unity of all the Muslims. However, Hiz-
bullah’s efforts to unify the Muslims remained on a theoretical level as a 
kind of persuasive smaller jihad by the tongue and heart, rather than real 
Sunni-Shi‘a unity, mainly due to mutually branding each other with infidel-
ity (khutab al-takfir) and the disintegration that the Islamic community was 
passing through. Nevertheless, in the local Lebanese context “The Union of 
Muslim ‘Ulama”179 has covered some grounds on the way to unifying Islamic 
work among the Sunni and Shi‘a ‘ulama as well as their respective populace. 
Hizbullah argued that respecting the jurisprudential differences among 
the Sunni and Shi‘ites does not preclude unity and cooperation among the 
Sunni and Shi‘a Islamists on common political-ideological concepts such as 
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anti-imperialism, anti-Zionismism, “the liberation of Jerusalem”, etc. In fact, 
such political-ideological concepts forged a unity of interests and common 
goals between Hizbullah and Sunni Islamists such as the Lebanese Harakat 
Al-Tawhid Al-Islamiyya and Al-Jama‘a Al-Islamiyya,180 as well as Palestinian 
Sunni Islamists, which all received material support from Iran.
3.6 Anti-imperialism
Hizbullah stressed that it is exercising its legitimate right of defend-
ing the rights and the dignity of the umma by confronting its basic enemies: 
the US, France, and Israel. Imam Khumayni clarified that the sensitivity of 
the Iranians is not towards the American people, rather the American gov-
ernment.181 Thus, Hizbullah is against Westoxification182 and does not prac-
tice xenophobia (antipathy to the West and East). Nevertheless, Hizbullah’s 
Westoxification is rooted in its hatred of the US Administration, not the US 
people.
Hizbullah employed a specific reading of Khumayni since it took one 
aspect, namely reforming the individual before reforming others, and inte-
grated it in another debate as a critique of Western concepts of revolution. 
By this Hizbullah intended to convey the superiority to the Islamic order 
– that is holistic concerned with all aspects of life, especially the spiritual 
dimension – over the materialist outlook of the East and West, socialism and 
capitalism. Hizbullah did not address the assumption that Western capital-
ism is rooted in specific cultural and societal traits. 
Thus, Hizbullah’s political-ideology claims a sense of moral superior-
ity vis-à-vis the West. By building a holistic-coalescent individual, Hizbullah 
purports that the project of the Islamic Revolution does not aim at mod-
ernizing Islam, rather Islam aspires for Islamising modernity, which poses 
a binary threat to materialism and rationalism that are found in the West. 
According to Hizbullah, this is what Islam has to offer in response.
3.7 Jihad and martyrdom
Hizbullah distinguished between smaller military jihad and greater 
jihad, relegating the role of the former to defensive jihad in the battlefield 
against the enemies of Islam and the latter to the internal struggle against 
one’s self. Hizbullah practiced smaller military jihad against the local ene-
mies of Islam, the political Maronites, as well as against the regional and 
international enemies – Israel, France, and the US. Hizbullah emphasized 
the ideological-political dimension of greater jihad whereby mere member-
ship in the Hizbullah amounts to engaging in greater jihad in the generic, 
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overall encompassing metaphorical sense of membership in the community 
of ‘the son’s of Hizbullah’s umma’. By this Hizbullahis would have accom-
plished their legitimate political responsibility (taklif). Therefore, Hizbullah 
amplified greater jihad to encompass all stages of membership in Hizbul-
lah’s activity. Employing a high-level theological discourse, Nasrallah distin-
guished between greater jihad and smaller jihad arguing along the lines of 
Khumayni that greater jihad should be practiced before engaging in smaller 
military jihad. Based on Khumayni and Fadlallah, it could be inferred that 
Hizbullah’s conception of greater jihad, as spiritual-transcendental jihad, 
aims at constructing a distinct Islamic identity of the individual. 
Hizbullah consciously extolled martyrdom as a religiously sanctioned 
legitimate defensive jihadi act conducted in order to face a superior invad-
ing or occupying army equipped with high-tech arsenal. While Hizbullah 
viewed the reward of martyrdom as eternal life in heaven, it vilified suicide 
as a ticket to hell in a moment of despair, hopelessness, and frustration. Hiz-
bullah legitimised its martyrdom operations on the basis of religious edicts 
and reiterated it prohibition of conducting them if the same objectives 
would be realised by smaller military jihad.
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4 Primacy to Political 
Program  (1991 to 2005)
Introduction 
This chapter presents Hizbullah’s political program as formulated over 
the period 1991 to 2005. It is compiled from and described on the basis of 
the available sources: Hizbullah’s 1992, 1996, 2000, and 2005 parliamentary 
election programs; its “Views and Concepts” of June 20, 1997; its “Statement 
of purpose” of March 20, 1998; its 1996 and 2004 municipal elections pro-
grams; its August 2004 “Identity and Goals”;1 and Hizbullah’s political declara-
tions and the discourse of its rank and file over the period 1991 to 2005. The 
quoted discourse in this chapter refers mainly to Hizbullah’s leaders and cad-
res: Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi2, Shaykh Na‘im Qasim3, Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah4, 
Nayef Krayyem5, Bilal N‘im6, Ali Fayyad7, Hajj Muhammad Ra‘d8, Hajj Husayn 
Shami9, Sayyid Nawwaf al-Musawi10, and Sayyid Hashim Safiyyeddine11. 
I start by giving a prelude to Hizbullah’s 1991 political program and 
the debates for participation in the 1992 parliamentary elections. Then I 
present a nine-point thematic exposition of the constituents of Hizbul-
lah’s political program as conveyed in the abovementioned sources: (2.1) 
Hizbullah’s standpoint towards the oppressors and oppressed; (2.2) its per-
spectives on the Islamic state (al-dawla al-Islamiyya); (2.3) its dialogue with 
the Lebanese Christians; (2.4) Hizbullah’s jurisprudential stipulations of 
parliamentary, municipal, and governmental work; (2.5) Hizbullah’s socio-
economic program: its Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and civil 
institutions; (2.6) Hizbullah as a nationalist Lebanese political party; (2.7) 
its stance towards Syria and Iran; (2.8) its perspective on Israel; and (2.9) its 
views on jihad and martyrdom. This will be followed by a summary of the 
basic constituents of Hizbullah’s political program.
1. Prelude to Hizbullah’s political program
1.1 Background to Hizbullah’s 1991 political program 
As mentioned in the history chapter, the Ta’if Agreement of October 
1989 was the closest thing or a substitute to a peace conference, which 
materialised in the ratification of Lebanon’s new constitution in September 
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1990. However, the 16-year old civil war in Lebanon ended a year later, in 
October 1990, and not on October 22, 1989 as it was officially announced 
from the Palace of Conventions at Ta’if. Thus, “With the ending of the hostili-
ties, political parties, like other political actors, entered the post-war phase 
of Lebanese politics. Militias had to adopt to this new state of affairs and 
quickly revert to their political party status”.12 Hizbullah found itself facing a 
new situation; it could no longer mobilize almost all of its resources to fight-
ing the Israel forces occupying Lebanon. And so, a new reality transpired 
through the opening up of a domestic public sphere that Hizbullah could 
not afford to ignore. However, Hizbullah had a serious problem when, in 
March-April 1991, the Lebanese government acted on the basis of imple-
menting the Ta’if Agreement and officially called for the dissolution of all 
the militias, ordering them to hand in their weapons to the Lebanese Army 
and to close their military and training centres. In order to counter that, 
Hizbullah launched a public relations campaign by issuing political declara-
tions and a political program. Hizbullah was exempted as the notable excep-
tion to such a decision since the Lebanese government classified Hizbullah’s 
Islamic Resistance, its military wing, as a resistance movement, and not as 
a militia; as such it was granted permission to keep up its arms and con-
tinue its struggle against Israel. Thus, Hizbullah’s public relations campaign 
paid off, and Hizbullah was adjusting to its new dual role of confronting the 
Israeli occupation in the South and gradually integrating in the newly cre-
ated domestic Lebanese public sphere, which came about as a result of the 
civil peace.
1.2 Hizbullah’s 1991 political program and infitah policy 
On January 3, 1991, Hizbullah issued a political declaration, which 
called on the Lebanese government to safeguard political, intellectual, ideo-
logical, and media freedoms as basic duties of the state towards its citizens. 
In addition, Hizbullah exhorted the government to differentiate between 
the role of the different militias in Lebanon and the role of Hizbullah’s Islamic 
Resistance, calling for disbanding the militias, while classifying the Islamic 
Resistance as a legitimate, legal, and humanitarian right that the state ought 
to be clearly and unequivocally committed to buttressing.13 This approach 
was followed by Sayyid Abbas’14 1991 four-point political program15, which 
he addressed to all the Lebanese, Muslims and Christians: (1) The continua-
tion and reinvigoration of the Resistance against the Israeli occupation.16 (2) 
Ending all the repercussions of internal discords (fitan) that were prevalent 
at that time17 in various (geographical) Lebanese areas18, and constructively 
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dealing with their consequences through serious public debate that permits 
open discussion of political and social issues, not only with allies, but also 
with former enemies.19 (3) Embark on a “Lebanonisation”20 (Labnana) process 
or infitah “opening-up”, aimed specially towards the Christians, through the 
launching of a unprecedented and far-reaching public and political relations 
campaign directed at fostering ties, in spite of the ideological differences, 
with all the social and political powers that comprise the Lebanese myriad21, 
especially the political parties present at that time in the local Lebanese 
scene. Infitah or Lebanonisation aims at inculcating an open dialogue policy 
in a pluralistic setting through interaction and cooperation with all Leba-
nese sects and communities in order to rid Lebanon of its political and social 
problems, foster national unity, and build a stronger-united Lebanon on the 
common grounds of respecting human values. (4) Allocate greater impor-
tance and devote a constructive effort towards alleviating socio-economic 
and communal issues that touch upon all walks of life, especially the strata 
inhabiting the deprived areas. Mobilize Hizbullah’s institutions to improve 
their services to the oppressed grassroots and cater to their needs without 
hampering the continuation of the Resistance.22 
1.3 Hizbullah’s arguments for participation in the 1992 
parliamentary elections
Hizbullah’s decision to participate in the 1992 parliamentary elections 
was not easy. It was taken after much heated internal debate and discussions, 
followed by Iranian arbitration (tahkim). Hajj Muhammad Ra‘d, the current 
head of Hizbullah’s 12-member parliamentary bloc, downplays the internal 
Hizbullah row and the Iranian intervention, which favoured participation. 
Ra‘d gives weight to the domestic dimension in Hizbullah’s “favourable deci-
sion” to participate. He argues that when Hizbullah took the decision to take 
part in the 1992 elections, a chain of ideological, intellectual, and political 
debates ensued among the leading cadres of the party. He added that these 
debates were sometimes heated, at other times constructive. According to 
Ra‘d, the debates evaluated the benefits of participating in a sectarian politi-
cal system, which remarkably differs from the ideological and intellectual 
vision of the party. Ra‘d continued that these debates ended up with the 
decision to participate on the basis that there are a lot of common grounds 
that Hizbullah shares with the Lebanese political myriad. Ra‘d stressed that 
political life dictates practical interaction with other groups without delving 
into the ideological background of every party.23 
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In turn, Na‘im Qasim gave a detailed exposition24 of Hizbullah’s posi-
tion on the nature of the debates25 regarding participation in the Lebanese 
political system, in general, and the parliamentary elections, in particular. 
According to Qasim, the issue of joining the Lebanese parliament or not led 
to extensive internal discussion and debate among Hizbullah’s leading cad-
res. Hizbullah’s seven-member Shura Council along with five leading cadres 
formed a twelve-member committee to assess the situation. The debates 
centred upon four main junctures: legitimacy; Islamic vision; interests and 
vices (al-masalih wa al-mafasid) as advantages and disadvantages; and pri-
orities.
According to Qasim, the committee was interested in finding answers 
to the following four questions: (1) The key question dealt with the legitima-
cy of participating in a parliament that is part and parcel of a political-sectar-
ian system, a system that does not reflect Hizbullah’s vision towards the best 
regime. (2) Supposing the issue of legitimacy is solved, does participation 
mean an implicit recognition of the reality of the political system, a recogni-
tion that might ultimately lead Hizbullah to defend the system and adopt 
it, forgoing its Islamic vision? (3) Are there clear and certain interests, which 
outweigh the vices? (4) Does participation lead to an adjustment in Hizbul-
lah’s priorities, to the extent of giving up the Islamic Resistance for the sake 
of integration in the domestic Lebanese political game?26 
1.3.1 Legitimacy
Concerning the issue of legitimacy, the committee conceded that it 
could not take a decision since this is the prerogative of al-waliyy al-faqih, 
Imam Khamina’i. However, some considered that participation in a non-
Islamic system is not in accordance with the holistic Islamic vision, since 
Hizbullah’s legitimate responsibility and legal obligation is confined to 
founding an Islamic state. Anything beside that should remain outside the 
framework of al-anzima al-wad‘iyya (positive man-made or situational sys-
tems). The committee added that the fear of granting legitimacy to a non-
Islamic system could lead to its perpetuation. According to the committee, 
the “Islamists’ ” (al-Islamiyyun)27 participation in the regime could stand as 
a barrier to reforming the system or altering it all together. The committee 
decided to voice its concerns to Khamina’i and wait for his decision.28
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1.3.2 Participation
The committee argued that participation in the parliamentary elec-
tions is an expression of taking part in the political structure of the present 
system, as such lending support to it. However, according to the committee, 
this does not imply that it is bound to protect its current structure as well as 
to defend its loopholes and deficiencies. Participation in the parliament car-
ries with it popular representation whereby the deputy could defend his29 
point of view and has the freedom to approve what is in conformity with 
his vision and reject what is not. Based on his belief system or background 
knowledge (religious and political ideology), the deputy can engage in dis-
cussions pertaining to the constituents of the system, propose changes to 
it, influence draft legislations and propose suitable ones, all this while being 
faithful to his constituency. The committee stressed that participation in the 
parliament does not imply a de facto recognition of the system. Rather, par-
ticipation and representation gives the deputy a big margin to manoeuvre 
and to express his opinion and defend it without being hostage to the cur-
rent political system.30
1.3.3 Interests (advantages) and vices (disadvantages)
According to the committee, there are many pros to parliamentary 
participation, the most salient of which are the following: (1) making use of 
the parliament as a political podium, which accords due care to the Resist-
ance, discussing and debating its support as well as laying the ground for a 
conducive environment so that others can hear the voice of the resistance 
from the viewpoint of popular parliamentary representation. (2) Through 
participation in parliamentary discussions and the debates of the parliamen-
tary committees, Hizbullah could articulate in draft legislations issues per-
taining to the improvement of people’s livelihood, development, health, and 
social concerns and worries. Also, Hizbullah would promote alleviating the 
plight of the oppressed areas by allocating to them the necessary funds from 
various ministries. (3) Prior cognisance of draft legislations, which makes its 
plausible to study them in advance in order to propose the required amend-
ments, rather than being confronted with an officially adopted binding law. 
(4) Building a network of political contacts with the representatives of sects 
and districts in order to conduct with them direct dialogue on standing, 
unresolved issues. Since it removes false barriers and wrong impressions, 
this process of familiarity and interaction opens the horizons for developing 
dialogue and accepting the differences of others.31 (5) Granting Hizbullah 
official recognition from the Lebanese parliament, one of the institutions of 
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the Lebanese government that reflects popular representation. This would 
confer upon the Islamic Resistance the Lebanese state’s legitimacy, which 
would make it part and parcel of both the popular and Lebanese state fabric. 
(6) Present an Islamic vision on the different issues put to debate, making it 
readily available to engage other viewpoints put to the fore.32 
The committee pointed out that there are also cons to parliamentary 
representation; the most noticeable are the following: (1) There are difficul-
ties in securing a precise popular representation because of the particularity 
of the political circumstances that specify a certain number of candidates, 
which renders presence in the parliament as a political representation, rath-
er than a numerical representation. (2) The enactment of laws that are in 
contradiction to the shari‘a although Hizbullah’s deputies opposed them. 
(3) People might hold deputies responsible for delivering the services they 
promised their constituencies with. However, the parliament legislates the 
laws and holds the cabinet accountable for its actions, but it does not exe-
cute, execution being the prerogative of the government.33 
1.3.4 Priorities
The committee highlighted that the priorities fall under the preroga-
tive of Hizbullah’s political decision making apparatus34, which gave promi-
nence to the Resistance against Israel. After deliberations and thorough read-
ings of the Lebanese constitution, the committee found no prior connection 
between parliamentary participation and the specificity of the resistance. 
In spite of that, the committee insisted on contesting the elections with a 
well-formulated declaration that lucidly emphasize the continuation of the 
Resistance.35 After evaluating the pros and cons of the situation, the com-
mittee concluded that the fear of the parliamentary elections affecting the 
Islamic Resistance is unfounded; on the contrary, parliamentary elections 
constitute an additional supporting asset to the Resistance. The committee 
stressed the convergence between Hizbullah’s enrolment in Lebanese politi-
cal life and the continuation of the resistance, a convergence that would lead 
to realizing the following two objectives: (1) practical coalescence between 
people’s interests and the endeavour to realize it and enhance it; and (2) 
the interest of Lebanon and the umma in the liberation of the land from the 
“Zionist” (Israeli) occupation.36
After balancing the debates, Hizbullah’s 12-member committee took 
a favourable decision to participate in the elections by a majority of ten to 
two, arguing that the interests, by far outweigh, the vices. In view of the 
155
committee’s favourable outcome, Hizbullah presented its findings to Imam 
Khamina’i and requested form him a formal legal opinion (istifta’ ) on the 
legitimacy of participating in the elections. As soon as Khamina’i authorized 
and supported (ajaza wa ’ayyada)37 participation, Hizbullah embarked on 
drafting its election program and officially announced its participation in 
the elections.38
2. The Constituent Points of Hizbullah’s Political Program
2.1  Views on the oppressed and oppressors, the US and Israel 
in particular
Hizbullah inaugurated its 1992 parliamentary elections program with 
a Qur’anic verse portraying itself standing up against the oppressors in the 
service of the oppressed by employing the concept of human empower-
ment (tamkin)39: “Those who, if we establish them firmly in the land, will 
perform the prayer, give the alms, command the good and prohibit evil. To 
Allah belongs the outcome of all affairs” (22:41).40 Domestically, Hizbullah’s 
program conveyed its commitment to confront the plots that are being con-
trived against Lebanon and to defend the “loyal Lebanese oppressed” with 
the purpose of upholding their rights, honour, and dignity. 
In a similar vein, Hizbullah’s 1998 and 2004 municipal elections pro-
grams were based on fending off oppression targeting the oppressed: (1) 
Since the populace constitute the main pillars behind Hizbullah’s movement, 
Hizbullah is under a responsibility to fend off all oppression and injustice in 
order to serve them and protect their dignity; (2) One of Hizbullah’s aims is 
to adopt the plight of the oppressed and the disenfranchised populace by 
protecting them and actively working for putting an end to oppression and 
discrimination towards the deprived areas in order to raise its standards of 
living in all respects.41
Regionally and internationally, Hizbullah’s 1992 parliamentary elec-
tions program cautioned that the project of the oppressors, spearheaded by 
the US, is putting its stake on subordinating Lebanon and the Middle East 
with the purpose of achieving recognition in the legitimacy of the “Zionist 
Entity”, and normalising relations with it, thus fusing the cultural identity of 
the people of the region and tying its destiny to the market economy and 
Western mode of production. Hizbullah’s program warned that this leads 
to plundering riches, the depletion of natural resources, the imposition 
of tyrannical regimes, and the execution of programs, policies, and plans, 
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which are contrary to the interests of the oppressed.42 In addition, Hizbul-
lah pledged to liberate Lebanon from the “Zionist occupation” as well as 
the arrogant oppressors’ manipulation and hegemony. Hizbullah reiterated 
the same stance in its 1996 election program by blasting the policies of US 
hegemony and “Zionist terrorism”.43 Hizbullah stressed that it would con-
front the US’s interference in Lebanese domestic affairs and conspiracies of 
the US’s arrogance and oppressive policies that are giving a green light to 
Israeli continuous daily aggressions.44
2.2 Views on the Islamic State
All of Hizbullah’s 1992, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2004, and 2005 parliamen-
tary and municipal election programs do not state anything about instating 
an Islamic order in Lebanon.45 Nevertheless, Hizbullah’s views on the Islamic 
state (dawla Islamiyya) in the era of the political program are discussed and 
addressed by the discourse of its leaders and cadres, most notably Nasrallah 
and Qasim.
Hizbullah stated in its 2004 “Identity and Goals” – its latest self-
description that includes aspects of its political ideology and political pro-
gram – that one of its strategic ideals aims at the establishment of an Islamic 
Republic (jumhuriyya Islamiyya). Hizbullah argued that verily, there is no 
Islamic movement that does not advocate the establishment of an Islamic 
state in its own country.46 Hizbullah stressed that there is no committed 
Muslim, who bears the Islamic doctrine and believes in its legitimacy, and 
does not advocate the project of establishing an Islamic state as one of the 
natural expressions of his Islamic commitment since it conveys and stands 
for the (social) justice that man aspires for.47 However, Hizbullah clarified in 
its 1998 “Statement of Purpose” that its objective is the presentation of Islam 
that addresses people’s minds and reasoning. Hizbullah added in its “Iden-
tity and Goals” that it does not aim at the application of Islam by force or vio-
lence; rather through peaceful political action, which offers the opportunity 
for the majority in any society to adopt or reject it. Hizbullah clarified that if 
Islam becomes the choice of the majority48 of both the Lebanese Christians 
and Muslims, then it would apply it. However, if the majority decline it, then 
Hizbullah would continue to coexist, discuss, negotiate, and bargain until a 
consensus is reached. Hizbullah emphasized that its Islam rejects violence as 
a means to gain power, exhorting non-Islamists not to have recourse to force 
in order to enforce their agendas.49 In conformity with the aforementioned, 
Hizbullah rejected recourse to power in order to establish an Islamic state 
(dawla Islamiyya). It argued that the Islamic state needs massive popular 
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backing, and is not only a theoretical option. Hizbullah clarified that a 51% 
majority does not satisfy the objective stipulation of establishing an Islamic 
state; rather the Lebanese state and political system should be based on 
the volition of the entire populace, both Muslims and Christians. Hizbullah 
stressed if the populace reject the Islamic state, then it would not impose it 
in 50 years, not even in 100 years.50 
2.3 Hizbullah’s dialogue with the Lebanese Christians
In 1992 Hizbullah reached out to the Christians and conducted a 
watershed visit to the Maronite Patriarch, thus opening up the channels of 
dialogue with the Christians.51 The Patriarch reciprocated, and a common 
committee was established in order to supervise a dynamic Christian-Mus-
lim dialogue, which included all Christian and Muslim denominations in 
addition to political parties as well as civil society groups and organizations. 
Hizbullah called for open dialogue that deals with all doctrinal and political 
issues.52 Hizbullah stressed that it always believed in dialogue with the vari-
ous Lebanese sects (myriad) in order to tackle differences and disagreements, 
thus consolidating a smooth national coexistence and national unity.53 In 
most cases, dialogue leads to beneficial discussions and constructive criti-
cisms that would ultimately reshape Hizbullah’s infitah policy towards more 
openness.54 On these grounds, Hizbullah included Christians and Sunnis 
in its parliamentary and municipal representation, allowing Christians to 
speak in its name55 as long as their discourse remained faithful to the party’s 
immutable set of values (thawabit), such as resisting the occupation. The 
Maronite Patriarch argued that Hizbullah’s Islamic Resistance has the right 
to liberate Lebanese occupied land. He added, that he has great confidence 
in the Resistance and its rationalisation in managing the conflict.56 
These meetings set the pace and become the corner stone of Hizbul-
lah’s dialogue with the Christians, mainly based on the “Papal Guidance” that 
was communicated to the Lebanese during the late Pope’s visit to Lebanon 
on April 10, 1997. In this regard, on August 20, 1997, Hizbullah’s “Central 
Information Unit”57 issued a two-sided book in English and Arabic entitled 
“A Reading in Papal Guidance: Hizbullah’s Perspective”, which included the 
following three issues: (1) “The Last Call” released by the Synod held by 
the Catholic Assembly at the Vatican on December 20, 1995; (2) “The letter 
addressed by Hizbullah to His Holiness the Pope John Paul II, on the occa-
sion of his visit to Lebanon” on April 6, 1997; and (3) “A lecture delivered 
by the head of the Political Council of Hizbullah, Deputy Muhammad R‘ad 
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in the seminar organized by the cultural council of Byblos about the Papal 
Guidance” on June 13, 1997. 
In its political declaration commenting on the “Last Call”, Hizbullah 
praised the need to consolidate national coexistence (al-‘aysh al-mushtarak) 
and the founding of common grounds among the Lebanese through a con-
structive dialogue that leads to national unity around fundamental issues 
that comprise a national unifying identity, which is conducive to uphold-
ing civil peace. It also applauded and encouraged the convention’s call to 
unprejudiced discussions and calm, objective dialogue.58
In its letter to the late Pope John Paul II, Hizbullah emphasized that 
difference in religious belief does not constitute a pretext to ebb a human 
right. According to Hizbullah, dialogue is the religious trait of the proph-
ets and messengers. Both Jesus Christ and Prophet Muhammad were very 
keen on engaging in dialogue with their own people as well as others. From 
this perspective, Hizbullah considers Christian-Muslim dialogue as a key to 
a productive, prosperous, and constructive cooperation locally and interna-
tionally in global forums, especially the Conference on Population Control 
held in Cairo.59 Finally, Hizbullah stressed the necessity of real dialogue that 
ought to include the Muslims who comprise civil society and the Lebanese 
public sphere, and not only deal with the political authorities since they do 
not represent the real socio-political fibre of the Muslim countries.60
In his lecture, Hajj Muhammad Ra‘d61 commented on the Papal Guid-
ance. He seconded the Pope’s call to the Christian youth to obliterate the 
walls that stand between them and the other, calling on them not to forget 
and to preserve their Christian-Arabic identity. The Pope also exhorted them 
to integrate and peacefully coexist and interact with their Arab milieu in 
order to enrich it, while at the same time highlighting the dangers of exclu-
sion, isolation, and reactionaryism since they are a minority living among 
a Muslim majority. Ra‘d extolled the Pope’s usage of the word “brothers” 
when he referred to non-Christians, as such emphasizing fraternity among 
the human beings. The Pope stressed that the Catholic Church declares that 
the building of society on serious, cooperative, and brotherly dialogue is 
a common endeavour to all the Lebanese. Ra‘d added that the Papal Guid-
ance affirmed that the different communities that constitute Lebanon are 
the wealth and authenticity of the country. He stressed that on the whole 
the Papal Guidance called for total infitah among the Lebanese, comprehen-
sive daily dialogue on all levels among them, mutual recognition, and giving 
up stereotyping and discrimination. 
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According to Ra‘d, the Papal Guidance called on the Lebanese to be 
one-united populace even though they have different political, intellectual, 
and religious loyalties. He emphasized that the national unity, which the 
Papal Guidance calls for, constitutes peaceful coexistence, far removed from 
the majority-minority concepts and logic. In line with the section of the 
Papal Guidance entitled, “Secularism and the Modern World”, Ra‘d empha-
sized that national cohabitation under the umbrella of the human values, 
which are affirmed both by Christianity and Islam, is much better for society 
than the adoption of secularism. Ra‘d underscored the Papal Guidance’s call 
for a constructive Christian-Muslim dialogue, national coexistence, solidar-
ity with the Arab world, building of a virtuous society that upholds human 
values and dignity as well as peace and reconciliation. Ra‘d reiterated that 
Hizbullah’s position towards the Papal Guidance is that it set a framework for 
a realistic reform of the Lebanese system and specified a general consensual 
policy between the Muslims and the Christians in order to erect together a 
unified society capable of conveying a distinguished civilizational message 
based upon fraternity so as to achieve the common good and promote a 
well-functioning civil society.62
Hizbullah’s overall political program reflected its infitah trend. Hizbul-
lah’s “Identity and Goals” called for dialogue, tolerance, and acceptance of 
the other. Hizbullah added that it also has its own cultural plan to attract 
and convince through civilized and humanitarian means as stipulated in the 
International Bill of Human Rights, without any recourse to violence or coer-
cion. From this perspective, Hizbullah opens its heart to friendship with eve-
ryone on the basis of mutual self-respect.63 Hizbullah’s Islam is the Islam of 
virtue and morality; the Islam of dialogue with the other; the Islam of unity 
and cooperation; and the Islam of guidance that displays what it has on oth-
ers so that they abide by God’s injunctions on the ground of: “Let there be 
no compulsion in religion” (2: 256).64
In its 1992 parliamentary elections program, Hizbullah did not vilify 
the Lebanese government or the political Maronites; rather Hizbullah called 
for the abolishment of political sectarianism65, blaming the Lebanese state, 
not only for the corruption of the political system, but also for all the cultural, 
security, social, and developmental calamities that have ruptured Lebanon 
for decades. Hizbullah also blamed political sectarianism for the malevolent 
entrance of the arrogant-gluttonous foreign powers to interfere in domes-
tic Lebanese affairs, thus endangering Lebanon’s destiny and future.66 In its 
1996 election program and 1997 “Views and Concepts”, Hizbullah repeated 
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its call for the abolishment of political sectarianism in order to achieve a just 
and equitable political system.67 In its political declaration commenting on 
the “Last Call”, Hizbullah regarded the call to shift from sectarian loyalty to 
national loyalty as synonymous with the abolishment of political sectari-
anism. However, Hizbullah condemned the call to a consensual democracy 
based on political sectarianism in order to avoid the tyranny of the major-
ity. Instead of the proposed system, Hizbullah called for an alternative to 
the political sectarian system that upholds religious and cultural diversity 
in the framework of the unity in cultural belonging based upon the aboli-
tion of political sectarianism that the Lebanese had already consented to 
and included in the new constitution (Ta‘if Agreement) with a mechanism 
of implementation.68 In its 2000 election program, Hizbullah urged the Leb-
anese government to establish the “National Body for the Abolishment of 
Political Sectarianism”.69 This culminated in Nasrallah’s 2001 call for the abo-
lition of political sectarianism in the mentality, before abolishing it in the 
texts (ilgha’ al-ta’fiyya al-siyassiyya fi al-nufus, qabla al-nusus),70 which bears 
a striking resemblance to the Maronite bishops’ declaration that cautioned 
that deleting political sectarianism from legal texts before wiping it out from 
Lebanese people’s mentality – through an efficient education of coexistence 
and mutual respect – is hazardous.71
Hizbullah 1992 parliamentary elections program addressed the Leba-
nese, in general, and the Christians, in particular, by promising them to fortify 
domestic peace, on the basis of political consensus, and to ward off appalling 
sectarian strife, narrow zealous partisanship, and fanaticism. Hizbullah called 
for the removal of the remnants of the obliterating civil war that has ravaged 
Lebanon, and objectively, constructively, and responsibly address its causes 
and consequences so that justice and equality would be served. Hizbullah 
added that attaining justice and equality among the Lebanese is regarded as a 
fundamental pillar for establishing a stable dignified and prosperous country 
in which all the Lebanese take an active part in the reconstruction process 
with impetus and solidarity governed by equality of opportunity as well as 
equality in political, economical, or social rights and duties.72
In its “Views and Concepts” Hizbullah allocated a separate section to 
its dialogue with the Christians. After Hizbullah conveyed its adherence to 
Islam that calls for upholding human values and abhorrence of all forms of 
discrimination, be it racial, sectarian, or denominational, Hizbullah portrayed 
its readiness and willingness to conduct a comprehensive dialogue with 
others dealing with all issues such as its convictions, beliefs, curricula, and 
political positions, without any impediments or taboos. Hizbullah stressed its 
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interest (maslaha) in reaching common grounds and a mutual understand-
ing with others, without any force or coercion. Hizbullah believes solely in 
continuous dialogue as the best means to rectify visions and clarify posi-
tions. Finally, Hizbullah emphasized that dialogue is one of the most salient 
tenets of its political program. In addition, “Views and Concepts” presented 
Hizbullah’s fundamental characteristic of dialogue: it uproots exclusiveness 
and arrogance in human passions and inculcates modesty; it also enhances 
pluralism, pluralism construed as unity in diversity. That is why wisdom dic-
tates the reduction of conflict since the lack of proper communication and 
understanding led to it, as exemplified by the Lebanese civil war. Hizbullah 
added that dialogue is possible among the eighteen sects who comprise 
the Lebanese myriad73 and who have different ideologies, mindsets, under-
standings, viewpoints, and belief systems. Hizbullah stressed freedom, right, 
justice, security, and peace as the most important human values. Thus, infi-
tah is needed since everybody needs to “open up” and live in the moment 
with awareness and dynamism.74 
2.4  Hizbullah’s jurisprudential stipulations of parliamentary, 
municipal, and governmental work
The introduction of Hizbullah’s 1992 parliamentary elections program 
emphasized that its participation in the elections through a comprehensive 
political program is a religious duty and legal obligation (taklif shar‘i)75 in 
front of God, a patriotic obligation, and an expression of the popular will. 
Hizbullah added that its participation is based upon a realistic diagnosis 
of the clear and possible dangers as well as the opportunities available to 
the “Islamists” to take a leading role in the path of consolidating the Islamic 
project, in harmony with jurisprudential stipulations based upon Islamic law 
or shari‘a, which serves as an authoritative guide. Hizbullah’s program prom-
ised that its work in the parliament would be firm in preserving the country 
and safeguarding the social, economic, and political interests (masalih) and 
needs of the Lebanese populace.76 The content of Hizbullah’s jurispruden-
tial stipulations was communicated by its 2002 municipal conference, Hajj 
Muhammad Ra‘d, Bilal N‘im, and Shaykh ‘Afif al-Nabulsi, who stressed the 
role the shari‘a plays in connection with non-shar‘i laws. 
In its first municipal conference held in July 2002, Hizbullah embarked 
on organizing detailed studies dealing with the jurisprudence or religious 
safeguards (dawabit shar‘iyya) of municipal work and municipal decisions. 
On the whole, Hizbullah legitimised its participation in the electoral process 
by employing the following Qur’anic concepts77: shura78 (consultation) and 
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its modern Islamic constructions as a democratic consultative government 
reflecting the public will of the people; ijtihad79 (independent reasoning) as 
Islamic interpretation or independent opinion formation; ikhtilaf 80 and its 
modern Islamic expressions as pluralism; and al-huquq al-shar‘iyya 81 (human 
or ‘legal’ rights) and its modern Islamic conceptions as human rights. Hizbul-
lah stressed that although the Qur’an, Sunna, and the shari‘a are the sources 
and bases of legislation; however, some issues in life could be referred to 
other sources such as “situational laws” (al-qawanin al-wad‘iyya) i.e. positive 
(man made) laws and legislations.82
In commenting on the aforementioned, Hajj Muhammad Ra‘d argues 
that there is no conflict between Hizbullah’s Islamic identity and its par-
liamentary work since there is no big practical difficulty between the two, 
the reason being that the roots of civil legislation or situational laws (al-
tashri‘ al-wad‘i) are derived from jurisprudential legislations (al-tashri‘ al-
dini-al-fiqhi) although their applications might be different. Ra‘d adds that 
Hizbullah bases itself on the following rule of thumb: what falls within the 
domain of the legally prohibited (haram shar‘i), Hizbullah endeavours to 
prevent from coming into being or Hizbullah stands in its way; what stands 
in sharp contrast to the legally sanctioned (halal shar‘i), Hizbullah tries 
to abort it or append it; what falls within the domain of the ‘permitted’ 
(mubah), Hizbullah does its best to find the most just implementation in 
conformity with its religious vision. Ra‘d explains that as Hizbullah inter-
acts with other groups that form the Lebanese myriad, in its parliamentary 
work Hizbullah engages in negotiations and bargaining, making compro-
mises when it is confronted with a draft resolution that might pose a grave 
damage to its religious and ethical vision. Ra‘d adds that according to the 
stipulations of the democratic game, maybe Hizbullah’s MPs are not able 
to abort the draft legislation except by voting in favour of another that is 
deemed less damaging though sometimes Hizbullah’s MPs are not able to 
accomplish that. Thus, according to Ra‘d, Hizbullah’s parliamentary work 
is based on two basic principles: (1) keeping away the vices (al-mafasid) 
has precedent over advancing interests (al-masalih); (2) the confrontation 
between the most damaging and the least damaging. In conformity with 
ijtihad, Ra‘d concludes that the jurisprudential principles, which constitute 
the bases for civil legislations, sanction a great margin of manoeuvre in 
influencing legislations and decisions.83 
In turn, Bilal N‘im stresses what distinguishes Islam from other reli-
gions is that it is a comprehensive system of legislation that covers all 
aspects of life.84 He argues against the contentions that Islamic legislation 
163
falls short of guiding modern life, does not have the flexibility to deal with 
man’s progress, and addresses only the generalities, failing to deal with the 
basic particularities that have to do with man’s necessities and needs. N‘im 
emphasizes that Islam is the religion of governorship (hakimiyya: God’s gov-
ernance) and governance; it is the religion to administer daily life and lead it; 
it is a religion that has all the necessary legislations to accomplish that; it is a 
religion that has enough conformity and immutability to preserve its identity; 
and it is a religion that is endowed with flexibility that makes people’s lives 
easier. He clarifies that Islam in its immutable legislations (tashri‘at thabita) 
has addressed the immutable natural disposition of the human being85. This 
branch of legislation is connected with eternal interests and vices (al-masa-
lih wa al-mafasid) that are only known to God. That is why it is difficult for 
human reason to meddle with this legislation. N‘im adds that Islam in its 
dynamic legislation (tashri‘at mutaharika) has focused upon eternal-tem-
poral interests and vices that are capable of being discovered by human 
reason (ijtihad) i.e. what the mind judges based on its knowledge of good 
and bad… If the mind has done its role and issued the necessary legisla-
tions and abided by them, then it is as if the mind has applied a part of the 
divine Islamic legislations. According to the laws, the person who does that 
receives his/her share of this commitment as God has willed, even if that 
person was a non-Muslim. He concludes that the problematic is in practice 
and not in theory, for Islam has a comprehensive civilizational project deal-
ing with all aspects of human life, thus it is holistic in its orientation.86 
Shaykh ‘Afif al-Nabulsi, the head of the Shi‘ite religious scholars of 
Jabal ‘Amil, granted Hizbullah religious approval and legitimacy to its partic-
ipation in the Lebanese cabinet. He argued that from a political standpoint 
there is a certain wisdom and interest (maslaha) that calls upon Hizbullah to 
participate on the basis of the maxims of Islamic jurisprudence (qawa‘id al-
fiqh), which state that “necessities permit what is prohibited” and “what can 
not be accomplished in its whole, can not be left in its entirety”. According 
to al-Nabulsi, the current political situation lifts any prohibition on Hizbul-
lah’s participation since one of the tenets of purposes of shari‘a (maqasid 
al-shari‘a) stipulate the safeguarding of the Resistance as a corollary to safe-
guarding law and order in Lebanese society. He adds that safeguarding law 
and order is a strict legitimate/legal responsibility (taklif shar‘i) in order to 
preclude chaos and discords (fitan) from rupturing Lebanese society as well 
as to prevent Israel from attacking Lebanon.87 Nabulsi added that the Resist-
ance and its weapons constitute an existential necessity to Lebanon as well 
as a strategic necessity tied to its national security.88
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Hizbullah’s political program as well as Na‘im Qasim’s, Muhammad 
Ra‘d’s, Bilal N‘im’s, and ‘Afif al-Nabulsi’s usage of the vices and interests (al-
masalih wa al-mafasid) in order to grant participation in electoral and demo-
cratic processes warrants some explanation. In brief, Islamic jurisprudence 
theories developed in three main stages: (1) from the principles of jurispru-
dence (usual al-fiqh); (2) to the maxims of Islamic jurisprudence (qawa‘id 
al-fiqh); and (3) finally to the purposes of the shari‘a (maqasid al-shari‘a).89 
Hizbullah stresses the second and alludes to the third. 
1. The principles of jurisprudence deal with the methodology used to 
extract the law from the authoritative sources. It has to do with the 
way a scholar tries to understand the text. 
2. The maxims of jurisprudence are pragmatic ‘principles’ that schol-
ars usually refer to from the stance of authority to justify. They are 
pragmatic, and as I see it, very pragmatic because they give a frame-
work that can be used to confront different situations in a flexible 
matter. They are principles in the sense of being employed authori-
tatively to justify things. In short, the provisions of the maxims of 
Islamic jurisprudence are based on pragmatism. As such, they form 
a bridge between politics and religion. The following are some max-
ims of Islamic jurisprudence that I have heard during my fieldwork 
or I came by while reading Hizbullah’s discourse: (A) difficulties will 
lead to easiness (al-mashaqqa tajri bi al-tayysir); necessities permit 
what is prohibited (al-darurrat tubih al-mahdhurat), which is based 
on (2:173) “But he who is constrained, without intending to disobey 
or transgress, will commit no sin. Allah is Forgiving, Merciful”. (B) 
What cannot be accomplished in its whole, can not be left in its 
whole (ma la yudraku kuluhu, la yutraku kuluhu), which implies an 
opposition of all to nothing. (C) Things are attributed to their final 
causes (lil umur maqasiduha), based on the intention (niyya), which 
should be in line with one’s action. (D) The maxim of “mutual compe-
tition” (tazahum): “If two duties conflict (compete), then it is a must 
to follow the one deemed more important than the other, or the 
one more pressing than the other” (idha tazahama amran wajiban fa 
yajib taqdim al-aham ‘ala al-muhim, wa al-mulih ‘ala al-aqal ilhahan). 
However, the most salient maxim – that was employed by Na‘im 
Qasim, Muhammad Ra‘d, and Bilal N‘im – is that “the warding off 
vices is preferable to obtaining interests” (dar’ al-mafasid muqadam 
‘ala jalb al-masalih). This is what they mean when they refer to inter-
ests and vices. 
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3. The purposes of shari‘a are based on the following natural and inal-
ienable rights as well as their corollaries (derivatives): (a) the protec-
tion of reason (hifz al-‘aql); (b) the protection of the self (hifz al-nafs); 
(c) the protection of family and descent (hifz al-nasl); (d) the protec-
tion of religion (hifz al-din); and (e) the protection of property (hifz 
al-mal). According to the purposes of shari‘a, the shari‘a was revealed 
to the human beings because of interest (maslaha) for reinterpreta-
tion of the law. It is most likely that when Hizbullah refers to al-huquq 
al-shar‘iyya as human rights, Hizbullah is referring to them from the 
stance of the purposes of shari‘a, which is a liberal interpretation in its 
own right. The purposes of shari‘a, being based on a humanistic inter-
pretation of the shari‘a, deal more with the interest (maslaha) of the 
human being, thus sanctioning engagement in democratic practices 
and calling for the upholding of human rights.
2.5 Hizbullah’s socio-economic program: its NGOs 
and civil institutions 
Another key plank in Hizbullah’s electoral platform is its commitment 
to a comprehensive socio-economic program90. Hizbullah’s 1992 socio-eco-
nomic vision remained vague since its major aim was to protect its Islamic 
Resistance. It just outlined certain policy measures dealing with adminis-
trative reform, and the enhancement of social, and educational services. In 
1996 Hizbullah listed a series of socio-economic ideas without developing 
a clear policy line. The important change occurred in 2000 when Hizbul-
lah’s entire election program was mainly concerned with socio-economic 
issues since the Israeli withdrawal dictated an alteration in priorities and 
strategies.91 This trend continued with Nasrallah’s 2001 domestic political 
program92 and reached its peak in Hizbullah’s 2004 municipal elections pro-
gram and its August 2004 “Working Document” 93 of the Central Workers’ and 
Syndicates’ Unit.94
Hizbullah emphasized that a constructive solution to the socio-eco-
nomic problem requires the exertion of exceptional efforts aimed at the 
formation and execution of a general reformist economic plan. Hizbullah 
outlined the elements, priorities, and emphases of its socio-economic pro-
gram stressing, in addition to political reforms, administrative, social, and 
economic reforms in order to stamp out corruption, inefficiency, waste, red 
tape, favouritism, nepotism, and replace the spoils system by meritocracy 
based upon economic function, specialisation, transparency, and account-
ability. Most importantly, Hizbullah exhorted the Lebanese state to concen-
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trate on enhancing human resources (bashar) i.e. the plight of the human 
being and not only material resources (hajar) through laying scientific foun-
dations of a comprehensive socio-economic program aimed at eliminating 
poverty by boosting the productive sectors, protecting the natural resourc-
es and the state’s capabilities, pursuing balanced development, achieving 
social justice, and improving the state’s care to its citizens.95
Hizbullah’s cadres regarded the municipal elections as a socio-eco-
nomic eventuality par excellence. Qasim stressed that the municipal elec-
tions are a developmental, socio-economic entitlement having a political 
flavour.96 Sayyid Hashim Safiyyeddine stated that the umma upholds its 
pride, honour, and dignity by participating in the municipal elections that 
wield (Hizbullah controlled) municipal councils, which industriously work 
to improve the socio-economic conditions of the Lebanese.97 Finally Hizbul-
lah’s 2005 parliamentary elections program stressed the need for establish-
ing a comprehensive socio-economic program aimed at eradicating poverty 
by boosting productive sectors such as agriculture, industry, and trade that 
are conducive to rendering basic services to the Lebanese citizens.
Hizbullah’s humanitarian duties, which are legitimised on the basis of 
the Qur’an, dictated upon it to redress the negative effects of “conspicuous 
consumption” 98 by targeting the periphery and upholding human rights. 
Hizbullah blasted the Lebanese government negligence in fulfilling 
its humanitarian and socio-economic duties toward its citizens.99 According 
to Hajj Husayn Shami, while the Lebanese government pursued conspicuous 
consumption concentrating on the “centre”, Hizbullah embarked on reciprocity 
and a redistribution system targeting the deprived “peripheries”.100 He added, 
historically, the Lebanese government engaged in modernization projects 
and developmental plans focusing on the centre i.e. Beirut and Mount Leba-
non, and ignored the periphery that constitutes the southern suburbs of Bei-
rut and deprived areas such as the North, South, and Biqa‘. Shami stressed that 
Hizbullah’s aim behind its NGOs, social institutions, and welfare programmes 
is to reverse this trend, lobbying the government, through parliament, to take 
conducive measures to eradicate unbalanced development.101 
In line with its political program where Hizbullah prided itself for indis-
criminately bestowing its humanitarian services upon the Lebanese in vari-
ous geographical areas102, most notably the periphery, Hajj Shami empha-
sizes that Hizbullah’s social and humanitarian services are not confined to 
Shi‘ites or Muslims only; rather a lot of Christians of various denominations 
benefit from these services.103 As such, a Lebanese martyr’s family is Hizbul-
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lah’s responsibility regardless of its religious affiliation.104 In line with Shami, 
Hajj Imad Faqih stresses that a human being receives his share by virtue 
of his humanity, the inalienable right of being human without any regard 
to the person’s political or religious beliefs. Faqih purports that Hizbullah’s 
NGOs indiscriminately offer their services to the populace at large belong-
ing to all denominations and political parties without aspiring for any remu-
neration or pressure to elect its representatives. He claims that Hizbullah 
has a strong social base and is investing its legitimacy for the establishment 
of social justice. Faqih adds this is the true vision of the humanistic life that 
Hizbullah aims at and strives for, so that every person can realise it.105
In line with its infitah, Hizbullah stresses and deals with almost all 
social, economical, religious, and political domains, thus, it is holistic in its 
orientation. In fact, Hizbullah’s NGOs and civil institutions conducted many 
services, some of which has been restoring damaged buildings, farming 
guidance, providing utilities for a token amount and sometimes for free, 
according medical care and hospitalisation, offering primary and intermedi-
ate schooling, granting scholarships to needy students in order to continue 
their college education as well as providing them with career and guidance 
orientation, and securing fresh water to the areas that are deprived of it.106 In 
order to broaden its support base among the masses, Hizbullah built a net-
work of infrastructure, civil institutions, NGOs, and social welfare that deals 
with all aspects of life.107 Also, efficient twin ship programs exist with Iran, 
and some of Hizbullah’s institutions are a replica of Iranian ones. Particular 
attention has been accorded to education, hospitalisation, and welfare pro-
grams giving prominence to the role of women in the public sphere, thus 
emulating the Iranian experience.108 
Hizbullah emphasized that it strives to present Islam as the guardian of 
human rights (al-huquq al-shar‘iyya) defining choices, adopting convictions, 
and articulating them across the lines of a socio-economic program. Hizbullah 
added that it opts for the formation of political pressure in education, peda-
gogy, medical care, and other socio-economic benefits asserted in the Inter-
national Bill of Human Rights.109 Hajj Shami stresses that Hizbullah’s NGOs 
target the deprived grassroots, in particular, and develop an overall welfare 
system that blends social democratic experience with the Islamic doctrine of 
human or ‘legal’ rights (al-huquq al-shar‘iyya)110 of zakat and khums, which are 
religious duties incumbent upon every believer. In this regard, Faqih quotes 
Imam Musa al-Sadr who has claimed that if all the Shi‘a performed their reli-
gious duty of khums, then poverty among the Shi‘a community in Lebanon 
would have been eradicated. According to Faqih, this is social justice proper 
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because it safeguards the dignity and humanity of the poor and the oppressed. 
He adds, the poor have their own needs, which ought to be appropriated from 
the rich, and this is what Hizbullah is endeavouring to do within the domain 
of al-huquq al-shar‘iyya.111 Both Shami and Faqih added that Hizbullah does 
not impose prohibitions on cooperation with voluntary welfare and devel-
opment associations as such; rather only those who threaten or undercut its 
Islamic Resistance are excluded.112 From this perspective, in its 2004 municipal 
election program, Hizbullah stated that it cooperated and coordinated not 
only with local NGOs and civil society organizations, but also with competent 
international associations and regional and international organizations such 
as the UNICEF and the UNDP.113 
Hizbullah legitimised its humanitarian duties by a Qur’anic verse 
that enjoins the need of good deeds and benevolence in this life: “But seek, 
thanks to what Allah gave you, the Hereafter, and do not forget your portion 
of the here below [the present world]. Be charitable, as Allah has been chari-
table to you, and do not seek corruption in the land; for Allah does not like 
the seekers of corruption” (28:77).114 Hizbullah’s political program consid-
ers it a religious duty to serve the populace, safeguard their rights, uphold 
their interest, and exert effort in order to pursue economic development 
and recovery, which affords the citizens with the requirements of a dignified 
and honourable life.115 
Hizbullah’s socio-economic program and NGOs are inspired by the 
same ideals of social justice. Hizbullah’s political program emphasized a con-
sorted effort between its resistance identity, on the one hand, and its socio-
economic, intellectual, and cultural work, on the other.116 Hajj Imad Faqih 
highlights the importance of social justice stressing that Hizbullah is not 
only a military party117; rather it has a “humanistic” dimension. According to 
him, Hizbullah was compelled to liberate occupied Lebanese land within an 
overall humanistic project that carries the banner of Islam.118 Faqih regards 
military victory over Israel as a step in the right direction towards the estab-
lishment of social justice.119 
2.6 Hizbullah as a nationalist Lebanese political party 
(Lebanonisation)
Hizbullah’s cadres affirm that the party never took part in the Leba-
nese civil war.120 They purport that the party never imposed (by force) its 
ideas, opinions, or its religio-political ideology and political program on 
any one; on the contrary, Hizbullah always respected the opinions, beliefs, 
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and ideas of others.121 Hizbullah has repeatedly stated that it refuses to be a 
social, political, or security alternative to the Lebanese state and its institu-
tions, thus working with the narrow confines of the Lebanese state, rather 
than aspiring to form a state within a state.122 
Hizbullah purports that it is not only an Islamic movement, but also 
a nationalist-patriotic Lebanese political party. Hizbullah’s political program 
portrayed it as one of the foremost mainstream Lebanese political parties, 
which is embraced by both the populace and government. It also aimed to 
present it as a Lebanese nationalistic political party that upholds its patriotic 
duty while at the same time being faithful to its Islamic identity.123 Hizbullah 
stressed that it has been mobilizing its “noble religious” and “national strug-
gle” in order to serve freedom, right, justice, and peace in Lebanon.124 Basing 
itself on its nationalistic responsibilities, Hizbullah emphasizes that its resist-
ance identity and struggle will continue until it liberates all occupied Leba-
nese land because it took on its shoulders the duty of defending the security, 
sovereignty, honour, dignity, and interests of all the Lebanese.125 From this 
perspective, Hizbullah formed the Multi-confessional Lebanese Brigades to 
fight Israel (LMCB) on November 3, 1997 almost two months after Sayyid 
Hadi Nasrallah, Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah’s son, died in a confrontation with 
the Israel soldiers in southern Lebanon. Hadi Nasrallah’s death galvanized 
the Lebanese to a sense of national unity around the Resistance. Hizbullah 
capitalised on this and founded the LMCB, which attracted a strong response 
from the Lebanese youth across the sectarian spectrum. The multi-confes-
sional-sectarian nature of LMCB testifies to Hizbullah’s sincerity in its efforts 
to Lebanonise itself. This move marks the “Lebanonisation” or infitah of the 
Resistance.126 Hizbullah exploited the Israeli Army’s labelling of its fighters 
as “freedom fighters” to convey its unwavering Lebanonisation127: “If this is 
the testimony of the enemy in us, then who are those who dare to question 
our nationalistic background”?128
The discourse of Hizbullah’s leaders stressed its infitah policy and its 
Lebanonisation process. In its 1991 political program Hizbullah outlined its 
infitah policy in an attempt to open up to other groups that form the Leba-
nese myriad, most notably the Christians. Since then, different nuances of 
Hizbullah’s infitah policy or Lebanonisation were given. Lebanonisation is 
defined as “a political approach where the Islamic movement examines the 
prevailing circumstances in Lebanon and formulates its strategy within that 
framework, making allowances for Lebanon’s particular circumstances, its 
confessional sensitivities, and its perception of its environment”.129 In gener-
al, Hizbullah employs the term infitah or Lebanonisation to denote its politi-
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cal discourse, deeds, and policies in the era of the political program130, or to 
signify its enrolment in Lebanese domestic political life.131 
Hizbullah’s leading cadres explained how infitah works. Since working 
within a certain country is linked to its particularity, specificity, and circum-
stances, Hizbullah’s work balances its “Islamic program” (Islamiyyat al-manhaj) 
and “Lebanese national loyalty/allegiance” (Lubnaniyyat al-muwatana). Hiz-
bullah is a Lebanese political party in all its particularities and specificities, and 
all of its leadership, cadres, and rank and file are Lebanese. Indeed, Hizbullah 
is concerned with what is happening in the jihadi, political, social, and cultur-
al domains, carrying the banner of Islam. There is no contradiction between 
caring for the causes of the Islamic world and the plight of the oppressed 
(regional and global dimensions), on the one hand, and being concerned with 
national-patriotic issues (domestic dimension) that are bound to reject tyr-
anny and occupation, as well as working towards the achievement of social 
justice and taking care of domestic priorities and interests.132
Other cadres stressed that, in its daily dealings with the Lebanese 
mosaic, Hizbullah tries to keep a balance between its nationalist political 
commitments and its Islamic background. Hizbullah unequivocally stated 
that it engages in negotiations and bargaining, making compromises (even 
by allying itself with formal ideological enemies) in its political work, so that 
the overall political decisions taken might not harm its Islamic and ethical 
vision.133 Hizbullah affirms that its Islamic identity endorses the establish-
ment of a civil society governed by the values of democracy, civil peace, 
public freedoms, as well as a functional-efficient political system.134 These 
are priorities that go hand in hand with the party’s political program and 
Islamic doctrine and are conducive to the service of the Lebanese society 
at large. Hizbullah claims that the establishment of civil society in Lebanon 
does not contradict its project; rather it is concomitant with it because one 
of the tenets of Islam135 urges the enactment of civil society.136 
Hizbullah’s practical performance has its own objective contexts, 
foundations, and fundamentals, which sanction the preservation of its 
Islamic identity while working within the domain of Lebanese state’s sov-
ereignty. Hizbullah stresses that this should not be seen as a deflection 
from God’s shari‘a since the party considers that its political experience in 
the domestic sphere in Lebanon has proven to be in accordance with the 
Islamic vision in a multicultural, confessional-sectarian society – in a country 
that cannot bear the Islamic “thought” or ideology137 as an administration, 
orientation, and basic conviction in the system of government.138 Hizbul-
lah purports that its Lebanonisation is in harmony with its Islamic identity. 
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Conveying pragmatism, it added that there is no objection from benefiting 
from its morale, competence, rectitude, and popular following, and invest 
these in domestic politics in the framework of the integrity and decency of 
the performance.139
Finally, a few examples of identity construction on the symbolic level 
illustrate the waning of identity determinants, giving more weight to Hiz-
bullah’s nationalistic character: (A) After the liberation or the nearly com-
plete Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon in May 2000, the logo on Hiz-
bullah flag, “The Islamic Revolution in Lebanon” was replaced by “The Islamic 
Resistance in Lebanon”. Hajj Imad Faqih contends that it changed as early as 
1998 in an endeavour of rapprochement towards the Christians and other 
confessional groups.140 (B) In 2001, Hizbullah’s weekly mouthpiece Al-‘Ahd 
not only changed its name to al-Intiqad, but also its orientation, thus con-
veying a “secular” image by dropping the Qur’anic legitimisation (5:56), on 
the right side, and removing the portrait of Khumayni and Khamina’i, on the 
left side. In the beginning, there was only Khumayni’s portrait; after his death 
Khamina’i’s portrait was added. Also, in the beginning AH dates were written 
with their AD equivalent. After the name change, the trend was reversed: 
AD dates, then their AH equivalent.141 (C) During the municipal elections of 
1998, in the Dahiya (Beirut’s southern suburb) Hizbullah removed all reli-
gious and ideological symbols – including pictures and banners – from areas 
surrounding the Christian polling stations in order not to offend or scare 
the Christians. This was done from the stance of respecting the specificity 
and particularity of the Christian displaced population that was competing 
for municipal seats. (D) Even before Hariri’s assassination, Hizbullah started 
to portray its national character in street politics, rather than its ideologi-
cal-Islamic identity. As a case in point, I take the November 30, 2004 and 
March 8, 2005 demonstrations where Hizbullah marched carrying Lebanese 
flags, rather than portraying it flags, banners, and special slogans. Thus, the 
vanishing of the symbols of Hizbullah’s identity marks an important victory 
for the logic of operating within the bounds of the Lebanese state over the 
logic of the revolution.
2.7 Hizbullah’s stance towards Syria and Iran 
From its stance of pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism, in its political pro-
gram Hizbullah stressed its amicable relations to Syria and Iran. In its 1996 
election program Hizbullah stated as a priority the preservation of good, 
brotherly Lebanese-Syrian relations as a practical application of Lebanon’s 
Arab heritage, identity, belonging, and cultural authenticity.142 Hizbullah 
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considered these relations as a bulwark standing against any endeavour 
aimed at isolating Lebanon in the face of regional challenges. According 
to Hizbullah, the previous years have proven that these relations present 
an element of stability to Lebanon.143 In the introduction to its 2000 parlia-
mentary elections program, Hizbullah emphasized that distinctive relations 
with Syria are an element of strength to Lebanon and Syria in the face of 
the mounting challenges and international pressures that are being waged 
against the two countries.144 The third article in Hizbullah’s 2005 parliamen-
tary elections program exhorted the Lebanese government to lay scientific 
foundations for systematising the special relationship between Lebanon and 
Syria. Also, Hizbullah’s 2000 parliamentary elections program laid emphasis 
on expanding the Lebanese-Iranian relations, thanking the Islamic Republic 
of Iran that has always been firm in buttressing Lebanon.145 
Hizbullah affirms that it is a Lebanese political party that derives 
legitimacy from its struggle for the liberation of Lebanese occupied land by 
Israel, and from the support of Lebanese people and government (domesti-
cally), and that it is buttressed by two strong regional players, namely, Iran 
and Syria (regionally). Hizbullah concedes that Iran furnishes it with eco-
nomic, social, political, military, and financial assistance.146 Hizbullah admits 
that it consults on a regular basis with Iran, Syria, and other key players, and 
that this renders any decision it embarks upon more ripe, wise, and perspi-
cacious.147 Hizbullah, as a political party, has domestic, regional, and inter-
national junctures that are in accordance with its overall vision and interests 
(masalih). This leads to harmony and coordination between Lebanon, on the 
one hand, and Iran and Syria, on the other, that grant Hizbullah assistance 
and backing in its legitimate right for resistance and liberation. Hizbullah 
benefits from the positive convergence of its interests and strategy with 
Syria and Iran to recover occupied land from Israel, be it Lebanese or Pal-
estinian.148 However, the details are left to the particularities and specifici-
ties to the Lebanese to deal with. Hizbullah takes its decisions independ-
ently of Iran and Syria, because Iran and Syria have their own convictions 
and responsibilities that might not always be in agreement with Hizbullah’s 
domestic Lebanese politics.149
The discourse of Hizbullah’s leading cadres demonstrated a politi-
cal-strategic partnership between Hizbullah and Syria. Before the Syrian 
withdrawal, Hizbullah defended Syria’s “legitimate” intervention in Leba-
non arguing that the Syrian forces entered Lebanon in 1976 by an official 
request from the Lebanese authorities and contending that the continu-
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ous Syrian presence was sanctioned by the Ta‘if Agreement. Hizbullah criti-
cised calls, most notably by the Christians, for the evacuation of the Syrian 
forces whom they regarded as a threat to civil peace. Hizbullah vehemently 
refused equating the Syrian presence with “colonialism and occupation”, 
labelling that presence as beneficial in the wake of Israeli occupation and 
continuous threats.150 Hizbullah’s official stance regarding its relations with 
Syria was summarised by its Political Council member and foreign relations 
officer, Sayyid Nawwaf al-Musawi who acknowledged that Lebanon has 
been advantaged from Syria’s standpoint towards the Arab-Israeli conflict 
and its support for resistance movements against the occupation. Al-Musa-
wi argued that this came about from the concordance of interests (malasih) 
between Lebanon and Syria in fighting the Israeli occupation of Southern 
Lebanon. Although al-Musawi conceded that Syria might have benefited 
from Hizbullah’s resistance, he vehemently denied that Syria used Hizbul-
lah as a tool of policy in order to further its strategic interest of recovering 
the Golan Heights, or to pressure Israel and the US by urging Hizbullah to 
enflame the northern front with Israel.151 
After the Syrian withdrawal, Nawwaf al-Musawi argued that the party 
embarked on the decision to involve itself more in the domestic Lebanese 
political scene by joining the Lebanese cabinet, in the wake of the Syrian 
President’s decision on March 5, 2005 to withdraw his army from Lebanon. 
He explained that Hizbullah took this decision in order to fill the vacuum 
that resulted from the Syrian withdrawal and to stop the Western powers, 
most notably the US and France152, from exercising their influence in Leba-
nese domestic affairs.153 Qasim revealed that the Syrian withdrawal dictated 
a change in Hizbullah’s tactics. He added that Hizbullah took an irrevoca-
ble decision not to join the cabinet as long as the Syrians were present in 
Lebanon since their presence accorded Hizbullah political protection. Also 
the general trend in Lebanon and the Syrian-Lebanese coordination were 
conducive to offering that protection. Qasim added, however, after the Syr-
ian withdrawal Hizbullah felt that the Lebanese cabinet would have to take 
important political decisions that might have grave consequences on the 
future of Lebanon, the face off with Israel, and the specificity of the Resist-
ance. From this perspective, Hizbullah deemed it an “executional and imple-
mentational” necessary to join the cabinet since this move would shelter 
the party with bona fide protection.154 Hajj Muhammad Ra‘d stressed the 
importance of putting the Lebanese-Syrian relations on the right track on 
the basis of mutual benefit and interest to the two countries, especially 
in the domain of political-strategic as well as economic coordination and 
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coalescence. In addition, Ra‘d called for total coordination and cooperation 
between the two countries in order to ward off any Israeli aggression and 
foreign intervention, tutelage, and hegemony over Lebanon, Syria, and the 
Middle East.155 Nasrallah stressed that becoming a foe to Syria is counterpro-
ductive to Lebanese interests.156 
The discourse of Hizbullah’s leading cadres conveyed an ideologi-
cal-strategic alliance between Hizbullah and Iran. After the death of Imam 
Khumayni, Hizbullah ideologically commanded allegiance to his successor, 
Imam Khamina’i, the official faqih. Hizbullah unequivocally stated that it 
does not regard the regime in the Islamic Republic of Iran as the jurisconsult 
of all the Muslims, and in consequence, not all Islamic movements have to 
abide by the orders and directives of the faqih or the regime.157 Hizbullah’s 
leadership is represented by the Shura Council158, which gets its legitimacy 
from the faqih. Thus, it has a wide margin of prerogatives and delegated 
responsibilities that facilitate the performance of its duties in line with an 
individual and specific margin and in harmony with the Shura Council’s esti-
mation of the executive performance, which is deemed beneficial for its pur-
pose and its general line of work.159 
In May 1995 after Khamina’i achieved the level of marja‘ al-taqlid, he 
nominated Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, Hizbullah’s Secretary general, and Shay-
kh Muhammad Yazbik, Hizbullah’s Shura Council member, as his representa-
tives in Lebanon. This move granted Hizbullah special prerogatives and del-
egated responsibilities that reflect a great independence in practical per-
formance. Even though the faqih need not monitor, on a daily basis, or keep 
his eye on Hizbullah, the party’s leadership takes the initiative to question, 
or ask the permission of the faqih if it needs to know the shar‘i judgment 
concerning a particular issue, such as participation in the 1992 elections, 
for instance. Hizbullah also consults with the faqih if it needs to know if a 
certain act could be deemed as legitimate or not; if it confronts a basic junc-
ture or watershed; and if it faces grave issues that might lead to a retrogres-
sion or deflection in the performance, or affect a basic principle.160 Although 
the watershed decision to participate in the Lebanese cabinet ideologically 
requires the shar‘i judgment and legitimacy of the faqih, for the first time in 
its history, Hizbullah secured the legitimacy from Shaykh ‘Afif al-Nabulsi, the 
head of the Shi‘ite religious scholars of Jabal ‘Amil of south Lebanon, and 
not Imam Khamina‘i, which indicates more independence in decision-mak-
ing. Indeed, administrative matters; following and keeping update with the 
nitty-gritty daily political work; cultural and social issues; even jihad against 
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the Israeli occupier, in all its details, are the prerogatives and responsibilities 
of the elected leadership of Hizbullah’s cadres in conformity with the inter-
nal bylaws of the party.161 Thus, Hizbullah does not blindly follow and adhere 
to Iranian policies, because the Lebanese circumstances differ from Iranian 
ones in many respects. Islam is universal; it is a worldly phenomenon. When 
this Islam is practised in Iran, it results in dynamism and gives a positive 
experience. However, Hizbullah does not abide by Islam only on the basis of 
its presence in Iran.162
Since Iran is obliged and committed to abide by the directives of 
Khamina’i, the faqih, then this obligation and commitment resulted in an easy 
convergence of ideological and strategic interests between Iran and Hizbullah’s 
vision towards the problems of the Middle East, which particularly resulted in 
boosting Hizbullah’s resistance identity. Hizbullah’s ideological relations are 
with the official marja‘ al-taqlid, Imam Khamina’i, and Iranian state institutions 
that are mostly controlled by the conservatives. Hizbullah does not take part 
in the internal Iranian debates and dynamics; rather what concerns Hizbullah 
is its good relations with both the conservatives and reformers as well as with 
other sectors in Iran, who, according to Hizbullah, all support its right to resist 
the Israeli occupation and are with the liberation of the land.163 As such, Hiz-
bullah contends that internal Iranian disputes and problems have no bearing 
on it since they are domestic Iranian affairs that Hizbullah does not interfere 
in.164 Also, there is no connection between the management of the affairs of 
the Islamic Republic and Hizbullah’s administration, for these are two different 
things having their own particularities and specificities, each in its own right. 
Hizbullah and Iran have also different administrative visions, even if they share 
a convergence in abiding by Khamina’i’s directives and ordinances.165 Hizbul-
lah’s relations with Iran do not dictate limitations on its domestic, regional, 
and international agendas and policies. Domestically this commitment does 
not hinder Hizbullah’s infitah or the building of various relationships with dif-
ferent institutions of civil society, especially political parties, interest groups, 
and NGOs. Also, it does not interfere with Hizbullah’s regional relations and 
international cooperation.166 
2.8 Hizbullah’s position regarding Israel 
Hizbullah referred to Israel as the “Zionist Entity, which, in its very ori-
gin, creation, and makeup is based upon a malicious belligerence and rape 
of the Palestinian land and its people”.167 According to Hizbullah, “The Zion-
ist Entity is absolutely and completely groundless and baseless (batil); it is 
a rapist, vanquisher, occupier, terrorist, cancerous entity that has absolutely 
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no legitimacy or legal status. This is a solid belief/faith and commitment in 
the Islamic Resistance and its rifles and bullets (weapons) and the blood of 
its holy warriors (mujahidin): Death to Israel”.168 Hizbullah put the accent on 
its identity as an Islamic jihadi movement against the “Zionist Entity” since, 
on an existential level, Hizbullah’s doctrinal foundations leave no room for 
granting any legitimacy or recognition to ‘Israel’.169 Hizbullah blasted the 
“Zionist enemy” and its “brutal” invasion, extortion, threats, and aggressions. 
Hizbullah emphasized that it will liberate Lebanon from the “rapist Zionists” 
and their occupation and terrorism.170
Hizbullah blasted the Israelis as “racist Zionist Jews”.171 Likewise, Hiz-
bullah vilified Israel as a “racist aggressive entity”.172 Also, Hizbullah exploited 
the Knesset’s (Israeli parliament’s) passing of a bill stopping Palestinians from 
obtaining Israeli citizenship in order to accuse Israel of being “racist and dis-
criminatory”.173 Hizbullah affirms that Israeli society is a military society.174 Hiz-
bullah stresses that in the state of ‘Israel’ the distinction between Jews as “Peo-
ple of the Book” and Zionists does not hold anymore because all the citizens 
are considered Zionists. Hizbullah affirms that in Israel, it does not distinguish 
between a civilian and a military, a woman, a child, and an elderly. Hizbullah 
argues, with a strong qualification175, that in Israel there are no civilians: they 
are all conquerors, occupiers, rapists of the land; they are all taking part in the 
crime and the massacre… they are all Zionists and must be killed.176 Hizbul-
lah adds that killing them is a religious obligation, and the persons who do 
it are regarded as martyrs.177 However, Hizbullah stresses that the formula of 
equating civilians to the military applies only to Israel, not outside its borders, 
or is the particular case of the Zionist entity. Hizbullah stressed that in all other 
places the Jews have the status of “The People of the Book”.178 
Hizbullah added, “No one has the right to give up one pebble of sand 
of Palestine’s land; no one has the right to relinquish one letter of the name 
of Palestine”.179 Hizbullah affirmed that it is totally against any negotiations, 
normalisation of relations, cultural invasion, and peace negotiations180 or 
treaties with Israel that would grant legitimacy to its rape of the land and 
aggression against the Palestinian people and would only give back 22% of 
the “historic” Palestine – the June 4, 1967 borders.181 Hizbullah clarified that 
its stance conforms to the Islamic Republic’s solution to the Palestinian cri-
sis, namely, a general referendum that includes the “indigenous Palestinian 
people” composed of the Muslims, Jews, and Christians – who are spread 
worldwide and inside the Occupied Territories – in order to determine their 
future and the type of government they aspire for.182 In other words, Hizbul-
lah demands the return of all the 1948 “historic” Palestine, from the Jordan 
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river till the Mediterranean Sea, and the repatriation of all the Jews who 
came after the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement that divided the Middle East 
among the British and French after the demise of the Ottoman Empire, plac-
ing Palestine under British Mandate.183 
2.9 The Banner of Jihad and Martyrdom
2.9.1 Smaller military jihad and greater jihad
Hizbullah’s distinction between halal and haram in smaller 
military jihad
Hizbullah clarified its stance on the killing of innocent civilians when 
it offered an outright condemnation of the Madrid March 11, 2004 terror-
ist bombings184. Hizbullah denounced the bombings, which cannot be war-
ranted by any standards or criteria, as a horrible crime and a blatant attack 
against innocent civilians and people. Hizbullah stressed that every attack 
that targets innocent civilians, to whichever country or religion or nation 
they belong to, is a cowardly act that is vehemently censured from an Islam-
ic, Qur’anic, and Muhammadi perspective.185 
Hizbullah affirmed that not all fighting is jihad, stressing that the 
Islamic-Qur’anic terminology (mustalah) or definition of jihad, is that jihad 
is the specificity of fighting in the way of God: “Oh believers, if you journey 
[fight with the sword] in the way of Allah be discerning… And he who kills 
a believer intentionally will, as punishment, be thrown into Hell, dwelling in 
it forever; and Allah will be angry with him, curse him and prepare for him a 
dreadful punishment” (4:94+93). Hizbullah added that this is par excellence 
the toughest punishment in the Qur’an inflicted upon a person who inten-
tionally kills a believer, for this the worst sin (kabira). According to Hizbullah, 
jihad has its own religious injunctions and jurisprudence; there is religiously 
sanctioned (halal) and religiously prohibited (haram) in jihad. That is why, 
Hizbullah stressed the need to ask the jurisprudents about the jurispruden-
tial details dealing with the jihadi work, or else this work would not be done 
for God, rather for some other end. And so, Hizbullah stressed that jihad in 
the way of God should be governed by God’s shari‘a, God’s legitimacy, and 
the total subjugation and obedience to God’s volition.186
However, Hizbullah’s smaller military jihad against the occupying 
Israeli forces falls within the domain of halal jihad, since it is not only sanc-
tioned by the Qur’an, religious injunctions, and jurisprudence, but also by 
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the International Bill of Human Rights as well as the UN Charter.187 Based on 
the aforementioned, Hizbullah emphasized its identity as an Islamic jihadi 
movement against the “Zionist” invasion and occupation of Lebanon. Hiz-
bullah underscored the legitimate right of its Islamic Resistance to practice 
self-defence as a natural and inalienable right in accordance with interna-
tional legitimacy.188 Hizbullah affirmed its resistance identity by mobilizing a 
large proportion of its resources in building a full-pledged resistance society 
(mujtama‘ al-muqawama) in order to safeguard the Lebanese populace. Hiz-
bullah depicted itself as the party of “Resistance and Liberation”. As such, a 
jihadi is a person who sacrifices his self and possessions in a war of national 
resistance against occupying forces.189 Hizbullah praised its model of resist-
ance, which accomplished Lebanon’s liberation from Israeli occupation, 
exhorting the populace in the Middle East, in general, and the oppressed 
Palestinian people, in particular, to adopt it.190 As a practical political dimen-
sion, Hizbullah founded its “Jihadi Council” is 1995 in order to closely moni-
tor and supervise its jihadi activities. It is worth mentioning that the Jihadi 
Council gained more importance after the May 2000 nearly complete Israeli 
withdrawal, since in its last 2004 conclave, the Secretary General himself 
became its head.
A new dimension to greater jihad
Hizbullah’s Jihadi Council gave a new practical dimension to greater 
jihad. Hizbullah portrayed its participation in the 1996 parliamentary elec-
tions as greater jihad. Hizbullah crowned its election program with the fol-
lowing Qur’anic verse: “But those who struggle [jahadu] in Our cause, surely 
We shall guide them in Our ways [paths]; and God is with the good-doers” 
(29:69). It is worth mentioning that Hizbullah considered the Lebanese gov-
ernment’s acquiescence to its demand of the creation of a separate governa-
rate in B‘albak-Hirmel in July 2003 as a victory in greater jihad. Hizbullah cel-
ebrated this political victory as it used to celebrate successful jihadi opera-
tions against the Israeli forces in the battlefield.191 The discourse of Hizbullah’s 
leaders stressed the importance of greater jihad. Nasrallah has remarked, in 
addressing the municipal councils and the majors of the South, that greater 
jihad is directed against the self, and that the greater struggler (al-mujahid 
al-akbar) is the one who can immune, hold back, and control himself from 
committing vices and engaging in corruption. Nasrallah stressed that the 
Hizbullahi’s endeavour and contriving, their presence on the ground, meet-
ings in the municipality and elective councils, and daily efforts to serve the 
public are all jihad. Nasrallah emphasised that the greater jihad is when man 
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refrains from theft and embezzlement.192 Nasrallah added that this holding 
back is the greater jihad and is the measure of victory and defeat as well as 
of success and failure. He called for transparency and accountability as the 
best means to face corruption.193 Nasrallah added that fighting corruption 
is much more difficult than resisting Israel. According to him, the Islamic 
Resistance could defeat 100 ‘Israels’, but the corruption in Lebanon is strong-
er than 100 ‘Israels’. Nasrallah stressed that in fighting the Israeli occupation 
there was a national consensus; however, in fighting corruption one has to 
fight with a considerable number of his fellow citizens. Nasrallah concluded, 
the jihad of resisting corruption is more severe and more bitter than resist-
ing the occupation.194 
Hizbullah’s distinction between suicide and martyrdom 
Reflecting on the political debates that took place before the 1992 
elections, Hizbullah stressed that its decision to contest the elections is 
based on permanent-principled political convictions, which are enforced 
by the blood of its martyrs and their families, the suffering and pain of its 
prisoners of war, detainees, wounded, and the oppressed. Hizbullah empha-
sized that it has sacrificed for these principles and convictions its best cadres 
who martyred themselves in resisting and driving out the “Zionist Occupa-
tion”.195 
In conformity to its resistance identity as an Islamic jihadi movement, 
Hizbullah sanctioned martyrdom operations (al-‘amaliyyat al-Istishadiyya) 
in its political program as a specific resistance strategy against a superior, 
well-equipped army when conventional smaller military jihad tactics prove 
to be futile. Hizbullah unequivocally states that it employed martyrdom 
operations as one of its distinguished techniques and a tactic of resistance 
against the allegedly “invincible” Israeli forces occupying Lebanon. In addi-
tion to elevating the spirits across the umma, Hizbullah purports that its 
martyrdom operations inflicted heavy casualties on the Israeli occupying 
forces and spread the reigns of terror among them.196 Hizbullah regards 
martyrdom in the way of God as the epitome of self-offering, giving the self 
and possessions, self-sacrifice, and the “preference” (ithar) of a dignified life 
in heaven, as to living under the disgrace of occupation; and the preference 
of the well being of the umma over that of the individual.197 Hizbullah added 
that the most vital human right that it has been sacrificing the blood of its 
martyrs to is the right of the Lebanese to their land.198 Hizbullah stressed 
that martyrdom in the way of God should be governed by God’s shari‘a, 
God’s legitimacy, and the total subjugation and obedience to God’s volition. 
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From here comes the devotion to martyrdom and the love of meeting God. 
In all other circumstances martyrdom becomes suicide; however, the final 
evaluation (taqyyim) is for God.199
Hizbullah distinguishes between suicide operations and martyrdom 
operations mainly in response to the West’s accusations200. Hizbullah con-
tends that suicide, not martyrdom, is an expression of hopelessness, frustra-
tion, and despair of life that usually occurs in the case of non-believers who 
are facing, for instance, economic, social, or political hardships. Hizbullah 
is confident that while, a believer surrenders to the will of God and knows 
that his/her patience will lead to rewards in heaven; however, a person who 
commits suicide will go to hell because he/she is not free to dispose his/her 
life as he/she deems fit. That is why understanding martyrdom and agreeing 
to it is not subordinate to international conventions or the enemies’ and the 
oppressors’ policies.201 
Hizbullah argues that it is quite natural that those who wage an 
organised campaign against martyrdom in order to distort it and label it 
with demeaning connotations do so because it has given Hizbullah a special 
and extraordinary power that made the party’s will to attain victory stronger, 
especially when power shifted in the direction of the enemies.202 According 
to Hizbullah, the West resorts to threats and intimidations that are of no avail 
to the martyrs since they live in this world, but are not part of it. Martyrdom 
is as dangerous as non-conventional weapons because the target can never 
prepare a defence mechanism to deal with it, unlike the defences that have 
been created to deal with almost any weapon. That is why, martyrdom as a 
weapon is tenable and cannot be controlled or contained by the enemy.203 
Hizbullah has reiterated, on various occasions that victory is always 
the result of martyrdom. It referred to the enormous pride and dignity in 
the hearts of the martyrs. Hizbullah emphasized that the Palestinian people 
in the (West Bank and Gaza), as well as the Lebanese, possess a substan-
tial power; they are lovers of martyrdom, lovers of meeting God, lovers of 
departing to the vicinity of God and the eternal gardens (garden of Eden).204 
Hizbullah “ ‘does not pursue martyrdom as an end in itself ’, but as a means 
of achieving victory… without the imperative need for a defensive jihad, 
martyrdom becomes suicide, which is clearly proscribed in Islam and there-
by not rewarded with an everlasting life in paradise, as is true martyrdom: 
‘Maybe some people think we crave martyrdom because we like to die in 
any way. No, we like to die if our blood is valued and has a great impact [on 
Israel]’ ”.205 
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Hizbullah, Ayatullah Fadlallah, and Iran206 condemned September 
11, 2001, and the London July 7, 2005 attacks207 as suicide-terrorist attacks 
that cannot be considered martyrdom operations, which are being carried 
out by national resistance movements that aim at the liberation of land still 
under occupation.208
Ayatullah Fadlallah denounced the September 11 operations as crim-
inal-suicidal acts that constitute an ugly human genocide in all respects. 
These, according to him, are not martyrdom acts. He added that neither 
offensive nor defensive jihad justifies such acts that are denounced reli-
giously (shar‘an). These are vicious acts that are not sanctioned by any reli-
gion, civilization, and human logic. It is not right to use innocent-peaceful 
civilians as bargaining chips and means of leverage to change a certain [US] 
policy. Islamically speaking, it is wrong to get engaged in such acts because 
there is no shar‘i justification for such acts. September 11 is a horrendous 
act that is not authorized by any religion or approved by any “heavenly 
message”, he affirmed. Thus, Fadlallah is adamantly against targeting civil-
ian means of transportation because their safety and security is a worldly, 
humane concern from a shari‘ perspective.209 
Hizbullah condemned the September 11, 2001 suicidal attacks against 
the US, showing sympathy towards the US people, while blasting the US 
Administration:
After many Muslim clergy men stated their position toward the bloody attacks 
which recently occurred in New York and Washington, we call for caution and not 
falling prey to a state of fear and panic that was intended to be spread throughout 
the world to give the US administration free rein to practice all types of aggres-
sion and terrorism under the pretext of fighting aggressions and terrorism, Now 
the big question is whether what the American administration is planning really 
has to do with responding to the perpetrators of the latest attacks, or whether it 
wants to exploit those tragic events to exercise more hegemony over the world 
and practice more unjust policies which have led to this level of hate against the 
US by many peoples and governments in the world. The world, which is now 
waiting for the U.S response, must not forget that there are massacres carried 
out against the Palestinian people by the Israeli occupation, which feels proud, 
that the world is silent towards its crimes. We are sorry for any innocent people 
who are killed anywhere in the world. The Lebanese, who have suffered repeated 
Zionist massacres in Qana and elsewhere, massacres that the US administration 
refused to condemn at the UN Security Council, are familiar with the pain and 
suffering of those who lost their loved ones in bitter events.210 
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Ayatullah Fadlallah’s fatwa stated that the London July 7, 2005 attacks 
are criminal-suicidal acts unacceptable to any religion, reason, and abhorred 
by any shar‘i or positive (man-made) law. He added it is a kind of savage-
ry that is totally rejected by Islam in spite of some people’s endeavours to 
accord an Islamic flavour to these attacks, or insinuate that Islam accepts 
these attacks. In turn, Hizbullah’s political declaration stressed that target-
ing the innocent is censured by all human, ethical, and religious standards. 
Hizbullah extended its consolation to the victims of the attacks, expressing 
its empathy and compassion with the families of the victims, in particular, 
and the Britons, in general.211
3. Chapter conclusion
Hizbullah’s 1991 political declaration and Sayyid Abbas’ 1991 politi-
cal program announced its infitah, dialogue, and Lebanonisation process 
as major pillars of its down to earth political program for the coming dec-
ades. 
As regards Hizbullah’s arguments for participation in the 1992 parlia-
mentary elections, the committee recommended that participation in the 
elections is a beneficiary must, which is in harmony with Hizbullah’s holistic 
vision that favours living up to the expectations of the people by serving 
their socio-economic, and political concerns. Hizbullah’s greater jihad and 
dedication to addressing the plight of the people does not contradict its 
priority of smaller military jihad for the sake of liberation of occupied land. 
Participating in the elections leads to the achievement of good political 
results, and is also regarded as a leading step towards interaction with oth-
ers. By this Hizbullah presents a novel experience in the infitah of a young 
Islamic party. The committee stressed that this participation is in accordance 
with the Lebanese particularities and specificities as well as the nature of 
the proposed elections, which allow for a considerable margin of freedom 
of choice. In short, the committee concluded that the sum total of the pros 
(masalih) outweighs the cons (mafasid) by far; that is why participation in the 
parliament is worthwhile since it is viewed as one of the ways of influencing 
change and making Hizbullah’s voice heard, not only domestically, but also 
regionally and internationally. Thus, it seems that Hizbullah is forced by the 
political circumstances, the Ta‘if Agreement and the end of the civil war, to 
change to a new phase in its history by propagating of a matter of fact politi-
cal program and by co-opting with the Lebanese system. 
183
3.1 Views on the oppressed and oppressors, the US and Israel 
in particular 
Hizbullah offered an Islamic justification to sanction its participation 
in the parliamentary elections by buttressing the oppressed against the 
oppressors. The opening Qur’anic verse of Hizbullah’s 1992 election pro-
gram (22:41) serves such a purpose because it stresses the Qur’anic concept 
of human empowerment that leads to the production of the doctrines of 
general human sovereignty and the responsibility of the community. It is 
worth mentioning that “establish them firmly in the land” connotes granting 
them political power. This is reminiscent of the Prophet who established the 
Islamic community in Medina. Hizbullah seems to be arguing that acquiring 
authority or political power through parliamentary representation, would 
not deflect it from giving due attention to the private sphere of prayer, and 
the social or public sphere of alms giving as well as commanding the good 
and prohibiting the evil. I think that Hizbullah’s apologetic discourse, which 
sanctioned the “Islamists” to participate in the electoral process, also reflects 
the internal heated debates, among Hizbullah’s cadres and leadership, which 
eventually led to the production and propagation of such a program. 
Domestically, Hizbullah’s political program stressed that its parlia-
mentary and municipal work would wholeheartedly protect the socio-eco-
nomic and political interests of the Lebanese oppressed. Regionally and 
internationally, Hizbullah’s political program blasted Israel and the US as 
oppressors: the US for aiming to hegemonise Lebanon and the Middle East, 
while at the same time buttressing Israel’s occupation and “aggression”. Hiz-
bullah criticised the imposition of the market economy and the Western 
mode of production on the people of the Middle East by the US, which has 
been aiming at robbing the wealth, natural resources, and planting despotic 
regimes in order to crush, dominate, and mutilate the cultural identity of the 
oppressed. 
3.2 Hizbullah’s views on the Islamic State
None of Hizbullah’s 1992, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2004, and 2005 parlia-
mentary and municipal election programs mentions, refers to, or advocates 
the founding of an Islamic state in Lebanon. Hizbullah emphasized that 
the establishment of an Islamic state could not be the result of the logic or 
adoption of a certain group or faction of people, who enforce it or enforce 
their own opinions on other groups or factions in society. Hizbullah neither 
applies nor accepts coercion in its project of Islamisation; rather the estab-
lishment of an Islamic state should be the result of freedom, will, and direct 
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choice of the people. Hizbullah would only move in the direction of imple-
menting an Islamic State in Lebanon on the basis of a democratic, tolerant 
process sanctioned by the majority of the non-Muslims and Muslims. 
Thus, it seems that due to practical reasons of political expediency, 
Hizbullah has put to rest, once and for all, the issue of the establishment or 
implementation of an Islamic state in Lebanon. That is why its political pro-
gram can be regarded as pragmatic. This accounts for Hizbullah’s participa-
tion in electoral politics, and its decision to take an active part in the Leba-
nese public sphere. It seems that Hizbullah was in its political programs 
down-to-earth and practical since it most probably saw that it is counter-
productive and politically unwise to mention its earlier commitment to an 
Islamic order. However, there appears to be a discrepancy between these 
political programs and the discourse of its leaders who continued to give 
lip service to the old ideological commitment of establishing an Islamic 
order. Thus, it is most likely that Hizbullah was guided by political expedi-
ency since in its political programs it accepted the fact that the majority 
of the Lebanese do not opt for an Islamic order, and imposing it by force is 
not an option. 
3.3 Hizbullah’s dialogue with the Lebanese Christians 
In conformity to Sayyid Abbas’s political program, which called for a 
Lebanonisation process, infitah, and dialogue, most notably, with the Chris-
tians, Hizbullah took the initiative in 1992 and visited the Maronite Patriarch. 
The talks centred mostly upon Christian-Muslim dialogue and Hizbullah’s 
gradual integration in the Lebanese public sphere. However, with the pas-
sage of time, Hizbullah’s dialogue did not remain confined to the Maronites 
only, rather it was extended to encompass the rest of the Christians that 
comprise the Lebanese mosaic. Hizbullah conducted dialogue with the 
Christians and other groups on the basis of transparency in order to reach 
common grounds. As to the content and subjects of the dialogue, Hizbullah 
tried to avoid engagement in theological or religious issues, which are the 
specificity and particularity of every sect in the Lebanese myriad, and con-
centrated on nurturing dialogue dealing with political, socio-economic, and 
civil society issues. In its political program, Hizbullah blamed political sec-
tarianism for Lebanon’s malaise, calling for its abolishment in line with Leba-
non’s 1990 new constitution. Hizbullah embarked on an open, peaceful, and 
constructive dialogue with all sects, political parties, and civil society groups 
and organizations in order to tackle the source or origin of cultural, political, 
theoretical, and practical differences. 
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Hizbullah tried to portray itself as a big Muslim-Christian co-existence 
promoter stressing the importance of pluralism through multi-confessional 
representation. It incorporated Christians, including Maronites, in its parlia-
mentary elections lists and granted them the right to speak in its name as 
long as they do not deflect from the party’s established doctrines. Also, it 
shared municipal council seats with Christians. Thus, Hizbulah made it clear 
that the only condition for a sympathizer to speak in its name is to abide by 
its policy guidelines. Hizbullah’s dialogue with the Christians, as stipulated 
in its political program, garnered the party support in its resistance against 
Israel and infitah policies, especially among the Christians. By adopting what 
many observers would consider “Christian discourse”, namely, the abolition 
of political sectarianism in the mentality, before abolishing it in the texts, 
Hizbullah is portraying a progressive-liberal, and pragmatic view on the 
abolishment of political sectarianism, which is in conformity with the stance 
of the Maronite Church and the Papal Guidance. The Pope’s call for frater-
nity and the inculcation of dialogue and tolerance among the Lebanese had 
a responsive cord in Hizbullah’s circles since most of it was reminiscent of 
Imam Musa al-Sadr’s discourse on Christian-Muslim understanding, mutual 
coexistence, and open and permanent dialogue. Thus, in an endeavour of 
rapprochement towards the Lebanese Christians, Hizbullah based its politi-
cal program of dialogue with them on the Papal Guidance. 
3.4 Hizbullah’s jurisprudential stipulations of parliamentary, 
municipal, and governmental work 
Hizbullah’s jurisprudential stipulations conveyed its understanding 
and usage of Islamic law in dealing with non-shar‘i laws through the pur-
poses of shari‘a and the maxims of Islamic jurisprudence such as “necessities 
permit what is prohibited”, “what can not be accomplished in its whole, can 
not be left in its entirety”, and most notably “the warding off vices is pref-
erable to obtaining interests”. Based on this pragmatic-religious legitimisa-
tion, Hizbullah was able to strike a balance between its Islamic identity, on 
the one hand, and its parliamentary, municipal, and governmental work, on 
the other, thus justifying its participation in the Lebanese system. This rea-
soning falls in line with, what Hizbullah calls, Islam’s comprehensive-holistic 
project that deals with all aspects of human life through its flexible shari‘a, 
which covers man’s needs, necessities, and progress.
Although it is typical of Hizbullah’s discourse and political program 
to consider the ultimate principle of legislation to be Islamic law in accord-
ance with the shari‘a, Hizbullah’s political program highlights the possibil-
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ity of making the shari‘a flexibility through the employment of a pragmatic 
approach in its distinction between situation bound laws or legislations 
(non-shar‘i laws) that are transient, on the one hand, and religious or juris-
prudential legislations, on the other. Also, Hizbullah’s characterization of 
the two principles that it bases its political work upon, namely warding off 
vices and the face off between the most and least damaging, is pragmatic 
because it is based on interest and necessity. Hizbullah concluded that juris-
prudential stipulations, which form the backbone of civil legislations, per-
mit a substantial margin of manoeuvre in influencing non-shar‘i legislations 
and decisions. Building on this reasoning, Hizbullah legitimises its partici-
pation in the democratic process on the basis of a practical application of 
the Qur’anic concepts of shura, ikhtilaf, al-huquq al-shar‘iyya, and ijtihad: the 
Islamisation of democracy by way of consultation (shura) through popular 
empowerment (tamkin); tolerance and acceptance through pluralism (ikhti-
laf); respect, honour, and dignity through human, ‘legal’ rights (al-huquq al-
shar‘iyya).
After the theoretical dimension dealing with the religious legitimacy 
of participating in the cabinet was settled, Hizbullah has to objectively and 
practically weight between the interests and vices that might result from 
this participation. It seems Hizbullah joined the Lebanese cabinet when its 
strategic calculations legitimatised by its interpretation of shari‘a dictated 
such participation. 
3.5 Hizbullah’s socio-economic program:  
its NGOs and civil institutions
Hizbullah conveyed in its parliamentary and municipal elections 
programs212 that it is a project for national Resistance and liberation, which 
founded its NGOs and civil institutions for a more effective and compre-
hensive socio-economic support. Hizbullah’s political program stressed that 
socio-economic, intellectual, and cultural work is concomitant with resist-
ance and should go hand in hand with it. In being faithful to its socio-eco-
nomic program, Hizbullah built an efficient network of NGOs and civil insti-
tutions dealing with all aspects of life ranging from socio-economic issues 
to cultural, educational, and health concerns. Since Hizbullah extended its 
services to all the Lebanese living in its constituencies, Hizbullah’s NGOs and 
civil institutions granted it popular and political support even among non-
Muslims. Hizbullah’s civil institutions and NGOs are a testimony to its capac-
ity to merge in civil society and engage in democratic practices once the 
services of its Islamic Resistance are not needed anymore.213 
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Hizbullah stressed that its political program dwells upon its civiliza-
tional belonging and commitment, which aspires to accord man with felic-
ity and dignity. As religious legitimisation, Hizbullah employed the Qur’anic 
verse (28:77), which implies that its engagement in the elections is based 
upon the stance that one should not neglect the here and now, the present 
life for the sake of the hereafter since any Hizbullahi aspires for felicity in this 
world and the world to come (al-sa‘da fi al-darayn). Hizbullah broadened the 
horizon of the Qur’anic concept of al-huquq al-shar’iyya to include, in addi-
tion to zakat and khums, the basic human rights, which the International Bill 
of Human Rights mentions and which Hizbullah’s NGOs and civil institutions 
grant to the people.
3.6 Hizbullah as a nationalist Lebanese political party 
(Lebanonisation) 
Hizbullah expressed its Islamic legitimisation in democratic form by 
portraying itself as a mainstream nationalist Lebanese political party while 
at the same time upholding its Islamic identity. Hizbullah’s infitah and Leba-
nonisation endeavoured to convey how it was able strike a balance between 
its Islamic identity and program, on the one hand, and its Lebanese national 
loyalty, on the other through “opening-up” to the various constituents of 
the Lebanese myriad. Although Hizbullah denies it, it seems its success in 
weighing between nationalist political commitments and its Islamic back-
ground was at the price of negotiations, bargaining, and compromises (even 
on some doctrinal issues), which characterise an open democratic system. 
Through buttressing civil peace, public freedoms, and a functioning civil 
society, Hizbullah attempted to preserve its Islamic identity while work-
ing within the domain of Lebanese state’s sovereignty, within a non-Islamic 
state and a multi-religious-confessional-sectarian state. Thus, Hizbullah can-
not go beyond being a political party operating within the Lebanese pub-
lic sphere by accommodating its protest through contestation214, co-opta-
tion215, and empowerment216. Hizbullah’s Lebanonisation and infitah fall 
under contestation; its participation in electoral politics and governmental 
work could be regarded as co-optation; and Hizbullah’s ascendancy to the 
political scene becoming a nationalistic political party can be viewed from 
the stance of empowerment. Thus, it is most likely that the Lebanese public 
sphere is dictating certain policies on Hizbullah, and the Lebanese politi-
cal structure seems to be co-opting Hizbullah to take decisions that may 
not be that popular to the rank, file, and leaders. On the whole, Hizbullah’s 
decisions are based on realpolitik, political expediency, benefit, and interest 
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(maslaha). This calls into question the extent to which Hizbullah is willing 
to be co-opted into the Lebanese political system/government and state 
institutions as well as its possible diffusion in the public sector.
3.7 Hizbullah’s stance towards Syria and Iran 
Even though there is an ideological-strategic alliance between Hizbul-
lah and Iran, on the one hand, and a political-strategic partnership between 
Hizbullah and Syria, on the other, the previous presentation has shown that 
Hizbullah is not a tool of policy in Syrian and Iranian hands. Rather, Hizbul-
lah has pursued an independent course of decision-making and action that 
suits the particularities and specificities of the Lebanese political equation 
by putting into practice its political program of Lebanonisation, infitah, and 
integration in the Lebanese public sphere.
3.8 Hizbullah’s position regarding Israel 
In its political program, Hizbullah considers Israel as the Zionist Entity 
that should be wiped out from the face of the earth so that the state of 
Palestinian could be reinstated along the pre-1948 borders. In other words, 
Hizbullah still adopts the pre-1967 Arab nationalist discourse that grants no 
legitimacy or recognition to Israel, refuses peace negotiations with it, and 
stands firmly against any normalisation of relations with it. 
Hizbullah considers the Jews as “People of the Book”, and only regards 
the Jews living in Israel as Zionists, who should be killed, as Nasrallah puts 
it. From the stance of regarding discrimination as a form of oppression, Hiz-
bullah has blasted the Israelis as “racist Zionist Jews”. Although on occasions 
Hizbullah has censured Israel for being “racist and discriminatory”, Hizbul-
lah neither discriminates against the Jews as a religion nor as a race. Thus, 
it seems that Hizbullah is not anti-Semitic in its overall orientation.217 It is 
worth mentioning that Hizbullah’s equating the civilians with the military in 
the state of Israel, as radical as it seems, is neither new, nor is it confined to 
it or to Islamic movements.218 
3.9 The banner of jihad and martyrdom
In all its election programs Hizbullah stressed the feats of its Islamic 
Resistance that engaged in smaller military jihad against the occupying 
Israeli army, thus enforcing Hizbullah’s resistance identity. Hizbullah prided 
itself in erecting a resistance society and in exporting its model of resistance 
as an exemplar to other resistance movements. In addition to the religious 
legitimacy of resisting occupation through smaller military jihad, Hizbul-
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lah added the legitimacy of the international community and international 
bodies. Hizbullah’s struggle against Israel falls within the domain of smaller 
military jihad or the jihad against the enemy, while greater jihad is the inter-
nal jihad with the self and holding it from living according to the flesh and 
being engaged in corruption. Hizbullah gave a new dimension to greater 
jihad since it emphasised that its mission in fighting domestic corruption 
in the Lebanese political and administrative system is much more difficult 
than defeating 100 ‘Israels’. In other words, Hizbullah seems to be arguing 
that engaging in greater jihad is 100 times more difficult than engaging in 
smaller military jihad. 
Hizbullah also extended the use of greater jihad to its participation in 
the elections.219 It used as a legitimisation the Qur’anic verse (29:69), which 
is usually employed to sanction and justify smaller military jihad, and which 
theologically falls within the domain of the controversy regarding free will 
and predestination. Hizbullah opted for free will, and broadened the man-
date of the verse: ‘God will help us if we perform greater jihad in the elec-
tions’. According to Hizbullah this is another way of the giving of blood.220 
Since 1995, both smaller military jihad and greater jihad has been super-
vised by Hizbullah’s Jihadi Council, which gave a new dynamic and prag-
matic dimension to both.
Hizbullah introduced a groundbreaking distinction between reli-
giously sanctioned (halal) and religiously prohibited (haram) jihad. It drew a 
line between jihad in the way of God, on the one hand, and vengeful piety 
i.e. when the suicide bombers regard themselves as avengers of God, on 
the other. Hizbullah exalted the former and vilified the latter. Building on 
the Qur’anic verse (4:93-4), religious injunctions, and Islamic jurisprudence, 
Hizbullah emphasized that religiously sanctioned jihad is only carried out 
when fighting in the way of God. Hizbullah affirmed that intentionally kill-
ing innocent civilians would be rewarded by hell fire. From this perspective 
Hizbullah condemned the March 11, 2004 Madrid terrorist attacks as well 
as the September 11, 2001 and the London July 7, 2005 suicide-terrorist 
attacks. Hizbullah also vehemently condemned all other terrorist attacks 
targeting innocent civilians worldwide. Since the international community 
regards all martyrdom operations as suicide actions, Hizbullah could not 
claim their support in its martyrdom operations, rather it contended itself 
with religious and strategic legitimisations as a resistance tactic against a 
superior army. Hizbullah regards martyrdom as a strategic means towards 
achieving victory, rather than an end in itself. Like the jihadi, the martyr in 
the way of God is willing to sacrifice the self and possessions.
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5 A Specific Perspective 
on the General Shifts 
in the Constituents of Hizbullah’s 
Ideology in the Three Stages
1. Introduction
The Lebanese Shi‘ite resistance movement, Hizbullah, is going 
through a remarkable political and ideological transformation. Hizbullah 
was founded in 1978 by various sectors of Lebanese Shi‘ite clergy and cad-
res, and with Iranian backing as an Islamic movement protesting against 
social and political conditions. Over the years 1984/5 to 1991, Hizbullah 
became a full-pledged social movement in the sense of having a broad over-
all organization, structure, and ideology aiming at social change and social 
justice, as it claimed. Starting in 1992, it became a mainstream political party 
working within the narrow confines of its pragmatic political program. The 
line of argument in this book is that Hizbullah has been adjusting its identity 
in the three previously mentioned stages by shifting emphasis among its 
three components: (1) from propagating an exclusivist religious ideology; 
(2) to a more encompassing political ideology; and (3) to a down-to-earth 
political program. 
In these three stages, however, Hizbullah’s identity as an Islamic jihadi 
(struggle) movement remained as one of its thawabit (immutable set of val-
ues), but the justifications of Islamic principles, in particular, jihad altered. 
The important shifts in Hizbullah’s ideology in the three stages tackle the 
following topics: wilayat al-faqih (guardianship of the jurisprudent or juris-
consult); oppressors and oppressed, with special focus on the US and Israel; 
jihad and martyrdom; Islamic state; Hizbullah’s relations with the Lebanese 
Christians; and Lebanonisation or infitah (“opening up”).
1.1 Wilayat al-Faqih
In stages one and two, Hizbullah argued that during the formation 
and early stages, it needed a unifying religio-political ideology, rather than 
an elaborate political program. So Hizbullah based itself on wilayat al-faqih 
and regarded Imam Khumayni as the jurisconsult of all the Muslims.1 In stage 
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one, Hizbullah was almost ideologically completely dependent on Khumay-
ni. In stage two the dependency witnessed some leeway in the sense that 
Hizbullah did not blindly follow Iran; rather it had some specificity, since 
in his capacity in determining the legitimacy, Khumayni highlighted cer-
tain precepts, however, he left their implementation to Hizbullah’s discre-
tion. Thus, although Hizbullah was ideologically dependent on Iran, it had 
some room to manoeuvre in its decisions pertaining to Lebanese domes-
tic issues, at least in some cases. Although the multiplicity of marja‘s and 
marja‘iyya (religious authority/ies) among the Shi‘ites continued after Imam 
Khumayni’s death; however, in Hizbullah’s case the issue of marja’iyya has 
been determined on the doctrinal-ideological basis of following the official 
marja‘ al-taqlid (authority of emulation) in Iran. Thus, Hizbullah’s religious 
authority was, is, and will always be the Iranian faqih. This made the transi-
tion after Khumayni’s death smoother in the end of the second stage and 
the third stage, especially since Khamina’i was appointed by Khumayni as 
Hizbullah’s godfather since its early beginnings. That being said, Hizbullah 
from a religious and an ideological stance used to fully abide by the ideas 
and opinions of Imam Khumayni as communicated by Khamina’i. Hizbul-
lah clarified that from the stance of religious ideology, it regarded highly 
Imam Khumayni, and after his death the same allegiance was accorded to 
Khamina’i. 
A shift occurred in the third stage when Hizbullah argued that it does 
not consider the regime in the Islamic Republic of Iran is the jurisconsult 
of all the Muslims, and in consequence, not all Islamic movements have to 
abide by the orders and directives of the faqih or the regime.2 Another shift 
occurred in stage three, when, in May 1995, Khamina’i nominated Sayyid 
Hasan Nasrallah, Hizbullah’s Secretary general, and Shaykh Muhammad Yaz-
bik, Hizbullah’s Shura Council member, as his representatives in Lebanon. 
This led to more Lebanese authenticity in line with the specificities and par-
ticularities of the Lebanese society, rather than blind adherence to Iran. Thus, 
Hizbullah moved from complete ideological dependency on Khumayni in 
the first stage, to less dependency after his death in the second stage, and 
finally in the third stage Hizbullah has had more independence in decision-
making, not only in practical political issues, but also in doctrinal issues, to 
the extent that one can purport that Hizbullah exercised almost independ-
ent decision-making, at least in some cases. For instance, in the summer of 
2005, Hizbullah secured the legitimacy to participate in the Lebanese cabi-
net, for the first time in its history, from Shaykh ‘Afif al-Nabulsi, the head of 
the Shi‘ite religious scholars of Jabal ‘Amil of south Lebanon. Thus, Hizbullah 
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heeds to Lebanese religious authority in addition to the Iranian one. There-
fore, Hizbullah’s participation in the Lebanese cabinet, which ideologically 
requires the shar‘i (religious) judgment and legitimacy of the faqih, has been 
relegated to an administrative matter that Hizbullah’s leadership is capable 
of taking a decision on, exercising independent decision-making. And so, 
Hizbullah joined the cabinet and proliferated in Lebanese state institutions 
and administrative structure at a time when the conservative Iranian presi-
dent, Mahmud Ahmadi Nejad, and his government came to power in Iran. 
Many argue that since the death of Imam Khumayni, there seems to 
be a discernable change in Hizbullah’s political relationship with Iran stress-
ing that the liberalization process in Iran might have had its toll on Hizbullah 
and have influenced its policies towards moderation.3 However, the reform-
ers in Iran do not drastically affect Hizbullah’s external and internal poli-
cies since its main relationship is with the official marja‘ and Iranian state 
institutions. That is why the shifting of the presidency from the reformist 
Khatami to the conservative non-‘alim (non-cleric)4 Mahmud Ahmadi Nejad 
does not alter Hizbullah’s relationship with Iran. Hizbullah clarified during its 
August 2005 visit to Tehran, that contrary to the common perception that 
categorizes Iran as being torn between the reformists and conservatives, 
it regards Iran as a monolithic order, rather than two competing powers. 
Indeed, the previous presentation points to a shift in Hizbullah’s relations 
with Iran, which arguably are moving towards more and more independ-
ence, autonomy in decision-making, Lebanese authenticity, and Lebanese 
particularities, specificities, and interests irrespective of the person of the 
faqih or the president.
It is worth mentioning that until now, Hizbullah’s religious ideology 
continues to play a significant role simply because it is difficult to separate 
Hizbullah from religious concerns, since it is a religiously based party. How-
ever, religion no longer constitutes the sole ideological justification and 
legitimisation of Hizbullah’s behaviour since its usage is nominally based 
upon the moral claims of Shi‘ite Islam, rather than on an uncompromising 
religious-ideological dogmatic basis, as it where in the first stage. Based on 
inside sources and my fieldwork observations, it could be fairly stated that 
the majority of Hizbullah’s cadres consider disagreements in religious and 
political opinions and viewpoints of the leaders to be a true phenomenon, 
which represents a healthy “democratic” atmosphere. However, strict obe-
dience and discipline prevents disagreements from festering into discord, 
al-Tufayli’s case being an exception.
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1.2 Oppressors and oppressed, with special focus on the US 
and Israel 
In the first two stages, Hizbullah’s use of oppressors and oppressed 
took another twist in practical terms since it regarded the political Maronites, 
Israel, France, and the US as the oppressors and all third-world countries 
as the oppressed. In stage two, Hizbullah employed in political-ideologi-
cal terms specific Islamic expressions or Qur’anic terminology against the 
West such as oppressors, oppressed, Great Satan, Little Satan5, etc. As such, 
Hizbullah legitimised the distinction between oppressors and oppressed on 
the basis of the Qur’an (34: 31-33) offering an Islamic theory of oppression. 
Grounding itself on a host of Qur’anic verses (28:5-6); (8:26); and (42:39), Hiz-
bullah argued that oppressed is a Qur’anic concept that came to prominence 
with the advent of the Islamic Revolution; as such it has nothing to do with 
Marxism or Liberation theology, which are deemed completely un-Islamic 
by Hizbullah. Fadlallah stressed that the Qur’an distinguishes between two 
groups of the oppressed: the negligent, who practice taqiyya (expedient 
dissimulation) and refuse to migrate, and the committed, who engage in 
ta‘bi’a (mobilization) to change their lot (4:97-99). Hizbullah’s political ide-
ology emphasizes the all-encompassing nature of the Qur’anic concept of 
oppression that does not discriminate between race, religion, class, gender, 
or cultural background.
This translated itself in practical political-ideological terms as a face 
off with both the East and the West, upholding only Islam (24:35). Hizbul-
lah’s reference to the Qur’anic verse on East and West gets another touch 
since its original use, as a mystical interpretation, is different from the East 
and West of the cold war. It seems that in stages one and two, Hizbullah’s 
ideology of “No East, no West, rather only Islam” resulted in a substantial fol-
lowing to Iranian foreign policy objectives6 with regard to the international 
community and the West. It is most likely that Hizbullah had adopted the 
Iranian framework of identity. However, Hizbullah replaced Persian national-
ism with Arab nationalism. In conformity with Iran’s third component of its 
identity, namely, anti-imperialism, Hizbullah’s political ideology preached 
hostility towards the United States, France, and Israel. This could be seen as 
a wider symbolic extension of the Iranian revolutionary struggle against for-
eign intervention and colonialism. Hizbullah’s ruling elite viewed its revolu-
tionary struggle in Lebanon through the political-ideological prism of anti-
imperialism, anti-colonialism, and pan-Islamism; this was reflected through 
the linkage of Hizbullah’s activity with Iran’s foreign policy within Lebanon. 
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In spite of the aforementioned, xenophobia or antipathy to the West 
is not rooted in Hizbullah’s political ideology of anti-imperialism. Rather Hiz-
bullah’s attitude to the West could be viewed from the stance of Westoxifica-
tion since Hizbullah’s anti-imperialism is directed mainly against the politi-
cal and cultural hegemony of the “Great Satan” (US) and the “Small Satan” 
(Israel). As such, Hizbullah’s political ideology conveys that its animosity is 
towards the US Administration, not the US people, while in Israel’s case Hiz-
bullah’s animosity is both towards the Israeli Administration and the Israeli 
citizens.7 In short, in stage one, Hizbullah practiced xenophobia; in stage 
two it shifted to exercise Westoxification; and in stage three less Westoxifica-
tion, mainly against the US and Israel, while at the same time opening up to 
European countries, including France and Britain, and international NGOs. 
Thus, in the third stage, both Hizbullah’s conception and percep-
tion towards the oppressed did not change since it still applied the same 
categorisation as in stages one and two. Although Hizbullah’s conception 
towards the oppressors remained the same, Hizbullah’s perception towards 
the oppressors witnessed some changes. Domestically, the Lebanese state 
and political Maronism ceased to be regarded as oppressors; on the contra-
ry, Hizbullah co-opted and cooperated with the Lebanese state and partici-
pated in the parliamentary and municipal elections, and it even joined the 
cabinet legitimising that from the stance of its shar‘i responsibility towards 
the oppressed people. Regionally and internationally, Hizbullah’s animosity 
towards France – equating it with the Great Satan and the Small Satan – was 
completely dropped, mainly due to its improved relations with Iran in the 
1990. However, Hizbullah’s enmity and ideological stance towards Israel and 
the US remained the same.
Nevertheless, an important policy shift could be noticed. Instead of 
using Trad Hamadé as a channel of communication, Hizbullah aspires for 
and wants direct contact and dialogue with the US, as proposed by Hamadé 
during his talks with the US Administration in June 2005. Nawwaf al-Musa-
wi’s meeting with Graham Fuller in March 2005 is a step in that direction. 
Hizbullah’s position presents an ideological shift towards the US. In May 
2001 Nasrallah claimed that the US Administration is doing its best to estab-
lish contact with Hizbullah. However, according to him, Hizbullah is refusing 
that from the perspective of its political-ideological stance, power politics, 
and the interest of the stronger party. He added that the stick and carrot as 
well as rationalization policies employed by the US Administration to con-
tain and curtail Hizbullah’s activities are to no avail.8
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In stages one and two Hizbullah directed its revolution against politi-
cal and social injustice and oppression, but did not offer a political program 
that constructively deals with pressuring socio-economic matters. Hizbul-
lah’s call for hakimiyya (God’s governance) lacked a socio-economic vision, 
something that would only materialise in the third stage. In the third stage, 
Hizbullah’s parliamentary, municipal, and governmental work was not at the 
expense of its welfare programs. On the contrary, boosting political work 
was concomitant with boosting social work. In its political program, Hizbul-
lah stresses its abidance by the International Bill of Human Rights as well 
as the UN Charter. Hizbullah’s assertion of cooperation with local and inter-
national voluntary welfare and development associations, including the 
UNICEF and the UNDP, presents an overhaul to Hizbullah’s earlier policies 
and stands in sharp contrast to its earlier view in the Open Letter regarding 
international organizations, which were accused of serving Western inter-
ests at the expense of the oppressed.9
1.3 Jihad and martyrdom 
Smaller and greater jihad
In the three stages, Hizbullah engaged in smaller military jihad by 
sacrificing the self and possessions as an act of defensive jihad against the 
Israeli forces occupying south Lebanon and the Biqa‘. In stages one and two, 
Hizbullah did not have the time to engage in the greater jihad of reforming 
the political system, or in participating in the municipal and parliamentary 
elections, and governmental and administrative work in order to ward off 
corruption; rather this is a trait of the third stage. In fact, in stages one and 
two, Hizbullah engaged in the greater jihad of refining and reforming the 
self through a spiritual-transcendent process that aims at building a coa-
lescent human being. Only then, can the Hizbullahis engage in smaller mili-
tary jihad. Also in these two stages Hizbullah employed greater jihad in its 
ta’tir (screening) and recruitment policies as well as its mobilization strate-
gies, through intizam (spiritual-religious indoctrination, self-discipline) and 
ta‘a (obedience) to God and the faqih. Without inculcating this method of 
Islamic mobilization in the psyche of every Hizbullah member, engagement 
in smaller military jihad and martyrdom was prohibited. In stage two, Hiz-
bullah amplified greater jihad to encompass all stages of membership in 
Hizbullah’s activity. Although in these two stages Hizbullah condemned 
the corrupt practices of the Lebanese state and its sectarian-confessional 
nature, Hizbullah did not justify its discourse by recourse to greater jihad. 
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In stage three, for the first time since its birth, Hizbullah engages 
in greater jihad, by integrating in the Lebanese public sphere through its 
infitah (“opening up”) policy. Thus, Hizbullah’s greater jihad did not remain 
confined to the theoretical (political-ideological) dimension of membership 
in the party rather transcended it to the practical political implication of 
fighting corruption in the Lebanese political and administrative system. The 
reason behind that might be that after it achieved liberation, it turned a 
large portion of its resource mobilization inward through an infitah policy 
in the domestic Lebanese public sphere. Its aim has been to prove that it is 
the largest political force in Lebanon. Thus, its transnational identity of pan-
Islamism dwindled at the expense of its integration in Lebanese domestic 
affairs.10 
It seems that Hizbullah also adapted and applied its infitah policy to 
jihad. Hizbullah specifically stated that engaging in greater jihad is hundred 
times more difficult than practicing smaller military jihad. Another ideologi-
cal shift is that Hizbullah did not conduct any martyrdom operation after the 
nearly complete Israeli withdrawal in May 2000. Thus, it is most likely that 
the meaning and application of jihad and martyrdom changed from smaller 
military jihad in the battlefield to the greater jihad in participating in inter-
nal-domestic democratic processes.
Hizbullah witnessed ideological discursive shifts after the libera-
tion. Hizbullah stated that its greater jihad and dedication to addressing 
the socio-economic plight of the Lebanese oppressed populace does not 
contradict or compromise its priority of smaller military jihad for the sake 
of liberation of occupied land. Indeed, Hizbullah’s priorities and discourse 
changed before the liberation from saliency of the resistance, to the promi-
nence of its socio-economic program after the liberation. The reason might 
be that in the context of national liberation struggle against non-Muslim 
rule, Islamic movements almost purely function in a nationalist fashion. Only 
after the attainment of the goal of national liberation do Islamic movements 
shift their attention to domestic reform issues pertaining to individual and 
social morality as well as to good governance. This has translated itself into 
Hizbullah’s intensified focus on the social-economic reconstruction of the 
liberated areas and other deprived areas as indicated in its comprehensive 
socio-economic program. 
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Suicide and martyrdom
Concerning the time frame of the martyrdom operations, it seems as if 
Hizbullah divided them evenly in the following fashion: four in the era of the 
dominance of the religious ideology; four in the period of the political ideol-
ogy; and four in the phase of the political program. In stage one, building on 
its religious ideological justifications of martyrdom, Hizbullah explicitly iden-
tified the suicide bombers as being inspired by and emulating Imam Husayn’s 
martyrdom in Karbala’. However, in all three stages, Hizbullah did not distin-
guish between dying on the battlefield with bullets, or blowing oneself up 
with explosives; both actions amount to an act of martyrdom as long as they 
are sanctioned by the religious authorities. 
In stage two, Hizbullah considered martyrdom as the key or ticket to 
Heaven but its explanations, ideological justifications, and rationalizations 
were couched more in political terms such as Hizbullah’s identification with 
pan-Arabism, pan-Islamism, anti-Zionism, anti-imperialism, in short with the 
oppressed against the oppressors, colonizers, and “rapists” of the land. And so, 
Hizbullah shifted its religious-ideological justification of jihad and martyrdom 
to a political-ideological justification.
The first stage’s prohibition on conducting martyrdom operations 
unless each operation leads to at least thirty Israeli soldiers dead, was given up 
in stages two and three. Nevertheless, martyrdom was sanctioned in all three 
stages in case Hizbullah was facing a superior military, such as the Israeli army, 
and the conventional ways of smaller military jihad proved totally ineffective. 
As such Hizbullah stressed that martyrdom is the most efficient means avail-
able for the Islamic Resistance to fight an outnumbered and well-equipped 
occupation force. 
In all three stages Hizbullah did not engage in any suicide operation 
against Israeli civilians in its 18-year struggle with the Israeli forces occupying 
south Lebanon since (1) suicide is completely prohibited in Islam, and (2) Hiz-
bullah’s religious ideology, political ideology, and political program prohibit 
targeting Israeli civilians in its war of attrition against the occupying Israeli 
forces. Rather, all its field and martyrdom operations targeted Israeli mili-
tary and intelligence personnel occupying Lebanese soil. In fact, “During the 
course of Hezbollah’s 17-year struggle with Israel along the Lebanese/Israe-
li frontier in southern Lebanon, it has never been established by any party 
directly involved (including the United Nations contingent on the ground) 
that the Party of God has perpetuated a single terrorist attack against Israeli 
civilians… Hezbollah made an early strategic decision to exclude terrorist tac-
tics from its jihad against Israeli occupation and stuck to it”.11
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It is interesting to note that in stage three, Hizbullah included a nation-
alistic justification for martyrdom operations in its political program, in addi-
tion to its earlier religious and political-ideological justification in stages one 
and two. The discursive shift in Hizbullah’s justification of martyrdom sug-
gests that it evolved from a religious-ideological justification, to a political-
ideological justification, and finally to a nationalistic-secular justification. It 
seems that the motivation for Hizbullah and secularist resistance movements 
to conduct martyrdom operations was in order to uphold the honour, pride, 
and dignity of the “nation” (‘izzat wa karamat al-umma). The common ground 
for both Islamic and nationalistic/secularist movements is the agreement that 
living under occupation is tantamount to disgrace and humiliation, as such it 
is respectively a religious and nationalistic duty to end the occupation using 
all possible means, including martyrdom operations. Thus, it is most likely 
that martyrdom operations – whether carried out by Islamic movements or 
resistance movements – are altruistic, self-sacrificial operations legitimised by 
upholding the honour and dignity of the nation.12
In stage three, on the whole, Hizbullah’s official pronouncements 
on jihad and martyrdom seem to suggest that Hizbullah also adapted and 
applied its infitah policy to jihad and martyrdom. Thus, it seems that the 
meaning and application of jihad and martyrdom changed from the battle-
field to the elections and dealing with internal-domestic issues. Hizbullah’s 
greater jihad was directed towards more integration in the Lebanese politi-
cal system and state institutions. Arguably this move is in accordance with 
Hizbullah’s resistance identity (smaller jihad) and is a basic technique of the 
party’s survival by trying to integrate its identity within the Lebanese state’s 
sovereignty, while trying to keep its regional commitments intact.
In other words, Hizbullah was founded as an Islamic jihadi Movement. 
The initial meaning of jihad since its founding denoted smaller military jihad. 
The important shift to notice after two decades is that this smaller jihad was 
transformed into greater jihad: jihad in the elections, fighting corruption, 
joining the cabinet, and in integrating in state institutions as well as the 
Lebanese public sphere at large. 
1.4 Islamic State 
In the first and second stages Hizbullah’s Islamic current considered 
that the Qur’an is the constitution of the Islamic umma, and Islam is both 
din wa dawla (a religious and a governmental order). Hizbullah enjoined 
the Muslims to strive using all legitimate means in order to implement the 
A  S P E C I F I C  P E R S P E C T I V E  O N  T H E  G E N E R A L  S H I F T S
200
‘ T H E  S H I F T S  I N  H I Z B U L L A H ' S  I D E O L O G Y ’
Islamic order, wherever they are. Hizbullah based its argument in the Leba-
nese context on demographic realities (the fact that the Muslims constitute 
the majority of the population) and proposed that Lebanon become part of 
the over-all encompassing Islamic state. Hizbullah’s cadres argued for the 
necessity of establishing an Islamic order, stressing that social change must 
begin from the top by changing the political system and annihilating the 
ruling elite through a top-down revolutionary process. 
In stages one and two, Hizbullah considered the Lebanese political 
system, which is dominated by the political Maronites, as a jahiliyya (pre-
Islamic pagan) system. The same would apply to any non-Islamic system, 
be it patriotic, democratic, or nationalist, even if it were to be governed by 
Muslims. In other words, in the first and second stages Hizbullah pursued 
the establishment of an Islamic state respectively from the perspective of a 
religious ideology and a political ideology. Religious ideology, as Hizbullah’s 
leading cadres argued, to instate God’s sovereignty and divine governance 
on earth through hakimiyya and the execution of God’s law by the establish-
ment of an Islamic order as taklif shar‘i (a religious and legal obligation). As 
a political ideology, Hizbullah did not want to impose the Islamic order by 
force; rather only if an overwhelming majority of Lebanese voted, by way 
of a referendum, in its favour. This should be taken with a grain of salt since 
Hizbullah’s rhetoric, in stages one and two, was different from what it was 
actually doing in reality, in the sense of being actively engaged in preparing 
the ground for establishing an Islamic order, at least in the areas it wielded 
power in or controlled.
In stage one, Hizbullah wanted to forcefully impose the Islamic order. 
In stage two, Hizbullah argued that it would apply the Islamic order only by 
the consent of the majority of the Lebanese, claiming that they are long-
ing for it. In the third stage, Hizbullah’s pragmatic and realistic approach 
reigned, making it concede that the majority of the Lebanese would say 
no to its Islamic order. Therefore, it not only vacated its call to establish it, 
but also totally dropped it from all of its election programs. In stage three 
Hizbullah did not blast political Maronism, rather its current political equiva-
lent: “political sectarianism”, in which both Sunnis and Shi‘ites participate. 
Hizbullah called for reforming the political system along the lines of the 
abolishment of political sectarianism, as Lebanon’s new 1990 constitution 
stipulated. Basing itself on its demographic strength, Hizbullah called for 
changing the electoral system to proportional representation. Thus, the 
shift from blasting “political Maronism” in stages one and two, to censur-
ing “political sectarianism” could be seen as a rhetorical shift, rather than 
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a genuine policy shift since its infitah policy does not warrant anymore its 
earlier criticism of political Maronism.
Hizbullah argues that it benefits from its jurisprudential vision that 
believes in the doctrine of wilayat al-faqih, which legitimises it having a 
political program in a multi-cultural, multi-religious country, which is also 
characterized by pluralist groupings and forces, without encroaching upon 
its doctrinal-ideological, Islamic-religious convictions.13 Employing this 
logic, Hizbullah reformulated what it meant by an Islamic state by making 
a categorical distinction between its al-fikr al-siyasi (political ideology) and 
its al-barnamaj al-siyasi (political program). From an ideological perspective 
Hizbullah is committed to an Islamic state, and it will not be dropped as 
a legal abstraction. However, Hizbullah’s political program has to take into 
account the political status quo and the overall functioning of the Lebanese 
political system. Hizbullah characterises the Lebanese political situation as 
a complicated mould of sectarian-confessional particularities and specifici-
ties that prohibit the establishment of an Islamic state, not only from a prac-
tical perspective, but also from a doctrinal one. Hizbullah’s political ideology 
stipulates that an Islamic state should be established on solid foundations 
having full legitimacy and sovereignty from the people. Since the general 
will of the Lebanese people is against the establishment of an Islamic state, 
then it is not plausible to establish one.14
Other Hizbullah cadres argued that founding an Islamic state in Leba-
non has been an ideological project (political ideology) rather than a politi-
cal one (political program). The Islamic state has been part of Hizbullah’s 
adabiyyat (culture), and has been debated in the domain of its political ide-
ology, but was never a part of its political program.15 Hizbullah distinguishes 
between the “ideological vision” (political ideology) and the “practical appli-
cation” (political program). Hizbullah’s ideological vision (political ideology) 
not only calls for the establishment of an Islamic state but also encourages 
others to accept it, since it leads to “man’s felicity”. Nevertheless on the prac-
tical level (political program), this needs the “proper base” that accepts the 
establishment of such an (Islamic) state; the proper base being the populace 
who have the right to choose which system should govern them.16
In short, Hizbullah stressed that its religious and political ideological-
ly defends the establishment of an Islamic state, but as a political program 
it is not practical because of confessionalism and sectarianism and because 
of opposition from the majority of the Lebanese, both Christians and Mus-
lims. In other words, Hizbullah put its political ideology in the drawer and 
practiced a down-to-earth pragmatic political program. Thus, in conformity 
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with its political program, Hizbullah moved from Islamiziation in the narrow 
sense of establishing an Islamic state to Lebanonisation and infitah policy. 
Although in the third stage Hizbullah has vacated its call for the implan-
tation of the Islamic state in Lebanon from all its election programs and 
political declarations, a discrepancy could be noticed between Hizbullah’s 
political program and the discourse of its leaders. Hizbullah’s public dis-
course reiterated its earlier position of no imposition of the Islamic state by 
force and its implementation only if the majority of the Lebanese Christians 
and Muslims consent to it. Hizbullah shifted its position by its acceptance 
and engagement in the democratic process under a sectarian-confessional 
political and administrative system. More dramatically, Hizbullah’s political 
program modified its demand from the abolishment of political sectari-
anism, to adopting the political Maronite discourse of the abolishment of 
political sectarianism in the mentality, before abolishing it in the texts. It 
seems Hizballah is moving ever closer to being a full participant in “nor-
mal” Lebanese politics – with the limitations that implies – merging into the 
Lebanese sectarian-confessional, corrupt political system that it abhorred in 
stages one and two.
1.5 Hizbullah’s relations with the Lebanese Christians 
In stages one and two Hizbullah vehemently opposed to being ruled 
by the “crusader” Christians. As such, Hizbullah considered it a religious 
injunction to bar the Christians from participating in the Islamic order by 
precluding them from any political freedom. Rather, as dhimmis (“people 
of the Book”), only their social and religious freedom was upheld. In stage 
three, the Christians were no longer regarded as dhimmis, rather partners in 
government, which represents a complete overhaul of Hizbullah’s views and 
of its total rejection of being ruled by Christians in the previous two stages.
In the third stage, Hizbullah’s discourse signified a shift from blam-
ing its misfortunes on the conspiracy theory to its dialogue with and infi-
tah to the Christians along the lines of the Papal Guidance, vacating its 
earlier exhortation to convert them to Islam. Contrary to its earlier policy 
of excluding Christians with blatant connections with Israel from dialogue 
(i.e. the political Maronites and the Phalangists), Hizbullah affirmed that it 
did not in principle have a problem with the Christians; rather its problem 
was with those who acted to promote Israel’s policies in Lebanon. How-
ever, Hizbullah has embarked on conducting dialogue with them on the 
basis of transparency in order to reach common grounds (3:64) without 
encroaching upon the specificity of every sect or community. In fact, Hiz-
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bullah broadened the horizon of its dialogue with the Christians to include 
almost the entire grouping that comprise the Lebanese myriad. Hizbullah 
stressed that political dialogue also includes socio-economic and civil soci-
ety issues. Therefore in stage three, Hizbullah tried to portray itself as a big 
Muslim-Christian co-existence promoter. As has been the common practice 
since 1992, Hizbullah included Christians, including Maronites, in its parlia-
mentary elections lists. Hizbullah also shared municipal council seats with 
the Christians. 
1.6 Lebanonisation or infitah
In the first two stages Hizbullah viewed it as its mission to liberate 
Lebanon from the shackles of political Maronism and the Lebanese sectar-
ian-confessional political system that is based upon positive (man-made) 
laws and legislations (al-qawanin al-wad‘iyya) such as state constitutions, 
and establish instead the shari‘a (Islamic law and legislation), which could 
only be instated by hakimiyya through a pure and uncompromising Islamic 
order, system, or mode of government, be it an Islamic government, state, 
or republic. Hizbullah argued that abiding by al-qawanin al-wad‘iyya instead 
of Islamic shari‘a is entirely prohibited both from a religious and political 
ideological perspective. The major shift in the third stage is that Hizbullah 
became satisfied with al-qawanin al-wad‘iyya and even contributed to their 
legislation through its MPs in the parliament. Hizbullah argued that the 
shari‘a, as a socially constructed phenomenon, is flexible and can account 
for all the complicities of modern life.
The shift that happened in the third stage could be attributed to the 
transformation of Iranian politics after the death of Imam Khumayni as well 
as to a change in Hizbullah’s own internal dynamics. For instance, there was 
a clear alteration in the Iranian stance from Imam Khumayni’s 1986 fatwa 
(religious edict) – which stipulated that the Lebanese system is illegitimate 
and criminal and Khamina’i’s argument for the necessity of the Muslims 
to rule Lebanon since they comprise the majority of the population17 – to 
Khamina’i’s 1992 ruling in favour of participation in the parliamentary elec-
tions, which Hizbullah interpreted as its unequivocal right to proliferate in 
the Lebanese political system as a whole, including state institutions and 
administration. Another ideological shift in the third stage is that Hizbul-
lah put its political ideology in the drawer making compromises on doctri-
nal issues by allying itself, on the same election slate, with former foes and 
engaging in negotiations and bargaining with a wide spectrum of groups 
across the Lebanese myriad.
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In the third stage, Hizbullah faced the problematic of reconciling its 
political ideology with reality, Hizbullah shifted from a jihadi perspective to 
a flexible shari‘a perspective. So Hizbullah portrayed a distinguished flex-
ibility in its political program in an attempt to reconcile, as much as possible, 
among its principles, aims, and political ideology, on the one hand, and the 
circumstances and its objective capabilities, on the other hand, by heavy 
reliance on the jurisprudential concepts of necessity, vices, and interests as 
a kind of Islamic prima facie duty. This is how Hizbullah’s pragmatism was 
conducive in forging a marriage of convenience between political ideology 
and reality to the extent that Hizbullah was willing to place its political ideol-
ogy on the shelf and pursue a policy of infitah as sanctioned by its political 
program. Thus, the logic of operating with the bounds of the Lebanese state 
prevailed over the logic of the revolution. Hizbullah justifies and legitimises 
its political program and pragmatism by resorting to Qur’anic and jurispru-
dential bases. In fact, Shi‘ite religio-political heritage conferred upon Hiz-
bullah all the authenticity it needed in order to derive from it a political 
program based on flexibility and pragmatism.
Although Hizbullah is still primarily an Islamic movement, it displays, 
more and more, the characteristics of a nationalist-patriotic political party 
pursuing al-waqi‘iyya al-siyasiyya (realpolitik), when and if this is required by 
the circumstances. Like any political party, Hizbullah has an overall grasp of 
the political system, acting, more or less, rationally and weighing the advan-
tages (interests) and disadvantages (vices) of every decision and action it 
embarks upon. In order to keep its Islamic identity intact while functioning 
within the domain of Lebanese state sovereignty, Hizbullah conferred a de 
facto recognition of Lebanese state, but not a de jure one. In other words, 
Hizbullah’s adherence to democratic principles and politics is not based on 
political-ideological grounds since its political ideology anathematised the 
Lebanese political system, rather on advancing al-masalih (interests) and 
warding off al-mafasid (vices). Hizbullah does legitimise its participation in 
the democratic process on the basis of the flexibility of the shari‘a and its 
jurisprudential stipulations as well as Qur’anic concepts of shura (consulta-
tion), ikhtilaf (pluralism), al-huquq al-shar‘iyya (human or ‘legal’ rights), and 
ijtihad (independent reasoning). 
Although most of the maxims Hizbullah mentions are given in the 
classical books of jurisprudence, and even though Hizbullah’s arguments 
are quite familiar and echo the Islamists justifications for participation in 
secular politics with an Islamist objective, one can notice two main shifts. 
First, these principles are now applied to politics, and politics becomes now 
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state centred with lawmaking as its own activity. Historically, the state or the 
Imam were conceived more as a person, rather than an institution. Sunnis 
and Shi‘as alike mistrusted the ruling Imams. The Sunnis hesitated to allow 
the Imam the right to legislate. The Shi‘as differentiated between the true 
Imam and the ruler. Now both realise the significance and necessity of the 
state and its legislative role. It is admirable how this shift is made, quite con-
vincingly, by semantics and hermeneutics between the classical concepts 
and terms with modern meaning. Second, it seems that the role of al-waliyy 
al-faqih or Khamina’i is absent in this regard. Hizbullah took the decision and 
legitimatised its participation in democratic processes by recourse to juris-
prudential maxims and principles made by legislators such as Muhammad 
Ra‘d, common Muslims such as Bilal N‘im, and leaders of Muslim opinion such 
as Shaykh ‘Afif al-Nabulsi. Even though the notion of maslaha (interest) has 
a negative connotation in Middle Eastern societies on a popular level, the 
same notion has gained a positive reception by religio-political ideologies, 
especially that one advocated by Imam Khumayni. Khumayni stipulated that 
the maslaha of the Islamic state or its agencies gains priority over any other 
principle in the social and political affairs. With Hizbullah’s “modern” usage, 
maslaha has not only gained a positive sense, but is also regarded as a core 
Islamic political concept.




 Conclusion and Implications 
Hizbullah did not start from scratch, but its evolution was always a 
sequence of gradual stages of development, in relation to what directly 
preceded it. In fact, many foundations of Hizbullah’s thought, doctrines, 
and policies – especially its infitah (“opening up”) policy – were already laid 
down by Imam Musa al-Sadr and the 1969 program of the Islamic Shi‘ite 
Higher Council. No wonder Musa al-Sadr is considered as one of Hizbullah’s 
ideologues.
Musa al-Sadr, a charismatic, veteran, and distinguished leader, mobi-
lized the Lebanese Shi‘a in the 1960s and 1970s and was able to channel 
their grievances into political participation.1 Although al-Sadr built on Shi‘ite 
popular heritage and religious history, he perceived his mission in Lebanon 
predominately in secular and integrative terms through a search of the iden-
tity of the Shi‘ites and their mobilization for political, social, and economic 
advancement.2 Thus, building on his religious knowledge and charisma, al-
Sadr was a pioneering figure in modern Lebanese history to promote religion 
as an idiom of opposition.3 Al-Sadr never called for an Islamic state, rather 
for equality and social justice among the various denominations within the 
Lebanese multi-confessional system. Out of these circumstances Hizbullah 
emerged and formulated its religious ideology. 
In 1978 Israel launched its first invasion of Lebanon; in the same year, 
Imam al-Sadr disappeared in Libya in mysterious circumstances. A year later, 
in 1979, Imam Khumayni announced the victory of the Islamic Revolution 
and the creation of the Islamic Republic in Iran. These catalysts were aggra-
vated by the second Israeli invasion of 1982, which resulted in the occupa-
tion of one-third of Lebanon, including Beirut. The 1982 Israeli invasion, with 
all of its appalling multi-sided consequences to the Lebanese populace and 
different ramifications, has acted as a direct accelerator for the emergence 
of Hizbullah, a new resistance movement – having a religious background, 
with Islam serving as the backbone of its ideology and principles – against 
the occupation. Many already existing Islamist Shi‘ite groups, as well as 
independent active Islamist figures and clerics joined ranks and established 
Hizbullah as an Islamic jihadi movement. These groups came together in 
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fighting the Israeli occupation and built the backbone of the party, most 
importantly its “resistance identity”. 
With the unprecedented accomplishments they achieved in directing 
several blows to the Israelis, these groups gained a wide reputation in their 
constituencies and garnered an unshakable credibility as a party renowned 
for fighting Israel and what was seen as aggression against the Lebanese. 
Their later achievements in addressing the socio-economic grievances, 
resulting from the Israeli aggression, gained the party a solid ground among 
the grassroots. This prompted its leadership in 1985 to found its political 
constitution, manifesto, or “Open Letter”, in which it declared its political 
ideology, thus engaging directly in Lebanese political life after operating 
clandestinely for some years. 
From 1985 to 1990, Hizbullah emerged as a strong internal organi-
zation with limited following. Al-Tufayli’s firm, uncompromising political 
discourse and his repeated references to the establishment of an Islamic 
state in Lebanon, which is unprecedented in Lebanese political discourse, 
backfired domestically alienating the party from other political and social 
movements, and from the Lebanese public sphere to a great extent. Thus, 
Hizbullah’s policies were counterproductive, leading to the failure of inte-
gration in Lebanese political life, especially after Hizbullah’s vehement criti-
cisms against the Ta‘if Agreement, Lebanon’s new constitution. 
Since the end of the Civil War in 1990, Hizbullah has been confronting 
major developments in Lebanon: prominently, the emergence of a pluralist 
public sphere and increasing openness toward other communities, politi-
cal parties, and interest groups in the Lebanese myriad. This resulted in a 
change in Hizbullah’s discourse and priorities. The mixed confessional space 
in Lebanon led Hizbullah to move from marginalisation to infitah, by which 
the party became a major player in the Lebanese public sphere, thus alter-
ing its stance and changing the political rules from Islamisation to Leban-
onisation by propagating a down-to-earth political program. Thus, since the 
1990s, Hizbullah gradually evolved into a mainstream political party having 
an extensive network of social services (accorded to Muslims as well as to 
Christians), and participated in parliamentary, municipal, and governmental 
work. 
Some changes that took place in the Lebanese system illustrate the 
growing importance of Hizbullah in the Lebanese political arena. Hizbullah’s 
integration in the Lebanese public sphere through electoral politics shel-
tered it with additional political legitimacy and a wider following. Hizbullah 
seems to have realized from the Iranian experience, as well as from the inter-
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nal dynamics of the Lebanese milieu, that electoral politics (parliamentary 
elections, especially municipal ones) is the cornerstone of democratic prac-
tice. Thus, Hizbullah’s participation in the elections could be considered as a 
pivotal event in shaping its current identity. 
In summary, in its successive political programs from 1992 to 2005, 
and in addition to calls for upholding resistance and liberation as well as 
enhancement of the Lebanese state’s foreign policy, Hizbullah stressed 
the following: (1) the establishment of civil peace; (2) the founding of the 
state of law and institutions; (3) the promotion of political participation; (4) 
political, administrative, social, and economic reforms; (5) upholding ‘pub-
lic freedoms’; (6) infitah and dialogue among all the Lebanese; (7) address-
ing demands dealing with health, educational, environmental, and cultur-
al issues; (8) and the achievement of social justice through the following 
measures: (a) dealing with the serious and pressuring socio-economic and 
financial crisis by finding the proper balance between material resources 
and human resources; (b) attaining and realizing socio-economic develop-
ment by developmental projects targeting the deprived and dispossessed 
areas in order to reach balanced development; (c) defending and protecting 
the “downtrodden” and oppressed grassroots.
Islamist identity and state sovereignty
Equating Hizbullah’s political ideology with its political program leads 
to a quandary in the understanding of Hizbullah’s role as a political party in 
the third stage. What adds to the confusion is that Hizbullah states in its 
Open Letter, “we in Lebanon are neither a closed organisational party nor a 
narrow political framework. Rather, we are an umma tied to the Muslims in 
every part of the world by a strong ideological-doctrinal, and political bond, 
namely, Islam”. This seems to imply that Hizbullah abides by Imam Khumay-
ni’s theory that considers political parties in the Islamic context as a Western 
phenomenon.4 Thus, in its political ideology, Hizbullah clearly states that it 
is not a political party, yet it developed a political program and participated 
in the national elections. Based on this, one needs to consider the time and 
the causes for this change.
The aura and stereotyped notion of Hizbullah’s advocacy of an Islamic 
state seems to hamper or, at least, downplay, Hizbullah’s political program 
of infitah or integration in the Lebanese public sphere. In other words, the 
claim of an Islamic state seems to boost Hizbullah’s religious credentials at 
the expense of its political credentials. It has been demonstrated that, in 
stages one and two, Hizbullah pursued the establishment of an Islamic state 
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both from a political ideology and a political program perspective through 
a top-down process. However, as has been already clarified in stage three, 
Hizbullah’s Islamic state remained a political ideology, rather than a political 
program. 
Since the early 1990s Hizbullah started promoting its Islamic iden-
tity and agenda by following a pragmatic political program, mainly to lull 
Christians and other Muslims who were opposed to the Islamic state. In the 
meantime, Hizbullah remained faithful to its Shi‘ite constituency by employ-
ing a bottom up Islamisation process through working within the Lebanese 
state’s political and administrative structures, while, at the same time estab-
lishing Islamic institutions within the civil society. 
Shift in Syrian-Lebanese relations: Hizbullah’s benefits after 
the Syrian withdrawal
A major shift is the relations between Lebanon and Syria occurred 
after Hariri’s assassination, which gradually led to the waning of Syrian influ-
ence in Lebanon. This calls into question the degree to which the Lebanese 
government is practicing its right in taking domestic, regional, and interna-
tional decisions, especially in the wake of UN Resolution 1559. It also poses 
questions on the overall strategy in Lebanon’s foreign policy. In spite of that, 
there has not been a significant change in Hizbullah’s political relationship 
with Syria before and after the Syrian withdrawal in April 2005. Nevertheless, 
Hizbullah’s leaders and cadres concede that the Syrian withdrawal hastened 
its joining the cabinet and proliferation in the Lebanese public life and state 
institutions. 
Hizbullah’s political victories in 2005 – its winning of 14 seats in the 
parliament and fielding two ministers in the cabinet – portrayed more the 
patriotic-nationalistic character of this mainstream political party that is 
not only supported by its major Shi‘ite constituency, but also by many Sun-
nis, Druz, and Christians.5 Based on its demographic strength and massive 
following, Hizbullah aimed to portray itself as the biggest political force in 
Lebanon. 
Although two ministers cannot veto the cabinet’s decisions, it seems 
that Hizbullah gave up its older argument of refusing to be represented in 
the cabinet because it rejected to hold responsibility for any dire decisions 
or unfavourable actions adopted by a 2/3-majority vote by the cabinet. Pre-
viously, Hizbullah argued that its prospective representatives in the cabi-
net could do nothing to alter these decisions. However, in the parliament 
and in municipality councils, Hizbullah’s members can voice their opinion 
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freely and act in favour of the masses or the social base that they represent. 
Those municipal councils, which are controlled by Hizbullah, act as advo-
cacy groups, employing a kind of empowerment mechanism, in order to 
lobby the government to pursue a course of balanced development as well 
as to live up to its promises and perform its developmental projects. Hizbul-
lah’s enrolment in the cabinet calls into question the extent to which the 
party is willing to be co-opted into the Lebanese political system and its 
state institutions.
Hizbullah is reputed in public to keeping its promises. This explains 
way people overwhelmingly voted for the party after it has proven its deter-
mination in aiding them, and not only spreading verbal promises. The con-
dition of some other parties was the opposite due to their poor munici-
pal performance that was based on impromptu work. One can argue that 
the municipal councils, which are controlled by Hizbullah, act as advocacy 
groups, employing a kind of empowerment mechanism, in order to lobby 
the government to pursue a course of balanced development as well as to 
live up to its promises and perform its developmental projects. In general, 
the results of the elections are indicative of the likelihood of Hizbullah’s suc-
cessful resource mobilization that showered it with mass appeal, particu-
larly at the local grassroots level, and made it a major player in the Lebanese 
public sphere, thus substantiating and consolidating its claims of being 
a Lebanese patriotic-nationalistic political party. This implies that Hizbul-
lah has accommodated its position in such a way as to demonstrate its full 
acceptance of the Lebanese political system and its techniques, but with a 
reservation when it comes to the doctrinal principles dealing with religion 
and its identity of resistance towards Israel.
Although parliamentary and municipal elections are not always con-
sidered as a true measure of democracy (being a necessary rather than a 
sufficient condition), the municipal elections could be, to a certain extent an 
indicator of democracy because they reflect the grassroots’ voice. Unlike the 
parliamentary elections law, the municipal elections law is not drawn along 
sectarian lines, which leaves a large room for the grass roots to voice their 
opinion in the ballot and make their subaltern voices heard. Thus, municipal 
elections reflect, more the less, Hizbullah’s real support base in society. The 
municipal elections dwell on developmental issues par excellence seeking 
balanced development among the different constituencies and districts, 
thus giving Hizbullah the chance to reap more legitimacy for its socio-
economic work. The 2004 municipal elections and the 2005 parliamentary 
elections conveyed Hizbullah’s ability to employ its resource mobilization 
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in order to boost its support base domestically, regionally, and internation-
ally. Domestically, voter’s turnout was remarkably high in Hizbullah’s main 
constituencies and strongholds in comparison to other constituencies.6 
Regionally and internationally, Hizbullah gave a strong message to its foes 
– especially Israel, the US, and France – through its strong show-out in the 
elections and through the massive following it enjoys.
The new role of Hizbullah’s religious legitimisation
Even though Hizbullah seems categorically against secularism as 
such7, it is forced, due to changing circumstances, to approach some secu-
lar aspects of society and politics, but without adopting secularisation as 
an objective or strategy. It is interesting to note that, although Hizbullah 
participated in the parliamentary elections that follow western models, it 
could not distance the religious element from what is supposed to be free 
and democratic elections. The fact that Hizbullah used the notion of taklif 
shar‘i (religio-legal obligation) in directing the votes of its voters, deprived 
Hizbullah’s involvement in the electoral system from true democracy. In 
this way, for devout believers, elections became an act of obedience to reli-
gious authorities, rather than an expression of free political will. However, it 
should be noted here that Hizbullah’s use of religious influence on its public, 
is not necessary for religious ends in all cases. In the last parliamentary elec-
tions, the taklif shar‘i method8 was used by Hizbullah in support of its Druz 
and Christian political allies against its political opponent Michel ‘Aun who 
endorses the 1559 UN resolution.
Hizbullah is referring more to the problems of society from a civil per-
spective stressing issues such as democracy, human rights, the rule of law, 
accountability, transparency, meritocracy, weeding off corruption, stamp-
ing out favouritism and nepotism, finding a conducive solution to the socio-
economic problems, etc. These are not only the demands of the poor grass-
roots, but also the liberals, the secular middle class, educated profession-
als, technocrats, etc. Hizbullah is employing a pragmatic-liberal approach 
simply because the running of a modern state is a natural process of civil 
development. It seems that Hizbullah has been forced to abandon a lot of its 
religious ideological dogma and discourse in order to enlarge its constitu-
ency and engage in more inclusive-pluralist discourse, and thus including 
Christians and Sunnis in its electoral lists. Most likely Hizbullah has been 
forced by political experience to put less emphasis on moral and religious 
issues and discourse, and as a matter of political expediency to concentrate 
on worldly affairs that concern the general public. Through this process of 
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disenchantment Hizbullah has been able to create a balance between its 
Islamic identity and nationalist-patriotic dimension. This is why Hizbullah 
was not only able to retain its voting base, put also expand it since vot-
ers judge how convincingly its performance is by assessing if it delivers its 
promises and services or not. In this case, moralizing-religious discourse is 
not enough to attract voters if it does not have practical implications. How-
ever, Hizbullah kept this moral-religious discourse as an umbrella, but not as 
a religiously dogmatic prescription, which excludes participation in an open 
system. In spite of the aforementioned, it seems that the changes that are 
occurring within Hizbullah has made some scholars to go as far as saying 
that Hizbullah has been “secularised by the process of politicisation”.9 This, 
of course, is debatable if all the factors that have been mentioned earlier are 
taken into consideration. 
This analysis falls in line with the earlier argument in the preface, which 
says that a social movement must, in order to mobilize resources, appeal to a 
broad constituency. In other words, Hizbullah must focus on things that a lot 
of people are concerned about. This might explain why Hizbullah’s political 
program dropped the notion of Islamic state and concentrated on address-
ing broad problems and concerns that are deeply embedded in society and 
that worry the majority of the voters irrespective of their denomination or 
political orientation. It is most likely that Hizbullah was able, by this move, to 
reap more political and socio-economic legitimacy, not only from its major 
constituencies, but also from other consistencies as well. This proves that 
Hizbullah is not detached from the concerns that occupy the general public 
in Lebanon. 
The so-called “secularisation” trend has even caused some shifts in 
Hizbullah’s thawabit (immutable set of values), the only constants have been: 
Hizbullah as an Islamic jihadi movement and safeguarding the Resistance. 
Some of the earlier thawabit in stages one and two that shifted in stage three 
are the following: (1) From anathematising the Lebanese state and regard-
ing the regime as an infidel, to upholding the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Lebanon, which bears a striking resemblance to the Lebanese 
Forces’ slogan of the 10, 425 square kilometre Lebanon. (2) From censuring 
the Ta‘if Agreement to safeguarding it. (3) From calling for the establishment 
of an Islamic state to working within the narrow confines of the Lebanese 
sectarian-confessional political and administrative system, etc.
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Hizbullah’s future
Hizbullah made it clear, as early as 2002, that its Resistance identity 
is a strategic choice, rather than a means for the liberation of a few meters 
of land.10 Hizbullah declares that it would remain on guard and would not 
allow Israel to enforce its hegemony on the Middle East as it pleases. Hiz-
bullah stresses that it did not come into being just to perform for a short 
while, or to execute a specific project, or to be a tool of policy to regional or 
international actors; rather, it originated from an immutable belief in God, 
Almighty, and from the stance of its taklif, which made it incumbent upon 
it to pursue its continuous jihadi mission of reforming this world till the 
end of time. As such, Hizbullah would remain “as long as heaven and earth 
exist”11, according to a chief leader in the party. Such statements are often 
considered as rhetoric or propagandist statements. However, it can reflect 
the mentality that directs the decisions made by Hizbullah, which can be 
categorised as extremist, aiming at political gains.
Another Hizbullah cadre tries to highlight the humanistic dimension 
of Hizbullah’s future. Basing himself on Hizbullah’s NGOs and welfare institu-
tions, he argues that the party has a strong social base and is investing its 
legitimacy for the establishment of social justice. According to him, although 
Hizbullah is a logical-rationalistic party, this does not mean that it does not 
have a project, which longs to cross the limitations of its natural boundaries. 
He claims that Hizbullah carries on its shoulders the message of organising 
society in such a way as to safeguard the humanism of the individual in all 
respects. He clarified that Hizbullah’s ideology is being constructed within 
the thawabit, while at the same time observing progress and development. 
According to him, Hizbullah was not only founded to fight Israel nor is it 
an introvert party; its infitah policy is a witness to the contrary. He seems 
to complement the earlier analysis by stressing that even if the struggle 
against Israel were put to a halt, Hizbullah would direct its resource mobili-
zation from the regional dimension towards the domestic dimension12. 
Although al-Aqsa Intifada provided Hizbullah with the opportunity 
to market its model of resistance abroad, Nasrallah employed his cautious 
approach: “If we were allowed to head to Palestine [Israel], then we would do 
it. However, if our going [to Israel] leads to problems, then simply we would 
not go”.13 Nasrallah clarified that Hizbullah’s banner of liberating Jerusalem 
and Palestine does not mean that the party wants to ignite a war in the 
Middle East. Rather, he stresses that the Palestinian populace is capable of 
liberating its own land with the support of Hizbullah, the populace of the 
Middle East, and the free world. Nasrallah adds, “We do not need a regional 
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war to regain occupied land; we just need to liberate Lebanese occupied 
land [Shib‘a Farms] and free our remaining prisoners of war… If this could be 
accomplished by recourse to the international community and international 
relations, then we welcome that”.14 
For the first time, Nasrallah spelled out clearly that after Israel with-
draws from the Shib‘a Farms, Hizbullah is ready to put down its arms after 
receiving assurances and guarantees, from the international community 
and leading world powers, that Israel would not “aggress” against Lebanon 
again.15 Although this development is too recent to warrant sufficient com-
mentary and analysis, it seems to be a rhetorical shift rather than a real policy 
shift since no one in the international community can forcefully give these 
assurances and guarantees. Further, Hizbullah does not seem to be satisfied 
with these assurances. One can notice that Nasrallah’s reasoning runs totally 
against Hizbullah’s theory of “calculated ambiguity”. It seems that after the 
Israeli withdrawal, Nasrallah undermined the taboo of the “if theory”. This 
change led to stay away from pre-anticipation in order to keep Israel in the 
dark as far as Hizbullah’s plans.16 Thus, Hizbullah has frozen its political ideol-
ogy of the liberation of Jerusalem and is currently pursuing a realistic politi-
cal program that gives primacy to Lebanese domestic affairs. 
It has been demonstrated that Hizbullah’s resistance identity is there 
to stay. One could argue that, in this context, resistance identity corresponds 
to Hizbullah’s “model of resistance”. Thus, Hizbullah’s role does not end with 
the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict; the party would remain an active social 
movement and a mainstream political party after that. Bearing this in mind, 
it seems that Hizbullah’s infitah policy is gradually transforming the party 
into a viable mainstream political party with the following traits: 
1. Hizbullah’s progressive views on the Islamic state and its dialogue, 
not only with the Christians, but also with all the Lebanese confes-
sions, resulted in multi-confessional parliamentary and municipal 
representation aimed at fostering pluralism and national unity. 
2. Its pragmatic political program: the flexibility of its jurisprudential 
stipulations and shari‘a, which justify participation in secular politics 
with an Islamic objective based upon maslaha (interest) as a core 
Islamic political concept. Through the power of its religious identi-
ty, Hizbullah was able to shift from the restrictive politics of a nar-
row exclusive identity (wilayat al-faqih) to the more encompassing 
identity based upon the mobilization of its intellectual and cultural 
resources. This new jurisprudence leads to dramatic transformations 
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that translate themselves into an Islamic identity that function within 
Lebanese state sovereignty.
3. Hizbullah’s holistic vision materialised in substantial financial resourc-
es that granted it the ability to found a comprehensive socio-economic 
program; wide-ranging civil institutions and NGOs, including its think 
tank CCSD; far-reaching al-Manar17 satellite TV, which remains a prec-
edent in the Middle East among Islamic movements; and al-Nour sat-
ellite radio station.18 Indeed, since Khamina’i appointed Nasrallah and 
Yazbik as his religious deputies in 1995, the huge financial resources 
of the khums (one-fifth religious tax), zakat (alms giving), and shar‘i 
(religious) donations – from the Lebanese Shi‘ite diaspora who follow 
Khamina’i – poured directly to Hizbullah, instead of being channelled 
through him, as was the case before the appointment.
4. Throughout its history, Hizbullah’s identity has been permanently 
under construction, both concretely and on a symbolic level.19 This 
is substantiated by the continuously revised and updated versions of 
its self-descriptions and political programs since the propagation of 
its Open Letter.20 This last point illustrates Hizbullah’s employment of 
resource mobilization beyond the survival strategy level, aiming at 
continuous development and progress in a dynamic world that is in 
constant flux.
Hizbullah seems to be accommodating its identity within the thawa-
bit in order to accompany progress and development, thus constructively 
working within its humanistic agenda, which allows it to legitimise itself 
through accumulation and transformation of its socio-economic legitimacy 
into a political legitimacy and vice versa. It is most likely that after every 
parliamentary or municipal election, Hizbullah earns more and more politi-
cal legitimacy and it spends it by investing it more and more into socio-
economic legitimacy in line with its “civilizational mission” of accomplishing 
social justice. Nevertheless, Hizbullah’s infitah policy is not only confined to 
its Lebanese domestic and regional sphere but it is also employing some of 
its resource mobilization to openness and to seriously conduct a construc-
tive dialogue with the EU, in particular, and the West, in general. The follow-
ing meetings seem to suggest this trend: meetings between Hizbullah cad-
res, on the one hand, and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the German Orient 
Institute, University of Birmingham21, the International Crisis Group, the UK 
government22, and numerous Western NGOs, on the other hand, as well as 
the meeting between Nasrallah and Patrique Renault, the EU ambassador,23 
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and meetings with the members of the US Administration such as Dibble’s 
watershed gathering with Trad Hamadé, and Graham Fuller’s groundbreak-
ing meeting with Nawwaf al-Musawi. Therefore, the indicators of Hizbullah’s 
infitah are not only domestic and regional, but also international, in the 
sense of Hizbullah’s gradual opening up to the West. 
Final word
It has been argued that the causes behind the shifts in Hizbullah’s 
ideology are due to the alterations in the local Lebanese domestic dimen-
sion, as well as the regional and international dimensions. Hizbullah’s own 
internal dynamic changed, Iranian politics shifted, and the international 
situation has been transformed. 
Hizbullah relies on the balance between the actual and the possible, 
altering its stance from rejectionism and opposition (religious and political 
ideology strategies) to accommodation and conformity (political program 
policies). Hizbullah modified its position from branding the Lebanese state 
with unrighteousness and infidelity, thus shunning the public sphere, to 
Lebanonisation and integration in the public sphere, participating actively 
in the political system through contestation, cooptation, and empower-
ment. Usually, this makes it shift its strategies from hawkish (religious and 
political ideology discourse) to dovish policies (political program discourse) 
according to altering political circumstances. While keeping its doctrinal 
principles in sight, Hizbullah is persistent in honouring its overall politi-
cal program. Thus, from time to time and as opportunities arise, Hizbullah 
might put aside, temporarily, its ideological program by leading a dynamic 
program without specifying a rigid political program. Hizbullah favours the 
incremental model of decision-making and employs piecemeal social engi-
neering that requires a thorough discussion, by the Hizbullah leadership, 
of each issue at a time. Although it seems that Hizbullah does not have a 
ready-made formula to deal with all problems and possibilities that might 
arise, Hizbullah’s Shura Council makes readily available answers to all ques-
tions. However, since its enemies, especially Israel, might benefit from this 
information, Hizbullah reserves the right of not disclosing these alternatives 
and contingency measures to the public. 
Although Hizbullah dwells on its religious legitimacy, its political pro-
gram deals realistically with the particularities of the Lebanese public sphere. 
Indeed, Hizbullah’s taklif is not confined only to religious legitimacy; rather 
it transcends it to deal, not only with all local Lebanese domestic socio-eco-
nomic and political concerns, but also foreign issues such as continuing the 
E P I L O G U E
218
‘ T H E  S H I F T S  I N  H I Z B U L L A H ' S  I D E O L O G Y ’
resistance till the evacuation of the last Israeli soldier from the Shib‘a Farms. 
However, after the Israeli withdrawal in May 2000, Hizbullah knows that the 
legitimacy it derives from its Resistance and military operations in Shib‘a is 
marginal and minimal, while it realizes that the part and parcel of its legiti-
macy is based on a balance between both its socio-economic and political 
work. In spite of the fact that Hizbullah’s NGOs are flourishing, Hizbullah is 
still pressuring the government to pursue a course of balanced develop-
ment in order to alleviate the “relative deprivation” that its main constituen-
cies are suffering from. It seems that the integration of Islamic movements 
into the political process is not only plausible, but is also the best alternative 
that serves their overall interests.
Regarding Hizbullah’s future in Lebanon as a viable Lebanese nation-
alistic political party, one should be cautious not to read too much into the 
results of the municipal and parliamentary elections as well as its joining 
the cabinet. It is interesting to note, here, that since the cabinet reflects the 
power balances in the parliament, it is obvious that any dismay by the parlia-
ment will always be extended to the cabinet and vice versa. However, Hiz-
bullah’s infusion into the Lebanese public sphere suggests that the party has 
been able to win the “hearts and minds” of many Lebanese voters, especially 
in its major Shi‘ite constituencies, thus confirming the efficiency of its infitah 
policy in the Lebanese public sphere by agreeing to participate in a sec-
tarian-confessional political process, while earning a reputation of probity, 
transparency, accountability, and integrity in its political and socio-econom-
ic work. Through its civil institutions and NGOs, Hizbullah has triumphantly 
portrayed itself as a Lebanese nationalist political party working in favour of 
the “wretched of the earth”, the relatively deprived, irrespective of their com-
munal identity, political affiliation, or sectarian-confessional belonging. 
Rafiq Hariri’s assassination along with the Syrian withdrawal and its 
aftermath played a major role in accelerating the political changes within 
Hizbullah. Thus, being disarmed and becoming an “ordinary” political party, 
would not cause its demise; rather, it would boost its domestic role, causing 
it to democratise and liberalise more in order to enhance its stance as one 
of the key players in the Lebanese milieu. Nevertheless, Hizbullah could not 
have faired so well in Lebanese domestic affairs without its two regional 
backers, Syria and Iran. 
Hizbullah’s political program sanctioned its infitah while, at the same 
time, stressed consolidating its regional and transnational ties with Syria 
and Iran. Despite the withdrawal of their supposed Syrian patron, Hizbullah 
remains a strong political actor with the avowed intent of “safeguarding the 
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Resistance”. Although Hizbullah cautiously straddled the fence during the 
“Cedar Revolution”, it has arguably benefited from Syria’s departure more 
than the erstwhile Lebanese opposition through its infusion in the Lebanese 
public sphere and its firm grip on Lebanon’s foreign policy in relation to its 
resistance identity and keeping up its arms. It could be argued that the stra-
tegic and political alliance between Iran and Syria has been to Hizbullah’s 
advantage not only because Iranian weapons and material aid to Hizbullah 
passed through Damascus, but also because Damascus benefited and used 
the Hizbullah card and Hizbullah’s Resistance as a bargaining chip against 
Israel. However, the transnational-ideological nexus between Hizbullah and 
Iran should not be construed as undermining the regional political-strategic 
link between Hizbullah and Syria, but ought to be regarded as a comple-
mentary phenonenon. 
In addition to investing in its domestic image, Hizbullah has exert-
ed efforts in portraying its international image as a pan-Arab, pan-Islamic 
movement with ties with Syria and Iran. The former is in conformity with 
Hizbullah’s political program, whereas the latter agrees with its political ide-
ology. It could be argued that Hizbullah is practicing authenticity politics 
in a religious garb, which is typical of Islamic discourse when it operates in 
secular politics while upholding its Islamic objective. Hizbullah translates 
this into practice by basing its relations with Iran on political-ideological, 
strategic-policy terms (pan-Islamism), while its relations with Syria on a 
common ethno-national identity (pan-Arabism). 
Of course, anyone who follows Hizbullah’s rhetoric knows that the 
statements released by its leaders are always exposed to change as circum-
stances change, a precept that is sanctioned by the jurisprudential theory 
of maslaha. This political mentality reflects, to a large extent, Iranian politi-
cal thinking, where alteration leads to genuine maslaha. Keeping in mind 
that there is no salafism (extremely militant Sunni fundamentalism) in Shi‘ite 
Islam since emulating a dead marja‘ is not fully endorsed, Iran employed 
the logic of maslaha in order to safeguard its society from salafism, which 
currently informs the ideology of al-Qa‘ida. Based on the Middle Eastern 
theory which says: “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”, it seems that Iran 
is serving the interests of the US by warding off and curbing Sunni Islamists 
through stopping the diffusion of the salafist Bin Ladenist-Zarqawi funda-
mentalism. Although the US Administration seems adamant in enforcing its 
policy of disarming the Lebanese Hizbullah, one might consider a different 
perspective which leads to thinking that the US policy might prefer that Hiz-
bullah keeps up its arms in order to perform a similar job as Iran, namely, to 
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protect Lebanese society and American interest there from the resurgence 
of Sunni fundamentalism. Thus, by following their own maslaha, both Iran24 
and Hizbullah are indirectly serving the maslaha of the US without con-

















































 Appendixes B, C, and D intend to convey how Hizbullah’s ideological 
shifts are taking place.1
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B Hizbullah Statements
1. The text of the Open Letter 2 addressed by Hizbullah to 
the oppressed in Lebanon and the world
February 16, 1985
The cover page of the Manifesto opens with the following Qur’anic quote: 
“Whoever takes Allah, His Apostle and those who believe as friends [must 
know] that Allah’s party [Hizbullah] in indeed the triumphant”. (5:56)
 Dedication
• To the torch that increased in light and brightness, so that it lit, to the oppressed 
in Lebanon, the path to a free dignified life, and burned, with its pure glittering 
blood [ jihad and martyrdom], the strength of the “Zionist Entity” [Israel] and its 
myth.
• To the leader who confided in and trusted his folk and was the lead for them in 
jihad [Shaykh Raghib Harb]. He sacrificed his soul and died as a martyr or was 
martyred in order to grant them victory3, and as a witness to the tyranny and 
oppression of the world oppressors.
• To the emblem of the victorious Islamic Resistance, and the great uprising 
(Intifada) that our people are still underlining with it the greatest Husayni4 
epics in the South and Western Biqa‘.
• To the one who shattered the American dream in Lebanon and fought (resist-
ed) the Israeli occupation, raising the banner of action according to the wilayat 
al-faqih, the leader, who liked to be addressed/characterized as the prince of 
the Muslims, Abdallah (the servant of God) al-Khumayni…
• We [Hizbullah] dedicate this, “Open Letter to the oppressed of the world”, to 
the Shaykh of the martyrs, Raghib Harb (may God’s blessings be upon him), 
consolidating between its lines the Islamic revolutionary-political path that 
was personified by our happy martyr, with his brothers the martyrs, so that 
he will become a leading example [to emulate] and a clear guide to all the 
freedom fighters (mujahidin) in Lebanon… We ask God, Glory be to Him and 
223
224
‘ T H E  S H I F T S  I N  H I Z B U L L A H ' S  I D E O L O G Y ’
highly exalted, to endow us with patience, consolidate our grounds, and make 
us victorious over the oppressors (al-qawn al-zalimin).5 
The main text of the Manifesto opens with the following Qur’anic substantiation: 
“And say: ‘The truth is from your Lord. Whoever wishes, let him believe; and 
whoever wishes, let him disbelieve’. We have prepared for the wrongdoers a 
Fire whose canopy encompasses them all. If they call for relief, they will be 
relieved with water like molten brass which scars the faces. Wretched is the 
drink and wretched is the resting-place!” (18:29).6
1. Who are we, and what is our identity?
We, the son’s of Hizbullah’s umma, whose vanguard God has given victory in 
Iran and which has established the nucleus of the world’s central Islamic state, abide 
by the orders of a single wise and just command represented by the guardianship 
of the jurisprudent (waliyy al-faqih), currently embodied in the supreme Ayatullah 
Ruhallah al-Musawi al-Khumayni… who has detonated the Muslim’s revolution, and 
who is bringing about the glorious Islamic renaissance.
Therefore, we in Lebanon are neither a closed organisational party nor a nar-
row political framework. Rather, we are an umma tied to the Muslims in every part of 
the world by a strong ideological-doctrinal, and political bond, namely, Islam, whose 
message God completed at the hands of the last of His prophets, Muhammad… God 
has established Islam as a religion for the world to follow… Therefore, what befalls 
the Muslims in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, or elsewhere befalls the body of 
our Islamic nation of which we are an indivisible part and we move to confront it out 
of a “religious duty” (wajib shar‘i) primarily and in light of a general political visualisa-
tion decided by the leader waliyy al-faqih.
The main sources of our culture are the venerable Qur’an, the infallible Sunna, 
and the rules and religious edicts made by the jurist (faqih), the authority of emula-
tion. These sources are clear, uncomplicated, and accessible to all without exception 
and they need no theorisation or philosophy. All they need is abidance and applica-
tion. 
… Each of us is a combat soldier when the call of jihad demands it and each 
of us undertakes his task in the battle in accordance with the “legitimate and reli-
gious responsibility” (taklif shar‘i) of the Wilayat al-Faqih, the leader. God is behind 
us with His care, putting fear in our enemies’ hearts, and giving His dear and resound-
ing victory against them. (Bold is mine). 7 
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2. The “Oppressors” are in concordance in fighting us
The US has tried, through its local agents, to persuade the people that those 
who crushed their arrogance in Lebanon and frustrated their conspiracy against the 
oppressed (mustad’afin) were nothing but a bunch of fanatic terrorists whose sole 
aim is to dynamite bars and destroy slot machines. Such suggestions cannot and will 
not mislead our umma, for the whole world knows that whoever wishes to oppose 
the US, that arrogant superpower, cannot indulge in marginal acts which may make 
it deviate from its major objective. We combat abomination and we shall tear out 
its very roots, its primary roots, which are the US. All attempts made to drive us into 
marginal actions will fail, especially as our determination to fight the US is solid.8 
3. America is behind all our catastrophes
We are dedicated to fighting and uprooting the vice… The first root of vice 
is America [the US]… All endeavours to push us into marginal action would be of no 
avail if measured in relation to our face off with America… 
Imam Khumayni has stressed time and again that America is behind all our 
catastrophes, and it is the mother of all vice… When we fight it, we only exercise our 
legitimate right of defending our Islam and the dignity of our umma.9
We declare openly and loudly that we are an umma which fears God only and 
is by no means ready to tolerate injustice, aggression and humiliation. America, its 
Atlantic Pact allies [NATO], and the Zionist entity in the holy land of Palestine [Israel], 
attacked us and continue to do so without respite. Their aim is to make us eat dust 
continually. This is why we are, more and more, in a state of permanent alert in order 
to repel aggression and defend our religion, our existence, our dignity. They invaded 
our country, destroyed our villages, slit the throats of our children, violated our sanc-
tuaries and appointed masters over our people who committed the worst massacres 
against our umma. They do not cease to give support to these allies of Israel, and do 
not enable us to decide our future according to our own wishes.
In a single night the Israelis and the Phalangists executed thousands of our 
sons, women and children in Sabra and Shatila. No international organization pro-
tested or denounced this ferocious massacre in an effective manner, a massacre per-
petrated with the tacit accord of America’s European allies, which had retreated a 
few days, maybe even a few hours earlier, from the Palestinian camps. The Lebanese 
defeatists accepted putting the camps under the protection of that crafty fox, the 
US envoy Philip Habib.10 
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“You shall find the most hostile people to the believers to be the Jews and 
the polytheists”(5: 82)11
4 & 5 We have no choice except confrontation, Zionist-Phalangist 
coordination/coalescing 
We have no alternative but to confront aggression by sacrifice. The coordina-
tion between the Phalangists and Israel continues and develops.
A hundred thousand victims – this is the approximate balance sheet of crimes 
committed by them and by the US against us. Almost half a million Muslims were 
forced to leave their homes. Their quarters were virtually totally destroyed in Nab‘a, 
my own Beirut suburb, as well as in Burj Hammud, Dekonaneh, Tel Zaatar, Sinbay, 
Ghawarina and Jubeil 12 – all in areas controlled today by the ‘Lebanese Forces’13. 
The Zionist occupation then launched its usurpatory invasion of Lebanon in full and 
open collusion with the Phalanges. The latter condemned all attempts to resist the 
invading forces. They participated in the implementation of certain Israeli plans in 
order to accomplish its Lebanese dream and acceded to all Israeli requests in order 
to gain power. 
And this is, in fact, what happened. Bashir Jumayyel14, that butcher, seized 
power with the help also of OPEC countries and the Jumayyel family. Bashir tried 
to improve his ugly image by joining the six-member Committee of Public Safety 
presided over by former President Elias Sarkis15, which was nothing but an Ameri-
can-Israeli bridge borrowed by the Phalangists in order to control the oppressed. 
Our people could not tolerate humiliation any more. It destroyed the oppressors, 
the invaders and their lackeys. But the US persisted in its folly and installed Amin 
Jumayyel16 to replace his brother. Some of his first so called achievements were to 
destroy the homes of refugees and other displaced persons, attack mosques, and 
order the army to bombard the southern suburbs of Beirut, where the oppressed 
people resided. He invited European troops to help him against us and signed the 
May 17th, [1983] accord with Israel making Lebanon an American protectorate.17 
6 & 7 Our main enemies, and our objectives/goals in Lebanon
Our people could not bear any more treachery. It decided to oppose infidelity 
– be it French, American or Israeli – by striking at their headquarters and launching a 
veritable war of resistance against the Occupation forces. Finally, the enemy had to 
decide to retreat by stages. 
227
Let us put it truthfully: the sons of Hizhallah know who are their major ene-
mies in the Middle East – the Phalanges, Israel, France and the US. The sons of our 
umma are now in a state of growing confrontation with them, and will remain so 
until the realization of the following three objectives: 
a. To expel the Americans, the French, and their allies definitely from Lebanon, 
putting an end to any colonialist entity on our land;
b. To submit the Phalanges to a just power and bring them all to justice for the 
crimes they have perpetrated against Muslims and Christians;
c. To permit all the sons of our people to determine their future and to choose in 
all the liberty the form of government they desire. We call upon all of them to 
pick the option of Islamic state, which alone, is capable of guaranteeing justice 
and liberty for all. Only an Islamic state can stop any further tentative attempts 
of imperialistic infiltration into our country.18 
8. Our Friends
These are Lebanon’s objectives; those are its enemies. As for our friends, they 
are all the world’s oppressed peoples. Our friends are also those who combat our 
enemies and who defend us from their evil. Towards these friends, individuals as well 
as organizations, we turn and say: 
Friends, wherever you are in Lebanon… we are in agreement with you on 
the great and necessary objectives: destroying American hegemony in our land; 
putting an end to the burdensome Israeli Occupation; beating back all the Phalang-
ists’ attempts to monopolize power and administration.
Even though we have, friends, quite different viewpoints as to the means of 
the struggle, on the levels upon which it must be carried out, we should surmount 
these tiny divergences and consolidate cooperation between us in view of the grand 
design…19
You convey ideas that do not originate from Islam… and this does not pre-
clude cooperation with you in order to achieve these goals… especially since we feel 
that the motives, which exhort you to struggle, are Muslim motives in the first place, 
originating from the oppression and tyranny that has been practiced and imposed 
upon you … even if these motives were formed by un-Islamic ideas, they have to 
converge back to the essence of Islam. Then, you witness that revolutionary Islam 
spearheads the struggle to confront tyranny and oppression…20
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9. We are committed to Islam, but we do not impose it by force 
We are an umma, which adheres to the message of Islam. We want all the 
oppressed to be able to study the divine message in order to bring justice, peace 
and tranquillity to the world: “There is no compulsion in religion; true guidance has 
become distinct from error. Thus he who disbelieves in the Devil and believes in 
Allah grasps the firmest handle [bond] that will never break. Allah is All-Hearing, All-
Knowing. Allah is the Supporter of the believers. He brings them out of darkness into 
light. As for those who disbelieve, their supporters are the devils who bring them 
out of light into darkness. Those are the people of the Fire in which they shall abide 
forever” (2:256-7).
This is why we don’t want to impose Islam upon anybody, as much as we 
don’t want others to impose upon us their convictions and their political systems. We 
don’t want Islam to reign in Lebanon by force, as is the case with political Maronism 
today.21
We stress that we are convinced of Islam as an ideology, doctrine, political 
order, and mode of governance. We call all the populace to be conversant with it and 
its religious imperatives/injunctions. We also call upon the populace to adhere to its 
teachings at the individual, political, and social levels. If our populace could freely 
choose the system of government in Lebanon, then they would definitely opt for 
Islam. From this perspective, we call for the implementation of an Islamic order on 
the basis of direct and free choice as exercised by the populace, and not on the basis 
of force, as others might entertain…22
10. The bare minimum of our aspirations in Lebanon
This is the minimum that we can accept in order to be able to accede by legal 
means to realize our ambitions, to save Lebanon from its dependence upon East and 
West, to put an end to foreign occupation [Israeli occupation] and to adopt a regime 
freely wanted by the people of Lebanon.23 
11. Why do we confront the existing regime?
This is our perception of the present state of affairs. This is the Lebanon we 
envision. In the light of our conceptions, our opposition to the present system is the 
function of two factors; (1) the present regime is the product of arrogance so unjust 
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that no reform or modification can remedy it. It should be changed radically, and (2) 
World Imperialism which is hostile to Islam.24 
“Whoever does not judge according to what Allah has revealed, those are the 
evildoers!” (5:45).25 
12. Our stance towards the opposition 
(to the Lebanese political system26)
We consider that all opposition in Lebanon voiced in the name of reform 
can only profit, ultimately, the present system. All such opposition, which operates 
within the framework of the conservation and safeguarding of the present constitu-
tion without demanding changes at the level of the very foundation of the regime, 
is hence, an opposition of pure formality, which cannot satisfy the interests of the 
oppressed masses. Likewise, any opposition, which confronts the present regime 
but within the limits fixed by it, is an illusory opposition, which renders a great serv-
ice to the Jumayyel system. Moreover, we cannot be concerned by any proposition 
of political reform, which accepts the rotten [Lebanese political] system actually in 
effect. We could not care less about the creation of this or that governmental coali-
tion or about the participation of this or that political personality in some ministerial 
post, which is but a part of this unjust regime.27 
13. Words to the Christians in Lebanon
The politics followed by the chiefs of political Maronism through the ‘Leba-
nese Front’28 and the ‘Lebanese Forces’ cannot guarantee peace and tranquillity for 
the Christians of Lebanon, whereas it is predicated upon ‘asabiyya (narrow-minded 
particularism), on confessional privileges and on the alliance with colonialism and 
Israel. The Lebanese crisis has proven that confessional privileges are one of the prin-
cipal causes of the great explosion, which ravaged the country. It also proved that 
outside help was of no use to the Christians of Lebanon, just when they need it 
most. The bell tolled for the fanatic Christians to rid themselves of denominational 
allegiance and of illusion deriving from the monopolization of privileges to the detri-
ment of other communities. The Christians should answer the appeal from heaven 
and have recourse to reason instead of arms, to persuasion instead of sectarianism. 
If you review your calculations and know that your interest lies in what you 
decide, by your own free will, not what is imposed upon you, then we renew our call 
to you: “Say: ‘O People of the Book, come to an equitable world between you and us, 
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that we worship none but Allah, do not associate anything with Him and do not set 
up each other as lords besides Allah’ ” (3:64).
If you, Christians, cannot tolerate that Muslims share with you certain domains 
of government, Allah has also made it intolerable for Muslims to participate in an 
unjust regime, unjust for you and for us, in a regime which is not predicated upon the 
prescriptions (ahkam) of religion and upon the basis of the Law (the shari‘a) as laid 
down by Muhammad, the Seal of the Prophets. If you search for justice, who is more 
just than Allah? It is He who sent down from the sky the message of Islam through 
his successive prophets in order that they judge the people and give everyone his 
rights. If you were deceived and misled into believing that we anticipate vengeance 
against you – your fears are unjustified. For those of you who are peaceful, continue 
to live in our midst without anybody even thinking to trouble you. 
We don’t wish you evil. We call upon you to embrace Islam so that you can 
be happy in this world and the next. If you refuse to adhere to Islam, we would not 
force you to do otherwise, rather we just expect you to respect and honour your cov-
enants with the Muslims and not to aggress against them. Free yourselves from the 
consequences of hateful confessionalism. Banish from your hearts all fanaticism and 
parochialism. Open your hearts to our Call (da’wa), which we address to you. Open 
yourselves up to Islam where you’ll find salvation and happiness upon earth and in 
the hereafter. We extend this invitation also to all the oppressed among the non-
Muslims. As for those who belong to Islam only formally, we exhort them to adhere 
to Islam in religious practice and to renounce all fanaticisms, which are rejected by 
our religion.29 
14. Our story with the world oppressors
We reject both the USSR and the US, both Capitalism and Communism, for 
both are incapable of laying the foundations for a just society. 
With special vehemence we reject UNIFIL30 as they were sent by world arro-
gance to occupy areas evacuated by Israel and serve for the latter as a buffer zone. 
They should be treated much like the Zionists. All should know that the goals of 
the Phalangist regime do not carry any weight with the Combatants of the Holy 
War [jihad], i.e., the Islamic resistance. This is the quagmire, which awaits all foreign 
intervention. 
There, then, are our conceptions and our objectives, which serve as our basis 
and inspire our march. Those who accept them should know that all rights belong to 
Allah and He bestows them. Those who reject them, we’ll be patient with them, till 
Allah decides between us and the people of injustice.31
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15. Israel must be completely obliterated/wiped out of existence
We see in Israel the vanguard of the United States in our Islamic world. It is 
the hated enemy that must be fought until the hated ones get what they deserve. 
This enemy is the greatest danger to our future generations and to the destiny of 
our lands, particularly as it glorifies the ideas of settlement and expansion, initiated 
in Palestine, and yearning outward to the extension of the Great Israel, from the 
Euphrates to the Nile. 
Our primary assumption in our fight against Israel states that the Zionist enti-
ty is aggressive from its inception, and built on lands wrested from their owners, at 
the expense of the rights of the Muslim people. Therefore our struggle will end only 
when this entity is obliterated. We recognize no treaty with it, no cease-fire, and no 
peace agreements, whether separate or consolidated. 
We vigorously condemn all plans for negotiation with Israel, and regard all 
negotiators as enemies, for the reason that such negotiation is nothing but the rec-
ognition of the legitimacy of the Zionist occupation of Palestine. Therefore we oppose 
and reject the Camp David Agreements, the proposals of King Fahd, the Fez and Rea-
gan plan, Brezhnev’s and the French-Egyptian proposals, and all other programs that 
include the recognition (even the implied recognition) of the Zionist entity.32
We condemn all perverted countries and organizations, which are running 
after recapitulative solutions with the enemy and that agree to the principle of ‘land 
for peace’, and we consider that as a blatant betrayal to the blood of the Palestinian-
Muslim people and the holy Palestinian cause.33
16. Escalation in the operations of the Islamic resistance 
(against the Israeli forces)
The dignified Islamic Resistance, which has underscored and still is under-
scoring the best epics of heroism against the occupying Zionist forces [Israeli Army], 
has destroyed, with the religious belief of its fighters, the myths of the invincible Isra-
el. It has put the “Rapist Entity” [Israel] in real trouble due to the daily war of attrition 
it waged against its military as well as human and economic resources, which has 
led its leaders to concede to the severity of the confrontation they are facing at the 
hands of the Muslims [Hizbullahis]…This Islamic Resistance is destined to continue 
and grow, God willing. It is expecting from all Muslims in the world all the support 
and backing in order to uproot the “Cancerous Gland” [Israel] and wipe it out of exist-
ence. In conformity with realism, we [Hizbullah] insist and stress the Islamic charac-
ter of our Resistance, which is concomitant with its nationalist-patriotic nature.34 
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17. Appeal for broad Islamic participation
We take the opportunity to call on all the Muslims in the world to share, with 
their brothers in Lebanon, the honour of fighting against the occupying Zionists, 
either directly or by supporting the mujahidin (Hizbullah’s freedom fighters) because 
it is the responsibility of all the Muslims to do so, and not only the residents of Jabal 
‘Amil and Western Biqa‘ (which were the areas under Israeli occupation). 
The Islamic Resistance was able, with the blood of its martyrs and the jihad of 
its heroes, to force the enemy [Israel], the first time in the history of struggle against 
it, to take the decision and withdraw from Lebanon35 without any American influ-
ence. On the contrary, the [Israeli] decision to withdraw led to a real American con-
cern, and it resulted in a historical overturn in the history of the struggle against the 
“rapist Zionists”. 
Hizbullah’s freedom fighters have proven that the umma, if left alone to con-
duct its own affairs freely, is capable of making miracles, and change the illusionary 
predestination [of defeat].36 It is worth mentioning that The Islamic Resistance is not 
only composed of young men whose weapon is the rifle and a religiously strong will, 
but also of women, children, and elderly.37 
18. The mercenary politics of the (Lebanese) government and its 
treacherous negotiations
We grant little attention to the occasional boasting of the Lebanese govern-
ment, which attempts to delude people that it is supporting the Resistance against 
the occupation… 
We overtly declare that the [alleged] verbal and media support is a source of 
contempt to our populace… Even if some declarations have emanated from some 
members of the ruling elite, our informed public cannot be deceived by these dec-
larations because they do represent the official stance of the Lebanese government, 
especially since it is unwilling to deploy the [Lebanese] Army in order to participate 
in the honour of liberating occupied land…
The contended financial support to the resistance is useless if the money 
does not reach Hizbullah’s freedom fighters (al-mujahidin) and is not used to buy 
ammunition, weaponry, and the like…
Our populace rejects the mercenary policies [the Lebanese government is 
engaged in] at the expense of the Resistance. There will come a day, when all of those 
– who debased and “traded” with the blood of the heroic martyrs and built for them-
selves glories at the expense of the mujahidin’s wounds – will be brought to justice.
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We can only assert that the policy of negotiations with the enemy [Israel] is 
a grave treason towards the Resistance that the Lebanese state contents to stand by 
and support… The insistence of the Lebanese government to join the negotiations 
with the enemy can only be regarded as a conspiracy aiming at acknowledging the 
Zionist occupation and according it legitimacy as well as privilege on the crimes it 
had committed against the oppressed in Lebanon…
The Islamic Resistance, which has openly declared its unwillingness to abide 
by any result/consequence emanating from the negotiations, stresses the continuity 
of jihad until the Zionists evacuate the occupied lands, which is seen as a step in the 
right direction to obliterate them from the face of the earth.38 
19. International forces and their suspicious role
The International Forces that the world oppressors are trying to deploy on Mus-
lim lands – in the areas that the enemy withdraws from, so that it makes up a security 
barrier that protects Israel and shelters its occupying forces derailing the movements of 
the Resistance –are totally rejected being indulged conspirators with Israel… we might 
be compelled to treat it as we engage with the Zionist occupying forces…
May everyone know that the commitments of the Phalangist regime [to Isra-
el] are totally rejected and are unbinding, in any way whatsoever, on the freedom 
fighters of the Islamic Resistance [who wash their hands from these commitments]… 
These countries [which sent its forces to Lebanon] has to deeply think before it 
indulges into the quagmire or quicksand that Israel has drowned itself into.39
20. Defeatist Arab Regimes
Concerning the Arab regimes which are running after reconciliation with the 
Zionist enemy, these regimes are impotent and short sighted in accompanying the 
ambitions and aspirations of the umma… These regimes cannot think of confronting 
the Zionist entity that raped Palestine because they were founded under colonial 
guardianship, which had a great role in the shaping of these rusty regimes…
Some reactionary rulers, especially those in the oil producing countries, do not 
hesitate to make of their countries military bases for America and Britain. They are not 
ashamed in being dependent on foreign experts whom they appoint in official high 
places. They abide by and execute what the “White House” dictates to them, especially 
the policies of getting out the natural resources and the riches [of their countries] and 
distribute it on the colonizers, using all possible means [to accomplish that]…
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Some of those who claim to be the guardians of the Islamic shari‘a [The Saudi 
regime] employ this claim to cover up their treason as well as to find a pretext for 
their yielding to the US Administration. At the same time, they [The Saudi regime] 
vehemently ban and prohibit any revolutionary Islamic book… [A reference to Imam 
Khumayni’s books] 
As a result of the defeatist policy employed by these reactionary regimes 
towards Israel, the latter was able to convince a lot of them that it has become fait 
accompli and that there is no way out save to recognize it and concede the need to 
providing security for it…
This policy of yielding encouraged the deceased Sadat to commit a grave 
treason by reconciling with Israel and signing a disgraceful peace treaty with it… 
This policy of yielding governs and constrains the movement of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC), and the Jordanian-Egyptian axis, Iraq, and the Arafati Organization 
[i.e. the PLO]…
The defeatist policy in front of America directs the attitude of the reaction-
ary rulers concerning the aggressive war imposed on the Islamic Republic of Iran… 
It stands behind the unlimited financial, economic, and military support the agent 
Saddam [Husayn] is showered with. They [the US] think that the Takriti [Tikrit is Sadd-
am’s hometown] Zionist regime can annihilate the Islamic Revolution and can stop 
the emanation of its revolutionary light and ideals. 
This defeatist policy pushes reactionary regimes to make the people 
ignorant; to brain wash them and make their Islamic personality wither away; 
to repress any Islamic mobilization that is against America and its allies in these 
countries. The defeatist policy also makes the reactionary governments fearful 
of the vigilance of the oppressed, banning them from interfering in its politi-
cal affairs because it posses a grave danger on the survival of these regimes, 
especially since the populace is aware of the corruption of its governments and 
its suspected relations/linkages [with other states], as well as the sympathy this 
populace shows towards liberation movements in all parts of the Islamic world 
as well as the world at large…
We find in these reactionary Arab regimes an impediment against the increase 
in conscious raising and unity of the Islamic populace. We consider them [reaction-
ary Arab regimes] responsible in stalling the attempts to keep the wound open and 
the struggle with the Zionist enemy going on…
We have a big hope in the Muslim populace that started to clearly complain, 
in most Islamic countries, and was able to benefit from the revolutionary world, 
especially the victorious Islamic Revolution… The day will come when these barely 
standing regimes will fall under the fist of the oppressed, as has the thrown of des-
potism collapsed in Iran. 
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We are fighting a ferocious battle against America and Israel and their plans 
for the region [Middle East]. We warn these reactionary [Arab] regimes from working 
against the dominant reformist current in the umma, which is against colonialism 
and Zionism. These [reactionary Arab regimes] have to learn from the Islamic resist-
ance in Lebanon grand lessons in the persistence in fighting the enemy in order to 
completely defeat it.
We warn these regimes from being engaged in new defeatist projects, or in 
aggressive projects targeting the young Islamic Revolution… because that will lead 
these regimes to the same fate that was accorded to Anwar al-Sadat, and before him 
Nur al-Sa‘id.40 
21. International front for the oppressed
We turn our attention to all the Arab and Muslim populace in order to declare 
to them that the experience of the Muslims in Islamic Iran, does not leave a pretext to 
anyone, because it has proven beyond the shadow of a doubt, that bear chests that 
are driven by a faithful volition, with the great aid of God, was able to break all the 
iron [power] of the tyrannical regimes… 
That is why, we call upon these populace to unify their ranks, plan their objec-
tives, mobilize to break the chains that engulf its volition, and to over through the 
despotic collaborating governments [with the ‘enemy’]. 
We exhort all the oppressed in the world to the necessity of forming an inter-
national front comprised of all their liberation movements in order to fully coordi-
nate among themselves so that an efficient action will transpire, thus concentrating 
on the Achilles heals of the enemies…
So if the colonizing countries and regimes have shown a consensus on fight-
ing the oppressed… so the oppressed must bond together in order to face the con-
ceit of the world oppressors.
All the oppressed populace, especially the Arab and Islamic ones, should 
understand that only Islam is capable of becoming the intellectual foundation or 
thinking that is capable of resisting and confronting the aggression because all situ-
ational/positive (man made) ideologies have been disbanded forever in the interest 
of the deterrence among the Americans and the Soviets as well as others.
The time has come to be cognizant of the fact that all foreign ideas, concern-
ing the origin of man and his instinct, are incapable of answering his ambitions or 
saving him from the darkness of ignorance and waywardness…
Only Islam leads to man’s reform, progress, and creativity because “It is kin-
dled from a blessed olive tree, neither of the East nor the West. Its oil will almost 
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shine, even if no fire has touched it. Light upon light, Allah guides to His light whom-
ever He pleases…” (24:35).41 
22. God is with the unity of the Muslims
A call on the Muslim populace:
Be aware of the malignant colonial discord [fitna] that aims at rupturing your 
unity in order to spread sedition among you and enflame Sunni-Shi‘a sectarian feel-
ings.
Be knowledgeable that colonialism was not able to control the natural 
resources and riches of the Muslims except after breaking up their unity… incit-
ing Sunnis against the Shi‘as and vice versa. Later on the colonizer left this mission 
of spreading dissention among the Muslims to its collaborators, be it the govern-
ing elite, the corrupt Muslim religious scholars (state jurists), or the feudal leaders 
(zu‘ama). 
God is with the unity of the Muslims… It is the rock that breaks all the con-
spiracies of the oppressors; it is the hammer that crushes the evil schemes of the 
oppressors…
Do not allow the policy of “divide and rule” to be practiced among you; rather 
fight it by recourse to the Qur’an: 
“And hold fast to Allah’s bond [His religion], all of you, and do not fall apart. 
And remember Allah’s grace upon you; how you were enemies, then He united your 
hearts [by becoming Muslims] so that you have become, by His grace, brethren. You 
were on the brink of the pit of Fire, but He saved you from it”. (3:103).
“Those who have made divisions in their religion and become sects, thou art 
not of them in anything” (6:159).42 
23. (An appeal/call on the) ‘ulama of Islam 
You Muslim ‘ulama,
You have a grave responsibility, as grave as the calamities that strike the 
Muslims… You are the best in conducting your duty of leading the umma towards 
Islam… And in alerting it to what the enemies are plotting in order to control and 
enslave it as well as rob it of its treasures…
No wonder you are conversant that the Muslims look upon you as bearers of 
the Prophet’s trust (amana) in your capacity as successors to the prophets and mes-
sengers… So be the hope and the good lead in overtly calling for right and standing 
237
up against the tyrants and despots. Be the lead in austerity, the passion to [go to] 
Heaven, and martyrdom in the way of God… 
You have the good lead of Prophet Muhammad who used to share hunger 
and satisfaction with the people; he used to lead the prayer at the Mosque; he used 
to lead the populace in jihad… 
He used to guide the people in missions; they used to get warmth from his 
guidance and in being around him; they followed him being assured and comfort-
ed…
You Muslim ‘ulama,
Imam Khumayni repeatedly stressed the need to rectify, reform, and refine 
the self, before rectifying reforming, and refining others and the world at large. He 
said in more than one occasion that if people knew that a shop owner is dishonest 
and immoral, then they say that Mr. X is dishonest and immoral; if they found out 
that a trader is cheating then, then they say that Mr. X is a cheater; however, if they 
knew that a Muslim religious scholar (‘alim), God forbid, is not upright, then they 
would generalize and say that all religious scholars are not upright (perverted) and 
the religion (Islam) as a whole is not upright.43 
You Muslim ‘ulama,
For this and other reasons… You have a grave responsibility, so invoke God 
in order to be able to conduct it in a proper way, and invoke Him with the calling of 
Imam ‘Ali: “God, we do not ask you [to take] a small burden, rather we ask you to be 
a strong bulwark supporting us”. Then the umma will respond to your call, guidance, 
and leadership.
Be knowledgeable about the importance of your position in the umma 
because the colonizer has known its importance. That is why the colonizer has 
vehemently targeted the ‘ulama al-mujahidin… so the colonizer prepared a devilish 
conspiracy to conceal Imam Musa al-Sadr after recognizing him as an impediment 
hurdling his aggressive plans… The colonizer killed the Islamic philosopher Ayatul-
lah Murtada Mutahhari… and executed the grand Islamic marja‘ Ayatullah Sayyid 
Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr44 because the colonizer felt the danger of his stance, which 
was personalized in these words: “Melt in Imam Khumayni as Islam has melted in 
you”. That is why the colonizer is stalking and ambushing every religious scholar who 
is accomplishing his Islamic duty to the best of his knowledge.
From another perspective, the colonizer started to penetrate the Muslims 
with state jurists who do not fear God. They make religious edicts (fatwas) where 
there is no place for fatwas; therefore they sanction peace with Israel, prohibit fight-
ing it, and find excuses for the treason of tyrant rulers…
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The colonizer would not have done that without [knowing] the important 
impact a religious scholar has on the people…
That is why, one of your most important responsibilities, you Muslim ‘ulama, 
is to raise up/rear the Muslims to abide by the religious injunctions, to clarify to 
them the righteous political path that they should follow, and to lead them to glory 
and honour… Also you take care of the religious seminaries so that the umma can 
graduate leaders who are faithful to God and who are committed to the victory of 
the religion and the umma45 (My emphasis).
24. A final word regarding international organizations
Finally, there is a need for a few words concerning international organizations 
such as the UN, the Security Council and others… 
We note that these organizations do not constitute a podium for the oppressed 
nations, and in general, they remain ineffective and inefficient due to the procedural 
hegemony and domination of the world oppressors on its decisions…
The veto right, which is accorded to some countries, is a testimony to what 
we say…
From this perspective, we do not predict these organizations to issue anything 
serving the interests of the oppressed. We call on all the countries, which respect 
themselves, to adopt a resolution banning the right of veto, which is accorded to the 
oppressor countries…
We also call on all countries to adopt a resolution to fire Israel from the UN 
because it is an illegitimate-rapist entity, which is opposed to humanity at large.
You free oppressed…
These are our visions and goals, and these are the basic regulations that 
guide our path…
There are those who have wholeheartedly and righteously accepted us [our 
discourse], God is the only Truth; and there are those who have contested our views. 
We patiently wait till God has judged between us, and the oppressors (al-qawn al-
zalimin). 
May God’s blessings and peace be upon all of you,
Hizbullah46
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2. Hizbullah: Views and Concepts, Manar TV, Beirut, 
June 20, 199747
 Introduction
Freedom, right, justice and peace are essential values for any society to rise 
and develop. Freedom is the basis for this rise, while justice cannot be applied with-
out right and peace is inaccessible with the exclusion of justice. 
Adopting and practicing these human values require commitment and cred-
ibility, for they make one importable whole; freedom can not be enjoyed by one 
group and denied to another, right should not prevail here and be paralyzed there; 
if abated, justice turns into injustice; peace can not be achieved unless it is compre-
hensive. 
These values have been established by the divine religions, the clearest and 
most comprehensive of which has been Islam, whether in theoretical or practical 
conception.
 Hizbullah- Lebanon 
Hizbullah-Lebanon is an organized striving current that has been established 
on the basis of its commitment to the above-mentioned values, seeking, with its 
noble religious and national struggle to achieve these values in Lebanon and the 
region and to eliminate all the artificial barriers that would obstruct that purpose. 
Hizbullah has faithfully, courageously and persistently resisted the Zionist 
invasion of Lebanon and prevented it from achieving its political objectives that 
were represented at that time by dominating this small country and establishing 
a political regime whose decision was to be controlled by the desires of the racist 
Zionist Jews. 
In order to liberate the occupied land, maintain the national dignity and 
materialize these values, Hizbullah has sacrificed hundreds of martyrs, injured and 
disabled as an act of faith in the legitimacy of its resistance against the usurping 
invaders. 
 Hizbullah between Peace and Violence
Hizbullah has a strong belief in the necessity of achieving the security and 
peace that are based on right and justice in Lebanon, the region and the world. Con-
sequently, it rejects all forms of aggression and terrorism; at the same time Hizbullah 
views the Zionist Jews’ occupation of Palestine, displacing its people and establish-
ing the entity of Israel on its usurped land as the living materialization of the most 
hideous kinds of aggression and organized terrorism that is supported by the USA, 
the sponsor of international terrorism, and some other states that claim to be demo-
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cratic and protecting human rights whilst they support Israel that was founded on 
invasion, killing and blood-shed, besides its daily violations of human rights in Leba-
non and Palestine. 
Hizbullah does not believe it is right for some people in the world to view the 
Zionist Jewish occupation as accepted violence and terrorism, while they condemn 
the counter-violence, which is a natural human reaction to the Zionist violence and 
terrorism. 
 Hizbullah and the Resistance
Hizbullah has benefited from the experiences of the nations and peoples of 
the world and read the history of the French people’s resistance against the Nazi 
occupation, and the resistance of the American people against the colonialists as 
well; It saw how the free world countries and the peoples of the world respect these 
resistances and annually commemorate their memory because they had expressed 
the will of freedom and the longing for right, justice and peace. 
When Hizbullah resists in Lebanon against the Zionist Jewish occupation 
lying heavily on its soil in the South and West Bekaa, it is exercising its legitimate 
and sacred right that was once exercised by the French and American peoples. 
Considering Hizbullah’s resistance to the Zionist Jewish occupation as “terror-
ism” is a kind of injustice, discrimination besides being a renunciation of the Bill of 
Human rights and the Charter of the United Nations. 
Therefore, we call on the peoples of the world to distinguish between aggres-
sion, which is none other than terrorism, and the honest resistance that is the only 
way to deter the aggression and confront the terrorism resulting from that aggres-
sion. Israel is an aggressive entity that practices terrorism; occupation is one of the 
forms of terrorism. Hizbullah of Lebanon is a popular resisting trend against occupa-
tion and terrorism. 
 Hizbullah and Dialogue 
Hizbullah observes the creed of the genuine Muhammadan Islam and the 
sublime human values emanating from it. This observance arises from ideological 
conviction that is established with proofs and evidence and does not originate from 
emotional liking or sectarian, denominational or racial group spirit. Since reason is 
the source of this observance, Hizbullah has always been ready to have dialogue 
with others over its convictions and creeds or even its method and positions; Hizbul-
lah does not seek to impose its convictions on anyone, as it does not like anyone to 
impose their convictions on it. It is attached to have mutual understanding with the 
others. It does not think of annulling anyone, as it does not accept anyone to annul 
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it. Therefore, continuing and incessant dialogue is the best way to rectify visions and 
positions; it is also a feature of Hizbullah. 
 Hizbullah and the Political System in Lebanon
Lebanon’s political system which is based on the principle of political confes-
sionalism can never achieve justice or realize right and peace. Perhaps one of the 
most important reasons of the civil war that broke out in 1975 lies within the confes-
sional tendency that had been established by the political system. 
The Taif Charter of National Reconciliation did not resolve this dilemma, but 
rather established it and re-distributed the sectarian quotas anew. This implies a 
foundation for a future crisis. 
That document, nevertheless, is viewed by Hizbullah as a bridge to transfer 
Lebanon from the stage of bloody conflicts to a new stage of internal peace that we, 
in Hizbullah, very strongly and definitely desire. 
In spite of that, it never calls off our looking forward to more change and 
development in the Lebanese political system in order to abolish the abhorred sec-
tarian discrimination and achieve justice among the citizens. 
 Hizbullah and Human Rights 
It is axiomatic to say that Hizbullah considers, as its religious task, serving 
human beings, protecting their rights, maintaining their interest, and exerting effort 
to provide them with the requirements of a dignified living and developing their 
society. 
If the existing regimes remiss in fulfilling their duties toward that human 
being, Hizbullah has efficiently contributed in providing humanitarian services to 
the citizens in various Lebanese areas without discrimination between one citizen 
and another, or one sect and another. 
These services have included many domains; some of them are restoring 
damaged buildings, farming guidance, providing utilities for the least cost prices 
and sometimes for free, providing medical care and hospitalization at the health 
care centers that are distributed in the areas and in private hospitals, providing pri-
mary and intermediate schooling, providing the needy students with scholarships 
to continue their college schooling plus providing them with scientific orientation, 
and securing fresh water to the neighborhoods that the public water network does 
not reach. 
However, the most important human right that Hizbullah sacrifices blood 
and lives in order to maintain is the right of the Lebanese human beings in their land 
and in determining the political system they desire.
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3. Statement of Purpose: Hizbullah Press Office 
March 20, 1998 48
Hizbullah is an Islamic freedom fighting movement founded after the Israeli 
military seizure of Lebanon in 1982, which resulted in immediate formation of the 
Islamic resistance units for the liberation of the occupied territories and for the 
expulsion of the aggressive Israelis forces. 
In addition to shouldering the burden of resisting the Israelis occupation as it 
is stated by the International Bill of Human Rights, Hizbullah is also concerned about 
the presentation of Islam which addresses the mind and reason. Hizbullah is con-
cerned about presenting Islam that is confident of its fundamentals, its highly civi-
lized understanding of man, life and the universe, Islam as being self-assured about 
its capability to achieve the basis of right and justice. We are anxious to present Islam 
as being open hearted to all nations their various political and cultural trends and 
their numerous experiences, away from subjection or bewilderment. We are anxious 
to present Islam as being the guardian for human rights defining choices, adopt-
ing convictions and expressing them, socially. We opt for the formation of political 
pressure in education, pedagogy, medical care and other social benefits announced 
in the Bill of Human Rights. We are anxious to define the priorities for our cultural 
project that utilizes persuasiveness and polarization through the civilized and the 
human methods confirmed by the Bill of the Human Rights. Away from evidence 
force, and coercion. We are anxious to offer a model of performance in struggling tar-
geting the enemy that represents a challenge for the existence of the whole nation 
along with its regimes and people. We also circumvent conflicts that do not serve the 
main aim, fighting the enemy, or that could create discord at the front, which is to 
be unified around the common interests. The hope is to rid of the pressuring threats 
practiced by the foreign Zionist Entity, which has been thrust upon the Islamic, and 
the Arab contemporary nation. It should be clear that the kind of Islam we want is a 
civilized endeavour that rejects injustice, humiliation, slavery, subjugation, colonial-
ism and blackmail while we stretch out our arms for communication among nations 
on the basis of mutual respect. The Islam we mean is the religion that never accepts 
control or delegation by others for the sake of manipulating the rights and the inter-
ests of the nation. The Islam we mean is the religion that recommends communica-
tion among civilization and rejects divisive collision between those civilizations. An 
Islam that believes in cultural communication among nations and refuses setting up 
barriers and embargos and sees that it is our right to remove those barriers by the 
diplomatic means, however, when others intend to launch wars against it, Hizbullah 
finds it a natural right to defend itself representing its supporters and their achieve-
ments [sic]. 
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Islam that we understand is a message that aims at establishing justice, 
security, peace and rights for all people no matter what nation, race or religion they 
belong. We don’t have any complex toward others, but we feel the responsibility 
toward them, to make them understand the essence of our religion away from obli-
gation and fanaticism. 
We don’t seek the application of Islam by force or violence but by peaceful 
political action, which gives the opportunity for the majority in any society to adopt 
or reject it. If Islam becomes the choice of the majority then we will apply it, if not, 
we will continue to coexist and discuss till we reach correct beliefs. 
We hereby affirm that our Islam rejects violence as a method to gain power, 
and this should be the formula for the non-Islamists as well. 
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4. Hezbollah: Identity and goals 49  
(August 2004)
Hezbollah is an Islamic struggle (jihadi) movement. Its emergence is based on 
an ideological, social, political and economical mixture in a special Lebanese, Arab 
and Islamic context. 
As a result of this background Hezbollah went through various decisive 
moments in its history. With the most important moment being in 1982 the year of 
the Zionist invasion of Lebanon. This invasion led to the occupation of the capital 
Beirut making it the second Arab capital to be occupied during the Arab-“Israeli” 
conflict, with Jerusalem being the first. This crossroad speeded up the presence of 
Hezbollah as a struggle movement that is totally affiliated in the long complicated 
and complex fight against the Zionist enemy. The starting point of that struggle 
being the Zionist occupation of Palestine, and then to many of the Arab lands in 
Egypt, Syria and Jordan leading up to Lebanon. All that led to the establishment 
of the identity of Hezbollah as a struggle movement against the Zionists. Add to 
that many social, economical, political and cultural ideals of the Shiaa in Lebanon. 
Another very important factor that developed Hezbollah was the establishment of 
the Islamic Revolution in Iran that was led by the late Imam Khomeini. This revolution 
consolidated new concepts in the field of Islamic thought mainly the concept of Wil-
layat Al-Faqih. The revolution also generalized Islamic expressions against the west 
such as arrogance, the great Satan, hypocrites and the oppressed.
With this crossroad and with the historic tie between the Shiaas in Lebanon 
and in Iran, which is a doctrinal tie. As well as of the reason that Iran hosts the sec-
ond most important religious school of the Shiaa in Qom with the second being the 
Al-Najaf school in Iraq. But because of many obvious reasons Qom has occupied the 
number one Shiaa school in the world today.
Due to that it was only normal for the ideological doctrine in Iran to take root 
in Lebanon. This tie was very quickly translated on the ground by direct support from 
the Islamic Republic of Iran through its revolutionary guards and then to Hezbollah 
that was resisting the “Israeli” occupation.
This religious and ideological tie between Hezbollah and Iran following the revo-
lution with its stance towards the Zionist entity had a great effect on releasing vital mate-
rial and moral support to Hezbollah. This support speeded up the acknowledgement 
of making Hezbollah one of the leading struggle movements against the Zionists. But 
during and after 1985 Hezbollah was the only such movement in this field.
It was not by cheer coincidence that Hezbollah turned into a struggle move-
ment against the “Israeli” occupation. Because Hezbollah’s ideological ideals sees 
no legitimacy for the existence of “Israel” a matter that elevates the contradictions 
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to the level of existence. And the conflict becomes one of legitimacy that is based 
on religious ideals. The seed of resistance is also deep in the ideological beliefs of 
Hezbollah, a belief that found its way for expression against the Zionist occupation 
of Lebanon. And that is why we also find the slogan of the liberation of Jerusalem 
rooted deeply in the ideals of Hezbollah. Another of its ideals is the establishment 
of Islamic Republic50.
The Islamic Resistance was able to direct very painful blows to the Zionist 
enemy forcing them to withdraw step by step. One of the principal withdrawals is 
that of 1985 leading up to the withdrawal from the Christian area Jezzine. And finally, 
leaving the enemy with no choice but to withdraw completely as a final solution to 
their problems.
Hezbollah also used one of its own special types of resistance against the 
Zionist enemy that is the suicide attacks. These attacks dealt great losses to the 
enemy on all thinkable levels such as militarily and mentally. The attacks also raised 
the moral across the whole Islamic nation.
It is also vital to state here, that the resistance gained high credibility amongst 
the people and in all official statuses, both locally and internationally. The US also once 
stated that the resistance is a justified movement in facing the “Israeli” occupation.51
The resistance also established an internal national axis in a way that was never 
witnessed in Lebanon before. This matter is of vital interest when we notice how Leba-
non is divided into various religions, sects, ideologies, societies, cultures etc.
Today, Hezbollah is one of the most prominent Lebanese political parties that 
has its presence in the parliament (with 8 MPs).
Hezbollah today also commands respect politically after it proved its power-
ful presence through a high level of efficiency measured by rationalism, steadfast-
ness, and high moral values aimed at respecting the values of others. This made 
Hezbollah inaugurate innovate political process.
Hezbollah also sees itself committed in introducing the true picture of Islam, 
the Islam that is logical. Committed to introduce the civilized Islam to humanity.
Hezbollah also sees itself committed in introducing the Islam that is confi-
dant in achieving justice, as well as introducing the Islam that protects all human 
rights. Introducing the Islam that supports education, the Islam that offers medical 
support. Hezbollah also has its own cultural plan to attract and convince through 
civilized and humanitarian means as specified in the human rights laws, far from any 
use of violence or coercion.
It should also be clear that the kind of Islam that Hezbollah seeks is a civi-
lized one that refuses any kind of oppression, degradation, subjugation and colo-
nization. Hezbollah also stretches its arm of friendship to all on the basis of mutual 
self-respect.
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The Islamic path that Hezbollah follows is one of a message that aims to 
establish peace and justice to all humanity whatever their race or religion. Hezbol-
lah does not have a problem with anyone, but it feels responsible towards him or her 
to clarify the true Islam far away of any fanaticism.
Hezbollah does not wish to implement Islam forcibly but in a peaceful and 
political manner, that gives the chance to the majority to either accept or refuse. If 
Islam becomes the choice of the majority only then will it be implemented. If not 
it will then continue to co-exist with others on the basis of mutual understanding 
using peaceful methods to reach peaceful solutions. And that is how the case should 
be to the non-Islamists as well. 
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C Parliamentary Elections Programs
1. Hizbullah’s 1992 Parliamentary Elections Program52 
(My translation)
In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate 
“Those who, if we establish them firmly in the land, will perform the prayer, 
give the alms, command the good and prohibit evil. To Allah belongs the 
outcome of all affairs” (22:41). 
From the stance of our legal (shar‘i) responsibility towards our oppressed 
people in Lebanon that gives due concern to the populace’s grand destining causes 
and its neglected daily demands; in light of a deep-conscientious reading to the 
nature of the degrading situation in Lebanon, and the changes in the international 
arena and their domestic impact, and the need to stand up against conspiracies that 
are being contrived against the land, rights, and dignities of our populace; based 
on a realistic diagnosis of the clear and possible dangers as well as the opportuni-
ties available to the Islamists in order to take a leading role, while avoiding slippery 
slopes, in the path to fortify the Islamic project, and consolidate its steps and fruits; 
in harmony with the jurisprudential (fiqhi) stipulations that, for us, act as a guide and 
an authority of emulation (marja‘ )… 
In conveying our gratitude to the righteous expression of our populace’s 
aspirations, pains, hopes, and aspirations; from the stance of the people’s trust in 
Hizbullah’s integrity and its great sacrifices, and its vigilance for public interest, and 
its principled stance. 
We [Hizbullah] made up our mind, relying on God, and decided to partici-
pate in electoral politics on the basis of a comprehensive political program, in which 
our candidates are obliged to do their utmost best to put it [political program] into 
operation, asking our populace to support it and follow up on it.
The dignified Lebanese,
The loyal oppressed, 
In this sensitive and grave period of the history of our wounded country; in 
the midst of grand international changes that ravaged out existence and led to the 
collapse of regimes and changed the features of policies and alliances; at the time 
when the Zionist enemy [Israel] is still occupying a beloved section of our country, 
the South and the Biqa‘, portraying the ugliest pictures of conquest and extortion, 
while the project of the oppressors, spearheaded by the US, continues its bet on 
subduing Lebanon and the region [Middle East] in order to seal the deal of recogni-
tion in the legitimacy of the Zionist Entity, and normalise relations with it, thus melt-
ing/fusing the cultural identity of the people of the region and tying its destiny to 
the [market] economy and Western mode of production and what it leads to in the 
sense of plundering riches and natural resources, the imposition of regimes, and the 
execution of programs [policies and plans].53
In these circumstances, Lebanon is embarked upon the preparation for the 
first parliamentary elections in twenty years. The Lebanese are facing an enormous 
historical eventuality that will paint the future picture of the general political situa-
tion in the country, be it on the level of the building a new [political] system, or on 
the level of its role, performance, and relations.
And if it assumed that the performance of the parliamentary elections will be 
conducive to finding a new formula for the [political] system that repels political sec-
tarianism and builds the foundations of a state that personifies the will of the Leba-
nese people, then Hizbullah’s decision to participate, with its brothers and friends, 
in these elections is based on perpetual principled political convictions, enforced by 
the blood of its martyrs, and the suffering and pain of its prisoners of war, detainees, 
wounded, families of the martyrs, and the oppressed; Hizbullah has sacrificed for 
these [principles and convictions] its best cadres and holy warriors (mujahidin), led 
by the leader of the martyrs of the Islamic resistance, Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi and his 
wife and child, and the Shaykh of the martyrs, Shaykh Ragib Harb, and Al-Sayyid the 
martyr Abdulatif al-Amin, and the Shaykh of the prisoners of war and the detainees, 
Shaykh AbdulKarim ‘Ubayd, and others from the heroes of the caravan of martyrdom 
and resistance who expelled the Zionist Occupation54 and enforced on it defeat and 
withdrawal, without any conditions, setting a precedent in the history of conflict 
against it, thus regaining to the umma the hope of victory and confidence in itself. It 
also gave Lebanon a chance to catch its breath and solve its plight away from direct 
Zionist [Israeli] intervention. 
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These convictions became embedded in our peoples’ souls, rendering them 
[i.e. convictions] a daily jihadi and political path, which revolves on two basic objec-
tives:
1. Lebanon’s liberation from the Zionist occupation and from the oppressors’ 
influence and following. 
2. The abolishment of political sectarianism
Hizbullah had a leading role in accomplishing important steps towards the 
realisation of these two goals. And Hizbullah has to continue, with the cooperation 
of other faithful [dedicated people], the necessary step in order to achieve total lib-
eration [the total withdrawal of the Israeli army from Lebanon] and strengthen the 
path to domestic peace, on the basis of political consensus, away from the despica-
ble sectarian strife and narrow zealous partisanship and fanaticism; the removal of 
the traces of the devastating [civil] war, and objectively, constructively, and responsi-
bly address its causes and consequences so that no party can feel duped, and so that 
privileges will not be accorded to any group [at the expense of another].
Today as Hizbullah embarks on participating in the parliamentary elections in 
Lebanon, it [Hizbullah] is trying to elevate the level of political work by selecting its 
nominees for the elections both on the basis of merit and a political program that is 
dedicated, in full honesty and seriousness, to address and solve people’s problems. 
Hizbullah’s responsible performance materialises in paying perpetual attention to 
accord the best care to the interests and the causes of the people, from the stance of 
its [Hizbullah’s] integrity in [honouring] word and deed as well as fidelity in following 
up people’s rights and defending their rights, honour, and dignity.
Hizbullah’s nominees have no desire to compete with others over power, wealth, 
or material possessions; rather to be dedicated to a religious duty (taklif shar‘i) in front 
of God, in order to preserve the country, uphold the interests of the people, and achieve 
the objectives that the holy warriors and the martyrs fought for.
From this stance, they [Hizbullah’s nominees] are committed to perpetual, 
industrious work, both within the confines of the parliament and outside it, in order 
to achieve the following objectives in the different domains: 
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 On the general political stance:
1. The Resistance
The conservation of a unified Lebanon, and its belonging to the civilised 
world, especially its Islamic-Arab milieu, dictates on us [Hizbullah] the serious com-
mitment to the Resistance as an alternative against the Zionist occupation until the 
liberation of all the occupied soil, especially after it has been proven on the ground 
that the Resistance is capable of foiling the conqueror’s [Israeli] plans, which aim at 
imposing a political reality that is against the interest of Lebanon and the Lebanese. 
After it became crystal clear that the Resistance is the only choice that is capable of 
standing out against the enemy and its extortions. In addition the Resistance stands 
for the right way of liberating Lebanon and upholding its unity and the unity of its 
people.
This choice [of Resistance] requires endeavouring to achieve the following: 
A. Being committed to the alternative of Resistance by supporting the fighters, 
backing up their ways of jihad, and embracing them and granting them popu-
lar and governmental support.
B. Put up programs that direct the capabilities in order to defend our populace 
and erect a withstanding resistance society (mujtama‘ al-muqawama)55 on all 
levels and domains, especially in the South and Western Biqa‘ [the occupied 
areas at the time].
C. The Lebanese state, with all its institutions, especially the army, should contrib-
ute in the operation of liberation and the defence of the land, the people, and 
the dignities.
D. According serious and practical attention to the occupied “Security Zone”, and 
take all necessary measures in order to foil the Zionist normalisation project.
E. Exhort the Lebanese government to secure the lives of the families that have 
either lost their breadwinners or whose breadwinners have became perma-
nently handicapped, in the detention camps or as a result of Zionist aggres-
sions. 
F. Standing up firmly and condemning every attempt of normalisation of rela-
tions or establishing peace with the “Zionist Entity”, which, in the first place, is 
found upon aggression and raping other people’s land.
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2. The abolishment of political sectarianism
Political sectarianism is one of the gravest ills for the corruption of the sys-
tem in Lebanon. It is also the result behind all cultural, political, security, social, and 
developmental misfortunes and disasters that have plagued the Lebanese people. 
It also offered the malignant entry to the oppressive greedy forces to interfere in 
domestic Lebanese issues and jeopardise Lebanon’s future and destiny. The first 
duties of Hizbullah’s nominees is to follow up the conducive efforts, in cooperation 
with all friends and loyal ones, to abolish it [political sectarianism], during the first 
constitutional cycle of the new parliament.
3. The electoral law
Amending the electoral law so that it will be more representative of the pop-
ulace, by adopting the following two measures:
– Lebanon as one election district.
– Reducing the age of voting to 18.
4. Political and media freedoms 
– Secure the freedom of belief and practicing religious rituals and rites, as well as 
respecting the sanctity of Abrahamic religions. 
– Enact laws that guarantee the freedom of political work.
– Organise the media within the following framework:
A. Harmonisation between the media mediums, on the one hand, and Lebanon’s 
[Arab-Muslim] cultural identity, on the other. 
B. Abiding by the sanctity of public conduct and morals.
C. Preserving the right of private media [institutions] to work within the above-
suggested points [A and B], without any guardianship [censorship] from the 
government 
5. The nationality
– Enacting a modern naturalisation law based on meritocracy, rather than sec-
tarianism and favouritism.
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– Granting the nationality to the residents of the “Seven Villages” and the Arabs 
of Wadi Khaled.56
6. The displaced
– Secure the comprehensive return of all the displaced.57
– Find [conducive] solutions to the displaced of the “Security Zone”.
– Set up a comprehensive developmental plan targeting all the geographical 
areas where the displaced are present in. 
7. Administrative, social, and educational issues
The need to fix and reform the infrastructure of the country in the administra-
tive, educational, social, and developmental domains. In addition to constructively 
addressing many pressing issues along these lines; issues which call for a conver-
gence of efforts in order be accomplished.
1. At the administrative level
A. Abolish the sectarian factor in public and private jobs and appointments.
B. Merit and open examinations should be used as a basis for selecting employ-
ees instead of favouritism.
C. Periodic rehabilitation of employees according to the demands of technologi-
cal advancement. 
D. Increase the effectiveness of administrative inspection.
2. On the developmental level
A. Protect the domestic produce; support the agricultural and industrial sectors 
by developing individual capabilities and providing external markets.
B. Develop the infrastructure of the oppressed [deprived] areas; enhance the lines 
of transportation, communication, electricity, and water. 
C. Secure job opportunities for all the Lebanese and protect the working force.
D. Support animal produce, help fishermen, and encourage handicrafts. 
E. Agricultural guidance; the inauguration agricultural centres, cooperatives, and 
laboratories.
F. Develop deprived areas in order to reach the level of flourishing areas in 
Lebanon; after accomplishing that balanced development.
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3. On the educational and cultural levels
A. Reinforce public education in all its stages and sectors, especially vocational 
education. 
B. Realisation of mandatory education, at least, till the middle level [preparatory 
for high school].
C. Buttress the Lebanese University, in particular the faculties of applied scienc-
es. 
D. Sponsor those who excel, and consolidate research at the [Lebanese] 
University. 
E. Rewriting the history [school] books based on an objective curriculum, and be 
committed to the standards of the cultural belonging of Lebanon to its Arab 
and Islamic milieu.58
F. Reinforce and protect religious education.
G. Re-stimulate the teacher’s education and rehabilitation centres, across the 
education spectrum or levels.
H. Strengthen the teachers’ financial conditions as well as their educational, and 
scientific qualifications.
I. Arabisation of the academic curriculum.
4. On the social level 
– Enact a law so that all Lebanese, including self-employed and daily workers, 
can benefit from social security, social and health benefits, and an old-age 
retirement plan.
– Reform [governmental] institutions that are responsible for social and health 
benefits and insurance [social security].
– Erect public hospitals and public medical centres in all Lebanese areas.
Based on this program, Hizbullah, through its nominees, presents itself to 
the parliament, while being resolute in protecting the interests of the oppressed in 
Lebanon, invoking God Almighty for acceptance and success. Hizbullah hopes to 
achieve victory, honour, glory, and progress (towards the better). God is All-Hearing 
and All-Responding.
Peace be upon you, God’s Mercy and Blessings
Hizbullah
July 1992
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2. Hizbullah’s 1996 Parliamentary Elections Program59
In His Name Be He Exalted 
The Electoral Program of Hizbullah, 1996
And those who strive [jahadu] in our (cause), we will certainly guide them to 
our paths60 for verily Allah is with those who do right.
(Holy Koran)  
Faithful Lebanese 
In persistence with our political course that is based on divine values, 
In commitment to our vast cultural affiliation with all its diversity, richness 
and sublimation of human value, within a framework of integration and unity, 
On the basis of our firm pledge of the Lebanese people’s interests in liberat-
ing our land in the South and West Bekaa, of maintaining our security and right in a 
decent life and an honorable living besides their looking forward to a political socie-
ty of more balance and justice, a society more capable of understanding the internal 
flaw points and confronting the foreign challenges and a more stable society, 
We continue the unlimited course of giving, the giving of blood, the hon-
esty of stand, the courageous word, and the political behavior that aims at chang-
ing instead of submitting to the status quo, overcomes balances instead of falling 
because of them and seeks a nation beyond sectarianism, a state with no monopo-
lization or absorption, a state of development with no discrimination and participa-
tion with no exclusion or elimination. 
In the light of a conscious reading of the magnitude of the perils and chal-
lenges that overwhelm the regional situation due to the policies of American hegem-
ony and Zionist terrorism, 
Out of the position of deep realization of the historic stage through which 
our country is passing, 
Under the staggering production of a sound political life and the disappoint-
ing results of the state institutions’ performance and their alleged attempts of devel-
opment, 
Before the regression of the state situation due to a combination of many fac-
tors surging out of the unbalanced nature of the Lebanese political system and the 
wrong practices by the authority men that led to deepening the status of corruption, 
favoritism and migration of qualifications, besides establishing the sectarian, confes-
sional and regional divisions, 
In the light of all that, and after four years, during which we had the honor of 
contribution in serving the Lebanese from the parliamentarian post, we run with you 
for the scheduled parliament elections with established responsibility and greater 
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insistence on shouldering the trust that our dear Lebanese people made us carry to 
complete the course of all the noble martyrs who died while defending our sacred 
soil and the dignity, freedom, future and welfare of our people, on top of whom the 
Master of the Islamic Resistance martyrs Sayyed Abbas Mussawi and Sheikh of its 
martyrs Sheikh Ragheb Harb (May Allah be pleased with them). 
As it has always been, Hizbullah will continue to be, with greater drive and 
increasing responsibility, the party of Resistance and Liberation, the party of stead-
fastness and construction and the party of change to a better status, according to 
the following program: 
1. Resisting the occupation
Through its liberating and striving course and its field and political achieve-
ment, the most distinguished of which were the steadfastness and victory in two 
large-scale wars, July 1993 and April 1996, the Islamic Resistance has affirmed its 
being the only option towards a dignified liberation with no conditions or prices 
that would61 damage the sovereignty, resources and right; it has also affirmed its 
being an element of unity and dignity for the Lebanese and a major guarantor for 
their security and their regional and international presence. Therefore, we confirm 
the following: 
– We will work on the strong and efficient continuation of the Resistance until 
our occupied land is completely liberated and restored to the national sover-
eignty, until our people in the occupied strip are released and able to secure a 
free honorable decent living away from any direct or indirect presence of the 
usurping Zionists. We will also work on confronting the logic of the theatrical 
negotiations that seek to establish Israel’s position at the expense of the people 
of the land. 
– Protecting the Lebanese civilians will remain essential in the Resistance per-
formance, due to its being a major objective and main role performed by the 
Resistance with wisdom, awareness and responsibility. 
– We will seek with all carefulness that the Lebanese people with all its sects, cat-
egories and individuals, remain the Resistance’s embracer and base from which 
it derives strength and presence. The sought-after liberation – Allah willing-will 
only be a gift to all the Lebanese and a major contribution in constructing a 
country with complete sovereignty and a state of consideration and estimation 
in the arena of regional and international conflict. 
– We will continue seeking to achieve more effective state involvement in the 
operation of liberation and embracing the Resistance men, and the prisoners, 
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detainees and martyrs’ families plus providing the steadfastness requirements 
through establishing and developing foundations for these ends, besides sup-
porting any action that assists in fighting normalization and cultural invasion 
along with rejecting any form of reconciliation with the enemy. 
2. Achieving Equality and Establishing the Just State 
Achieving justice and equality among the Lebanese is considered one of the 
main bases for establishing a stable dignified and prosperous country in which all 
the Lebanese engage in the process of construction with drive and solidarity under 
equality of opportunities, equality of all, individuals, classes and areas, in rights and 
duties, whether political, economical or social. Consequently we will seek to con-
tinue working until we achieve: 
– Abolishing political sectarianism that represents the center of the essential flaw 
in the formula of the Lebanese political system and its social structure, besides 
being what secretes most of the domestic instability features, the fertile soil 
for the disturbance that marks the authority institutions and the inter-confes-
sional relations. 
– A just and balanced electoral system that treats all the Lebanese even-handed-
ly, allows for real representation, and leads towards developing the Lebanese 
political status through the approbation of Lebanon as one constituency with 
a proportional representation system. 
– Establishing real political institutions that can not be summarized in individu-
als, nor emptied by the dominance of parties or groups, or employed to serve 
the “favorites” and “guys”. The most dangerous thing that confronts the state 
and topples its logic is politicizing the administration and linking it to political 
loyalties away from the criteria of qualification and equality. 
– Applying the principle of administration decentralization through a consist-
ent and proportionate law that guarantees achieving administrative divisions 
capable of accomplishing efficient development in the various areas besides 
reviving the municipal and mayor councils to allow for real participation by the 
civil society in running its development and social affairs. 
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3. At the Economical Level 
We will work on making the state adopt economical policies that give prior-
ity to achieving integral human development instead of being confined to imported 
economical policies that do not consider in their priorities the economical and social 
particularities discharged by the war and that led to increasing the rates of pov-
erty, unemployment, and the evanescence of the middle class that is considered the 
scales of economical justice. Moreover, we will work on realizing justice in the distri-
bution of taxes and charges among citizens according to their capabilities.62 
What is required is the rearrangement of development priorities and subsi-
dizing the sectors of industry, agriculture, animal breeding and fishery, plus provid-
ing loans and production requirements, protection, and marketing, in addition to 
supporting all forms of craftsmanship. 
The state’s role in the economical operation must be based on a delicate har-
monization between the necessity of activating the public sector, prosperity of its 
movement and investments, on one hand, and the necessity of not deserting the 
state’s responsibilities towards the citizens and the public utilities, especially what 
concerns supporting the steadfastness of the areas confronting the Zionist occupa-
tion. 
4. At the Educational and Syndical [Syndicate] levels 
– The chronic demand of enhancing and reforming public schooling has not 
taken its implementation course seriously and effectively until today, there-
fore; it is vital to seek enhancing and developing public schooling, as schools, 
teachers and administrations. Furthermore, the development of the education-
al structure must be followed by the policy of reestablishing and modernizing 
the curriculums in harmony with the modern necessities, besides accomplish-
ing the history book drafting on objective basis and working on increasing the 
interest in vocational education, taking into account the necessity of linking it 
to the Lebanese market needs. 
Uplifting the Lebanese University is a vital demand that we will work on 
achieving through modernizing its curriculums, uniting the branches of the 
capital and the surrounding areas, enhancing the branches of the areas, reviv-
ing specialization scholarships and sponsoring top students and strengthen-
ing research methods to get out of the currently-adopted dictation method 
and allow for developing talents and qualifications. 
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Reinforcing the labor movement and the syndical frameworks is a civil 
and political must; that ought to be away from pressure, straitening and har-
assment that are being practiced by the authority at times of crises and criti-
cal phases. Moreover, justice to teachers and university professors in achiev-
ing their various demands, without procrastination and postponement is an 
urgent measure for the stability of these two sectors. Therefore, Hizbullah 
affirms its persistence on staying in the stand of supporting the syndical 
movement and supplying it with political, and popular support and power. 
5. At the Social and Health Levels 
– We affirm the importance of the role of the youth in constructing their country 
and the necessity of providing them with the essentials for strengthening their 
personalities and filling their times with constructive activities. 
–  The woman’s role is based on her being the other half that raises and is effec-
tive in all the political, educational, social, cultural and economical life. Women 
must not be treated as supplements nor as commodities of advertisement. 
– Enhancing and maintaining the unity of the family that is the cornerstone in 
building a good society and providing all the educational and social conditions 
to establish this direction. 
– The completion of resolving the two issues of naturalization and the displaced 
so as those who have the right to the nationality obtain it and all the displaced 
return to their houses or villages in dignity, plus giving the displaced of the 
occupied strip a special priority attention and consideration. 
– Completing the task of improving public hospital and health clinics with the 
required equipment, spreading these health centers all over the country espe-
cially in remote areas and the steadfast and resisting areas in the South and 
West Bekaa, in addition to making health security accessible to all the sectors 
of the Lebanese society. 
– Developing the social welfare foundations, supporting the social care insti-
tutions, adopting old-age pension, and establishing institutes specialized in 
treating the various social problems and perversions.63 
– The necessity of reforming and developing prisons, establishing reformations 
for juvenile delinquents in all the Lebanese provinces. 
– Activating the foundations and legislative laws that protect the public resourc-
es and the environment, adopting a forestry policy that would restore the 
balance to the Lebanese environment, protect it from the jeopardy of aridity, 
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maintain the water resources, set projects to be used in all the Lebanese areas 
and reclaim the lands in order to increase the arable areas. 
– Making serious plans that secure a gradual resolution for the housing prob-
lem in Lebanon, plus considering this issue one of the great challenges that 
confront the Lebanese society and have negative social results at numerous 
levels. 
6. Safeguarding Public Freedoms
– To work carefully and persistently on safeguarding public freedoms, i.e. the 
freedom of belief, freedom of syndical [syndicates] and political activity, free-
dom of practicing religious rituals and schooling, in addition to accomplishing 
the regulation of the media without abating the freedom of press, on one hand, 
but while preserving the maintenance of the identity, public ethics and morals 
on the other. 
7. Foreign Policy
– Adherence to maintaining the Lebanese-Syrian relations, being the practical 
application of Lebanon’s Arab affiliation and since these relations represent 
a major element of inaccessibility and fortification for Lebanon before the 
attempts of isolating it under the regional challenges. Furthermore, the previ-
ous years have proven that these relations comprise factors of stability for the 
uneasy Lebanese formula. 
– To work on cementing the Lebanese stand in the face of the American pressure 
policies which are being practiced against Lebanon politically and economi-
cally, to reject the continuous American interference in its internal affairs and 
to deal with the American policy on the grounds of its being identical to and 
supportive for the positions of the Israeli enemy that occupies our land, kills 
our children and targets our villages with its incessant daily aggressions. 
– The necessity of adopting serious policies and efficient plans to communicate 
with the Lebanese communities in the countries of expatriation; sponsoring 
the frameworks that organize those communities’ existence; protecting them 
from attempts to expose them, weaken them or damage their economical 
presence (as has been the case in more than one African country); working 
effectively and persistently on rehabilitating the Lebanese expatriate existence 
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and precluding its being vulnerable and without political protection before the 
challenges and plots it confronts. 
– To emphasize building normal and balanced relations with the Arab and Islamic 
countries and all the countries of the world on the basis of independence and 
strengthening the ties that assist in confronting the plots of the American arro-
gance and allow for honorable and constructive cooperation. 
Dear Lebanese People, 
From the position of representing the people, with all its implications of reli-
gious, national and ethical dimensions and responsibilities, and with our full realiza-
tion of the magnitude of the complications and obstacles that our Lebanese soci-
ety is experiencing and with our realization of the long time needed to achieve all 
what our people anticipates, Hizbullah confirms its candidates’ observance and their 
doing their utmost to put into effect this electoral program that will formulate the 
framework for the political-legislative role of Hizbullah’s parliamentarian bloc. 




3. Hizbullah’s 2000 Parliamentary Elections Program65 
(My translation)
The elections offer a chance to participate in the parliamentary life in order to 
continue defending the rights of our people, country and causes. 
We work for the continual readiness of the [Islamic] Resistance, the populace, 
and the official stance of defending the country. 
The unique relations with Syria are an element of strength for Lebanon and 
Syria in facing the challenges. 
Alleviating the economic problem needs extraordinary efforts by propagat-
ing a general reformist economic plan.
Giving due care to the deprived areas, especially the Biqa‘ and Akkar, and 
allocating to them the necessary attention in order to develop them.
In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate
“But seek, thanks to what Allah gave you, the Hereafter, and do not forget 
your portion of the here below [the present world]. Be charitable, as Allah has been 
charitable to you, and do not seek corruption in the land; for Allah does not like the 
seekers of corruption” (28:77). 
Our loyal Lebanese populace:
Based on the experience that we provided [through our work in] the Leba-
nese political life, and using as a point of departure our immutable and clear intel-
lectual-political curriculum, which is based upon our civilizational belonging and 
commitment that makes religious norms the fulcrum of human life, and which aims 
at providing felicity to man in conjunction with upholding his/her dignity and ele-
vating his/her status… we continue the road to offering, giving, sacrifice, and ithar or 
“preference” in all positions and domains, putting our mind on continuing to defend 
our people’s and country’s rights and causes. [We] face the dangers and challenges 
that target our umma, primarily the “Zionist” conquest and US hegemonic projects. 
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[We] stress national unity, and we uphold national coexistence with all the religious 
denominations in Lebanon. 
From this perspective, our engagement in the elections constitutes an oppor-
tunity for us to take part in Lebanese parliamentary life in order to continue our 
course in defending our people’s and country’s rights and causes. 
1. Resistance and liberation
The Resistance has proven over the course of the past 18 years of continuous 
sacrifice and jihad, and through the blood of its dignified martyrs, that it is the only 
road to deter [Israeli] aggression and face “Zionist” greed, uphold the security and 
dignity of our people, [achieve] the liberation of our land and a true national unity 
based upon a national consensus in rejecting the occupation and its corroborators, 
and in buttressing the resistance.
– The Resistance was able to regain occupied Lebanese land and enforce its 
stance in the regional and international equation, forcing the Zionist enemy 
to capitulate and withdraw in humiliation, a precedent that the region [Middle 
East] has never experienced in the history of struggle against the “Zionist 
Entity”. Moreover, the resistance has proven its salient civilizational [cultured] 
behaviour during the liberation, that it is up to the grand national responsibil-
ity, and its upholding of the security of all the citizens, without any discrimina-
tion among their groups and sects, and the country. This great achievement 
[liberation] has been accomplished by the cooperation of the public govern-
ment, and the Lebanese army. This was conducive to the creation of a general 
positive atmosphere, which has shielded the victory [liberation].
– The Resistance imposed itself as a serious option that could be bet upon in 
order to regain the rights and liberate occupied land, without any conditions 
or dictated peace treaties. It [the Resistance] became a model to emulate and 
to adopt by all the people in the region, especially the oppressed Palestinian 
people inside Palestine [Occupied Territories].
– That is why, it is a duty to consolidate and generalise the experience of the 
Islamic Resistance in Lebanon [Hizbullah’s model], in order to awaken and ele-
vate the umma as well as to strengthen the stances of its rulers and regimes, 
and to stop normalization with the Zionist enemy. This will lead to inflicting a 
“retreat” on the US-Israeli project, which aims at imposing their hegemony on 
the region and imposing their dictates forcing its people to grant them conces-
sions. 
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– We work to continuously keep on guard the Resistance and the readiness of the 
populace as well as the official [Lebanese] stance to defend our country against 
any aggression or “Zionist” threat. [This is in line with] our continued convic-
tions and belief in facing the Israeli enemy in order to prevent its schemes and 
dangerous projects from materialising in the region [Middle East]. 
In order to continue the path and aims of liberation we stress the following:
– Exhort the government to decree and execute a developmental-service oriented 
socio-economic program for the liberated areas and their peripheries, and work 
on the reconstruction and development of human resources, the economic 
cycle, and the return of all the displaced, without discriminating against them 
and giving their cause the appropriate care without humiliating them and forc-
ing them to seek favours66. (Italics are added for emphasis).
– The continuation of different and rapid efforts in order to liberate the prisoners 
of war, detainees, and the purified bodies of the martyrs. The activation and 
development of the necessary social care for the families of the martyrs, the 
liberated prisoners of war and detainees, and the wounded and handicapped 
of the Resistance.
– Being cautious on safeguarding our total rights and national interests in order 
to accomplish a total liberation of Lebanese soil, and expropriating our total 
sovereignty on our land, water rights, and security rights, without giving in any 
part of it, especially those aspects (points) of disagreement67 and the Shib‘a 
Farms.
– Resisting normalization [of relations with Israel], opposing the cultural con-
quest, refusing coexistence with the Zionist invaders [by not] giving legitimacy 
to their “Rapist Entity”, and refusing the naturalization [of the Palestinians living 
in Lebanon]68 and insisting on their right of return to all their land in Palestine. 
2. Lebanese foreign policy
– Work on consolidating the Lebanese stance in the face of the US aggressive 
policy, which is always biased towards and supportive of the “Zionist Entity”, 
covering up all its crimes, aggressions, and terrorism against our people. Reject 
the continuous US interference in Lebanese domestic affairs, which is against 
all norms and diplomatic standards.
– Consider the special and destined relations with Syria as an element of force 
for both Lebanon and Syria in order to confront the challenges facing them, 
especially the dangers posed by the “Zionist Entity”.
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– Follow a governmental policy towards taking care of the matters and causes 
of the Lebanese expatriates and diaspora in order to make it as an element of 
force for Lebanon abroad (in the international domain) as well as an element of 
economic support for the Lebanese residing inside the country. 
– Aspire for consolidating Lebanon’s relationships with the Arab and Islamic 
countries as well as other friendly countries in the world of nations. 
– Fortify interests and complimentarily with the Arab nations economically.
– Develop the relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, which has always been 
a staunch supporter of Lebanon. 
3. Socio-economic problem
– The aggravation of the social problem reached a serious level making most 
Lebanese suffer from poor living standards, which are marked by severe short-
ages. This calls for exercising extraordinary efforts in order to solve the problem 
by propagating a general economic reform plan that aims at materializing the 
following:
– Treating the budget deficit by adopting a general and balanced economic-
developmental plan among the different sectors in order to increase revenues, 
decrease expenses, and increase the levels of growth.
– Austerity in expenditure, dealing with the public debt, and reducing its bur-
dens.
– Follow homogeneous fiscal, monetary, and economic policies, which aim at 
developing economic growth, increasing employment, and encouraging 
investment.
– Energise the national productive sectors of industry and agriculture by increas-
ing government spending on these sectors and by following stimulating poli-
cies and animating procedures. 
– Protect local production; be committed to the principle of [fair] competition, 
increase the ability to compete in foreign markets, and protect the interests of 
the consumer. 
– Develop the sectors [material resources] and human resources by adopting up 
to date plans and programs aimed at rehabilitation, organisation, and guid-
ance.
– Taking due care of the deprived areas, especially in the Biqa‘ and Akkar, and 
allocate to them due attention in order to develop them, especially the agricul-
tural sector and work on accomplishing the following:
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1. Find a plan to buttress agricultural products.
2. Make available agricultural loans and ensure investment.
3. Begin actual work in the Public Foundation for Alternative Agricultural prod-
ucts in the Biqa‘ region, and place a time-schedule suitable in dealing with the 
grave catastrophe that has ravaged this struggling, productive area.
4. Engage in a continual effort in order to make available the necessary funding 
required for alternative agricultural products.
5. Decrese the middleman role between the farmer and the consumer by activat-
ing the role of cooperative agricultural farms.
6. Fortify the interest of domestic products and protecting it by contracts and 
agreements. 
7. Reduce the cost of insecticides, fertilisers, electricity, and water.
8. Give due attention to natural resources, and prepare the ground for exploiting 
them, and looking for them, especially oil and water.
4. The building of the state of law and institutions, and 
the promotion of political participation 
From the stance of our concern: with the development of political life and 
the establishment of social justice among all the Lebanese without any discrimina-
tion; the building a stable country; of a fruitful future that offers equal opportunities 
to all individuals, groups, and geographical areas, and where all people are equal 
in rights and duties, we [Hizbullah] will continue to work so that the following will 
materialise:
– Establish the “National Body for the Abolishment of Political Sectarianism”.
– Accord special attention to the youth in order to activate their role in the public 
and political life, and founding specialised centres in order to rehabilitate them 
on different levels or scales.
– Strengthen the role of women and open the doors for them to participate in 
the building and activation of public life.
– Enact an election law that is conducive to the development of political life and 
which gives chance to be a better representation that is based on political pro-
grams according to proportional representation, and reduce the voting age 
[from 21] to 18 in order to offer the opportunity for the youth to express their 
genuine nationalistic choices.
– Strengthen the role of political parties, the institutions of civil society, and the 
associations and syndicates [that are engaged in] the public life.
– Develop surveillance and accountability bodies, and activate their role away 
from the politics of arbitrary decisions and the centres of power. 
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– Accomplish administrative and political reform, and fight and prevent corrup-
tion and waste.
– Accomplish an administrative decentralisation law.
– Accomplish a new and modern naturalisation law.
5. Educational [Pedagogical] and cultural issues
– Strengthen public education and increase the efficiency in the teachers’ roles; 
furnish the schools with the necessary equipment in order to be able to cope 
with the implementation of the new educational curricula; make the educa-
tional opportunity available to all walks of life, especially the poor and deprived; 
give the proper attention and care to the deprived areas in this respect.
– Accord serious attention to vocational education according to market 
demand.
– Develop the Lebanese University and activate its role; encourage specialised 
scientific studies and research.
– Enact [a law making] religious education an obligatory subject in both public 
and private schools. 
– Reactivate the National Union of the Students of the Lebanese University.
6. Social and health issues 
– Put a just end to the displaced file or dossier, with particular attention to the 
special circumstances of the displaced in light of the [Israeli] occupation and 
“Zionist” attacks.
– Develop and activate the institutions of social care that all strata of society are 
in need of, especially social security; reconsider and re-evaluate social securi-
ty’s legislations in order to increase the benefits and the circle of the services so 
that they extend to all Lebanese strata [and not only those registered in social 
security] and contribute with the available social security’s money to economic 
development and addressing the housing problem.
– Increase and expand social benefits and public services based on a well-stud-
ied plan in order to help the families residing in Lebanon, because 40% of these 
families are poor or deprived and live below the poverty line. That is why it is 
incumbent upon [the state] to provide a dignified way of living for these fami-
lies.
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– Constructively remedying the social problem according to a general develop-
mental-economic vision in order to root it out.
– Put into practice the old-age retirement plan, and improve it for the benefit of 
the citizen.69
– Develop the state hospitals, and extend social security to cover all hospitalisa-
tion cases pertaining to the poor strata. 
– Continue to deal with the loopholes that resulted from the naturalisation 
decree.
– Reform and develop the prisons, and establish and universally introduce reha-
bilitation centres; place mandatory safeguards in order to uphold ethical norms, 
moral values, and public mores, in all domains, especially in the media; launch 
national conscious-raising campaigns aimed at reducing the crime rate.
– Work on placing practical plans, which are conducive in solving the difficult 
and severe housing problem. 
– Place the necessary programs and plans aimed at providing total, safe, and real 
care for the children.
– Encourage private initiate and work; ensure the availability of work for Lebanese 
manual labour; work for putting an end to the aggravated unemployment 
problem.
7. Environmental issues
– Develop and organise recycling plants for sanitary sever water, and continue 
the installation of sanitary sewer networks.
– Put accurate, scientific plans in order to deal with the issue of “solid” garbage.
– Work on preserving forestry; launch a campaign to plant trees in all geographi-
cal areas in order to face desertification; legislate the necessary laws in order to 
protect forestry and establish natural conservations.
– Activate the role of municipalities in the environmental activities.
– Universally introduce a general guided program for the planning gravel and 
rock excavation and appropriation.
– Activate the institutions that cater for consumer protection through increased 
control and supervision on domestic and imported goods in order to ensure 
their validity and quality.
– Increase supervision and control the way factories dispose their chemical 
waste; legislate laws that protect the environment, especially the rivers, sea, 
and underground waterbeds, from the dangers of pollution.
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Dear dignified Lebanese,
By counting on you, and with our confidence in the loyalty and consciousness 
of our populace that has given and sacrificed a lot, we boldly embark upon [partici-
pate in] the elections, renewing the oath to dispense all efforts and potentials [do 
our best] within the narrow confines of the parliament and outside it, in every place 
and domain, “to serve you with our eyebrows” – as the leader of the martyrs of the 
Islamic Resistance, al-Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi, may God have mercy on his soul – and 
to continue, with you, our march in order to achieve all our goals that we all aspire 
for, our election program, as an avant-garde.
God is behind the intention.
Hizbullah.
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4. Hizbullah’s 2005 Parliamentary Elections Program70 
(My translation)
1. Safeguard Lebanon’s independence and protecting it from the Israeli men-
ace by safeguarding the (Islamic) Resistance, Hizbullah’s military wing, and its 
weapons in order to accomplish total liberation of Lebanese occupied land (a 
reference to the Shib‘a farms). 
2. Facilitate the mission of the UN investigating team into Hariri’s assassina-
tion. 
3. Take practical measures to organize a special relationship between Lebanon 
and Syria. 
4. Reject any foreign tutelage or intervention in Lebanese domestic affairs 
under any pretext or form. 
5. Contest the parliamentary elections with the mentality of achieving the 
broadest and most encompassing national and populist representation in 
order to come up with an efficient parliament that protects the established 
national set of values (thawabit wataniyya).
6. Affirm the recourse to the constitutional apparatus and state institutions, 
while urging the employment of a national discourse through openness and 
dialogue in a national-comprehensive framework.
7. Stress the need for establishing a comprehensive socio-economic program 
aimed at stamping out poverty by boosting productive sectors such as agri-
culture, industry, and trade that are conducive to rendering basic services to 
the Lebanese citizens. 
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D Municipal Election Program
 Hizbullah’s 2004 Municipal Election Program71 
(My translation)
1. Hizbullah’s principles dictate that the populace constitute the main pillars 
behind its movement. From this perspective, Hizbullah is under a responsibil-
ity to fend off all oppression and injustice in order to serve them and protect 
their dignity. 
2. One of Hizbullah’s aims is to adopt the plight of the oppressed and the disen-
franchised populace by protecting them and actively working for putting an 
end to oppression and discrimination towards the deprived areas in order to 
raise its standards (of living) in all respects.72
1. Core Program
1.1 Administration and organization
– find a unified internal order for the employees which takes into account the 
development of the need of municipal work; 
– be strict in enforcing remuneration and punishment as well as a rotation policy 
targeting the appraisal of employees by developing a special magnetic card for 
that purpose;
– consider the service of the citizen as a legal and ethical obligation;
– employ state of the art communication and technology as well as rehabilitate, 
train, and modernize the administrative cadre in order to efficiently render 
services to the citizens;
– apply accountability, objectivity, and transparency in dealing with the citizens 
in taking decisions and on a procedural basis;
– regularly publish a brochure, which clearly indicates the accomplishments of 
the municipalities and its activities as well as a detailed appraisal of the employ-
ees and their responsibilities in front of the municipal councils, in order to build 
a two way street with the public and keep it informed.73
1.2 The efficiency of the municipal council and boosting 
the confidence of the citizens in it
– make sure that the members of the municipal councils are conversant with the 
municipal and administrative rules and regulations;
– erect efficient municipal committees, composed of specialized and authori-
tative individuals that could be chosen from outside the municipal council, 
according to a promulgated internal order, specifying its role and jurisdiction, 
making sure that the same person can not participate in more than two com-
mittees;
– layout an annual plan, which is adopted by the municipal council, and followed 
up by regular appraisal sessions;
– building good relations with the authority of administrative surveillance and 
public institutions;
– building good relations with the deputies of the region and cooperate with 
them in order to effectively follow up people’s administrative transactions or 
“dossiers” (mu‘amalat) and the developmental projects; 
– establishing dialogue sessions, between the municipal council and the citi-
zens, which include debating the projects and submitting a summary of the 
municipal achievements as well as the impediments facing it. Also, listening to 
the problems and complaints of the citizens;
– launch campaigns that encourage the submission of innovative projects 
accompanied by valuable financial prizes to these projects;
– sponsoring conflict resolution by peaceful means between the feuding fami-
lies;
– establish a special “complaint box”, and respond in an efficient way to the com-
plaints of the people;
– follow transparency and accountability in executing promises;
– establish committees from the people in order to react and interact with the 
municipal work;
– erect big bulletin boards in the centre of the towns and villages and place on 
them the decisions and news of the municipal councils.74
1.3 Expand the financial revenues of the municipalities
– specifying in detail the expenditures and the incomes that the municipalities 
incur;
– incomes are divided along the following lines: the money that the municipality 
derives directly from the people as well as the money that the state levies on 
behalf of the municipalities, which is distributed accordingly among them.75





– study the possibility of redefining the municipal enclosures or boundaries with 
respect to the projects and studies of every town;
– form specialized committees by the central committees in various districts or 
areas;
– lay out “guided planning” (mukhatat tawjihi) in conformity with the demographic, 
social, and touristic stance of the towns concerned, in such a way that takes into 
consideration the present situation and the benefit of each and every town. Also, 
activate the role of the municipality by voicing its opinion during the propaga-
tion of studies and guided planning by the official governmental institutions;
– supervise (public) works taking place within the municipal domain;
– work on detailing the “guided planning” for each municipality, dividing the 
projects with specifying the technical and financial needs for every project, and 
the time needed to executed it;
– divide the town according to the deprivation index, (level of ) oppression, differ-
ent walks of life (social, economic, and touristic). Also, setting priorities in order 
to take proper care of the various areas according to the recommendations of the 
proposed studies;
– prepare topographies and computerized maps that clearly indicate real estate, 
roads, planned projects in order to make use of them in all engineering, develop-
mental, and financial studies for the town.76 
B. Specific projects
– study and execute sanitary sewer and drainage network for all the streets that 
are included within the municipal domain, and seriously thinking for establish-
ing a recycling factory in conjunction with the neighbouring municipalities; 
– erect central water tanks in the municipalities and villages in order to make 
use of rain or ground water. Also constructing dams and asking the Ministry 
of Water and Energy to help find other sources of water and construct water 
networks in the towns and villages lacking it;
– organize garbage collection without resorting to containers placed on the 
streets; rather working hard in order to establish garbage recycling factories;
– supply streets and internal allies with lights;
– build bridges for pedestrians above the main roads and highways, especially at 
the entrance of villages and towns;
– encourage agriculture and the free reclamation of barren land to make it agri-
culturally productive. Rehabilitate and secure irrigation networks, ponds, and 
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dams as well as constructing agricultural roads and encouraging the erection 
of cooperatives and establishing seminars and special guidance sessions;
– construct markets (groceries, fish, meat) or reorganize what is available accord-
ing to the stipulated requirements;
– build and rehabilitate shelters in a good manner, especially in the southern areas 
adjacent to the “occupied lands” (Palestine) by the “Zionist Entity” (Israel);
– put an end to building violations (mukhalafat al-bina’ ) and being sever towards 
handling encroachments on public and private property;
– building parking lots and making use of unused land as well as constructively 
working on solving the traffic problem;
– building care and recreational centres for ages ranging between 65-75 in order 
to find good substitutes for what is presently available;
– work on executing the modal street and taking proper care of ruins;
– helping private companies in constructing housing complexes for low income 
people in an attempt to help the youth77 to get married and solve the escalat-
ing problem of housing.78 
1.5 Giving importance to environmental conditions within 
the municipal jurisdiction
– regular check up of the state of the environment in order to determine the 
polluters in sanitary sewers, drinking water, air, garbage, etc., while keeping in 
touch with private companies, local ministries, and foreign associations that 
are all specialized in executing projects capable of fighting pollution, while 
being strict in regular follow up inspection and supervision;
– be strict in spreading environmental awareness;
– planting trees and various plants as well as establishing public gardens and 
greenhouses;
– putting temporary solutions as well as long term ones in order to get rid of all 
kinds of garbage and polluters to the environment, in coordination with the 
concerned ministries as well as competent international associations;
– preservation of the environmental and national heritage;
– encouraging/motivating private initiatives aiming at establishing model/exem-
plar neighbourhoods;
– be strict in giving permits that might affect the environment;
– conduct efficient health inspection on restaurants, slaughter houses, and food 
factories;
– regular medical examination and check up on school pupils; 
– cleaning and protecting beaches and river banks.79
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1.6 Social care
A. Consolidating the resistance society (in order to substantiate the already exist-
ing “resistance identity”)
– naming the streets within the municipal jurisdiction in such a way as to reflect 
the identity of the village, town, or city (article 49 of the municipal law);
– erecting monuments (article 62 of the municipal law);
– protecting the youth from the causes of immorality or vices (article 62 of the 
municipal law) by erecting gyms, public gardens, children playgrounds as well 
as helping in ridding society from social problems; 
– caring for the oppressed families (article 49 of the municipal law);
– support and encourage clubs and associations working within the geographi-
cal areas of the municipalities (article 49 of the municipal law);
– helping in building mosques and husayniyyat;
– according special attention to religious occasions and public holidays through 
decoration and congratulatory call on feast days;
– consolidating commendable societal customs and habits;
– erecting a special praying place (musalla) in the town hall so that people can 
pray at the stipulated times; 
– exhort the citizens to form special committees, under the jurisdiction of the 
law, in order to deal with procedural matters concerning their dwelling facili-
ties;
– regulate and strictly observe, within the narrow confines and the jurisdiction 
of the municipal law, media and information activities situated within the con-
fines of the municipalities.80
B. Caring for the youth
– appointing a committee, headed by one of the members of the municipal 
council, in order to follow up on the matters or affairs of the associations, thus 
rendering a variety to youth activities such as scouts, athletics, and cultural 
activities. Also it would lead to the erection of clubs aiming at attracting the 
highest possible number of youth; 
– setting up handicraft, vocational, athletic, scientific, mathematical and cultural 
training courses in cooperation with the specialized ministries, UN programs, 
and local associations, which are concerned with the youth’s welfare and their 
(scientific) development;
– encourage the youth to acquire scientific and cultural education by helping 
them in pursuing higher education in their own fields of specialization;
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– stimulate the successful, creative, innovative youth by organizing an annual 
celebration in their honour;
– doing their utmost best in creating job opportunities and establishing athletic 
playgrounds and well-equipped facilities for the youth;
– encourage the youth to visit holy places by organizing competitions and offer-
ing them prizes; 
– establishing a monthly or seasonal journal or brochure specifically for the 
youth.81
C. Children, motherhood, old age, and handicap (disability)82
– collect information and data on the orphans, old people, working children and 
handicapped children, so that it could be studied and evaluated in order to find 
the appropriate ways to deal with it;
– fighting illiteracy in society and establishing pedagogical and educational 
training courses;
– reducing child labour and dealing with difficult cases through guidance, reha-
bilitation, and effectively working for finding them schools;
– establishing training and vocational courses for mothers in order to help them 
to perform their role in a satisfactory way by helping them raise more income 
for their families. Also, finding or building day care centres (for children) in 
order to help working women;
– upgrading contact with specialized international associations in order to guide 
the nursing mother and afford her with what she needs;
– constructing gardens for children and the old aged;
– helping, as much as possible, the poor, especially the elderly in order to pay 
state and municipal taxes;
– making health and social care available for the elderly, orphans, handicapped 
and the needy through municipal associations and other governmental and 
private institutions;
– commemorating the grandfather, grandmother, mother, and child day and 
honouring the eldest man or woman by special celebrations and meetings, or 
according them media coverage.83
D. Pedagogical care
– honouring the directors, faculty, and educational staff;
– setting up educational training courses and reinforcements for the public 
degree;
– celebrating the “Day of Victory and Resistance” (May 25) in the domain of the 
municipality school;
‘ T H E  S H I F T S  I N  H I Z B U L L A H ' S  I D E O L O G Y ’
276
277
– celebrating “Teachers day” at schools located inside the municipality;
– working on rehabilitating public schools located within the municipal domain
– adopting (as a course of action) and encouraging the holding of cultural and 
technical fairs;
– working on the erection of a public library and cultural centre.84
1.7 The domestic, regional, and international resources that 
the municipalities benefit from
– local or domestic institutions: The Ministry of Social Issues, The Ministry of 
Health, The Ministry of Environment, The Ministry of Public Works, The Ministry 
of Energy and Waterworks, The Institution of Civil Planning/Organization; and 
the Lebanese Army;
– regional and international institutions and organizations: UNICEF, UNDP, 
(Iranian) Jihad Al-Bina‘, etc.85
2 Recommendations
1. according special attention to the Lebanese diaspora86 and encourage them to 
invest their capital in developmental projects within the municipal domain;87
2. the relationship between the municipalities and Hizbullah and its civil insti-
tutions and NGOs should be one of coalescence in such a way that it ought 
to serve the objectives of the party, which are the same as the objectives of 
municipal work, since the latter aims at actively working in order to redress 
deprivation at the level of the municipalities, which ultimately leads to a con-
structive political society;88
3. organize detailed studies targeting the following: 
– establishing a union of municipalities in order to evaluate things and address 
obstacles/impediments;
– twin ship programs;
– a new municipal elections law;
– the jurisprudence of municipal work (the religious safeguards, dawabit shar‘iyya, 
for municipal work and municipal decisions);
– a general evaluation of municipal work in every municipality with specific men-
tion of the weaknesses in order to constructively address them.89
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E Chronology of events (1975 - 2005)
 
1975
• April 13 witnessed the beginning of the 16-year old Lebanese civil war
1976
• In response to an official request by the Lebanese government, on July 20, the 
Syrian army entered Lebanon as a contingent to the Quwat Al-Rad‘ Al-‘Arabiyya 
(Arab Deterrent Forces) in order to help the Lebanese government enforce law 
and order in the civil war torn Lebanon.
1978
• Hizbullah came into being in 1978 when Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi, one of its 
primary founders and its second secretary general, came back from Najaf to 
Lebanon and established in the Biqa‘, along with other Lebanese and Iranian 
clergy and cadres, the religious and ideological foundations of the party. 
Sayyid Abbas established religious seminaries (hawzas) and started his Islamic 
propagation or call (da‘wa), in B‘albak, in the Biqa‘. This also coincided with 
the arrival of dissident Iranian clergy and military personnel (most notably Ali 
Akbar Muhtashami and Mustafa Shamran) who established religious and mili-
tary training centres with substantial material and spiritual backing from Imam 
Khumayni who was himself banished in Najaf for a period of 13 years. 
• On March 14 Israel launched “Operation Litani” by invading Lebanon and even-
tually occupying a 500-squared kilometre “Security Zone”, which included 61 
cities and villages. On March 19, the UN Security Council issued resolution 425 
calling for the unconditional withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Lebanon, a 
resolution that fell on deaf ears. In order to help restore the Lebanese state’s 
sovereignty to the border, the UN established the UNIFIL, a 5000 interim peace-
keeping force, which was sent to Lebanon as of March 23. However, Israel did 
not allow the UNIFIL to deploy all the way to the border.
• On August 31, Imam Musa al-Sadr, the leader of the Lebanese Shi‘a community 
and the head of the Islamic Shi‘ite Higher Council, disappeared in Libya in mys-
terious circumstances. All of these factors were conducive to the emergence of 
Hizbullah’s rudimentary foundations that crystallized in the birth of its religious 
ideology. 
1979
• On February 1, Imam Khumayni landed in Tehran, thus ushering the victory 
of the Islamic Revolution in Iran on February 11. Many Lebanese Shi‘ites were 
inspired by Imam Khumayni’s revolutionary ideology, which led them to active-
ly mobilize and struggle for a more active role in the Lebanese political system. 
Thus, after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Sayyid Abbas Al-Musawi along 
with his students and other leading ‘ulama officially founded “The Hizbullah of 
Lebanon”.
1982
• At a time when the Arabs and the international community were preoccupied 
with the Iraq-Iran war, on June 6 Israel invaded Lebanon for a second time 
through its “Peace for Galilee” operation. From 8 to 13 June, the Khaldé bat-
tle (which was spearheaded by many of Hizbullah’s founding cadres, many of 
whom were wounded) heralded the initiation of Hizbullah’s military wing, the 
“Islamic Resistance”. Khaldé, a small town near Beirut, was the only location that 
the Israeli invasion was temporary halted because of the stiff resistance it met, 
a resistance that resulted in heavy Israeli casualties (16 dead and 176 wounded) 
and led the Israelis to change their military strategy and tactics. 
• As early as July, the political framework of Hizbullah was embarked upon, a task 
that passed through different stages, most notably in 1984-85.
• On August 23, Bashir Jumayyel, the head of the Phalangist Christian militia, was 
elected president.
• On August 21, the Multi-National Forces, made up of contingents of US, French, 
UK, and Italian forces, landed in Beirut in order to supervise the implementa-
tion of the agreement between the PLO and Israel. The agreement dictated the 
withdrawal of PLO fighters, cadres, and leaders from Beirut, including Yasser 
Arafat who left Beirut on August 30. 
• In Tyre, in south Lebanon, on August 31 during the fourth anniversary of the 
disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr, a massive popular uprising, in the hun-
dreds of thousands, paid allegiance to al-Sadr avowing that Israel will remain 
the enemy, shouting: “Israel is the absolute evil, and dealings with it are reli-
giously prohibited (haram)”. This event culminated in violent confrontations 
with the Israeli forces in Jibshit, in south Lebanon. 
• On September 3, PLO fighters left Beirut, thus ending a military presence that 
lasted decades. 
• After 83 days of besieging it, Israeli army entered Beirut on September 14 in the 
wake of the assassination of president elect Bashir Jumayyel by a car bomb.
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• September 15-17 witnessed the massacres of the Palestinian civilians in the 
Sabra and Shatila refugee camps. 
• On September 23, Amin Jumayyel, Bashir’s brother, was elected as president of 
the Lebanese Republic.
• On September 28, the Israeli army withdrew from Beirut.
• On November 11 Ahmad Qasir, Hizbullah’s first suicide bomber (“martyr”), det-
onated his car in the Israeli headquarters in Tyre killing around 76 soldiers and 
military personnel and wounding 20.
• Thus, the military birth of Hizbullah, as an Islamic jihadi (resistance/struggle) 
movement, was a direct result of the Israeli invasion – in which Israel killed 
around 20,000 people (mostly Lebanese and Palestinian civilians, but also some 
Lebanese, Palestinian, and Syrian fighters) as well as occupied almost one-third 
of Lebanon (3560 squared kilometres) including 801 cities and villages. 
1983
• January witnessed the first massive launch of Katyusha rockets at Israel’s north-
ern settlements as well as the capture of the first Israeli soldier by the Islamic 
Resistance. The Israeli soldier died suffering from wounds during his abduction, 
and his body was left behind. 
• In March Shaykh Raghib Harb, the leader of the popular uprising in the south, 
was captured by Israeli forces.
• On April 13, Hizbullah conducted its second martyrdom operation when ‘Ali 
Safiyyeddine detonated his car into an Israeli convey in Dayr Qanun al-Nahr 
killing 6 soldiers and wounding 4 others.
• On April 18 the US Embassy in West Beirut was targeted by a suicidal attack 
resulting in the death of 63 people, out of whom 17 were Americans, including 
the entire Middle East contingent of the CIA.
• On May 17, Israel and the Lebanese government signed a peace agreement. 
• In July Israel withdrew from Mount Lebanon to the Awwali River, near Sidon, in 
the south. October witnessed the ‘Ashura uprising in Nabatiyyé, in the south, 
in response to Israeli’s defilement of the ritual. On October 14 Hizbullah con-
ducted its third martyrdom operation when Ja‘far Al-Tayyar blew himself in 
an UNIRWA building in Tyre housing Israeli soldiers, killing 29 soldiers by the 
concessions of the Israelis themselves. On October 23 the “Islamic Jihad” com-
mitted twin-suicidal attacks against the Marines barracks and the French para-
troopers, which resulted in the death of 241 American and 58 French soldiers 
respectively. 
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• Hizbullah put a lid on its aborted double suicidal (martyrdom) operation when 
the car of the two suicide bombers got blown prematurely on its way to Tyre.
• In November the Israeli air force started targeting Hizbullah’s training bases in 
the Biqa‘. On November 23 the Israelis released 4,500 Lebanese and Palestinian 
detainees from the Ansar detention camp (in southern Lebanon) and 63 other 
Palestinians in exchange for the release of one Israeli pilot and six soldiers. 
1984
• Hizbullah’s Shura Council, or main decision body, passed through different stag-
es from 9 members to 5 and was finalized to 7 as of 1984. Hizbullah released 
several political declarations bearing its name and established its politburo.
• In March the Lebanese parliament abrogated the May 17, 1983 agreement with 
Israel. 
• On June 18 Hizbullah’s mouthpiece and weekly newspaper Al-‘Ahd came to 
light.
• On February 16 Saykh Raghib Harb, Hizbullah’s most influential resistance lead-
er in the south, was assassinated by the Israeli forces. 
• On September 20 the US Embassy in East Beirut was targeted by a suicide oper-
ation. 
1985
• On February 16 Hizbullah published its “Open Letter” or Political Manifesto, 
ushering the birth of its political ideology. The Open Letter officially announced 
the establishment of Hizbullah, and its military wing, the Islamic Resistance. 
The Open Letter was read by Sayyid Ibrahim Amin Al-Sayyid, its spokesman at 
that time. In February Israel withdrew from Sidon.
• In March Israel blew the Husayniyya (religious gathering place) of Ma‘raké and 
assassinated two leading Hizbullah cadres. 
• In April Israel withdrew from Nabatiyyé and Tyre. 
• The Jalil Operation on May 20 between the General Command of the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Israeli government resulted 
in the release of 1,150 Lebanese and Palestinian detainees from the Atlit deten-
tion camp in Israel, in exchange for three Israeli soldiers. 
• In June the Israeli Army announced that it has finalised its withdrawal and 
established an 1100-squared kilometre “Security Zone”, which included 168 
cities and village. The “Security Zone” comprised around 15% of Lebanese ter-
ritory along Lebanon’s southern border with Israel that is reminiscent of the 
1978 invasion, which aimed at creating a similar security arrangement in order 
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to protect the northern Israeli settlements from missile attacks across the 
Lebanese border. 
1986
• On February 16 the Islamic Resistance captured two Israeli soldiers in an opera-
tion in the Kunin area of Bint Jubayl. Israel launched a limited incursion in 17 
villages for six consecutive days in order to retrieve the two soldiers, but with 
no avail. The Islamic Resistance waged a relentless war against the SLA posts 
aiming at occupying them and destroying them, killing and detaining all mem-
bers, then blowing the entire post.
• In October an Israeli jet fighter was downed, and Ron Arad, the assistant pilot 
was captured. 
• Hizbullah standardised the practice of videotaping military operations against 
Israeli forces in order to convey the exact number of the Israeli dead and 
wounded to the Israeli public, thus belying Israeli claims of low casualties.
1987
• On June 15, the Lebanese government issued the official double annulment of 
the May 17, 1983 Agreement and the November 3, 1969 Cairo Agreement.
• Nasrallah assumed the newly established “chief executive officer” post, in addi-
tion to being a member of the Consultative Council, which is Hizbullah’s high-
est leading panel.90 This year witnessed the reinvigoration of the war of attri-
tion against SLA posts in an unprecedented manner. December marked the 
beginning of the first Palestinian Intifada (popular uprising). 
1988
• The first major military encounter and direct confrontation took place between 
the Islamic Resistance and the Israeli Army, in an Israeli attack on Maydun, in the 
Western Biqa‘. On March 11 Hizbullah conducted its fifth martyrdom operation 
when ‘Amer Kalakish blew himself in an Israeli convoy near the Mtulé settle-
ment at the Lebanese border killing 12 Israeli soldiers and wounding 14 oth-
ers. 
• The AMAL-Hizbullah control war – secular Shi‘ites against Islamist Shi‘ites – 
started in on April 5 in the South and spread to the Dahiya on May 6, which led 
to the ousting of AMAL fighters from the Dahiya. This control war ended more 
than 2 years later in November 1990.
• The Consultation Centre for Studies and Documentation (CCSD), Hizbullah’s 
think tank, was created. In May Hizbullah’s al-Nour radio station started broad-
casting. On August 19 Hizbullah conducted its sixth martyrdom operation 
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when Haytham Dbuq blew himself in an Israeli convoy on the Marji‘yun road 
killing one Israeli soldier and wounding three others according to Israeli mili-
tary sources. The seventh operation occurred on October 19 when Abdallah 
‘Atwi blew himself near the Fatima Gate on the border between Lebanon and 
Israel killing eight soldiers and wounding another eight by the concession of 
the Israelis.
• The tenure of the then Lebanese President Amin Jumayyel ended without 
electing a successor by the Lebanese parliament. (It is worth mentioning that 
Jumayyel was “voluntarily” banished to France from 1988 till 2000). So, on 
September 23, 1988, Jumayyel appointed General Michel ‘Aun, the Lebanese 
Army Commander, to head a military government composed of 3 Christians 
and 2 Muslims. Deeming the appointment unconstitutional, Muslim spiritual 
leaders met and issued a fatwa banning any Muslim from participating in the 
military government. So General ‘Aun virtually ruled the Christian areas in East 
Beirut and Mount Lebanon, while the rest of the country was under the man-
date of prime minister Salim Al-Hoss, who formed a second government in 
West Beirut. Thus, at that time, Lebanon had 2 governments, a situation that 
lasted for almost 2 years.
1989
• Hizbullah held its first conclave and revealed the identity of its leaders and 
cadres. The conclave resulted in the creation of the post of the secretary gen-
eral and the election of Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli as Hizbullah’s first secretary 
general.
• On July 28 the Israeli army abducted Shaykh AdbulKarim ‘Ubayd, a leading 
Hizbullah cadre, from his hometown, Jibshit. 
• In an attempt to drive the Syrian Army out of Lebanon, on March 14, General 
Michel ‘Aun, waged a “Liberation War” against the Syrian forces present in 
Lebanon since 1976. 
• On August 9 Hizbullah conducted its eighth martyrdom operation when Shaykh 
As‘ad Birru blew himself in an Israeli convoy across the Marji‘un road killing five 
soldiers and wounding five others according to Israeli military sources.
• The Ta’if Agreement, a “bill of rights” or a blueprint for national reconciliation 
and reform aimed towards a more equitable political system for all sectarian-
confessional groups, was drafted and ratified between the 30th of September 
and the 22nd of October in Ta’if, Saudi Arabia. On Saturday, October 22 at 10:45 
pm, it was officially announced, from the Palace of Conventions at Ta’if, that the 




• The proposed changes in the Ta’if Agreement were officially written into the 
Constitution in August and September 1990. The final document is known as 
“The Constitution of Lebanon after the Amendments of August 21”. 
• October 13 witnessed the actual ending of the 16-year civil war by the ousting 
of General Michel ‘Aun and banishing him to France.
• On November 9 the 2 and a half-year AMAL-Hizbullah war ended by a final 
accord brokered between the warning factions through intensive Syrian and 
Iranian pressure. 
1991
• In line with the Ta’if Agreement, in March the Lebanese government officially 
declared the dissolution of the militias. The end of April was set as a dead-
line for the militias to hand in their heavy weapons and to close their military 
and training centres. Hizbullah was a notable exception, and to a lesser extent 
AMAL.
• Starting May 22, Hizbullah held its second conclave and elected Sayyid ‘Abbas 
Al-Musawi as its second Secretary General. Unlike the first conclave in which 
the seven-member Shura Council were nominated, in the second conclave they 
were elected. On June 3 Hizbullah’s Al-Manar TV station was created.
• The first swap operation between Hizbullah and Israel, which was brokered 
by UN91, took place took place, on three instalments, between September 11 
and December 1. Israel released 91 Lebanese detainees (one from Israeli pris-
ons and 90 from the Khyam detention camp, including ten women), and the 
remains of nine fighters in exchange for information about two Israeli soldiers 
who were detained by Hizbullah on February 16, 1986.
1992
• February 16 witnessed the assassination of Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi, his wife, 
and his son, by an Israeli helicopter. Two days later, Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, 
Hizbullah’s third Secretary General, was elected as well as Shaykh Na‘im Qasim 
as Deputy Secretary General. Both Nasrallah and Qasim retain their posts till 
the current day.
• Israel attacked the two villages of Kafra and Yatir, an act that is met with forceful 
resistance from Hizbullah fighters.
• Hizbullah started employing the Katyusha weapon as a deterrent strategy to 
protect Lebanese civilians from Israeli aggressions.
• Hizbullah launched its political program as a distinct manifestation (or exten-
sion) of its political ideology. Hizbullah participated and won 12 seats in the 
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first parliamentary elections, which were frozen for a period of 20 years due to 
the Lebanese civil war. 
• On September 21 Ibrahim Dahir conducted Hizbullah’s ninth martyrdom 
operation when he targeted an Israeli convoy on the Jarmaq road, killing and 
wounding 25 according to Hizbullah. 
1993
• In its third conclave, Hizbullah re-elected Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah as its Secretary 
General, and Shaykh Na‘im Qasim as Deputy Secretary General. It is important to 
note that the Islamic Resistance was rewarded by electing Hizbullah’s “Central 
Military Commander”, Hajj Muhsin Al-Shakar, as one of the seven-member 
Shura Council.
• July 23 till 31: “The seven days war” or the Israeli “Operation Accountability” 
erupted as a direct result of the Islamic Resistance’s killing of seven Israeli sol-
diers. “The seven days war” led to the death of 130 people, mostly Lebanese 
civilians, and it displaced around 300,000. “Operation Accountability” resulted 
in an unwritten agreement between Hizbullah and Israel to sideline the civilians 
on both sides of the border. (Italics added for emphasis).
• On September 13, when Hizbullah was protesting peacefully against the Oslo 
Agreement, the Lebanese Army and ISF (Police) killed 13 Hizbullah supporters 
– including two women – and wounded 40 because they took to the streets 
when the Hariri government imposed a ban on demonstrations.
1994
• April 21: the Lebanese state jailed Samir Geagea, the leader of the right wing 
Christian Lebanese Forces (LF), and banned the LF.
• In October the Islamic Resistance stormed the Israeli post of Dabshé. Hizbullah 
exploited the camera as a primary weapon in its psychological warfare against 
Israel by airing, through its al-Manar TV, details of the operation and the Israeli 
casualties. 
• On 31 May an Israeli commandos unit abducted Hajj Mustafa al-Dirani, an 
Islamic AMAL leading cadre, from his hometown, Qsarnaba, in the Biqa‘.
1995
• On May 17 Imam Khamina’i appointed Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, Hizbullah’s 
Secretary general, and Shaykh Muhammad Yazbik, Hizbullah’s Shura Council 
member, as his religious deputies (wakilayn shar’iyyan) in Lebanon “in the hisbi 
domain and shar‘i issues, taking over from him the religious duties and dispos-
ing them to the benefit of the Muslims; warding off oppression and injustice; 
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conducting shar‘i reconciliations for the khums people; and appointing their 
own deputies”.92
• On April 25 Salah Ghandur conducted Hizbullah’s tenth martyrdom operation 
when he blew himself in an SLA post in Bint Jubayl wounding eleven according 
to Israeli military sources.
• Hizbullah’s fourth conclave was held in July. The Secretary General and his deputy 
were re-elected. Some of the basic organizational changes that Hizbullah made 
were the following: (1) The Politburo was renamed as the “Political Council” and 
its jurisdiction was enlarged; (2) The creation of the “Jihadi Council”, headed by 
Sayyid Hashim Safiyyeddine, the only new member of the Shura Council; (3) The 
“Executive Council” replaced the “Executive Shura” with, more or less, the same 
jurisdictions; (4) In order to evaluate Hizbullah’s experience in the parliament, the 
party formed a new body called the “Parliamentary Block Council”. 
1996
• On March 20 ‘Ali Ashmar conducted Hizbullah’s eleventh martyrdom operation 
in the Town of Rub Thalathin in al-‘Daysé killing two according to Israel military 
sources. From April 11 till 18, the Israeli military operation of the “Grapes of 
Wrath” ended with the Qana massacre, where more than 100 Lebanese civil-
ians, seeking shelter in a UN complex, where killed by Israeli shelling. The Israeli 
aggression resulted in what became known as “April 1996 Understanding/
Agreement” that protected both Israeli and Lebanese civilians from military 
operations. The UN, France, Syria, and the US brokered the April 26 written 
Agreement between Israel and Hizbullah, which established the “Monitoring 
Group for the Understandings of Operation Grapes of Wrath”. The “Grapes of 
Wrath” led to the death of more than 150 Lebanese civilians and displaced 
around half a million others. (Italics added for emphasis).
• Under German sponsorship, on July 21 Hizbullah exchanged the bodies of 2 
Israeli soldiers (kidnapped on February 16, 1986) and 17 SLA collaborators, for 
45 Lebanese detainees and 123 remains.
• In the 1996 parliamentary elections of this year, Hizbullah managed to keep 11 
seats. 
1997
• In February, while attempting to avoid being spotted by Hizbullah, 73 Israeli 
soldiers were killed on board of two helicopters, which collided into each other 
while they were on a mission aimed at deploying troops in south Lebanon.
• On April 7 a swap operation between Hizbullah and Israel resulted in the 
exchange of three Lebanese detainees for the body of a dead SLA sergeant. 
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• Conflict between Hizbullah’s identity and the Lebanese state sovereignty: on 
May 4, Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli founded the “Revolution of the Hungry”, and on 
4 July he called for civil disobedience against the Lebanese government, which 
culminated in blocking roads on October 26. 
• On September 5 the Israeli operation of al-Ansariyyé resulted in the death of 12 
high-ranking officials of an elite Israeli military commandos while not a single 
member of the resistance was injured.
• On September 12, Sayyid Hadi Nasrallah, Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah’s son, died in 
a confrontation with the Israel soldiers in southern Lebanon.
• On November 3, Hizbullah formed Al-Saraya Al-Lubnaniyya Li-Muqawamat 
Al-Ihtilal Al-Israeli or the Multi-confessional Lebanese Brigades to fight Israel 
(Lebanonisation of the resistance). 
1998
• Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli was officially expelled from Hizbullah by a political dec-
laration issued on January 24. On January 30 a violent military confrontation 
erupted between the Lebanese army and al-Tufayli’s supporters, who occupied 
by military force Hizbullah’s religious seminary in ‘Ayn Burday, near B‘albak. The 
bloody face off ended with the destruction of Tufayli’s headquarters and the 
Lebanese state’s issuing of an arrest warrant against him. However, till this day, 
Tufayli is still at large. After solving the internal discord problem, Hizbullah held 
its fifth conclave between June 20 and the end of July. Nasrallah was elected 
for a third term. For this move to be made, Hizbullah had to amend its internal 
bylaws by deleting the stipulation that the secretary general cannot serve for 
more than two consecutive terms. 
• The May-June 1998 municipal elections – that reflect true populace represen-
tation and which had not been carried out since 1963 – were carried out only 
after pressure and lobbying from Hizbullah. The Lebanese government used 
the pretext of lack of financial and technical resources and manpower, but 
Hizbullah insisted on the reactivation of the elections. Eventually, Hizbullah 
won a landslide victory in its main constituencies (with the exception of the 
B‘albak district), including electoral districts that were supported by the 
Lebanese government and its candidates.
• On 26 June, by mediation of the Lebanese government, the remains of an Israeli 
soldier, who died during the Ansariyyé battle of Sept. 1997, were exchanged 
for 60 detainees (10 of whom were detained in Israel) and the remains of 40 
Lebanese resistance fighters, including Hadi Nasrallah. 
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• On September 13 Israel released Suha Bshara (who 10 years ago attempted to 
take the life of the SLA leader, Antoine Lahd) after 10 years of imprisonment 
and torture at the notorious Khyam prison.
1999
• On February 28 the Islamic Resistance blew the convoy of the Israeli Brigadier-
General in Lebanon, Erez Gerstein, which resulted in his immediate death. 
Gerstein was the highest-ranking Israeli soldier to be killed in 17 years.
• In early June Israeli forces and SLA withdrew from Jezzin (a predominantly 
Christian enclave) that comprised around 6% of the “Security Zone”, thus reduc-
ing the total size of the “Security Zone” to 9% of the Lebanese territory.
• Through German mediation, Israel released, on two instalments, 13 Lebanese 
freedom fighters, five of whom were released on December 26 from the Israeli 
Ayalut detention camp, in exchange for a promise from Hizbullah to help 
track the missing Israeli pilot, Ron Arad, whose plane was downed over south 
Lebanon in 1986. 
• On December 30 ‘Ammar Husayn Hammud conducted Hizbullah’s twelfth mar-
tyrdom operation on the road to al-Qlay‘a killing 7 Israeli soldiers and wounding 
seven others according to Hizbullah, while according to Israeli military sources 
the operation resulted in no Israeli casualties due to premature denotation on 
behalf of the suicide bomber.93
2000
• In February the Islamic Resistance blew the farm of the SLA’s second man in 
rank, ‘Aqil Hashim, who died in the blast.
• On April 19 Israel released 13 Lebanese detainees from the Israeli Ayalut deten-
tion camp.
• On 24 May Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon after 22 years of occupa-
tion. (Israel failed to relinquish the Lebanese Shib‘a farms, which are a bone of 
contention between Israel and Lebanon). 
• On 28 September the second Palestinian Intifada was inaugurated in the wake 
of Sharon’s visit to the Dome of the Rock (al-Masjid al-Aqsa).
• Hizbullah won 12 seats in the parliamentary elections held in the summer.
• On October 7 Hizbullah captured 3 Israeli soldiers from the Lebanese Shib‘a 
farms. On 15 October Hizbullah lured and apprehended, at Beirut, a retired 
Israeli Mossad colonel.
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2001
• In Hizbullah’s sixth conclave that ended on July 30, 2001, Nasrallah was re-
elected for life, and Sayyid Ibrahim Amin Al-Sayyid and Hajj Jawad Nureddine 
replaced Hajj Muhammad Ra‘d and Hajj Muhsin Shakar in the Shura Council. 
Hizbullah placed its media institutions under the direct command of Nasrallah 
aided by the head of the Political Council and that of the Executive Council. 
This was done in order to upgrade the role of Hizbullah’s media, and pursue its 
ideological hegemony. Also, Hizbullah abolished its “Central Planning Council”, 
and strengthened internal audit and accountability mechanisms. From this 
perspective, the roles and duties of the municipal councils were expended 
(horizontally) and upgraded (vertically). 
2002
• On March 27-28 the Arab Summit was held in Beirut and the Arab initiative of 
ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was propagated. 
• In late March, early April, the Israeli army conducted a deadly incursion into the 
West Bank. Hizbullah’s responded by 12-day military operations in the Shib‘a 
farms in order to buttress the Intifada. 
• On June 10, in light of the revival of the prisoner-swap negotiations and as a 
good well gesture towards Hizbullah, Israel released Muhammad al-Birzawi, a 
Hizbullah fighter, who has been detained since 1987.
2003
• On August 21 Israel returned the remains of two Hizbullah fighters in return for 
a meeting between the detained Mossad colonel and the German mediator.
• In response to a suicide operation in Israel a day earlier, in which 19 Israeli civil-
ians died, on December 5 Israeli jets violated Lebanese airspace and bombed 
an alleged Palestinian training camp near Damascus. This was the first Israeli air 
strike on Syria in 30 years, since the end of the October 1973 war.
2004
• On January 19 Hizbullah destroyed an Israeli military bulldozer after it crossed 
the “Blue Line”. Hizbullah targeted it by firing an anti-tank rocket when it was 26 
meters inside Lebanese territory by the concession of the UNIFIL. 1 Israeli sol-
dier was killed, and another was seriously wounded. This confrontation came 
at a time when the prisoner exchange negations between Israel and Hizbullah 
were at a their peak/ reached a climax. This exemplifies Hizbullah’s 2-track pol-
icy: military confrontation and negotiations.
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• On January 29-30, Hizbullah and Israel conducted the first phase of a watershed 
prisoner exchange deal after 4 years of negotiations brokered by Germany. 
Hizbullah released the Israeli colonel and the bodies of three Israeli soldiers 
captured in October 2000 in return for 400 Palestinians, 23 Lebanese and Arabs 
(including two Hizbullah senior cadres: Shaykh AbdulKarim ‘Ubayd and Hajj 
Mustafa Al-Dirani), and the remains of 59 Lebanese guerrilla fighters, 11 of 
whom belonged to Hizbullah. It was a watershed operation since it was the first 
time that Israel acquiesced to Hizbullah’s demands and released Palestinians, 
setting a precedent and bestowing Hizbullah an unprecedented role in the 
Intifada, thus regionalizing the conflict. By this move, Israeli granted Hizbullah 
a de facto recognition as a legitimate resistance movement.
• On May 7 an Israeli incursion reminiscent of Ansariyyé occurred after the 
elite Israeli Egoz commandos unit crossed the “Blue Line”. Hizbullah fighters 
ambushed it, killed one soldier and wounded 5 others, by the concession of 
the Israel’s themselves. Unlike the precedent set by Ansariyyé and in spite of 
Hizbullah’s intensive firing power, the Israeli’s were able to evacuate their dead 
and wounded, but they left behind a dead dog.
• Between the 2nd and 30th of May the second municipal elections were held after 
a lapse of 6 years. Hizbullah achieved a landslide victory in Beirut (100%), the 
Biqa‘ (almost 95%), and the south (almost 61%).94
• May 21: Hizbullah held a big demonstration to protest the desecration of the 
holy sites in Iraq. Around half a million Hizbullah supporters wearing white 
burial shrouds chanted “death to Israel” and “death to America”. This show of 
force came 2 days before the municipal elections in the South, which was con-
sidered an AMAL den and strong constituency.
• May 27: Events reminiscent of Sept. 13, 1993 occurred: licensed demonstra-
tions spread over the country in protest for the pressing socio-economic situ-
ation triggered by a severe hike in fuel prices. In Hayy al-Sulum, in Dahiya, the 
Lebanese Army fired at the demonstrators who where throwing rocks at it, kill-
ing 5 and wounding several others. As a result, riots spread in the Dahiya and 
the demonstrators burned the first floor of the Ministry of Labour.
• May 29: Nasrallah held a news conference in which he accused the US Embassy 
in Beirut of infiltrating the demonstrators and perpetrating the violence, thus 
giving weight to the hidden hand explanation or the conspiracy theory. He 
called on the cabinet and parliament to hold emergency sessions to discuss the 
issue, and he called on the government to launch an investigation about what 
has happened.
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• May 30: Hariri visited Nasrallah and conducted a meeting with him in the house 
of the latter’s political advisor/aide.
• May 31: Conceding to Nasrallah’s demands, the Lebanese cabinet held an 
urgent meeting in which it vehemently condemned the May 27 shootings and 
offered, as blood money, around $33,000 to the family’s victims. The cabinet 
asked the Justice Minister and the Defence Minister to conduct an investiga-
tion into the unrest and report directly to it.
• Between June and August 16, Hizbullah held its seventh conclave. Shura 
Council members retained their same functions. Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, 
Hizbullah’s Secretary General became the head of the Jihadi Council. The most 
salient administrative amendment was Hizbullah’s division of the South into 
two geographical areas: the first south of the Litani river, and the second to its 
north. Both function under the auspices of one central organisational leader in 
order to secure organisational structures that are capable of improving local 
administration and activate polarisation. In addition, Shaykh Karim ‘Ubayd 
was appointed as the head of Hizbullah’s social institutions. Shaykh Hasan 
Izzeddine, Hizbullah’s spokesman at the Central Press Office, was appointed as 
Hizbullah’s political representative in the South, and Nasrallah’s media aide or 
advisor, the engineer Hajj Muhammad Afif, replaced him. 
• September 2: The UN Security Council issued Resolution 1559 censuring Syrian 
intervention in Lebanese affairs and criticising both Syria and Lebanon for the 
intended constitutional amendment that will extend president Lahud’s tenure 
for three more years, till November 2007. Among other things, Resolution 1559 
called on the Lebanese government to disband and disarm Lebanese militias, 
which is a direct reference to Hizbullah since it is the only Lebanese political 
party that still bears up arms.
• September 3: The Lebanese parliament amended the constitution, thus allow-
ing president Lahud to remain in office for a second half-tenure, or a three-year 
term.
• October 1: A failed assassination attempt targeted MP Marwan Hamadé in West 
Beirut and left his bodyguard dead and wounded his driver.
• November 11: On Hizbullah’s Martyr’s day, the party set a precedent in its “bal-
ance of terror” with Israel. For the first time since its founding, Hizbullah flew 
an unmanned drone, which is a small spying plane supplied with state of the 
art cameras and is capable of carrying 40 to 50 kilograms of explosives and can 
be programmed to hit any target, for 14 minutes over Israel. It took pictures of 
the northern Israeli settlement of Keryat Shmona. Israel confirmed the flight 
and claimed the drone flew over Israel for 5 minutes. The Israeli government 
issued a statement condemning the act a serious breach of Israeli sovereignty 
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forgetting the 9400 breaches Israel conducted to Lebanese sovereignty, by air 
and sea, since its nearly complete withdrawal in May 2000.95
• November 30: Around 250,000 Lebanese people, one-third of whom were 
Hizbullahis, demonstrated against resolution 1559. All the participants carried 
out Lebanese flags including Hizbullahis. It was the fist time that Hizbullah par-
ticipates in a demonstration without portraying flags, banners, and special slo-
gans. The only two features that pointed out at Hizbullah were (1) the chanting 
of “death to Israel” and “death to America” and (2) the Hizbullahi veiled women 
who outnumbered Hizbullahi men by a great margin. Some of the banners 
raised by the Hizbullahis were the following: “Unity, unity in Lebanon so that 
we can defend our country”; “We do not want democracy American style”. 
• In the beginning of December and in light of the decisions taken in Hizbullah’s 
seventh conclave, Hizbullah, for the first time in its history, has appointed the 
head of Hizbullah’s Women’s Organization, Rima Fakhry, as a member of its 18-
member Political Council (Politburo). Also, Hizbullah appointed Wafa’ Hutayt, 
the person responsible for political programs in al-Nour radio, as deputy of 
Hizbullah’s Central Information Office.
• December 13: France banned Hizbullah’s satellite TV, al-Manar, from broad-
casting to France and other EU countries. Hizbullah abided by the ruling and 
al-Manar voluntarily stopped transmission. However, al-Manar continued to 
broadcast from six other satellites covering most of the globe, including three 
in Europe, which do not fall under France’s jurisdiction.
• December 17: the US followed suit and banned al-Manar classifying it as a “ter-
rorist organization”.
2005
• January 29: Hizbullah’s first annual celebration of the “Day of Freedom” marking 
the watershed prisoner release operation a year ago.
• February 14: ex-PM Rafiq al-Hariri was assassinated by a suicidal massive truck 
bomb. 
• March 8: Hizbullah organized a pro-Syrian demonstration. Around half a mil-
lion Hizbullahis along with their supporters and sympathizers filled the streets 
of the capital carrying Lebanese flags. Nasrallah delivered a speech calling for 
national unity, dialogue, and coexistence.
• March 14: The “Cedar Revolution”: one million people took to the streets in 
Downtown Beirut to demand Syrian troops withdrawal and the truth about 
Hariri’s assassination.
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• April 19: Omar Karami’s government resigned and Nagib Miqati’s 14-member 
Cabinet took office. The cabinet included Trad Hamadé, a Hizbullah affiliated 
sympathizer (non official member), for the first time in its history.
• April 26: Syria ends its military presence in Lebanon after all its remaining 
14,000 soldiers along with its intelligence personnel leave Lebanon after a 29-
year presence.
• May 23: The UN verified the Syrian military pullout from Lebanon.
• 29 May-June 19: first parliamentary elections after the Syrian withdrawal. Sa‘d 
Hariri’s camp won 72 seats out of the 128. Hizbullah won 14 seats, adding 2 
seats to its previous gains.
• June 27: Trad Hamadé signed a memo allowing the Palestinians who were born 
in Lebanon to work.
• Early July: Syrian trade embargo begins; a de facto economic embargo.
• July 18: 100 MPs voted for the parole of Samir Geagea – the leader of the right-
wing outlawed Christian Lebanese Forces (LF), who has been serving a jail sen-
tence for 11 years – and the Sunni Islamists who served a 5-year jail sentence. 
• July 19: Fa’ud al-Sanyura forms the first cabinet after Syrian withdrawal, where 
Hizbullah joins with an official member, MP Muhammad Fnaysh, and an ally, 
Trad Hamadé.
• July 22: Condoleezza Rice visits Lebanon, the first visit of a Secretary of State 
since Collin Powell’s visit in May 2003.
• July 30: Sanyura’s cabinet wins a parliamentary vote of confidence of 92 votes.
• July 31: Sanyura visited Syria in an attempt to end the Syrian economic embar-
go.
• August 1: Syria partially lifted its economic embargo and opened its border to 
Lebanese transit trucks.
• 31 July-August 6: Nasrallah along with members of the Shura Council visited 
Tehran in order to attend the inauguration of the newly elected president 
Mahmud Ahmadi Nejad on August 3 as well as conduct meetings with him, 
Imam ‘Ali Khamina’i, and other Iranian officials. The Iranian leadership assured 
Hizbullah that disarming it is a mirage. 
• August 17: Israel relinquished the Gaza strip after 38 years of occupation and 
starts evacuating its settlers. Nasrallah termed this eventuality as the send vic-
tory for the model of resistance in five years: “The choice of resistance liberates 
Gaza”. He added that this constitutes further proof for the utility of holding on 
to the weapons of the Hizbullah’s Islamic Resistance. 
• September 12: Israel officially ended its occupation of Gaza after the complete 
withdrawal of its military. 
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• October 21: Detlev Mehlis, the head of the UN investigation team into Rafiq 
Hariri’s assassination, presented a legally inconclusive, but politically powerful 
report that implicated high-ranking Syrian and Lebanese officials in the assas-
sination. 
• October 24: AMAL and Hizbullah released a joint declaration blasting the Mehlis 
report for failing to convey the truth, sided with the Syrian regime in its face off 
with the international community, but endorsed the Lebanese government’s 
decision to extend Mehlis’ mandate till December 15.
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on us to possess the right of power along with the power of right”. See his speech in the 
third anniversary of the liberation on May 25, 2003 at: http://www.nasrollah.org/arabic/
hassan/khitabat/2003/khitabat93.htm (Last accessed April 2005).
 132. Cf. “Fadlallah, who is considered close to Hizbollah but who rejects being called the 
organization’s spiritual leader…”. Daniel Sobelman, Rules of the Game: Israel and Hizbullah 
After the Withdrawal from Lebanon. Memorandum No. 69. Tel Aviv university: Jaffee 
Center for strategic Studies, January 2004, 117, at: http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/memoranda/
memo69.pdf. 
 133. Kramer, “The Oracle of Hizbullah”, 84.
 134. Al-Harakat al-Islamiyya fi Lubnan, op. cit., 175-176. 
 135. Al-Madini, Amal wa Hizbullah…, 203. For an insider’s view on the relationship between 
Ayatullah Fadlallah and Hizbullah refer to: Hasan Fadlallah, Al-Khiyar al-Akhar, 83-89. 
Nabih Berri stressed that AMAL follows Fadlallah’s marja‘iyya. Adnan El-Ghoul, “At Shiite 
conclave, Berri backs Iran’s nuclear quest: Observers see ‘deal’ to Boost Amal prestige”, 
Daily Star 20 August 2004.
 136. The living Imam is Imam al-Mahdi, whose occultation makes him away from people’s 
sight. (See Qasim, Hizbullah: Al-Manhaj…, 388). 
 137. Salim Al-Hasani, Al-Ma‘alim Al-Jadida Lil-Marja‘iyya Al-Shi‘iyya [The New Features of the 
Shi‘ite Marja‘iyya]. Third edition. Beirut: Dar Al-Malak, 1994, especially 48-58; see also Al-
Madini, Amal wa Hizbullah…, 201.
 138. This continued till Imam Khumayni’s death in June 1989.
 139. Talal Salman, Sira Dhatiyya li Haraka Muqawina ‘Arabiyya Muntasira: Hizbullah [An 
Autobiography of a Victorious Arab Resistance Movement: Hizbullah]. Beirut: Al-Safir, 
June 2000, 4. See the following web page: http://www.nasrollah.org/arabic/hassan/
sera/about002.htm. That is why it is not surprising that Hizbullah allocated, in its “Open 
Letter” or political constitution, a special section dealing with the dangers of fitna. See 
“Appendix A”, section 22: “God is With the Unity of the Muslims”.
 140. Hasan Fadlallah, op. cit., 35; 163-183. As of 1998 the signature and motto changed to 
“Hizbullah – The Islamic Resistance in Lebanon”. (Italics added for emphasis).
 141. Ali Al-Kurani, a Hizbullah middle rank cadre, was the first to expose the social movement’s 
mobilization strategies in his book entitled, Tariqat Hizbullah fi Al-’Amal Al-Islami 
[Hizbullah’s Method of Islamic Mobilization]. Tehran, Maktab Al-I‘lam Al-Islami: Al-Mu’assa 
Al-‘Alamiyya, 1985, 9-20; 165-181.
N O T E S
340
‘ T H E  S H I F T S  I N  H I Z B U L L A H ' S  I D E O L O G Y ’
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for more than one year. During that period they undergo intensive Islamic cultural 
indoctrination, on the basis of which they are evaluated in terms of behaviour and action 
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of Islamic mobilization upon. After passing this stage the recruits have to be strictly 
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command or pyramidical structure, come what may; and (2) undergo intensive military 
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fi Lubnan, op. cit. 219-233. 
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 158. Ibid., 53.
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 180. Although Imam Husayn did not blow himself (simply because there were no explosives 
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156-169.
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N O T E S
342
‘ T H E  S H I F T S  I N  H I Z B U L L A H ' S  I D E O L O G Y ’
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self-flagellation and self-immolation by beating their chests, slashing their scalps with 
swords, and whipping themselves with chains.
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and ‘Self-Martyrdom’ in Shi‘ite Lebanon”. Terrorism and Political Violence 3, (Autumn 1991) 
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 191. Hizbullah offered 1281 martyrs from the second Israeli invasion in June 1982 till the 
nearly complete Israeli withdrawal in May 2000.
 192. Al-Khamina‘i, ‘Itr Al-Shahada…, 17.
 193. Interview with Sayyid Husayn al-Musawi conducted by al-Shira‘ on 26 October 1983.
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68-79, 241-244, 246-248; and Peter Singer, Practical Ethics. Second edition. Cambridge: 
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 202. Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, Al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya [The Islamic Resistance]. 
Beirut: Imam al-Rida Publications, 1984, 18, as cited by Kramer in “Sacrifice and ‘Self-
Martyrdom’ in Shi‘ite Lebanon”, 10. 
 203. See Amin Mustapha, Al-Muqawama fi Lubnan: 1948-2000 [The Resistance in Lebanon: 
1948-2000]. Beirut: Dar Al-Hadi, 2003, 461. Although only Ahmad Qasir, the first Hizbullah 
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 204. Qasim, Hizbullah: Al-Manhaj…, 62.
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“Sacrifice and ‘Self-Martyrdom’ in Shi‘ite Lebanon”, 10.
 206. Speech by Fadlallah, Al-Nahar 14 May 1985, as cited by Kramer in “Sacrifice and ‘Self-
Martyrdom’ in Shi‘ite Lebanon”, 10-11. 
 207. Cf. “Islam’s ability to dominate a state’s identity is highly contested. While powerful 
Islamic movements exist within several states in the region [Middle East], these groups 
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in the Middle East. Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett (eds.). (London: Cornell University 
Press, 2002), 191.
 Notes Chapter 3
 1. The translation of the Open Letter is based on Hizbullah’s original text. It is extracted 
from “Appendix A”, with an indication of the corresponding page numbers as published 
in al-‘Ahd. The Open Letter only outlined Hizbullah’s political ideology; other documents 
elaborated the content of the political ideology.
 2. Hizbullah’s most notable political declarations referred to in this chapter are the 
following: “Jerusalem is the Holiest of our Causes” (29 June 1984); “Our Struggle with 
Israel is Doctrinal” (July 1984); “Resistance and Continued Struggle” (October 1984); “The 
American Threats and Confrontation” (28 October 1984); “Negotiations with Israel are 
Religiously Prohibited” (November 1984); “The Negotiations with Israel and the Treachery 
of the Lebanese Political System” (November 1985); Hizbullah’s political declaration on 
the martyrdom of Ahmad Qasir (19 May 1985); Hizbullah’s political declaration in the 
anniversary of the annulment of May 17 Agreement (23 May 1986); and Hizbullah’s 
political declaration on the relations with Christians (31 May 1986). Also references are 
made to al-‘Ahd and other sources like daily newspapers such as al-Nahar, al-Safir, al-
Liwa’, al-Anwar, and Kayhan; and weeklies such as al-Shira‘ and al-Masira.
 3. Member of the Shura Council and the first Secretary General of Hizbullah in 1989.
 4. Member of the Shura Council and the leader of the Islamic Resistance.
 5. Sayyid Abbas’ brother. The only civilian in the leadership. Member of the Shura Council, 
AMAL’s deputy president; he founded Islamic AMAL, which later became part of 
Hizbullah.
 6. He was Hizbullah’s first spokesman and he read the Open Letter; member of the Shura 
Council.
 7. Fadlallah is a local Lebanese Ayatollah who is respected by Hizbullah.
 8. Member of the Shura Council and the head of Hizbullah’s Executive Council in 1987. 
 9. Member of the Shura Council.
 10. Z‘aytir was a leading Hizbullah cadre at the time. Nazra ‘ala Tarh Al-Jumhuriyya Al-Islamiyya 
fi Lubnan [An Outlook at the Proposal of the Islamic Republic in Lebanon]. Beirut: Al-Wikala 
Al-Sharqiyya lil-Tawzi‘, 1988. 
 11. Kurani, a Hizbullah middle rank cadre, was the first to expose the social movement’s 
mobilization strategies in his book entitled, Tariqat Hizbullah fi Al-’Amal Al-Islami 
[Hizbullah’s Method of Islamic Mobilization]. Tehran, Maktab Al-I‘lam Al-Islami: Al-Mu’assa 
Al-‘Alamiyya, 1985.
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 12. In order to denote the Islamic order, Hizbullah uses “Islamic state”, “Islamic government”, 
and “Islamic Republic” interchangeably, maybe because Imam Khumayni called his book 
Islamic Government and labelled Iran as the “Islamic Republic”, not “Islamic State”. Till 
2000, Hizbullah’s flag contained the expression “The Islamic Revolution in Lebanon”. Still 
other Hizbullah cadres referred to the Islamic Republic in Lebanon (Al-Jumhuriyya Al-
Islamiyya fi Lubnan). 
 13. Sayyid Ibrahim Amin Al-Sayyid, Al-‘Ahd (21 Dhul-Qadah 1404/ 17 August 1984). 
 14. See Section 13: “Words to the Christians in Lebanon”.
 15. These are called the “purposes of the shari‘a” (maqasid al-shari‘a), which are discussed in 
chapter 4.
 16. The term was coined in 1973 by Gustavo Rutierrez, a Peruvian Catholic priest. In brief, 
liberation theology is a Biblically inspired doctrine that exhorts the Church to employ its 
resources in order to liberate the world populace from poverty, oppression, injustice, and 
inequality in order to secure social and economic justice.
 17. See Section 8: “Our Friends”. This explanation on this specific section of the Open Letter 
was accorded to me through two separate interviews with Hajj Imad Faqih and Sayyid 
Ibrahim Al-Musawi on November 2, 2004 and October 29, 2004 respectively. Faqih is a 
Hizbullah social welfare and public relations officer; al-Musawi is a Hizbullah media cadre 
who is an al-Manar TV editor and al-Intiqad weekly newspaper columnist. 
 18. See Section 2: “The Oppressors are in concordance in fighting us”, Section 8: “Our Friends”, 
Section 21: “International front for the oppressed”, and Section 14: “Our story with the 
world oppressors”.
 19. According to Yusuf ‘Ali, the context of the “passage was the question of migration from 
places where Islam was being persecuted and suppressed. Obviously the duty of the 
Muslims was to leave such places, even if it involved forsaking their homes, and join and 
strengthen the Muslim community among whom they could live in peace and with whom 
they could help in fighting the evils around them. But the meaning is wider. Islam does 
not say: ‘Resist not evil’. On the contrary it requires a constant, unceasing struggle against 
evil. For such struggle it may be necessary to forsake home and unite and organise and 
join our brethren in assaulting and overthrowing the fortress of evil. For the Muslim’s 
duty is not only to enjoin the good but to prohibit evil. To make our assault we must be 
prepared to put ourselves in a position in which such assault would be possible, and 
God’s earth is spacious enough for the purpose. ‘Position’ includes not only local position, 
but moral and material position. For example, we must shun evil company where we 
cannot put it down, but organise a position from which we can put it down”. However, he 
adds, “If through physical [smaller military jihad], mental, or moral incapacity [persuasive 
jihad], we are unable to fight the good fight, we must rest content with putting up with 
evil and just guarding ourselves from it. God’s gracious Mercy will recognise and forgive 
our weakness if it is real weakness, and not merely an excuse”. (The Holy Qur’an…, 211-
212).
 20. Fadlallah, Ma‘ Al-Hikma…, 46-54. This bears some similarity to the Prophetic tradition 
where the Prophet spent 13 years in Mecca practicing his call and succeeded in converting 
only 83 people to Islam. When his life was in danger, according to Islamic belief, God 
ordered him to emigrate to Medina. He heeded and consolidated his call, and made of 
Medina the base for spreading the mission of Islam.
 21. By political Maronism Hizbullah means the leading Maronite notables and their retinue, 
which constitute the symbols of the Lebanese political system. Their retinue included 
the Sunni prime minister and the Shi‘a speaker who were completely under their 
command blindly exercising their political whim and will. The late PM Sami al-Solh said 
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that the PM is only “ketchup” in the hands of the president. Thus, from 1943 till 1990 the 
Muslims, in general, and the Shi‘as, in particular, had been politically marginalized since 
the Maronites wielded economic and political power and had absolute control of the 
country’s resources and riches.
 22. See Section 2: “The Oppressors are in concordance in fighting us”, Section 8: “Our Friends”, 
Section 21: “International front for the oppressed”, and Section 14: “Our story with the 
world oppressors”.
 23. Z‘aytir, op. cit., 63.
 24. Ibid., 75-80. 
 25. Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, Ma‘ Al-Hikma fi Khat Al-Islam [Wisdom in the Way of 
Islam]. Beirut: Dar Al-Wafa’, 1985, 47.
 26. Z‘aytir, op. cit., 200.
 27. At least the six verses mentioned below.
 28. Al-‘Ahd no. 9 (Dhul-Qadah 1404/ August 1984), 9. See also Qasim, Hizbullah: Al-Manhaj…, 
388. Hizbullah’s English home page quotes (28:4) in the following manner: “And we desire 
to bestow a favour upon those who were deemed weak in the land and make them 
the Imams and make them heirs” See http://www.hizbollah.org/english/frames/index_
eg.htm. According to Yusuf ‘Ali, “God’s plan was to protect them as they were weak, and 
indeed to make them custodians and leaders in His Faith, and to give them in inheritance 
a land ‘flowing with milk and honey’. Here they were established in authority for such 
time as they followed God’s Law”. See The Holy Qur’an…, 1002.
 29. Yusef ‘Ali commented on this verse, “Muslims were reminded that they were a small band 
in Mecca; despised and rejected; living in a state of insecurity for their persons, their lives, 
their property, and those of their dependents; persecuted and exiled and how by the 
Grace of God they found a safe asylum in Medina, how they found friends and helpers, 
how their many needs were cared for, and how at length they generated strength and 
numbers enough to defeat the forces of godlessness, injustice, and oppression”. The Holy 
Qur’an…, 421.
 30. Hizbullah remained working underground and released its first political declarations in 
1984.
 31. Amin Al-Sayyid, Al-‘Ahd (21 Dhul-Qadah 1404/ 17 August 1984). See also Al-Hukumat 
al-Islamiyya [Islamic Government]. Tehran: The Institute of Coordinating and Publishing 
Imam Khumayni’s Heritage, 1996, 60-62; 64-65.
 32. Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, Al-Islam wa Mantiq Al-Quwwa [Islam and the Logic 
of Power]. Beirut: Dar Al-Huruf, 1987, 171ff.
 33. Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, Al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya [The Islamic Resistance]. 
Beirut: Al-Dar Al-Islamiyya, 1986, 47. 
 34. Al-‘Ahd (21 Dhul-Qadah 1404/ 17 August 1984).
 35. See sections 2, 8, 14, and 21 of the Open Letter. 
 36. Cf. Al-Hukumat al-Islamiyya, 60-62; 64-65.
 37. Cf. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Chapter Ten entitled “Foreign Policy”, 
article 154. Tehran, Department of Translation and Publication, Islamic Culture and 
Relations Organization: Alhoda Publishers and Distributors, 1997, 118.
 38. See Section 7: “Our objectives in Lebanon”.
 39. Khumayni, Al-Hukuma Al-Islamiyya, 60ff. 
 40. Sharif al-Husayni, “Hizbullah: Haraka ‘Askariyya am Siyasiyya am Diniyya? (Hizbullah: A 
Military or Political or religious Movement?)”. Beirut: Al-Shira‘ (17 March 1986), 20.
 41. See Section 7: “Our objectives in Lebanon”.
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revolution to undermine it in the name of the ideal umma (italics in original)… Yet other 
Muslim radicals, perhaps non-violent, possess utopian views that perceive the creation 
of an ‘Islamic state’ as the solution to all problems, or as a way to empower the Muslim 
world and restore the power of the Muslim civilization”. Fuller, The Future of Political Islam, 
17, 88.
 175. Fadlallah, Al-Islam wa Mantiq Al-Quwwa, 258ff.
 176. Imam Khumayni issued a fatwa stressing that the Lebanese system is illegitimate and 
criminal. In 1986 Khamina’i clarified Khumayni’s fatwa arguing for the necessity of the 
Muslims to rule Lebanon since they comprise the majority of the population. (Al-Madini, 
Amal wa Hizbullah…, 162-163; Sharara, op. cit., 342). The chief of staff of the Iranian 
revolutionary guards in Lebanon stressed that Hizbullah and the Revolutionary Guards 
are going to bring down the Martonite regime just as the Iranians brought down the 
Shah. (Al-Anwar 9 February 1988).
 177. Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, “Reflections on the Muslim-Christian Dialogue”, A 
lecture delivered at the American University of Beirut, 22 December 1987. 
 178. Sharara, op. cit., 348.
 179. “The Union of Muslim Ulama” was established in the wake of the Israeli invasion in June 
1982.
 180. See Al-Harakat al-Islamiyya fi Lubnan and Al-Kurani, Tariqat Hizbullah…, especially 147-
163.
 181. Imam Khumayni, Al-Kalimat Al-Qisar: Al-Islam wa A‘malina [Short Words: Islam and our 
Words], p. 193, as cited in: Rafiq Sulayman Fidda, Athar Al-Imam Al-Khymayni ala Al-Qadiyya 
Al-Filastiniyya [Imam Khymayni’s Impact on the Palestinian Cause]. Beirut: n.d., 170.
 182. Westoxification, a term coined in the 1960s by an Iranian intellectual called Jalal al-
Ahmad, denotes the venomous Western civilizational influence and hegemony on other 
civilizations and cultures.
 Notes Chapter 4
 1. “Views and Concepts”, “Statement of Purpose”, and “Identity and Goals” are Hizbullah’s 
self-descriptions, which include aspects of its political ideology and political program. 
The first was circulated via al-Manar TV, the second via Hizbullah’s Press Office, and the 
third via Hizbullah’s official website. See “Appendix A”.
 2. Hizbullah’s second Secretary General, assassinated on February 16, 1992.
 3. Deputy Secretary General of Hizbullah since 1991.
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 4. Hizbullah’s third Secretary General since 1992.
 5. In 1997 he was a member of Hizbullah’s Political Council and the head of Hizbullah’s 
Central Press Office.
 6. A middle rank cadre who is columnist at al-Intiqad, Hizbullah weekly newspaper.
 7. The director of Hizbullah’s think tank, CCSD (Consultative Centre for Studies and 
Documentation), and a member of Hizbullah’s Political Council.
 8. The current head of Hizbullah’s 12-member parliamentary Bloc entitled, “Loyalty to the 
Resistance”; previously the head of Hizbullah’s Political Council. 
 9. The ex-head of Hizbullah’s social institutions and the current head of Hizbullah’s “Islamic 
Resistance Support Association”.
 10. Political Council member and foreign relations officer.
 11. Hizbullah’s current head of the Executive Council.
 12. Farid El-Khazen, “Political Parties in Postwar Lebanon: Parties in Search of Partisans”, 
Middle East Journal, 57 (Autumn 2003), 4, 612.
 13. Hizbullah’s Central Press Office, 3 January 1991. As will be shown later, Hizbullah included 
these principles in its parliamentary elections programs. 
 14. Sayyid Abbas’ political program is compiled from: Kawkab Al-Shahada…; Hiyan Rizq, 
Sayyid Al-Qada…; Al-Shaykh Muhammad Ali Khatun, Amir Al-Qafila…; Qudwat Al-
Tha’rin…; and Sayyid Shuhada Al-Muqawama…
 15. As will be conveyed later, these points figured our prominently in Hizbullah’s parliamentary 
elections programs. 
 16. As Sayyid Abbas put it, “If the populace of the Muslims and the oppressed give paramount 
importance to the resistance, then it would be fruitful”. He added, “the umma is living the 
eventuality of jihad and the heroics of the freedom fighters (mujahidin)”. Sayyid Abbas 
argued that this model of resistance should be emulated in all parts of the world that are 
suffering from occupation.
 17. The author considers this as an indirect reference to the two and a half year AMAL-
Hizbullah war that ended in November 1990, the ending of the 16-year old civil war, and 
Tufayli’s schism (See chapter one and the “Chronology” in “Appendix D”).
 18. The AMAL-Hizbullah war was fought in the South and Dahiya; the Lebanese civil war 
moved from one place to another, thus engulfing almost all of Lebanon.
 19. Sayyid Abbas added this is of vital importance since fortifying the domestic front leads the 
populace to engulf and embrace the Islamic Resistance, thus leading to its continuation 
and viability. 
 20. Lebanonisation signifies Hizbullah’s enrolment in Lebanese domestic political life. It is 
worth mentioning that in political science, “Lebanonisation of nation-states” refers to 
fragmentation or tribalism, a usage completely different than the one employed here. 
See for instance Benjamin. J. Barker, Jihad vs. McWorld. New York: Times Books, 1995; 
and James N. Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a 
Turbulent World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
 21. The Lebanese myriad or mosaic refers to the ethnic composition of the Lebanese 
communities that comprise Lebanon, including the officially recognised 18 sects. 
 22. This stance goes in line with Sayyid Abbas’ famous slogans: “We will serve you with our 
eyebrows”; “We [Hizbullah] will fight deprivation, as we fight the [Israeli] occupation”.
 23. Personal interview, 31 December 2001. 
 24. Qasim, Hizbullah: Al-Manhaj…, 267-273.
 25. Cf. Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbullah: Politics and Religion, 2002, 67-68.
 26. Qasim, op. cit. 267-268.
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 27. Islamists are committed, serious, honest, faithful, politically engaged Muslims. Islamism 
is holistic in its approach since it is “a religious-cultural-political framework for engagement 
on issues that most concern politically engaged Muslims”. (Italics in the original; my 
underlining). Fuller, The Future of Political Islam, 193. The three elements of Hizbullah’s 
identity are embedded in this definition. 
 28. Qasim, op. cit., 268-269.
 29. Since 1992, all Hizbullah’s deputies in the parliament have been males. 
 30. Qasim, op. cit., 269-270.
 31. Cf. Open Letter and Ch 4 on Hizbullah’s views on the acceptance of the other. 
 32. Qasim, op. cit.,270-271.
 33. Ibid., 271.
 34. It is usually composed of the Shura Council members in addition to the Political Council 
members.
 35. Hizbullah voiced this worry in its election program. In fact, the Resistance was the first 
entry (article, point) in Hizbullah’s 1992 election program, and the most elaborated entry 
by far, making it the main priority.
 36. Qasim, op. cit., 271-272.
 37. Saad-Ghorayeb argues that Khamina’i’s ‘blessing’ of Hizbullah’s decision implies that he 
did not issue a fatwa. She relies on a secondary source (al-Diyar) to make this claim. (See 
Saad-Ghorayeb, op. cit., 68).
 38. Qasim, op. cit., 272-273.
 39. The most salient verse repeatedly referred to by Hizbullah is the following: “We wish to 
favour the downtrodden [oppressed] in the land and make them leaders [Imams] and 
make them the inheritors; And establish (numakin) them firmly in the land…” (28:5-6). 
As mentioned in chapter three, the oppressed were established in authority or were 
empowered because they followed God’s Law. Other Qur’anic verses quoted by Hizbullah 
are: (12:21); (12:56); (12:54); (18:84); (7:10); (46:26); (6:6); (22:41); (18:95); and (28:57).
 40. Yusuf ‘Ali comments on the following verse by arguing: “The justification of the righteous 
in resisting oppression when not only they but their Faith is persecuted and when they 
are led by a righteous Imam, is that it is a form of self-sacrifice. They are not fighting for 
themselves, for land, power, or prestige. They are fighting for the right”. (See The Holy 
Qur’an…, 862). As will be argued in the conclusion (3.4), this verse stresses the Qur’anic 
concept of human empowerment (tamkin). 
 41. See the cover page of Mu’tamar Al-Baladiyyat Al-Awwal [The First Municipal Conference/
Convention]. Beirut: Hizbullah’s Central Press Office, 16 July 2002. 
 42. See the introduction to Hizbullah’s 1992 election program.
 43. See the introduction to Hizbullah’s 1996 election program.
 44. See the seventh article: “Foreign policy”. The same stance was reiterated in Hizbullah’s 
1997 “Views and Concepts” in the sections entitled, “Hizbullah- Lebanon” and “Hizbullah 
between Peace and violence”.
 45. See Appendixes A, B, and C.
 46. Nasrallah, Al-‘Ahd 26 August 1994.
 47. Qasim, op. cit., 38.
 48. Since in Lebanese politics the issue of majority-minority is a very sensitive issue, 
Nasrallah stressed the unity and solidarity among the Lebanese by clarifying that when 
he or Hizbullah speaks about the majority and minority, he does not speak about the 
Muslim majority and the Christian minority (God forbid); rather he speaks about a 
Muslim-Christian majority and a Muslim-Christian minority. See Nasrallah’s speech in the 
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commemoration of “Jerusalem Day” on 12 November 2004. http://www.nasrollah.org/
audio/hassan/2004/quds12112004.html (Last accessed April 2005).
 49. Identity and Goals. Nasrallah expressed the same views in al-‘Ahd 16 February 1998.
 50. Nasrallah, Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC) 24 September 1995.
 51. Al-‘Ahd no. 441.
 52. Nasrallah, Al-‘Ahd 6 April 1994.
 53. Nasrallah’s speech on July 10, 2001. Al-Manar and al-Nour 10 July 2001; al-Safir 11 July 
2001. See also Nasrallah’s speech “On the Occasion of the End of the Summer Activities 
for ‘Sayf Association’ ”, 4 September 2004, http://www.nasrollah.org/audio/hassan/2004/
anshita04092004.html. 
 54. Nayef Krayyem, Hawla Al-Dawla Al-Mansuba li Hizbullah [On Hizbullah’s Alleged State]. 
Beirut: Hizbullah’s Educational Mobilization Unit, 1997, 41.
 55. The ex-Hizbullah MP, George Najm, used to read, while wearing a cross, Hizbullah’s 
political declarations, that are inaugurated with, “In the name of Allah, the Merciful and 
Compassionate”. 
 56. See various Lebanese daily newspapers of the month of April 2002, especially al-Safir of 
18, 20, and 23 April 2002. 
 57. Hizbullah’s Central Press Office.
 58. Hizbullah’s Central Information Unit, “A Reading in Papal Guidance”, 9-15.
 59. That conference saw an unprecedented concordance of ideas, especially those pertaining 
to religious and moral issues, between the Vatican and the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
 60. Hizbullah’s Central Information Unit, “A Reading in Papal Guidance”, 16-25.
 61. At that time, he was the head of Hizbullah’s Political Council (politburo).
 62. Hizbullah’s Central Information Unit, “A Reading in Papal Guidance”, 26-37.
 63. “Identity and Goals”.
 64. Al-Nour, 6:00 GMT News, 17 January 2004. 
 65. It is worth mentioning that the abolition of political sectarianism is stipulated in article 95 
of the Ta’if Agreement. All that has been achieved till now on the way to the abolishment 
of political sectarianism is that, in 2004, the Lebanese parliament formed a committee, 
which is supposed to pave the way for the establishment of the “National Body for the 
Abolishment of Political Sectarianism”.
 66. Hizbullah’s 1992 election program, second article: “ The abolishment of political 
sectarianism”.
 67. See the second article: “ Achieving equality and establishing the just state”.
 68. Hizbullah’s Central Information Unit, “A Reading in Papal Guidance”, 14.
 69. See article 4: “The building of the state of law and institutions, and the promotion of 
political participation”. 
 70. See Nasrallah’s 10 July 2001 Speech, al-Safir 11 July 2001.
 71. Daily Star 5 February 2004.
 72. See the second article: “ Achieving equality and establishing the just state”.
 73. In addition to the Maronites, Hizbullah embarked on a political dialogue with the 
Christian notables and clergy from all religious denominations such as Greek Orthodox, 
Greek Catholic, Protestants, Armenians, Syriacs, Assyrians, etc.
 74. See the “Introduction” and “Hizbullah and Dialogue”, in “Views and Concepts”.
 75. As mentioned in chapter two, the concept of taklif is a term used for legal obligation in 
the methodology of Islamic jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh). 
 76. Hizbullah’s nominees to positions in the governmental apparatus portrayed ambitious 
expectations in serving the public interest. (See the introduction to Hizbullah’s 1992 
election program). Hizbullah employs a periodic rotation policy among its cadres, a 
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great majority of whom are the product of the European system of education, rather 
than Islamic schools and universities.
 77. By Qur’anic concepts I mean either explicitly stated in the Qur’an, or derived from a 
Qur’anic doctrine by way of correlation with religion, interpretation in a religious mode, 
and authentication in the Qur’an, Sunna, and shari‘a.
 78. See for instance: (42:38) “Their affair being a counsel [shura] among themselves”, (3:159), 
and (2:233). It seems that Hizbullah interprets shura as some form of ijma‘ based on the 
Shi‘ite variant of the hadith: “The Imams will not confer upon an error”, instead of “The 
umma will not confer upon an error”
 79. See for instance: (3:23) and (4:105).
 80. See for instance: (2:213); (10:19); (5:48); (32:25)
 81. See for instance: (8:41); (73:20); (2:277); (4:172); (5:12); and (22:41). 
 82. See Mu’tamar Al-Baladiyyat Al-Awwal, 16ff. Also Hajj Muhammad Ra‘d and Dr. Ali Fayyad 
explained the abovementioned concepts to me in personal interviews conducted in 
December 2001. See Muhammad Jawad Maghniyyé, ‘Ilm Usual Al-Fiqh fi Thawbihi Al-Jadid 
[The Science of the Principles of Jurisprudence in its New Garment]. Beirut: Dar Al-Tayyar 
Al-Jadid, 1988, especially 225-232; 363-365. Cf Ahmad S. Moussalli, The Islamic Quest 
for Democracy, Pluralism, and Human Rights. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 
2001.
 83. Interview conducted by Fadeel M. Abun-Nasr on 24 April 2002, as cited in his book 
entitled Hizbullah: Haqa’iq…, 132-133.
 84. Bilal N‘im, “Al-Islam fi Shumuliyatihi Al-Tashri‘iyya [Islam as a Comprehensive (System of ) 
Legislation]”. Al-Intiqad 1065 (9 July 2004). 
 85. Hizbullah argues that every human being has a natural disposition to worship the divine 
or God. Hizbullah’s Islamic propagation or call (da‘wa) aims to wake up this element of 
human nature. 
 86. Bilal N‘im, op. cit. (Italics added for emphasis).
 87. Al-Safir 7 June 2005.
 88. Lebanese National News Agency 10 August 2005.
 89. See for instance Martyr Murtada Mutahhari’s two books: The Role of Reason in Ijtihad at 
http://www.al-islam.org/al-tawhid/reason-ijtihad.htm and The Role of Ijtihad in Legislation 
at http://www.al-islam.org/al-tawhid/ijtihad-legislation.htm. See also Maghniyyé, op. 
cit.
 90. Cf. Saad-Ghorayeb who contends that Hizbullah’s political program and ideology do not 
contain or leave room for a socio-economic program. op. cit., 196, note 2.
 91. See Appendix B.
 92. Al-Manar and al-Nour 10 July 2001; al-Safir 11 July 2001.
 93. It annually holds regular conclaves in order to study and evaluate the socio-economic 
situation, and it issues its recommendations in a publicised document.
 94. This “Working Document” was divided into two main sections. The first section prescribed 
a ten-point working plan whose objective was to constructively alleviate the socio-
economic situation, while the second section stipulated a ten-point strategy directed 
at finding constructive solutions to the workers’ and syndicates’ demands. See al-Intiqad 
1074 (10 September 2004).
 95. See, for instance, Nasrallah’s speech in commemoration of the municipal councils and 
majors of the South, 30 June 2004, http://www.nasrollah.org/audio/hassan/2004/
baladiat30062004.html
 96. http://www.naimkassem.org/materials/activity/2004/aml_hizb.htm. See also Al-Nour, 
5:00 GMT News, 5 April 2004. 
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 97. Al-Nour 5 GMT News 22 May 2004. Hizbullah has been able to build an efficient and 
responsive organization that meets many of the needs of its constituents while avoiding 
the tag of corruption that taints the Lebanese political system and its institutions as a 
whole. Knowing that the national public debt reached $35 billion by June 2004 and is 
expected – according to the late Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafiq Hariri – to reach $45 
billion in 2007, the socio-economic agenda seems to be Hizbullah’s most salient feature 
of its political program after the May 2000 Israeli withdrawal. It is worth mentioning that 
the economic situation is so severe that a lot of the youth, predominantly males, are 
either emigrating or working abroad.
 98. Conspicuous consumption refers to “Thorstein Veblen’s term for a change from the 
Protestant ethic to an eagerness to show off wealth by the elaborate consumption 
of goods.” James M. Henslin, Sociology: A Down-To-Earth Approach. New York: Allyn 
and Bacon, 2003, 411. See Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class. New York: 
Macmillian, 1912.
 99. See the section entitled, “Hizbullah and Human Rights”, in “Views and Concepts”.
 100. Cf. Peter Burke, History and Social Theory. New York: Cornell University Press, 1992; Richard 
Bulliet, Islam: The View from the Edge. New York: Colombia University Press, 1994.
 101. Hajj Husayn Shami was the ex-head of Hizbullah’s social institutions and is the current 
head of Hizbullah’s “Islamic Resistance Support Association”. See “Hizbullah In Haka 
[Hizbullah Speaks Out]”, Hurriyat 9 (Fall 1997), 34-41. Beirut: CRED.
 102. See the section entitled, “Hizbullah and Human Rights”, in “Views and Concepts”.
 103. Hizbullah has efficiently contributed in providing humanitarian services to the citizens in 
various Lebanese areas without discrimination between one citizen and another, or one 
sect and another.
 104. Shami, Hizbullah In Haka.
 105. Personal interview, 2 November 2004. Faqih, an engineer by profession and Nasrallah’s 
second cousin, is Hizbullah’s social welfare and public relations officer of the “Organization 
of the Seal of the Prophets” (Mujama‘ Khatim Al-A fnbiya’ ) in Nwayri-Bashura, a heavily 
populated Sunni area of Beirut.
 106. See the section entitled, “Hizbullah and Human Rights”, in “Views and Concepts”.
 107. Some of Hizbullah’s civil institutions and NGOs are the following: The Institution of 
The Good Loan (Jam‘iyyat Mu’ssat al-Qard al-Hasan), established in 1982; The Martyrs’ 
Foundation (Mu’assat Al-Shahid), founded in 1982; The Association of Islamic Health 
(Jam‘iyyat Hayy’at al-Sihiyyat al-Islamiyyat), founded in 1984; Institution of Construction 
and Development (Jam‘iyyat Mu’ssat Jihad al-Bina’ al-Inma’iyyat), founded in 1984; 
Al-‘Ahd (Hizbullah’s weekly mouthpiece), established in 1984, renamed Al-Intiqad in 
2001; The Association of the Relief Committee of Imam Khumayni (Jam‘iyyat lajnat al-
Imdad al-Khayriyyat al-Islamiyyat), established in 1987; CCSD (Hizbullah’s think tank), 
founded in 1988; Al-Nour radio station, established in 1988. (In November 2004 al-Nour 
satellite transmission covered the globe); The Wounded Foundation (Mu’assat Al-Jarha), 
established in 1990; The Educational Foundation (Al-Mu’asasa al-Tarbawiyya), established 
in 1991; Al-Manar TV station, founded in 1991. (In September 2000, in the wake of the 
second Palestinian Intifada, al-Manar started its satellite transmission); etc.
 108. Talal Salman, Sira Dhatiyya li Haraka Muqawina ‘Arabiyya Muntasira: Hizbullah [An 
Autobiography of a Victorious Arab Resistance: Hizbullah]. Beirut: Al-Safir, 2000, 12.
 109. “Hizbullah’s Statement of Purpose”, Central Press Office, 20 March 1998. Hizbullah’s 2004 
“Identity and Goals” reiterated the same issues.
 110. Hala Jaber calls these “religious taxes” Jaber, Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance, 151; the 
author prefers to call them ‘religious donations’.
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 111. Interview with Faqih, 2 November 2004.
 112. Shami, Hizbullah In Haka; Interview with Faqih, 2 November 2004.
 113. See “Appendix C”, Sections 5 and 7. 
 114. Yusuf ‘Ali comments on the verse by arguing, “That is, spend your wealth in charity and 
good works. It is God who has given it to you, and you should spend it in God’s cause. Nor 
should you forget the legitimate needs of this life, as misers do, and most people become 
misers who think too exclusively of their wealth. If wealth is not used properly, three evils 
will follow: (1) its possessor may be a miser and forget all claims due to himself and those 
about him; (2) he may forget the higher needs of the poor and needy, or the good causes 
which require support; and (3) he may even misspend on occasions and cause a great 
deal of harm and mischief”. The Holy Qur’an…, 1023.
 115. See the section entitled, “Hizbullah and Human Rights”, in “Views and Concepts”.
 116. This resonates Sayyid Abbas’ important statement: “We will fight deprivation, as we fight 
the occupation”. Sayyid Ibrahim Amin Al-Sayyid, Hizbullah’s Political Council head, while 
calling for occasional economic conferences, repeatedly stated the need to alleviate 
“political desertification” as well as the problem of political and party life in Lebanon. 
See http://www.dirasat.net/indexarab.htm for Hizbullah’s workshops and conferences on 
domestic and socio-economic issues.
 117. He means Hizbullah did not solely exist to rid Lebanon of the Israeli occupation. 
 118. Faqih emphasised that Hizbullah’s will, determination, and reliance on God accomplished 
this “divine victory” over the Israeli forces occupying Lebanon. Thus, using the banner of 
Islam, Hizbullah dealt with the populace and the world for the benefit of the people and 
the “message”.
 119. Personal interview, 2 November 2004. 
 120. Cf.: “It is important to remember, however, that Hezbollah was never involved in meting 
out ‘just punishment’ to the Christian militias and had never kidnapped, car bombed or 
sniped at Lebanese civilians as most other militias had at one time or another”. Harik, 
Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism, 67.
 121. Nasrallah and Muhammad Ra‘d, as cited in the program entitled “Ahzab Lubnan: Hizbullah: 
Al-Jiz’ Al-Awwal [Lebanese Parties: Hizbullah, Part I]”, NBN, 21 July 2002.
 122. Nasrallah’s speech on July 10, 2001. Al-Manar and al-Nour 10 July 2001; al-Safir 11 July 
2001. See also Nasrallah’s 4 September 2004 speech, op. cit. Hajj Imad Faqih explains that 
Hizbullah refuses to engage in such acts and operate on the ground, simply because 
these acts will eventually dirty its hands, an eventuality Hizbullah can not afford to 
happen. (Personal interview, 2 November 2004).
 123. For instance, see “Identity and Goals”; its 1996 election program, article one: “Resistance 
and occupation”; and its 2000 election program, article one: “Resistance and liberation”. 
 124. “Views and Concepts”.
 125. Nasrallah bases his argument on the Lebanese government’s official position/stance as 
conveyed by the Lebanese permanent delegate to the UN, on September 2, 2004, in 
the wake of the adoption of US-French backed UN Security Council Revolution 1559, 
which indirectly referred to Hizbullah as a militia calling on the Lebanese government 
to disband it and disarm it. The Lebanese delegate argued that in Lebanon there are no 
militias, rather a Resistance (Hizbullah’s Islamic resistance) that is officially recognized 
and embraced by the Lebanese government. See Nasrallah’s 4 September 2004 speech, 
op. cit. This reasoning has been reiterated by the Lebanese cabinet’s policy statement of 
July 2005. 
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 126. The socio-political indicators of the LMCB testify to its secularist-nationalist nature. See 
the section entitled, “The formation of the Multi-confessional Lebanese Brigades” in 
Chapter 1.
 127. Mirrored from Yadi‘ot Ahronot, as cited in al-safir 12 December 2005. 
 128. Hizbullah’s “Educational Mobilization” photocopied al-Safir issue and wrote the 
above quotation at the bottom of the page, distributing it at Lebanese colleges and 
universities. 
 129. Ayatullah Fadlallah, Personal interview, October 1999.
 130. Qasim, op. cit., 294, 320, 327.
 132. Ibid., 286. 
 133. Ibid., 77.
 133. Hajj Muhammad Ra‘d, Personal interview, 31 December 2001. See also the interview 
conducted by Fadeel M. Abun-Nasr on 24 April 2002, as cited in his book entitled Hizbullah: 
Haqa’iq…, 132. Also Dr. Ali Fayyed employed the same reasoning when I interviewed him 
in December 2001.
 134. Hajj Muhammad R‘ad, Hizbullah’s Central Information Unit, “A Reading in Papal Guidance”, 
33-36. These dimensions of civil society are also clearly salient in all of Hizbullah’s 
parliamentary elections programs.
 135. As stipulated in the “Constitution of Medina”.
 136. See Nasrallah’s interview with al-Safir 28 June 2000.
 137. I think Qasim is using the world ideology to connote a system or order or basis for political 
and social action.
 138. Qasim, op. cit., 39-40.
 139. See http://www.naimkassem.org; Al-Nour, 6:00 GMT News, 10 February 2004; Al-Safir 10 
February 2004.
 140. Personal interview, 2 November 2004.
 141. The last issue of al-‘Ahd was number 896, dated 6 April 2001/ 12 Muharram 1422 AH; the 
first issue of al-Intiqad was number 897, dated 20 April 2001/ 26 Muharram 1422 AH.
 142. Hizbullah reiterated that Lebanon is characterized by an Arab identity and belonging. 
Hizbullah’s Central Information Unit, “A Reading in Papal Guidance”, 23. 
 143. See article 7: “Foreign policy”.
 144. See article 2: “Lebanese foreign policy”.
 145. See article 2: “Lebanese foreign policy”.
 146. See Nasrallah’s interview with al-Jazeera 25 May 2000. When Nasrallah started his visit to 
Iran on July 4, 2001 he was received as a head of state.
 147. See Nasrallah’s interview with al-Safir 28 June 2000.
 148. Qasim, op. cit., 77.
 149. Interview with Na‘im Qasim, “Salun al-Sabt [Saturday’s Saloon]”, Sawt Lubnan 25 January 
2003. See also Nasrallah’s fiery speech on the occasion of a funeral procession for three 
Hizbullah “martyrs” who died fighting the Israeli forces in the Lebanese border village 
of Ghajar on November 25, 2005: “We are allied with Syria and Iran from the stance of 
Lebanon’s maslaha to liberate its occupied land. However, the Islamic Resistance’s orders 
come from Beirut”. See al-Intiqad 1138 (2 December 2005), 7-8. 
 150. Hizbullah’s Central Information Unit, “A Reading in Papal Guidance”, 13; 36.
 151. See “Politburo member lauds Hizbullah’s role”, Daily Star 1 September 2003.
 152. Al-Musawi is referring to the UN Resolution 1559.
 153. Daily Star 18 June 2005.
 154. Interview with Reuters as reported by al-Safir 17 August 2005.
 155. See Lebanese daily newspapers of 8 August 2005 and al-Intiqad 1122 (12 August 2005).
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 156. See Nasrallah’s speech to Hizbullah’s Women’s Organization during an iftar organized by 
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 24. http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/Hiz_letter.htm
 25. Al-‘Ahd, op. cit., 6.
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http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unifil/index.html 
 31. Al-‘Ahd, op. cit., 7. http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/Hiz_letter.htm
 32. Idem. http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/Hiz_letter.htm
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 33. Idem. 
 34. Idem.
 35. This is a contextual reference to the 1985 Israeli withdrawal from Nabatiyyé and Tyre and 
the formation of its self-declared “Security Zone”. (See Chronology and Chapter 1). 
 36. Cf. SSNP nationalist discourse of “In you is a power, which if actualised will change the 
course of history”. See Alagha (2004).
 37. Al-‘Ahd, op. cit., 7.
 38. Idem.
 39. Idem. http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/Hiz_letter.htm
 40. Ibid., 7-8.
 41. Al-‘Ahd, op. cit., 8.
 42. Idem.
 43. Hizbullah appropriated this section of the Open Letter, almost word by word, from the 
section entitled, “The Grave Responsibilities of the Muslim ‘ulama”, in: Imam Khumayni’s 
Al-Jihad Al-Akbar [Greater Jihad]. Translated by Husayn Kurani. Tehran: Islamian Grand 
Library, 1980, 9-10. The same statement of refining the self before refining others is 
repeated and born out in the article entitled, “The Spiritual-Dynamic Force of the Islamic 
Revolution – Second Episode: The Ideological and Social Change… A New Conception of 
Jihad”, in: al-‘Ahd (10 Shawwal 1405/28 June 1985), 9. Cf. Norton’s failure to translate and 
contextualise this concept of greater jihad. Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and the Shi‘a 
Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon. Austin: University Press of Texas, 1987, 185.
 44. Saddam executed him on April 9, 1980. Hizbullah leaders (al-qada) or ideologues are 
listed, from ascending to descending order, as follows: Imam Khumayni (Iranian), Imam 
Khamina’i (Iranian), the martyr al-Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (Iraqi), Sayyid Musa al-
Sadr (Iranian-Lebanese), the martyr al-Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi (Lebanese), Sayyid Hasan 
Nasrallah (Lebanese), and the martyr Shaykh Raghib Harb (Lebanese). (See http://www.
nasrollah.org/english/index.htm; last accessed August 2004). Thus, not all of Hizbullah’s 
leaders are fuqaha’ (plural of faqih), even though they are all clergymen. Also, it appears 
that Hizbullah’s most prominent ideologues are transnational, rather than Lebanese. 
The word “Rahbar” in Persian, which means leader of the Islamic Revolution, is the 
title assumed by Khumayni, and after his death, it was accorded to Khamina’i when he 
succeeded him in 1995.
 45. Al-‘Ahd, op. cit., 8.
 46. Idem, 8. Thus, the Open Letter ended as it started: with a Qur’anic substantiation. Hizbullah 
is not claiming the absolute Truth, since Truth is from God. God is the only Truth, we 
(Hizbullah) do not know if our discourse reveals the Truth. If there is anybody who refuses 
our ideas and discourse, then God will be the ultimate judge. However, Hizbullah claims 
the truth, but not the ultimate Truth, which is only known by God. This seems in line 
with classical Islamic discourse where the wrong is perceived from the self, and not from 
God. Therefore, Hizbullah is trying to employ a pluralist discourse, which is very different 
from post-modernist discourse and philosophy because it is based on the metaphysical 
underpinning of relations underscoring the difference between the relative truth and 
the absolute transcendent Truth. While the post-modernists seem to be agnostic, the 
Islamists, including Hizbullah, seem to be theists. After all, God is transcendent: “None 
knows God but God” (la y‘rif Allah illa Allah). This seems in line with what Imam ‘Ali has 
said: “incapability of cognisance is cognisance” (al’ajzu ‘an al-idrak al-idrak). The solution 
might be the hadith qudsi: “I [God] was a hidden treasure and I wanted to be known, so 
I created and through me, they knew me” (kuntu kanzan makhfiyyan fa aradtu an u‘raf fa 
khalaqtu al-khalq fa bi ‘arafuni). [I think this hadith is related to the Islamic explanation 
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of cosmology. Although there is a controversial discussion among Islamic scholars about 
the validity of this hadith making it highly vulnerable to criticism, there seems to be a clue 
in the Qur’an to justify this hadith since it is written that human beings are created in the 
image of God. Thus, the existential aspect of human life is related to or goes back to or 
is ultimately referred back to God. It is worth mentioning that Ibn ‘Arabi had argued that 
this hadith is correct through God’s revelation to him (sahih bi-al-mukashafa), which is a 
speculative way of defending his argument]. The weakness is that human beings never 
fully understand God; this is the true understanding. Thus, one does not know God, but 
only the signs of God i.e. ‘alam (creature) and verses of the scripture, both are referred 
to as aya and both are signs; this is the way God reveals Himself to us. That is why we 
say Rab al-‘alamin (God of the creatures). Thus, human beings understand the signs, not 
the absolute, and Hizbullah seems to imply and abide by this interpretation. In short, 
when Hizbullah opposes itself and its discourse to the oppressors (al-qawn al-zalimin), 
it is indirectly claiming truth on its side. Therefore, there is an aspect of relativism in 
Hizbullah’s discourse. Remark: it is worth mentioning that from a theological perspective, 
aya has different meanings; however, it is very important to look at the generic meaning. 
The generic meaning of aya is signs, but the specific meaning is a sentence in the scripture 
(verse). Both uses are warranted in the Qur’an. Generic sense: “There are in the creation 
of Heavens and the earth and the alteration of night and day real signs [ayat] for people 
and understanding” (3:190); verse in the scripture: “Yet they are not all alike; some of the 
people of the Book are a nation upstanding, that recite God’s signs [ayat] in the watches 
of the night, bowing themselves” (3:113).
 47. http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/300/320/324/324.2/hizballah/hizballah-background.
html (Last accessed August 2005).
 48. http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/300/320/324/324.2/hizballah/statement01.html (Last 
accessed August 2005).
 49. http://www.hizbollah.org/english/frames/index_eg.htm (Last accessed August 2004).
 50. Although Hizbullah translated jumhuriyya Islamiyya (Islamic Republic) as Islamic 
Government, I prefer to stick to the exact translation as mentioned in the original Arabic 
text.
 51. The 1996 April Understanding.
 52. My translation is based upon Hizbullah’s original document released by Hizbullah’s 
Central Press Office in July 1992.
 53. This is reminiscent of socialist-Marxist discourse.
 54. A reference to the 1985 Israeli withdrawal and its formation of its self-declared “Security 
Zone”. (See Chronology and Ch 1).
 55. This is a clear stress on Hizbullah’s resistance identity.
 56. Lebanon lost the Seven Villages to Israel during the 1948 war. (See for instance, Al-Jam‘iyya 
Al-Ijtima‘iyya Al-Thaqafiyya Li-Abna’ Al-Qura Al-Sabi‘, Al-Qura Al-Sabi‘Al-Lubnaniyya Al-
Muhtalla: Dirasa Qanuniyya-Ijtima‘iyya [The Seven Lebanese Occupied Villages: A Legal-
Social Study]. First edition. Beirut: Al-Markaz Al-Istishari Lil-Dirasat, November 2003). The 
Arabs of Wadi Khaled have been granted the Lebanese nationality in 1994.
 57. It is ironic to note that up till now, this has not been accomplished. 
 58. This has been accomplished in 2003 by the government sponsored Centre of Research 
and Development (Markaz Al-Buhuth wa Al-Inma’ ).
 59. http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/300/320/324/324.2/hizballah/hizballah-platform.
html (Last accessed August 2005). As translated from a four-page document entitled 
“Al-Barnamaj Al-Intikhabi Li-Hizbullah”, issued by Hizbullah’s Central Press Office in the 
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summer of 1996. In the translation, I denote where every page in the original Arabic text 
ends.
 60. Yusuf ‘Ali argues, “The Way of God (sirat-ul-Mustaqim) is a Straight Way. But men have 
strayed from it in all directions. And there are numerous Paths by which they can get back 
to the Right Way, the Way in which the purity of their own nature, and Will and mercy 
of God, require them to walk. All these numerous Paths become open to them if once 
they give their hearts in keeping to God and work in the right Endeavour (jihad) with all 
their mind and soul and resources. Thus will they get out of the Spider’s web of this frail 
world and attain to eternal Bliss in the fulfilment of their true destiny”. The Holy Qur’an…, 
1048.
 61. Ibid., p. 1.
 62. Ibid., p. 2.
 63. Ibid., p. 3. 
 64. Ibid., p. 4.
 65. My translation is based upon “The Electoral Program of Hizbullah: Priorities and 
Continuations”, Al-‘Ahd 863 (18 August 2000), 4.
 66. In addition to being plagued by sectarianism and confessionalism, the Lebanese system 
is characterised by nepotism and favouritism. It is based on the slogans of “I’ll scratch 
your back, if you scratch mine” and “What will I get out of it?”, etc. 
 67. This seems to refer to the demarcation of the Blue line, in which Lebanon gained back 
17,756,600 square meters of its southern land along the Israeli border, and the seven 
villages that were stripped out from Lebanon during the 1948 war with Israel. 
 68. This clause is mentioned in Preamble of Lebanon’s 1990 constitution that was the fruit of 
the Ta‘if Agreement.
 69. On August 5, 2004, a new pension-retirement plan, which would create the much-
anticipated public retirement system, was approved by the Lebanese Cabinet; however, 
its implementation still awaits the parliament’s approval. It is ironic to note that such a 
plan was proposed in 1965 by the Social Affairs Minister, but it never came into effect. 
 70. Although Hizbullah did not publish a full pledged political program, its 2005 election 
program could be outlined from the speeches and stances of its leaders, most notably 
Shaykh Na‘im Qasim. See Qasim’s interview with al-Intiqad 26 April 2005: “Our Alliances 
are Political par excellence and are Based on a Political Program”; Qasim’s speech on 29 
April 2005 commemorating the death of Prophet Muhammad; and al-Nour 5:00 GMT 
News 30 April 2005. 
 71. I was told by Hizbullah cadres that this is an edited and appended version of the 1998 
municipal election program after the recommendations of Hizbullah’s “First Municipal 
Conference” held on 16 July 2002. It is worth mentioning that these points have been 
outlined, before, during, and after the elections, but not in considerable detail, in the 
following al-Intiqad issues: 1054 (23 April 2004); 1055 (30 April 2004); 1056 (7 May 2004); 
1057 (14 May 2004); 1058 (21 May 2004); 1059 (28 May 2004); 1060 (4 June 2004).
 72. See the cover page of Mu’tamar Al-Baladiyyat Al-Awwal [The First Municipal Conference/
Convention]. Beirut: Hizbullah’s Central Press Office, 16 July 2002. 
 73. Ibid., 3.
 74. Ibid., 4.
 75. Ibid., 5-6.
 76. Ibid., 7.
 77. This is a pressing problem in Lebanon that caused most of the male population to 
emigrate. 
 78. Mu’tamar Al-Baladiyyat…, 7-8.
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 79. Ibid., 9.
 80. Ibid., 10.
 81. Ibid., 10-11.
 82. In the Pre-Ta’if Lebanese constitution, there was an article placing women, children, and 
handicapped in the same clause (al-mar’a wa al-tifl wa al-mu‘aq). Hizbullah added old age 
to this category/classification.
 83. Mu’tamar Al-Baladiyyat…, 11.
 84. Ibid., 12.
 85. Ibid., 13.
 86. It is estimated the there are 20 million Lebanese expatriates; 5 times more than the total 
population of Lebanon, which is estimated to be 4 million. See “The diaspora: Lebanon’s 
secret weapon against economic collapse ”, AFP (Agence France-Presse), 20 July 2004. 
 87. Mu’tamar Al-Baladiyyat…, 14.
 88. Ibid., 15.
 89. Ibid., 16.
 90. See http://www.nasrollah.org/english/hassan/sera/sira.htm 
 91. See Nasrallah’s speech in the 5th day of Muharram, 1425 A.H., 24 March 2004. 
 92. Al-Safir 18 May 1995.
 93. Sobelman, Rules of the Game…, 47-48.
 94. See Chapter 4.
 95. See Nasrallah’s speech in the commemoration of “Jerusalem Day” on 12 November 2004. 
http://www.nasrollah.org/audio/hassan/2004/quds12112004.html
 96. A book or an article, unless otherwise specified.
 97. The Social Science Research Council of American.
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English Summary
 The Shifts in 
Hizbullah’s Ideology
 Religious Ideology, 
Political Ideology, and 
Political Program 
The Lebanese Shi‘ite resistance movement, Hizbullah, is going 
through a remarkable political and ideological transformation. Hizbullah 
was founded in 1978 by various sectors of Lebanese Shi‘ite clergy and cad-
res, and with Iranian backing as an Islamic movement protesting against 
social and political conditions. Over the years 1984/5 to 1991, Hizbullah 
became a full-fledged social movement in the sense of having a broad over-
all organization, structure, and ideology aiming at social change and social 
justice, as it claimed. Starting in 1992, it became a mainstream political party 
working within the narrow confines of its pragmatic political program. The 
line of argument in this dissertation is that Hizbullah has been adjusting 
its identity in the three previously mentioned stages by shifting emphasis 
among its three components: (1) from propagating an exclusivist religious 
ideology; (2) to a more encompassing political ideology; and (3) to a down-
to-earth political program. 
In these three stages, however, Hizbullah’s identity as an Islamic jihadi 
(struggle) movement remained as one of its thawabit (immutable set of val-
ues), but the justifications of Islamic principles, in particular, jihad altered. 
The important shifts in Hizbullah’s ideology in the three stages tackle the 
following topics: wilayat al-faqih (guardianship of the jurisprudent or juris-
consult); oppressors and oppressed, with special focus on the US and Israel; 
jihad and martyrdom; Islamic state; Hizbullah’s relations with the Lebanese 
Christians; and Lebanonisation (integration) or infitah (“opening up”).
The dissertation’s findings suggest that the causes behind the shifts 
in Hizbullah’s ideology are due to the alterations in the local Lebanese 
domestic dimension, as well as the regional and international dimensions. 
Hizbullah’s own internal dynamic changed, Iranian politics shifted, and the 
international situation has been transformed. However, the focus has been 
primarily set on the alterations in Hizbullah’s internal dynamics. 
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Hizbullah relies on the balance between the actual and the possible, 
shifting its stance from rejectionism and opposition (religious and political 
ideology strategies) to accommodation and conformity (political program 
policies). Usually, this makes it modify its strategies from hawkish (religious 
and political ideology discourse) to dovish policies (political program dis-
course) according to changing political circumstances. Since the end of 
the Civil War in 1990, Hizbullah has been confronting major developments 
in Lebanon: prominently, the emergence of a pluralist public sphere and 
increasing openness toward other communities, political parties, and inter-
est groups in the Lebanese myriad. This resulted in a change in Hizbullah’s 
discourse and priorities. The mixed confessional space in Lebanon led Hizbul-
lah to modify its position from marginalisation, and branding the Lebanese 
state with unrighteousness and infidelity, to infitah. Through this process, 
the party became a major player in the Lebanese milieu. It continued to alter 
its stance and change its political rules from Islamisation to Lebanonisa-
tion, which implies integration in the public sphere. This was accomplished 
through active participation in the political system that involved contesta-
tion, cooptation, and empowerment. Therefore, the logic of operating within 
the bounds of the Lebanese state has prevailed over the logic of revolution. 
While keeping its doctrinal principles in sight, Hizbullah is persistent 
in honouring its overall political program. Consequently, from time to time 
and as opportunities arise, Hizbullah might put aside, temporarily, its ideo-
logical program by leading a dynamic program without specifying a rigid 
political program. Hizbullah favours the incremental model of decision-
making and employs piecemeal social engineering that requires a thorough 
discussion by the Hizbullah leadership of each issue at a time. Although it 
seems that Hizbullah does not have a ready-made formula to deal with all 
problems and possibilities that might arise, Hizbullah’s Shura (Consultative) 
Council makes readily available answers to all questions. However, since 
its enemies, especially Israel, might benefit from this information, Hizbul-
lah reserves the right of not disclosing these alternatives and contingency 
measures to the public.
As a mainstream political party, Hizbullah operates according to Real-
politik calculations of political expediency, benefit, and maslaha (interest). 
The party’s gradual involvement in “normal” Lebanese politics – by joining 
the parliament, municipal councils, and cabinet – with the limitations that 
implies, begs the question of how much it is willing to be co-opted into the 
Lebanese political system and state institutions. Hizbullah’s political victo-
ries in 2005 illustrated the patriotic-nationalistic character of a party that is 
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supported, not only by its major Shi‘ite constituency, but also by many Sun-
nis, Druze and Christians. Depending on popular support, Hizbullah aims to 
portray itself as the biggest political force in Lebanon. Although Hizbullah 
denies it, its success at balancing its nationalist political commitments, on 
the one hand, and its Islamic background, on the other, came at the price 
of compromise (even on some doctrinal issues). Through arguing for civil 
peace, social freedoms, and a functioning civil society, Hizbullah attempted 
to preserve its Islamic identity while working within the domain of the Leba-
nese state’s sovereignty and inside the confines of a non-Islamic state and 
a multi-confessional polity. On these grounds, Hizbullah conferred de facto 
recognition upon the Lebanese state, and its supporters know this. Thus, 
Hizbullah ended up as being unable to cross the boundaries of an “ordinary” 
political party. 
One should be careful not to read too much into the 2005 parliamen-
tary elections and Hizbullah’s decision to join the cabinet. It is interesting 
to note, here, that since the cabinet reflects the power balances in the par-
liament, it is obvious that any popular dismay with the parliament will be 
extended to the cabinet, and vice versa. However, Hizbullah’s electoral suc-
cess suggests that the party has been able to win the “hearts and minds” 
of many Lebanese voters, especially in its major Shi‘ite constituencies. This 
has confirmed the efficiency of its infitah policy of agreeing to participate 
in a pluralist political process, while maintaining respect its for integrity and 
probity in its socio-economic work. Through its NGOs, Hizbullah has trium-
phantly portrayed itself as a Lebanese nationalist political party working in 
favour of the “wretched of the earth,” without confessional fear or favour. 
Rafiq al-Hariri’s assassination, along with the Syrian withdrawal and its after-
math, accelerated the political changes within Hizbullah. It may be argued 
that disarming and becoming an “ordinary” political party, far from causing 
the party’s demise, would boost its domestic political power even further. 
Nevertheless, Hizbullah could not have faired so well in Lebanese domestic 
affairs without its two regional backers, Syria and Iran. Even though there 
is an ideological-strategic alliance between Hizbullah and Iran, on the one 
hand, and a political-strategic partnership between Hizbullah and Syria, on 
the other, the dissertation endeavours to demonstrate that Hizbullah is not 
a tool of policy in Syrian and Iranian hands. Rather, Hizbullah has pursued 
an independent course of decision-making and action that suits the particu-
larities and specificities of the Lebanese political equation by putting into 
practice its political program of Lebanonisation, infitah, and integration in 
the Lebanese public sphere.





 De verschuivingen in 
Hezbollah’s ideologie 
 Religieuze ideologie, 
politieke ideologie en  
politiek programma
 
De Libanese sjiïtische verzetsbeweging Hezbollah ondergaat een 
opmerkelijke politieke en ideologische transformatie. Hezbollah werd in 
1978 met Iraanse steun opgericht door verschillende sectoren van de sjiï-
tische geestelijkheid en zijn kaders, als een Islamitische beweging van pro-
test tegen maatschappelijke en politieke omstandigheden. Gedurende de 
jaren 1984/85 tot 1991 groeide Hezbollah uit tot een volledig ontwikkelde 
sociale beweging, in die zin dat het ging beschikken over een alomvattende 
organisatie, structuur en ideologie, die aanspraak maakte op doeleinden op 
het gebied van maatschappelijke verandering en sociale rechtvaardigheid. 
Vanaf 1992 werd het een prominente politieke partij die werkzaam is binnen 
de nauw omschreven grenzen van haar eigen pragmatische politieke pro-
gramma. De centrale argumentatie in deze dissertatie luidt dat Hezbollah 
haar identiteit gedurende de hierboven genoemde drie stadia heeft aan-
gepast door het accent te verschuiven tussen haar drie componenten: 1) 
van het propageren van een exclusivistische religieuze ideologie; 2) naar 
een meer omvattende politieke ideologie; en 3) naar een realistisch politiek 
programma. 
Gedurende deze drie stadia bleef Hezbollah’s identiteit als een islami-
tische jihadistische (strijd-) beweging echter een van zijn thawabit (verzame-
ling van vaste waarden), maar de rechtvaardigingen van Islamitische princi-
pes, en met name die van jihad, veranderden. De belangrijke verschuivingen 
in Hezbollah’s ideologie gedurende de drie stadia hadden betrekking op 
de volgende onderwerpen: wilayat al-faqih (voogdij van de rechtsgeleerde 
of rechtsadviseur); onderdrukkers en onderdrukten, vooral van toepassing 
op de VS en Israël; jihad en martelaarschap; islamitische staat; Hezbollah’s 
relaties met de Libanese christenen; en Libanisering (integratie) of infitah 
(“politiek van openheid”). 
 De bevindingen van deze dissertatie geven aan dat de oorzaken van 
de verschuivingen in Hezbollah’s ideologie toegeschreven moeten worden 
aan de veranderingen die plaatsvonden. Hezbollah’s eigen interne dynamiek 
veranderde, de Iraanse politiek verschoof en ook de internationale situatie 
is veranderd. De dissertatie richt zich echter allereerst op de veranderingen 
binnen Hezbollah’s interne dynamiek. 
Hezbollah borduurt voort op het evenwicht tussen het feitelijke en 
het mogelijke en het schuift zijn standpunt van afwijzing en oppositie (stra-
tegieën van religieuze en politieke ideologie) op in de richting van aanpas-
sing en conformiteit (politiek van het politieke programma). Doorgaans 
brengt dit de beweging ertoe om zijn haviken-beleid (discours van religi-
euze en politieke ideologie) bij te stellen in de richting van duiven-beleid 
(discours van het politieke programma) in overeenstemming met verande-
rende politieke omstandigheden. Sinds het einde van de burgeroorlog in 
1990 ging Hezbollah de confrontatie aan met belangrijke ontwikkelingen 
in Libanon. De meest prominente daarvan zijn het tot stand komen van een 
pluralistische openbare sfeer en een toenemende openheid ten aanzien van 
andere (confessionele) gemeenschappen, politieke partijen en belangen-
groepen in de Libanese myriade. Dit bracht een verandering in Hezbollah’s 
discours en prioriteiten met zich mee. De gemengde confessionele ruimte 
in Libanon leidde ertoe dat Hezbollah zijn standpunt, dat eerst gekenmerkt 
werd door zelf-isolatie en het brandmerken van de Libanese staat als zijnde 
onrechtvaardig en ongelovig, aanpaste in de richting van infitah. Door dit 
proces werd de partij een belangrijke speler in het Libanese milieu. Het bleef 
haar standpunt en haar politieke regels omtrent Islamisering wijzigen in de 
richting van Libanisering, hetgeen integratie in de openbare sfeer met zich 
meebrengt. Dit was het resultaat van actieve deelname aan het politieke 
systeem dat (legale politieke) strijd, inkapseling en empowerment met zich 
meebracht. Aldus heeft de logica van het opereren binnen de grenzen van 
de Libanese staat het gewonnen van de logica van de revolutie.
Terwijl Hezbollah haar doctrinaire principes in het oog blijft hou-
den, volhardt de beweging in het honoreren van haar politieke programma 
als geheel. Bijgevolg kan Hezbollah op tijdelijke basis en al naar gelang 
de mogelijkheden die zich voordoen haar ideologische programma opzij 
schuiven door een dynamisch programma naar voren te halen, zonder een 
rigide politiek programma te specificeren. Hezbollah geeft de voorkeur aan 
een periodiek model van besluitvorming en past een stapsgewijze vorm van 
maatschappijhervorming toe die een grondige bespreking van elke kwestie 
door de leiding van Hezbollah vereist op het geëigende moment. Ook al 
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schijnt Hezbollah geen pasklare formule te hebben om met alle problemen 
en mogelijkheden die zich kunnen voordoen om te gaan, Hezbollah’s Shura 
(consultatieve) Raad stelt haar antwoorden op alle vraagstukken beschik-
baar. Aangezien echter haar vijanden, en vooral Israël, hun voordeel kunnen 
doen met deze informatie, behoudt Hezbollah zich het recht voor om deze 
alternatieven en noodmaatregelen niet openbaar te maken.
Als prominente politieke partij opereert Hezbollah in overeenstem-
ming met overwegingen van Realpolitik, politieke opportuniteit, politiek 
voordeel en maslaha (belang). De geleidelijk toenemende betrokkenheid 
van de partij bij het “normale” Libanese politieke leven – door in het par-
lement, de gemeenteraden en het kabinet zitting te nemen – met alle 
beperkingen die dat met zich meebrengt, roept de vraag op in hoeverre het 
bereid is om zich in te laten kapselen in het Libanese politieke systeem en de 
staatsinstellingen. Hezbollah’s politieke overwinningen bij de verkiezingen 
in 2005 illustreren het patriotisch-nationalistische karakter van een partij 
die niet alleen door haar hoofdzakelijk sjiïtische achterban gesteund wordt, 
maar ook door vele Soennieten, Druzen en Christenen. Al naar gelang de 
steun die het geniet onder de bevolking probeert Hezbollah zich te pre-
senteren als de grootste politieke kracht in Libanon. Ook al wordt het door 
Hezbollah ontkend, haar succes in het balanceren van haar nationalistische 
politieke engagement met haar Islamitische achtergrond bracht een prijs 
met zich mee in de vorm van compromissen (zelfs ten aanzien van enkele 
doctrinaire kwesties). Hezbollah probeerde in het kader van haar activitei-
ten binnen het domein van de Libanese staatssoevereiniteit en binnen de 
grenzen van een niet-Islamitische staat en een multi-confessioneel staats-
bestel haar Islamitische identiteit te handhaven door zich ten gunste van 
civiele vrede, sociale vrijheden en een functionerende civiele maatschappij 
uit te spreken. Daarmee heeft Hezbollah de Libanese staat feitelijk erkend, 
en haar aanhangers weten dat. Aldus bleek Hezbollah er uiteindelijk niet toe 
in staat om de status van een “gewone” politieke partij te overstijgen.
Men moet ook weer niet te veel opmaken uit de deelname aan de 
verkiezingen in 2005 en aan Hezbollah’s beslissing om tot het kabinet toe te 
treden. Het is in dit verband interessant om op te merken dat aangezien het 
kabinet een afspiegeling is van de machtsverhoudingen in het parlement, 
het duidelijk is dat elke onvrede onder de bevolking ten aanzien van het 
parlement ook het kabinet zal treffen, en omgekeerd. Hezbollah’s electorale 
successen geven echter aan dat de partij erin geslaagd is om de “harten en 
de geesten” van vele Libanese kiezers te winnen, vooral onder haar belang-
rijkste sjiïtische achterbannen. Dit heeft de doeltreffendheid van haar inti-
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fah-beleid van instemming met deelname aan een pluralistisch politiek 
proces bevestigd, terwijl de beweging het respect voor de integriteit en de 
rechtschapenheid van haar eigen sociaal-economische activiteiten hand-
haafde. Door middel van haar NGO’s heeft Hezbollah zichzelf op triomfalis-
tische wijze afgeschilderd als een Libanese nationalistische politieke partij 
die ten gunste van de “verworpenen der aarde” werkzaam is, zonder confes-
sionele angst of bevoordeling. De aanslag op Rafiq Hariri heeft samen met 
de Syrische terugtrekking en zijn nasleep de politieke veranderingen bin-
nen Hezbollah versneld. Men zou kunnen stellen dat, verre van het teweeg-
brengen van het verdwijnen van de partij, Hezbollah’s proces van ontwape-
ning en ontwikkeling tot een “gewone” politieke partij haar politieke macht 
alleen maar heeft versterkt. Toch zou Hezbollah het niet zo goed hebben 
gedaan in Libanese binnenlandse aangelegenheden zonder de steun van 
twee mogendheden in de regio, Syrië en Iran. Ook al bestaat er – enerzijds 
– een ideologisch-strategisch bondgenootschap tussen Hezbollah en Iran 
en – anderzijds – een politiek-strategisch partnerschap tussen Hezbollah en 
Syrië, deze dissertatie probeert aan te tonen dat Hezbollah niet een poli-
tiek instrument in Syrische of in Iraanse handen is. Hezbollah heeft veeleer 
een onafhankelijke koers van besluitvorming en handelen gevolgd die in 
overeenstemming is met de eigenaardigheden en de specifieke kenmerken 
van het Libanese politieke leven door haar politiek programma van Libani-
sering, intifah en integratie in de Libanese openbare sfeer in de praktijk te 
brengen.
‘ T H E  S H I F T S  I N  H I Z B U L L A H ' S  I D E O L O G Y ’
